There is no question that but for the prompt and conciliatory action of General Figueroa the events which took place in the last months of 1907 might well have involved the whole of the States of Central America in a long, serious, and sanguinary conflict. As it was, sufficient provocation was given to Salvador, whose territory was invaded, and many of whose citizens were either injured or robbed. In this month, the invaders who came from Honduras were largely composed of Honduraneans, Nicaraguans, Salvadorean revolutionists, and American filibusters, who actually seized the port of Acajutla, and taking forcible possession of engines and cars belonging to the Salvador Railway Company, reached as far as the city of Sonsonate. The invading forces were led by Generals Manuel Rivas and Prudencio Alfaro, the latter being General Santos Zelaya's candidate for the Presidency of Salvador. It was at this time that General Figueroa issued a fervent and eloquent appeal to the loyalty of his troops and his countrymen. In exhorting them to deeds of valour, he declared that he himself would
It is satisfactory to know that the Presidential call to arms, in addition to the strong personal influence which General Figueroa wielded, shortly afterwards put an end to the trouble that had threatened at one time to assume the most serious aspects, and to have involved the whole of the five States in a fierce struggle. Now that the threatening cloud has been dispersed—it may be hoped for all time—it is possible to smile at some of the incidents which have been related in connection with the embroilment. It is, for instance, related that the invasion of Salvadorean territory, the first step of which took place in the month of June, 1907, failed of achievement principally on account of a personal dispute which broke out between the two Revolutionary Generals, Rivas and Alfaro. It is alleged that the former, on reaching the town of Sonsonate, after landing successfully at Acajutla, proceeded to the National Bank in that town, where he overawed the cashier (not a very brilliant achievement, since he was only a boy) and raised what is known as "a forced loan," departing heroically with the sum Before leaving one another, it was arranged, however, that the Republic of Salvador should be divided in half, General Rivas to rule the Eastern zone, with headquarters at San Salvador, and General Alfaro to rule the Western zone, with headquarters at Sonsonate. To this proposition General Alfaro also strongly objected at first, but consented reluctantly later; and while the two future victors were quarrelling as to what they would do with the territory which was not yet theirs, a messenger arrived hot-haste from the Capital with the unpleasant tidings that General Figueroa was coming in person with a train-load of troops to Sonsonate. Thereupon followed a hasty and most undignified retreat to Acajutla, and an eyewitness has left a humorous description of how the brave invaders, in their desire to get out as soon as possible, precipitated themselves into small boats, barges, and lighters, or any kind of thing that floated, making their way to the gunboat Momotombo, up the sides of which they scrambled helter-skelter, glad enough to be safely off The gunboat was obliged, as all vessels are, to anchor a half-mile from the Acajutla pier, men, arms, and ammunition having to be conveyed over that distance in any kind of boat of which they could command the use. At an early period of the invasion it is certain that General Figueroa had the situation well in hand. He was always popular with the army, and he likewise possessed the complete confidence of the Salvadorean people, who felt that in his strong hands the safety of the Republic lay. Moreover, by his excellent system of organizing the Intelligence Department of his army, and the care with which he had selected his officers, General Figueroa was always in complete possession of the plans and actions of the opposing force; and even when these latter fatuously supposed that he knew nothing, and was doing nothing, to check their advance, General Figueroa was laying his plans with consummate ability, and, as we now know, he ultimately executed them with complete success. Dr. Alfaro, who for the nonce had become a "General," was never an opponent worth much consideration; while General Rivas only displayed any marked ability when conspiring and organizing foreign troops, destined to be led to battle, when led at all, by others than himself. The only man who had any chance of making serious difficulty, and who might have fostered formidable trouble, was Barahona, of whose actions and intentions the President was always fully aware, and who at the psychological moment consigned him to the security of a prison. And there he kept him until the worst trouble was over. The conciliatory measures which were adopted at the beginning by General Figueroa and his Government were adhered to throughout the upheaval, and it is only right that impartial history should record the dignified and sane proceedings which characterized the attitude of the Republic of Salvador at this period. The views which General Figueroa entertained and acted upon throughout are clearly reflected in an official communication addressed to a well-known American, the then Consul-General for Salvador in the United States. General Figueroa said:
