It was late in the day when the battles ended. One army was wearied with fighting and victory; the other equally oppressed by labor and defeat. The conquered Mexicans fled to their eastern defences or took refuge within the gates of their city. There was, for the moment, utter disorganization among the discomfited, while the jaded band of a few thousand invaders had to be rallied and reformed in their ranks and regiments after the desperate conflicts of the day over so wide a field. It surely was not a proper moment for an unconcentrated army, almost cut off from support, three hundred miles in the interior of an enemy's country, and altogether ignorant of the localities of a great capital containing nearly two hundred thousand inhabitants, to rush madly, at night fall, into the midst of that city. Mexico, too, was not an ordinary town with wide thoroughfares and houses like those in which the invaders had been accustomed to dwell. Spanish houses are almost castles in architectural strength and plan, while from their level and embattled roofs, a mob, when aroused by the spirit of revenge or despair, may do the service of a disciplined army. Nor was it known whether the metropolis had been defended by works along its streets,—by barricades, impediments and batteries,—among which the entangled assailants might be butchered with impunity in the narrow passages during the darkness and before they could concentrate upon any central or commanding spot. Repose and daylight were required before a prudent General would venture to risk the lives of his men and the success of his whole mission upon such a die.

Accordingly the army was halted; the dispersed recalled, the wounded succored, the dead prepared for burial, and the tired troops ordered to bivouack on the ground they had wrested from the enemy.

Meanwhile the greatest consternation prevailed within the city. When Santa Anna reached the Palace, he hastily assembled the Ministers of State and other eminent citizens, and, after reviewing the disasters of the day and their causes, he proclaimed the indispensable necessity of recurring to a truce in order to take a long respite. There was a difference of opinion upon this subject; but it was finally agreed that a suspension of arms should be negotiated through the Spanish Minister and the British Consul General. SeÑor Pacheco, the Minister of Foreign Relations, accordingly addressed Messrs. Mackintosh and Bermudez de Castro, entreating them to effect this desired result. During the night the British Consul General visited the American camp, and was naturally anxious to spare the effusion of blood and the assault by an army on a city in which his country had so deep an interest. On the morning of the 21st, when General Scott was about to take up battering or assaulting positions, to authorize him to summon the capital to surrender or to sign an armistice with a pledge to enter at once into negotiations for peace, he was met by General Mora y Villamil and SeÑor Arrangoiz, with proposals for an armistice in order to bury the dead, but without reference to a treaty. Scott had already determined to offer the alternative of assault or armistice and treaty to the Mexican government, and this resolution had been long cherished by him. Accordingly he at once rejected the Mexican proposal, and, without summoning the city to surrender, despatched a note to Santa Anna, expressing his willingness to sign, on reasonable terms, a short armistice, in order that the American Commissioner and the Mexican Government, might amicably and honorably settle the international differences, and thus close an unnatural war in which too much blood had already been shed. This frank proposal, coming generously from the victorious chief, was promptly accepted. Commissioners were appointed by the commanders of the two armies on the 22d; the armistice was signed on the 23d, and ratifications exchanged on the 24th; and thus, the dispute was for a while transferred once more from the camp to the council chamber. On the morning of the 21st, the American army was posted in the different villages in the vicinity. Worth's division occupied Tacubaya. Pillow's Mixcoac, Twiggs's San Angel, while Quitman's remained still at San Agustin, where it had served during the battles of the 19th and 20th in protecting the rear and the trains of the army. Tacubaya became the residence of General Scott, and the headquarters of the commander-in-chief were established in the Bishop's Palace. There are critics and politicians who are never satisfied with results, and, whilst their prophecies are usually dated after the events which they claim to have foreseen, they unfortunately find too much favor with the mass of readers who are not in the habit of ascertaining precisely what was known and what was not known at the period of the occurrences which they seek to condemn. General Scott has fallen under the heavy censure of these writers for offering the armistice and avoiding the immediate capture of the capital, the practicability of which they now consider as demonstrated. We propose to examine this question, but we believe that the practicability or impracticability of that event does not become one of the primary or even early elements of the discussion.

If we understand the spirit of this age correctly, we must believe that mankind, purified by the progressive blessings of Christianity and modern civilization, desires the mitigation rather than the increase of the evils of war. It does not seek merely to avert danger or disaster from the forces of one party in the strife, but strives to produce peace with as little harm as possible to all who are engaged in warfare. It is not the mission of a soldier to kill, because his profession is that of arms. It is ever the imperative duty of a commander to stop the flow of human blood as soon as he perceives the slightest chance of peace; and if his honorable efforts fail entirely, through the folly or obstinacy of the foe, he will be more fully justified in the subsequent and stringent measures of coercion.

