John Marshall

Defects in the Commissary department.... Distress of the army at Valley Forge.... The army subsisted by impressments.... Combination in congress against General Washington.... Correspondence between him and General Gates.... Distress of the army for clothes.... Washington's exertions to augment the army.... Congress sends a committee to camp.... Attempt to surprise Captain Lee.... Congress determines on a second expedition to Canada.... Abandons it.... General Conway resigns.... The Baron Steuben appointed Inspector General.... Congress forbids the embarkation of Burgoyne's army.... Plan of reconciliation agreed to in Parliament.... Communicated to congress and rejected.... Information of treaties between France and the United States.... Great Britain declares war against France.... The treaties with France ratified by congress.... Complaints of the treatment of prisoners.... A partial exchange agreed to.

1777

The army under the immediate command of General Washington was engaged through the winter in endeavouring to stop the intercourse between Philadelphia and the country. To effect this object General Smallwood was detached with one division to Wilmington; Colonel Morgan was placed on the lines on the west side of the Schuylkill; and General Armstrong, with the Pennsylvania militia, was stationed near the old camp at White Marsh. Major Jameson, with two troops of cavalry, and M'Lane's infantry, was directed to guard the east, and Captain Lee with his troop, the west side of that river. General Count Pulaski, a Polish nobleman who commanded the horse, led the residue of the cavalry to Trenton, where he trained them for the ensuing campaign.

December 22.

One of the first operations meditated by General Washington after crossing the Schuylkill was the destruction of a large quantity of hay which remained in the islands above the mouth of Derby Creek, within the power of the British. Early in the morning after his orders for this purpose had been given, Sir William Howe marched out in full force, and encamped between Derby and the middle party, so as completely to cover the islands; while a foraging party removed the hay. Washington, with the intention of disturbing this operation, gave orders for putting his army in motion, when the alarming fact was disclosed, that the commissary's stores were exhausted, and that the last ration had been delivered and consumed.

Accustomed as were the continental troops to privations of every sort, it would have been hazarding too much to move them, under these circumstances, against a powerful enemy. In a desert, or in a garrison where food is unattainable, courage, patriotism, and habits of discipline, enable the soldier to conquer wants which, in ordinary situations, would be deemed invincible. But to perish in a country abounding with provisions, requires something more than fortitude; nor can soldiers readily submit, while in such a country, to the deprivation of food. It is not therefore surprising that, among a few of the troops, some indications of a mutiny appeared. It is much more astonishing that the great body of the army bore a circumstance so irritating, and to them so unaccountable, without a murmur.

On receiving intelligence of the fact, General Washington ordered the country to be scoured, and provisions, for supplying the pressing wants of the moment, to be seized wherever found. In the mean time, light parties were detached to harass the enemy about Derby, where Sir William Howe, with his accustomed circumspection, kept his army so compact, and his soldiers so within the lines, that an opportunity to annoy him was seldom afforded even to the vigilance of Morgan and Lee. After completing his forage, he returned, with inconsiderable loss, to Philadelphia.

That the American army, while the value still retained by paper bills placed ample funds in the hands of government, should be destitute of food, in the midst of a state so abounding with provisions as Pennsylvania, is one of those extraordinary facts which can not fail to excite attention.

Defects in the Commissary Department.

Early in the war, the office of commissary general had been confirmed on Colonel Trumbull, of Connecticut, a gentleman fitted by his talents, activity and zeal, for that important station. Yet, from the difficulty of arranging so complicated a department in its commencement, without the advantages of experience, complaints were repeatedly made of the insufficiency of supplies.

The subject was taken up by congress; but the remedy administered, as well from the time of its application, as from the ingredients of which it was composed, served only to increase the disease. The system was not completed until near midsummer; and then its arrangements were such that Colonel Trumbull refused to accept the office assigned to him; and new men were to be called into service at a time when the strongest necessity required the exertions of those who understood the plan of supplies for the campaign in all its modifications. In addition to the commissary of purchases, and a commissary general of issues, each to be appointed by congress, the new plan contemplated four deputies in each department, also to be appointed by that body, who were not accountable to, nor removeable by the head of the department, but might be suspended, and accused before congress who should examine the charge, and either remove the accused from his office, or reinstate him in it.

Distress of the American army at Valley Forge for provisions.