In this reference to the trifling effect occasioned to the coffee crop by the political disturbances, the President was a little premature. The subsequent depression which was experienced in commercial circles generally was undoubtedly occasioned by these disturbances, although the consequence only proved transient. All travellers, foreigners and natives alike, who happened to be in Central America at this time, were well aware of the provocative part which President Santos Zelaya of Nicaragua was playing; for many years he had been acting as the evil genius of this Republic, and his misgovernment and brutalities to his own people met with general condemnation. There can be no question that the revolution which was started in Salvador, but which was so promptly and effectually suppressed, was promoted by Zelaya, who, rightly or wrongly, imagined that at the psychological moment he would meet with support, not alone from Honduras, but from the United States, either directly or indirectly. There is sufficient evidence on record to prove that Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who, since the death of General Regalado during the war with Guatemala in 1906, had attained some slight popularity in Salvador, was the instrument through whom General Zelaya hoped, and indeed endeavoured, to carry out his plans. The conquest of Salvador was only one of them, since, as I have mentioned in another part of this volume, it was the ambition of Santos Zelaya to reconstitute a Federation of the five Central American States, and then to elect himself first President. It was with the financial and physical assistance of Zelaya that Dr. Alfaro engaged the Nicaraguan I have been shown documentary proofs of the arrangements upon which Zelaya had been employed for many months previous, and which provided for the invasion of Salvador at four different points. From time to time changes were made in the personnel of the Nicaraguan commanders, but the names upon the lists which were shown to me were not in all cases the same as those of the men who actually took part in the abortive invasion. I remember, for instance, observing the name of General Salvador Toledo, who had previously been deputed to command the invading army which was to enter Salvador from Honduras, near the Guatemalan frontier; and also that of General Estrada, who had been nominated to strike at the enemy with the Northern forces at the proper time. This General Estrada had been in command of the Honduranean forces between Puerto Cortes and the Salvadorean line, and he it was who numbered among his followers all the scum of the population, mostly consisting of ex-prisoners and exiles, who were willing enough to fight against their own country's soldiers, side by side with Honduraneans. Another name which was on the officers' list was General Figueroa at this time wisely declared the City of Salvador "in a state of siege," which is the equivalent of suspension of political guarantees, to enable summary action to be taken against political offenders or even suspects; a condition afterwards extended to the whole country; and his instructions to the Governors of the several Departments no doubt saved the Central Government from considerable embarrassment as the result of the rising. Those who led the insurrection had counted upon receiving support from the public, which, however, they did not realize, and the lack of this made the capture of the leaders by the Government troops a matter of comparative facility. Secondly, much of the inconvenience which would have followed a general disturbance of the affairs of the country at that time, and which would have caused both the Government and the people losses upon coffee shipments, was spared them, but not altogether obviated. As we have seen, it was altogether a clumsy attack which had been planned, and had better local knowledge prevailed it would have been ascertained that the prestige of the existing Government stood too high, and the personal popularity of General Figueroa was too great, to have ever endowed this rising with any great chances of success. In this connection I think I may well quote an
Colonel's Quarters, School of Sergeants. Officers Officers' Club Room, School of Sergeants. The extract which I am quoting continues as follows:
It cannot be too emphatically pointed out that the Salvadoreans are not naturally a rebellious or warlike people, and, except when compelled to take up arms in their own defence or in favour of a righteous cause, they ask nothing better than to be permitted to devote themselves to the congenial and profitable occupation of cultivating the bounteous land which is theirs by inheritance. In the troubles which afflicted the country in the years 1907-08, the whole cause was the incitement which was offered to them by their turbulent and troublesome neighbours the Nicaraguans and the Honduraneans. As I have shown very conclusively, it was the long-established policy of Santos Zelaya to foster an outbreak in Salvador which should broaden into a revolution, in the course of which Salvadorean troops would be compelled innocently to commit some overt act which would give Honduras or Nicaragua a cause for the initiation of a movement against the Republic. This, it was hoped, would ultimately result in the election to the Presidency of Salvador of Dr. Prudencio Alfaro, who was always a creature of Santos Zelaya, and who for The invasion of Salvadorean territory in the month of June, 1907, by the Nicaraguans was a direct and unprovoked violation of the Treaty of Peace and Amity of Amapala, only signed on the previous April 23, and ratified on May 8, by which the Governments of the two countries agreed to submit their
The gunboat mentioned was one of six warships which Nicaragua at that date possessed, and which composed the whole of the Nicaraguan "Navy." The vessel was capable of transporting 1,000 troops, and the facility with which these landed and seized the port of Acajutla is explained by the fact that the Salvadoreans were entirely unsuspicious and unprepared for such an outrageous act upon the part of the treacherous Zelaya, with whom they had every reason to consider themselves at peace. The civilized world has denounced the Nicaraguans' act of aggression, and unhesitatingly expressed the opinion that President Zelaya had committed a grave violation of international ethics in opening hostilities against Salvador without having made a preliminary declaration of war or giving any reasons for such an action. |