CHAPTER VIII. 1846

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GENERAL TAYLOR ORDERED TO THE RIO GRANDE.—HISTORY OF TEXAN BOUNDARIES.—ORIGIN OF THE WAR.—MILITARY PREPARATIONS—COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.—BATTLES OF PALO ALTO AND RESACA.—MATAMOROS—TAYLOR'S ADVANCE.—FALL OF MONTEREY.

Whilst Slidell was negotiating, and, in consequence of the anticipated failure of his effort to be received,—as was clearly indicated by the conduct of the Mexican government upon his arrival in the capital,—General Taylor, who had been stationed at Corpus Christi, in Texas, since the fall of 1845, with a body of regular troops, was directed, on the 13th of January, 1846, to move his men to the mouth of the Rio Grande. He, accordingly left his encampment on the 8th of March, and, on the 25th, reached Point Isabel, having encountered no serious opposition on the way. The march to the Rio Grande has been made the subject of complaint by politicians in Mexico and the United States, who believed that the territory lying between that river and the Nueces, was not the property of Texas. But inasmuch as Mexico still continued vehemently to assert her political right over the whole of Texas, the occupation of any part of its soil, south of the Sabine, by American troops, was in that aspect of the case, quite as much an infringement of Mexican sovereignty, as the march of our troops, from the Nueces to the Rio Grande.

As it is important that the reader should understand the original title to Louisiana, under which the boundary of the Rio Grande, was claimed, first of all for that state, and, subsequently, for Texas, we shall relate its history in a summary manner.

Louisiana had been the property of France, and by a secret contract between that country and Spain in 1762, as well as by treaties between France, Spain, and England, in the following year, the French dominion was extinguished on the continent of America. In consequence of the treaty between this country and England in 1783, the Mississippi became the western boundary of the United States, from its source to the thirty-first degree of north latitude, and thence, on the same parallel, to the St. Mary's. France, it will be remembered, had always claimed dominion in Louisiana to the Rio Bravo del Norte, or Rio Grande; by virtue:—

1st. Of the discovery of the Mississippi from near its source to the ocean.

2d. Of the possession taken, and establishment made by La Salle, at the bay of Saint Bernard, west of the river Trinity and Colorado, by authority of Louis XIV. in 1635—notwithstanding the subsequent destruction of the colony.

3d. Of the charter of Louis XIV. to Crozat in 1712.

4th. Of the historical authority of Du Pratz, Champigny and the Count de Vergennes.

5th. Of the authority of De Lisle's map, and of the map published in 1762, by Don Thomas Lopez, Geographer to the king of Spain, as well as of various other maps, atlases, and geographical authorities.

By an article of the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in October, 1800, Spain retroceded Louisiana to France, but this treaty was not promulgated until the beginning of 1802. The paragraph of cession is as follows: "His Catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the French republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations above recited, relative to his royal highness the Duke of Parma, the colony and province of Louisiana, with the same extent that it already has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and, such as it should be, after the treaties passed subsequently between Spain and other powers." In 1803, Bonaparte, the first consul of the French republic, ceded Louisiana to the United States, as fully, and in the same manner, as it had been retroceded to France by Spain, under the treaty of San Ildefonso; and, by virtue of this grant, Messrs. Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay, Van Buren, Jackson, and Polk, contended that the original limit of the new state had been the Rio Grande. However, by the third article of our treaty with Spain, in 1819, all our pretensions to extend the territory of Louisiana towards Mexico on the Rio Grande, were abandoned by adopting the river Sabine as our boundary in that quarter.