This imperium in imperio, erected in direct opposition to the opinion of the Commander-in-chief, drove Colonel Trumbull from the army. Congress, however, persisted in the system; and the effects of deranging so important a department as that which feeds the troops, in the midst of a campaign, were not long in unfolding themselves. In every military division of the continent, loud complaints were made of the deficiency of supplies. The success of Gates appears to have been more endangered by this cause, than by the movement of Sir Henry Clinton up the Hudson. The army of General Washington was often greatly embarrassed, and his movements not unfrequently suspended, by the want of provisions. The present total failure of all supply was preceded, for a few days, by the issuing of meat unfit to be eaten. Representations on this subject were made to the Commander-in-chief, who, on the morning that Sir William Howe moved out to Derby, and before intelligence of that movement had been received, communicated them to congress.

The army subsisted in a great measure by impressments.

That body had authorized the Commander-in-chief to seize provisions for the use of his army within seventy miles of head quarters; and either to pay for them in money, or in certificates, for the redemption of which the faith of the United States was pledged. The odium of this measure was increased by the failure of the government to provide funds to take up these certificates when presented.

At the same time, the provisions carried into Philadelphia were paid for in specie at a good price. The inhabitants of that part of Pennsylvania were not zealous in support of the war, and the difference between prompt payment in gold or silver, and a certificate, the value of which was often diminished by depreciation before its payment, was too great not to influence their wishes and their conduct. Such was the dexterity they employed that, notwithstanding the rigour of the laws, and the vigilance of the troops stationed on the lines, they often succeeded in concealing their provisions from those who were authorized to impress for the army, and in conveying them privately into Philadelphia.

December 10.

General Washington exercised the powers confided to him with caution, but he did exercise them; and by doing so, acquired considerable supplies. Congress appeared as much dissatisfied with the lenity of the Commander-in-chief, as the people were with his rigour, in consequence of which the subject was taken into consideration, his forbearance disapproved, and instructions given for the rigorous exertions in future of the powers with which he was invested. In reply to the letter communicating these resolves, the General stated the conduct he had observed, insisted that provisions had been taken very extensively, and repeated his opinion, that such measures would be much more readily submitted to if executed by the civil authority.

In obedience, however, to the will of congress, he issued a proclamation, requiring the farmers within seventy miles of head quarters, to thrash out one half of their grain by the first of February, and the residue by the first of March, under the penalty of having the whole seized as straw.

The success of this experiment did not correspond with the wishes of congress. It was attended with the pernicious consequences which had been foreseen by the General, to avoid which he had considered this system as a dernier ressort, of which he was to avail himself only in extreme cases. In answer to a letter on this subject from the board of war, he said, "I shall use every exertion that may be expedient and practicable for subsisting the army, and keeping it together; but I must observe, that this never can be done by coercive means. Supplies of provisions and clothing must be had in another way, or it can not exist. The small seizures that were made of the former some time ago, in consequence of the most pressing and urgent necessity—when the alternative was to do that or dissolve—excited the greatest alarm and uneasiness imaginable, even among some of our best and warmest friends. Such procedures may relieve for an instant, but eventually will prove of the most pernicious consequence. Besides spreading disaffection and jealousy among the people, they never fail, even in the most veteran armies, to raise in the soldiery a disposition to licentiousness, plunder, and robbery, which it has ever been found exceeding difficult to suppress; and which has not only proved ruinous to the inhabitants, but, in many instances, to the armies themselves." In a subsequent letter to congress, he added, "I regret the occasion which compelled us to the measure the other day, and shall consider it as among the greatest of our misfortunes to be under the necessity of practising it again. I am now obliged to keep several parties from the army thrashing grain, that our supplies may not fail; but this will not do."

Combination formed in Congress against General Washington.
General Gates supposed to be concerned in it.

About this time, a strong combination was forming against the Commander-in-chief, into which several members of congress, and a very few officers of the army are believed to have entered.