The Mexican masses, mistaking vanity for true national pride, had hitherto persevered in resisting every effort to settle the international difficulties. Diplomacy, with such a nation, is extremely delicate. If we exhibited symptoms of leniency, she became presumptuous;—if we pushed hostilities to the extreme, she grew doggedly obstinate. On the 21st of August her capital was in Scott's power. His victorious army was at her gates. Two terrible battles had been fought, and the combatants on both sides had shown courage, skill and endurance. The Mexican army was routed, but not entirely dispersed or destroyed. At this moment it doubtless occurred to General Scott, and to all who were calm spectators of the scene, that before the last and fatal move was made, it was his duty to allow Mexico to save her point of honor by negotiating, ere the city was entered, and while she could yet proclaim to her citizens and the world, that her capital had never been seized by the enemy. This assuaged national vanity, and preserved the last vantage ground upon which the nation might stand with pride if not with perfect confidence. It still left something to the conquered people which was not necessary or valuable to us.

There are other matters, unquestionably, that weighed much in the very responsible deliberations of General Scott. If our army entered the city triumphantly, or took it by assault, the frail elements of government still lingering at that period of disorganization, would either fly or be utterly destroyed. All who were in power, in that nation of jealous politicians and wily intriguers would be eager to shun the last responsibility. If Santa Anna should be utterly beaten, the disgrace would blot out the last traces of his remaining prestige. If so fatal a disaster occurred, as subsequent events proved, the Americans would be most unfortunately situated in relation to peace, for there would be no government to negotiate with! Santa Anna's government was the only constitutional one that had existed in Mexico for a long period, and with such a legalized national authority peace must be concluded. It was not our duty to destroy a government and then gather the fragments to reconstruct another with which we might treat. If a revolutionary, or provisional authority existed, what prospect had we of enduring pacification? What guaranty did we hold in a treaty celebrated with a military despot, a temporary chief, or a sudden usurper, that such a treaty could be maintained before the nation? What constitutional or legal right would an American general or commissioner have, to enter into such a compact? Was it not, therefore, Scott's duty to act with such tender caution as not to endanger the fate of the only man who might still keep himself at the head of his rallied people?

Besides these political considerations, there are others, of a military character, that will commend themselves to the prudent and the just. The unacclimated American army had marched from Puebla to the valley of Mexico during the rainy season, in a tropical zone, when the earth is saturated with water, and no one travels who can avoid exposure. Our men were forced to undergo the hardships of such a campaign, to make roads, to travel over broken ground, to wade marshes, to bivouack on the damp soil with scarce a shelter from the storm, to march day and night, and finally, without an interval of repose, to fight two of the sharpest actions of the war. The seven or eight thousand survivors of these actions,—many of whom were new levies—demanded care and zealous husbanding for future events. They were distant from the coast and cut off from support or immediate succor. The enemy's present or prospective weakness was not to be relied on. Wisdom required that what was in the rear should be thought of as well as what was in advance. May it not then be justly said that it was a proper moment for a heroic general to pause in front of a national capital containing two hundred thousand people, and to allow the civil arm to assume, for a moment of trial, the place of the military? Like a truly brave man, he despised the eclat of entering the capital as CortÉz had done on nearly the same day of the same month, three hundred and twenty-six years before. Like a wise man, he considered the history and condition of the enemy, instead of his personal glory, and laid aside the false ambition of a soldier, to exhibit the forbearance of a christian statesman. [73]

*****

The American Commissioner unquestionably entered upon the negotiations in good faith, and it is probable that Santa Anna was personally quite as well disposed for peace. He, however, had a delicate game to play with the politicians of his own country, and was obliged to study carefully the posture of parties as well as the momentary strength of his friends and enemies. Well acquainted as he was with the value of men and the intrigues of the time, he would have been mad not to guard against the risk of ruin, and, accordingly, his first efforts were directed rather towards obtaining the ultimatum of the United States, than to pledging his own government in any project which might prove either presently unpopular or destroy his future influence. The instructions, therefore, that were given to General JosÉ J. de Herrera, Bernardo Couto, Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Miguel Atristain, the Mexican commissioners, were couched in such extreme terms, that much could be yielded before there was a likelihood of approaching the American demands. In the meanwhile, as negotiations progressed, Mexico obtained time to rally her soldiers, to appease those who were discontented with the proposed peace, and to abjure the project if it should be found either inadmissible or impossible of accomplishment without loss of popularity.

For several days consultations took place between Mr. Trist and the commissioners, but it was soon found that the American pretensions in regard to the position of Texas, the boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession of New Mexico and Upper California, were of such a character that the Mexicans would not yield to them at the present moment. The popular feeling, stimulated by the rivals of Santa Anna, his enemies, and the demagogues, was entirely opposed to the surrender of territory. Sensible as the President was, that the true national interests demanded instantaneous peace, he was dissuaded by his confidential advisers from presenting a counter projÉt, which would have resulted in a treaty. Congress, moreover, had virtually dissolved by the precipitate departure of most of its members after the battles of the 20th.

All the party leaders labored diligently at this crisis, but none of them with cordiality for Santa Anna, in whose negotiations of a successful peace with the United States, they either foresaw or feared the permanent consolidation of his power. The puros, or democrats, still clung to their admiration of the constitution of our Union; to their opposition to the standing army; to their desire for modifying the power and position of the church and its ministers, and to their united hostility against the President. They were loud in their exhortations to continue the war, while Olaguibel, one of their ablest men and most devoted lovers of American institutions, issued a strong manifesto against the projected treaty. This was the party which, it is asserted, in fact desired the prolongation of the war until the destroyed nationality of Mexico took refuge from domestic intrigues, misgovernment and anarchy, in annexation to the United States.