The Mexican authorities upon this subject are either silent or doubtful. No light is to be gathered from the geographical researches of Humboldt, whose elucidations of New Spain are in many respects the fullest and most satisfactory. In the year 1835, Stephen Austin published a map of Texas, representing the Nueces as the western confine,—and in 1836, General Almonte the former minister from Mexico to the United States, published a memoir upon Texas in which, whilst describing the Texan department of Bejar, he says—"That notwithstanding it has been hitherto believed that the Rio de las Nueces is the dividing line of Coahuila and Texas, inasmuch as it is always thus represented on maps, I am informed by the government of the state, that geographers have been in error upon this subject; and that the true line should commence at the mouth of the river Aransaso, and follow it to its source; thence, it should continue by a straight line until it strikes the junction of the rivers Medina and San Antonio, and then, pursuing the east bank of the Medina to its head waters, it should terminate on the confines of Chihuahua." [67]

The true origin of the Mexican war was not this march of Taylor and his troops from the Nueces to the Rio Grande, through the debatable land. The American and Mexican troops were brought face to face by the act, and hostilities were the natural result after the exciting annoyances upon the part of the Mexican government which followed the union of Texas with our confederacy. Besides this, General Paredes, the usurping president, had already declared in Mexico, on the 18th of April, 1846, in a letter addressed to the commanding officer on the northern frontier, that he supposed him at the head of a valiant army on the theatre of action;—and that it was indispensable to commence hostilities, the Mexicans themselves taking the initiative!

We believe that our nation and its rulers earnestly desired honorable peace, though they did not shun the alternative of war. It was impossible to permit a conterminous neighbor who owed us large sums of money, and was hostile to the newly adopted state, to select unopposed her mode and moment of attack. Mexico would neither resign her pretensions upon Texas, negotiate, receive our minister, nor remain at peace. She would neither declare war, nor cultivate friendship, and the result was, that when the armies approached each other, but little time was lost in resorting to the cannon and the sword.

As soon as General Taylor reached the Rio Grande he left a command at the mouth of the river, and taking post opposite Matamoros erected a fort, the guns of which bore directly upon the city. The Mexicans, whose artillery might have been brought to play upon the works, from the opposite side of the river, made no hostile demonstration against the left bank for some time, nor did they interrupt the construction of the fort. Reinforcements, however, were constantly arriving in the city. Ampudia and Arista were there. Interviews were held between the Mexican authorities and our officers, in which the latter were ordered to retire from the soil it was alleged they were usurping. But as this was a diplomatic, and not a military question, General Taylor resolved to continue in position, though his forces were perhaps inadequate to contend with the augmenting numbers of the foe. He examined the country thoroughly by his scouting parties and pushed his reconnoissances, on the left bank, from Point Isabel to some distance beyond his encampment opposite Matamoros. Whilst engaged in this service, some of his officers and men were captured or killed by the ranchero cavalry of the enemy; and, on the 24th of April, Captain Thornton who had been sent to observe the country above the encampment with sixty-three dragoons, fell into an ambuscade, out of which they endeavored to cut their way, but were forced to surrender with a loss of sixteen killed and wounded. This was the first blood spilled in actual conflict.

Life near the river

MATAMOROS.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the news of Taylor's supposed danger, greatly exaggerated by rumor, was spread far and wide. An actual war had, perhaps, not been seriously apprehended. Taylor had been expressly commanded to refrain from aggression. It was supposed that the mere presence of our troops on the frontier would preserve Texas from invasion, and that negotiations would ultimately terminate the dispute. This is the only ground upon which we can reasonably account for the apparent carelessness of our government in not placing a force upon the Rio Grande, adequate to encounter all the opposing array. Congress was in session when the news reached Washington. The president immediately announced the fact, and, on the 13th of May, 1846, ten millions of dollars were appropriated to carry on the war, and fifty thousand volunteers were ordered to be raised. An "Army of the West" was directed to be formed under the command of Kearney, at fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri, which was to cross the country to the Pacific, after capturing New Mexico. An "Army of the Centre," under General Wool, was to assemble at San Antonio de Bejar whence it was to march upon Coahuila and Chihuahua, and, whilst the heart and the west of Mexico were penetrated by these officers, it was designed that Taylor should make war on the northern and eastern states of the Mexican republic. In addition to these orders to the army, the naval forces, under Commodores Stockton and Sloat in the Pacific, and Commodore Conner, in the Gulf of Mexico, were commanded to co-operate with our land forces, to harass the enemy, and to aid, with all their power, in the subjugation and capture of Mexican property and territory.