The splendour with which the capture of a British army had surrounded the military reputation of General Gates, acquired some advocates for the opinion that the arms of America would be more fortunate, should that gentleman be elevated to the supreme command. He could not be supposed hostile himself to the prevalence of this opinion; and some parts of his conduct would seem to warrant a belief that, if it did not originate with him, he was not among the last to adopt it. After the victory of the seventh of October had opened to him the prospect of subduing the arms of Burgoyne, he not only omitted to communicate his success to General Washington, Correspondence on this subject between the two generals.but carried on a correspondence with General Conway, in which that officer expressed great contempt for the Commander-in-chief. When the purport of this correspondence was disclosed to General Washington, Gates demanded the name of the informer in a letter far from being conciliatory in its terms, which was accompanied with the very extraordinary circumstance of being passed through congress.[97] The state of Pennsylvania too, chagrined at the loss of its capital, and forgetful of its own backwardness in strengthening the army, which had twice fought superior numbers in its defence, furnished many discontented individuals. They imputed it to General Washington as a fault that, with forces inferior to his enemy in numbers, and in every equipment, he had not effected the same result which had been produced in the north, by a continental army, in itself, much stronger than its adversary, and so reinforced by militia as to treble his numbers. On the report that General Washington was moving into winter quarters, the legislature of that state addressed a remonstrance to congress on the subject, manifesting, in very intelligible terms, their dissatisfaction with the Commander-in-chief. About the same time, a new board of war was created, of which General Gates was appointed the President; and General Mifflin, who was supposed to be of the party unfriendly to Washington, was one of its members. General Conway, who was probably the only brigadier in the army that had joined this faction, was appointed inspector general, and was promoted, above senior brigadiers, to the rank of major general. These were evidences that, if the hold which the Commander-in-chief had taken of the affections and confidence of the army and of the nation could be loosened, the party in congress disposed to change their general, was far from being contemptible in point of numbers. But to loosen this hold was impossible. The indignation with which the idea of such a change was received even by the victorious troops who had conquered under Gates, forms the most conclusive proof of its strength. Even the northern army clung to Washington as the saviour of his country.

These machinations to diminish the well-earned reputation of the Commander-in-chief, could not escape his notice. They made, however, no undue impression on his steady mind, nor did they change one of his measures. His sensibilities seem to have been those of patriotism, of apprehension for his country, rather than of wounded pride. His desire to remain at the head of the army seemed to flow from the conviction that his retaining that station would be useful to his country, rather than from the gratification his high rank might furnish to ambition. When he unbosomed himself to his private friends, the feelings and sentiments he expressed were worthy of Washington. To Mr. Laurens, the president of congress, and his private friend, who, in an unofficial letter, had communicated an anonymous accusation made to him as president, containing heavy charges against the Commander-in-chief, he said, "I can not sufficiently express the obligation I feel towards you for your friendship and politeness upon an occasion in which I am deeply interested. I was not unapprised that a malignant faction had been for some time forming to my prejudice, which, conscious as I am of having ever done all in my power to answer the important purposes of the trusts reposed in me, could not but give me some pain on a personal account; but my chief concern arises from an apprehension of the dangerous consequences which intestine dissensions may produce to the common cause.

"As I have no other view than to promote the public good, and am unambitious of honours not founded in the approbation of my country, I would not desire, in the least degree, to suppress a free spirit of inquiry into any part of my conduct that even faction itself may deem reprehensible. The anonymous paper handed you exhibits many serious charges, and it is my wish that it may be submitted to congress. This I am the more inclined to, as the suppression or concealment may possibly involve you in embarrassment hereafter, since it is uncertain how many, or who, may be privy to the contents.

"My enemies take an ungenerous advantage of me. They know the delicacy of my situation, and that motives of policy deprive me of the defence I might otherwise make against their insidious attacks. They know I can not combat their insinuations, however injurious, without disclosing secrets it is of the utmost moment to conceal. But why should I expect to be free from censure, the unfailing lot of an elevated station? Merit and talents which I can not pretend to rival, have ever been subject to it. My heart tells me it has been my unremitted aim to do the best which circumstances would permit. Yet I may have been very often mistaken in my judgment of the means, and may in many instances deserve the imputation of error."[98]

Fortunately for America, these combinations only excited resentment against those who were believed to be engaged in them.

December.

Soon after being informed of the unfavourable disposition of some members of congress towards him, and receiving the memorial of the legislature of Pennsylvania against his going into winter quarters, the General also discovered the failure already mentioned in the commissary department. On this occasion, he addressed congress in terms of energy and plainness which he had used on no former occasion. December 23.In his letter to that body he said, "Full as I was in my representation of the matters in the commissary's department yesterday, fresh and more powerful reasons oblige me to add that I am now convinced beyond a doubt that, unless some great and capital change suddenly takes place in that line, this army must inevitably be reduced to one or other of these three things—to starve, dissolve, or disperse in order to obtain subsistence. Rest assured, sir, that this is not an exaggerated picture, and that I have abundant reason to suppose what I say.