The monarquistas, who still adhered to the church and the army, proclaimed their belief in the total failure of the republican system. Revolutions and incessant turmoils, according to their opinions, could only be suppressed by the strong arm of power, and in their ranks had again appeared General Mariano Paredes y Arrellaga, who, returning from exile, landed in disguise at Vera Cruz, and passing secretly through the American lines, proceeded to Mexico to continue his machinations against Santa Anna, whom he cordially hated.

The moderados formed a middle party equally opposed to the ultraisms of monarchy and democracy. They counted among their number, many of the purest and wisest men in the republic, and although they were not as inimical to the United States as the monarquistas, or as many of the puros pretended to be, yet they cordially desired or hoped to preserve the nationality and progressive republicanism of Mexico. In this junto Santa Anna found a few partizans who adhered to him more from policy than principle, for all classes had learned to distrust a person who played so many parts in the national drama of intrigue, war, and government. As a party, they were doubtless unwilling to risk their strength and prospects upon a peace which might be made under his auspices.

In this crisis the President had no elements of strength still firmly attached to him but the army, whose favor, amid all his reverses, he generally contrived to retain or to win. But that army was now much disorganized, and the national finances were so low that he was scarcely able to maintain it from day to day. The mob, composed of the lower classes, and the beastly leperos, knowing nothing of the principles of the war, and heedless of its consequences,—plied moreover by the demagogues of all the parties,—shouted loudly for its continuance, and thus the president was finally forced to yield to the external pressure, and to be governed by an impulse which he was either too timid or too weak to control.

The armistice provided that the Americans should receive supplies from the city, and that no additional fortifications should be undertaken during its continuance; nevertheless the American trains were assailed by the populace of the city, and, it is alleged, that Santa Anna disregarded the provision forbidding fortifications. When it became evident to the American commissioner and General Scott, that the Mexicans were merely trifling and temporizing,—that the prolongation of the armistice would be advantageous to the enemy, without affording any correspondent benefits to us,—and when their supplies had been increased so as to afford ample support for the army during the anticipated attack on the city,—it was promptly resolved to renew the appeal to arms. Accordingly, on the 6th of September, General Scott addressed Santa Anna, calling his attention to the infractions of the compact, and declaring that unless satisfaction was made for the breaches of faith before noon of the following day, he would consider the armistice terminated from that hour. Santa Anna returned an answer of false recriminations, and threw off the mask. He asserted his willingness to rely on arms;—he issued a bombastic appeal to the people, in which he announced that the demands of the Americans would have converted the nation into a colony of our Union. He improved upon the pretended patriotic zeal of all the parties—puros, moderados, monarquistas and mob—who had proclaimed themselves in favor of the war. Instead of opposing or arguing the question, he caught the war strain of the hour, and sent it forth to the multitude in trumpet tones. He was determined not to be hedged or entrapped by those who intrigued to destroy him, and resolved that if he must fall, his opponents should share the political disaster. Nor was he alone in his electioneering gasconade, for General Herrera—a man who had been notoriously the advocate of peace, both before and since the rupture,—addressed the clergy and the people, craving their aid by prayer, money, fire and sword, to exterminate the invaders! All classes were, thus, placed in a false and uncandid position.

This is a sad picture of political hypocrisy based upon the misnamed popular will of a country which had for twenty years been demoralized by the very chieftain who was about to reap the direful harvest he had sown in the hearts of his people. Every man, every party, acknowledged, privately, the impolicy of continued hostilities, yet all men and all parties were resolved that Santa Anna should not make the peace whilst an American army remained in the country to sustain it, or an American government dispensed millions to pay for the ceded territory. Distrusting his honesty and patriotism, they believed that the money would only be squandered among his parasites, or used for the prolonged corruption and disorganization of their country. With gold and an army they believed him omnipotent; but, stripped of these elements of power in Mexico, the great magician dwindled into a haggard and harmless witch.

Combinations arose readily and bravely against the man whose sway was irresistible as long as he dealt with his countrymen alone or preserved a loyal army and dependant church, whose strength and wealth were mutual supports. The sky was dark and lowering around him, and he must have acknowledged secretly, that the political parties of his country, if not his countrymen universally, were more anxious to destroy him than the Americans. The army of the invaders, they hoped, might perform a task in this drama, which the Mexicans themselves could not achieve; and there are multitudes who would have been glad to see its end become tragic by the death of one whom they feared in prosperity, and despised in adversity.

[73] It will be remembered that even CortÉz had paused in the precincts of the ancient capital of the Aztecs, in order to give them a chance of escape before striking the fatal blow. See Prescott, vol. 3, p. 199. It is a little remarkable also, that the dates of Scott's and CortÉz's victories coincide so closely. CortÉz's victory was on the 13th of August, 1521, Scott's on the 20th of August, 1847. The date of CortÉz's achievement is given according to the Old Style, but if we add ten days to bring it up to New Style, it will be corrected to the 23d of August!