Immediately after Thornton's surrender, General Taylor, availing himself of authority with which he had been invested to call upon the governors of Louisiana and Texas for military aid, demanded four regiments of volunteers from each state, for the country in the neighborhood of the Rio Grande was alive with belligerant Mexicans. He then visited the fortifications opposite Matamoros, and finding the garrison but scantly supplied with provisions, hastened back to Point Isabel with a formidable escort, and obtaining the requisite rations, commenced his march back to Matamoros and the fort on the 7th of May. But, in the interval, General Arista, had crossed the Rio Grande with his forces, and on the 8th, our General encountered him, drawn up in battle array at Palo Alto and ready to dispute his passage along the road. A sharp engagement ensued between the two armies from two o'clock in the afternoon until nearly dark, when the Mexicans withdrew from the action for the night. Our total force in this affair, according to official reports, was two thousand two hundred and eighty-eight, while that of Mexico, according to the admission of the officers, amounted to six thousand regulars with a large and probably undisciplined force drawn, at random, from the country.

The night of the 8th was passed with some anxiety in the American camp, for the fierce conflict of the day induced many prudent officers to believe it best either to return to Point Isabel or await reinforcements before again giving battle to the enemy. General Taylor heard and weighed the opinions of his most reliable officers, but, after due reflection, determined to advance. The condition of the fort opposite Matamoros demanded his urgent aid. The moral effect of a retreat would be great, at the commencement of a war, both on Mexico and our own troops; and, moreover, he had perfect confidence in the disciplined regulars who sustained so nobly the brunt of the first battle.

Accordingly the troops were advanced early on the 9th, for they found, at day dawn, that the Mexicans had abandoned Palo Alto for a stronger position nearer the centre of action and interest at Matamoros. After advancing cautiously, in readiness for immediate battle, our men came up with the Mexicans, in the Resaca de la Palma, or as it is properly called La Resaca del Guerrero,—the "Ravine of the Warrior," which afforded them a natural defence against our approach along the road. The ravine, curved across the highway and was flanked by masses of prickly plants aloes, and undergrowth, matted into impenetrable thickets, known in Mexico as chapparal. The action was begun by the infantry in skirmishes with the foe, and after the centre of the position on the road had been severely harassed and damaged by our flying artillery, a gallant charge of the dragoons broke the Mexican lines and opened a pathway to Matamoros. The engagement lasted a short time after this combined movement of artillery and cavalry, but, before night fall the enemy was in full flight to the river and our garrison at the fort joyously relieved. In the interval, this position had been bombarded and cannonaded by the Mexicans from the opposite side of the river, and its commanding officer slain. In memory of his valiant defence, the place has been honored with the name of Fort Brown.

After General Taylor had occupied Matamoros on the 18th of May,—and he was only prevented from capturing it and all the Mexican forces and ammunition on the night of the 9th by the want of a ponton train, which he had vainly demanded,—he established his base line for future operations in the interior, along the Rio Grande, extending several hundred miles near that stream. His task of organizing, accepting, or rejecting the multitudes of recruits who flocked to his standard, was not only oppressive but difficult, for he found it hard to disappoint the patriotic fervor of hundreds who were anxious to engage in the war. The Quatermaster's department, too, was one of incessant toil and anxiety; because, called unexpectedly and for the first time into active service in the field, it was comparatively unprepared to answer the multitude of requisitions that were daily made upon it by the government, the general officers, and the recruits. The whole material of a campaign was to be rapidly created. Money was to be raised; steamers bought; ships chartered; wagons built and transported; levies brought to the field of action; munitions of war and provisions distributed over the whole vast territory which it was designed to occupy! Whilst these things were going on, the country, at home, was ripe, and most eager for action.