"Saturday afternoon, receiving information that the enemy, in force, had left the city, and were advancing towards Derby with apparent design to forage, and draw subsistence from that part of the country, I ordered the troops to be in readiness, that I might give every opposition in my power; when, to my great mortification, I was not only informed, but convinced, that the men were unable to stir on account of a want of provisions; and that a dangerous mutiny, begun the night before, and which with difficulty was suppressed by the spirited exertions of some officers, was still much to be apprehended from the want of this article.

"This brought forth the only commissary in the purchasing line in this camp, and with him this melancholy and alarming truth, that he had not a single hoof of any kind to slaughter, and not more than twenty-five barrels of flour! From hence, form an opinion of our situation, when I add that he could not tell when to expect any.

Distress of the American army for clothes.

"All I could do under these circumstances, was to send out a few light parties to watch and harass the enemy, whilst other parties were instantly detached different ways to collect, if possible, as much provision as would satisfy the present pressing wants of the soldiers; but will this answer? No, sir. Three or four days of bad weather would prove our destruction. What then is to become of the army this winter? And if we are now as often without provisions as with them, what is to become of us in the spring, when our force will be collected, with the aid perhaps of militia, to take advantage of an early campaign before the enemy can be reinforced? These are considerations of great magnitude, meriting the closest attention, and will, when my own reputation is so intimately connected with, and to be affected by the event, justify my saying, that the present commissaries are by no means equal to the execution of the office, or that the disaffection of the people surpasses all belief. The misfortune, however, does, in my opinion, proceed from both causes; and, though I have been tender heretofore of giving any opinion, or of lodging complaints, as the change in that department took place contrary to my judgment, and the consequences thereof were predicted; yet, finding that the inactivity of the army, whether for want of provisions, clothes, or other essentials, is charged to my account, not only by the common vulgar, but by those in power; it is time to speak plain in exculpation of myself. With truth, then, I can declare that no man, in my opinion, ever had his measures more impeded than I have, by every department of the army. Since the month of July, we have had no assistance from the quartermaster general; and to want of assistance from this department, the commissary general charges great part of his deficiency. To this I am to add that, notwithstanding it is a standing order (often repeated) that the troops shall always have two days provisions by them, that they may be ready at any sudden call; yet, scarcely any opportunity has ever offered of taking advantage of the enemy, that has not been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded, on this account; and this, the great and crying evil is not all. Soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by congress, we see none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have little occasion for; few men having more than one shirt, many, only the moiety of one, and some, none at all. In addition to which, as a proof of the little benefit from a clothier general, and at the same time, as a farther proof of the inability of an army under the circumstances of this to perform the common duties of soldiers, we have, by a field return this day made, besides a number of men confined to hospitals for want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same account, no less than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men, now in camp, unfit for duty, because they are bare-foot, and otherwise naked. By the same return, it appears that our whole strength in continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive of the Maryland troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to no more than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty; notwithstanding which, and that since the fourth instant, our number fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they have undergone, particularly from the want of blankets, have decreased near two thousand men, we find gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going into winter quarters or not, (for I am sure no resolution of mine would warrant the remonstrance), reprobating the measure as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a superior one, in all respects well appointed and provided for a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to cover from depredation and waste the states of Pennsylvania, Jersey, &c. But what makes this matter still more extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen, who were well apprised of the nakedness of the troops from ocular demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than others, and advised me, near a month ago, to postpone the execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days, agreeably to a decree of the state; (not one article of which by the by is yet to come to hand,) should think a winter's campaign, and the covering of their states from the invasion of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room, by a good fireside, than to occupy a cold bleak hill, and sleep under frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and from my soul pity those miseries which it is not in my power either to relieve or to prevent."

The representations made in this letter were not exaggerated. The distresses of the army, however, so far as respected clothing, did not arise from the inattention of congress. Measures for the importation of clothes had been adopted early in the war, but had not produced the effect expected from them. Vigorous but ineffectual means had also been taken to obtain supplies from the interior. The unfortunate non-importation agreements which preceded the commencement of hostilities, had reduced the quantity of goods in the country below the ordinary amount, and the war had almost annihilated foreign commerce. The progress of manufactures did not equal the consumption; and such was the real scarcity, that exactions from individuals produced great distress, without relieving the wants of the army. A warm blanket was a luxury in which not many participated, either in the camp or in the country.