Nor was our government inattentive to the internal politics of Mexico. It perceived at once that there was no hope of effecting a peace with the administration of Paredes, whose bitter hostility was of course, not mitigated by the first successes of our arms. Santa Anna, it will be recollected had left Mexico after the amnesty in 1845, and it was known there was open hostility between him and Paredes who had contributed so greatly to his downfall. Information was, moreover, received from reliable sources in Washington, that a desire prevailed in the republic to recall the banished chief and to seat him once more in the presidential chair; and, at the same time, there was cause to believe that if he again obtained supreme power he would not be averse to accommodate matters upon a satisfactory basis between the countries. Orders were, accordingly issued to Commodore Conner, who commanded the home squadron in the gulf, to offer no impediment if Santa Anna approached the coast with a design of entering Mexico. The exiled president was duly apprised of these facts, and when the revolution actually occurred in his favor in the following summer and his rival fell from power, he availed himself of the order to pass the lines of the blockading squadron at Vera Cruz.

After General Taylor had completely made his preparations to advance into the interior along his base on the Rio Grande, he moved forward gradually, capturing and garrisoning all the important posts along the river. At length the main body of the army, under Worth and Taylor reached the neighborhood of Monterey, the capital of the state of New Leon, situated at the foot of the Sierra Madre on a plain, but in a position which would enable it to make a stout resistance, especially as it was understood that the Mexican army had gathered itself up in this stronghold, which was the key of the northern provinces and on the main highway to the interior, in order to strike a death blow at the invaders. On the 5th of September, the divisions concentrated at Marin, and on the 9th they advanced to the Walnut Springs, which afterwards became, for so long a period, the headquarters of the gallant "Army of Occupation."

Reconnoissances of the adjacent country were immediately made and it was resolved to attack the city by a bold movement towards its southern side that would cut off its communications through the gap in the mountains by which the road led to Saltillo. Accordingly General Worth was detached on this difficult but honorable service with a strong and reliable corps, and, after excessive toil, hard fighting and wonderful endurance upon the part of our men, the desired object was successfully gained. An unfinished and fortified edifice called the Bishop's Palace, on the summit of a steep hill was stormed and taken, and thus an important vantage ground, commanding the city by a plunging shot, was secured.

Meanwhile, General Taylor seeking to withdraw or distract the enemy from his designs on the southern and western sides of the city, made a movement under General Butler, of Kentucky, upon its northern front. What was probably designed only as a feint soon became a severe and deadly conflict. Our men,—especially the volunteers,—eager to flesh their swords in the first conflict with which the war indulged them, rushed into the city, which seems to have been amply prepared, in that quarter, with barricades, forts, loop-holes, and every means of defence suitable for the narrow streets and flat roofed and parapeted houses of a Spanish town. After the first deadly onset there was, of course, no intention or desire to abandon the conflict, fatal as its prosecution might ultimately become. On they fought from street to street, and house to house, and yard to yard, until night closed over the dying and the dead. On the second day a different system of approach was adopted. Instead of risking life in the street which was raked from end to end by artillery, or rendered untenable by the hidden marksmen who shot our men from behind the walls of the house tops, our forces were thrown into the dwellings, and breaking onward through walls and enclosures, gradually mined their way towards the plaza or great square of Monterey.

Thus, both divisions under the eyes of Worth, Butler and Taylor, successfully performed their assigned tasks, until it became evident to the Mexicans that their town must fall, and, that if finally taken by the sword, it would be given up to utter destruction and pillage. A capitulation was therefore proposed by Ampudia who stipulated for the withdrawal of his forces and an armistice. Our force was in no condition to seize, hold, and support a large body of prisoners of war, nor was it prepared immediately to follow up the victory by penetrating the interior. General Taylor, who was resolved not to shed a single drop of needless blood in the campaign, granted the terms; and, thus, this strong position, garrisoned by nearly ten thousand troops, sustained by more than forty pieces of artillery, yielded to our army of seven thousand, unsupported by a battering train and winning the day by hard fighting alone. The attack began on the 21st of September, continued during the two following days, and the garrison capitulated on the 24th. This capitulation and armistice were assented to by our commander after mature consultation and approval of his principal officers. The Mexicans informed him, that Paredes had been deposed,—that Santa Anna was in power, and that peace would soon be made; but the authorities, at home, eager for fresh victories, or pandering to public and political taste, did not approve and confirm an act, for which General Taylor has, nevertheless received, as he truly merits, the just applause of impartial history.


Footnote

[67] Memorias para la historia de la Guerra de Tejas, vol. ii, p. 543.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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