In the northern states, where the sea coast was too extensive, and the ports too numerous to be completely guarded, and where the people were more inclined to maritime enterprise, supplies both of arms and clothes were attainable in a more considerable degree than in those farther south; but the large sums of money expended in that part of the union for the support of the army, had lessened the value of the currency there more rapidly than elsewhere, and a consequent high nominal price was demanded for imported articles. Congress deemed the terms on which some large contracts had been made by the clothier general in Massachusetts, so exorbitant, as to forbid their execution; and at the same time, addressed a letter to the state government, requesting that the goods should be seized for the use of the army, at prices to be fixed by the legislature, in pursuance of a resolution of the 22d of November.

These recommendations from congress, so far as they exhorted the states to supply the wants of the soldiers, were strongly supported by the General. In his letters to the several governors, he represented the very existence of the army, and the continuance of the contest, as depending on their exertions in this respect.

1778

General Washington's exertions to increase his force, and to place it on a respectable footing before the ensuing campaign.

To recruit the army for the ensuing campaign became again an object of vital importance; and the Commander-in-chief again pressed its necessity on congress, and on the states. To obtain a respectable number of men by voluntary enlistment had, obviously, become impossible. Coercion could be employed only by the state governments; and it required all the influence of General Washington to induce the adoption of a measure so odious in itself, but so indispensable to the acquirement of means to meet the crisis of the war, which, in his judgment, had not yet passed away. He enclosed to each state a return of its troops on continental establishment, thereby exhibiting to each its own deficiency. To those who had not resorted to coercive means, he stated the success with which they had been used by others; and he urged all, by every motive which could operate on the human mind, to employ those means early enough to enable him to anticipate the enemy in taking the field.

To the causes which had long threatened the destruction of the army, the depreciation of paper money was now to be added. It had become so considerable that the pay of an officer would not procure even those absolute necessaries which might protect his person from the extremes of heat and cold. The few who possessed small patrimonial estates found them melting away; and others were unable to appear as gentlemen. Such circumstances could not fail to excite disgust with the service, and a disposition to leave it. Among those who offered their commissions to the Commander-in-chief, were many who, possessing a larger portion of military pride, and therefore feeling with peculiar sensibility the degradation connected with poverty and rags, afforded the fairest hopes of becoming the ornaments of the army. This general indifference about holding a commission; this general opinion that an obligation was conferred, not received by continuing in the service, could not fail to be unfavourable, not only to that spirit of emulation which stimulates to bolder deeds than are required, but to a complete execution of orders, and to a rigid observance of duty.

An officer whose pride was in any degree wounded, whose caprice was not indulged, who apprehended censure for a fault which his carelessness about remaining in the army had probably seduced him to commit, was ready to throw up a commission which, instead of being valuable, was a burden almost too heavy to be borne. With extreme anxiety the Commander-in-chief watched the progress of a temper which, though just commencing, would increase, he feared, with the cause that produced it. He was, therefore, early and earnest in pressing the consideration of this important subject on the attention of congress.

January 10.

Congress send a committee of their own body to the army.

The weak and broken condition of the continental regiments, the strong remonstrances of the General, the numerous complaints received from every quarter, determined congress to depute a committee to reside in camp during the winter, for the purpose of investigating the state of the army, and reporting such reforms as the public good might require.

This committee repaired to head quarters in the month of January. The Commander-in-chief laid before them a general statement, taking a comprehensive view of the condition of the army, and detailing the remedies necessary for the correction of existing abuses, as well as those regulations which he deemed essential to its future prosperity.

This paper, exhibiting the actual state of the army, discloses defects of real magnitude in the existing arrangements. In perusing it, the reader is struck with the numerous difficulties, in addition to those resulting from inferiority of numbers, with which the American general was under the necessity of contending. The memorial is too long to be inserted, but there are parts which ought not to be entirely overlooked. The neglect of the very serious representation it contained respecting a future permanent provision for the officers, threatened, at an after period, to be productive of such pernicious effects, that their insertion in this place will not, it is presumed, be unacceptable.

He recommended as the basis of every salutary reform, a comfortable provision for the officers, which should render their commissions valuable; to effect which the future, as well as the present, ought to be contemplated.

"A long and continual sacrifice of individual interest for the general good, ought not," he said, "to be expected or required. The nature of man must be changed, before institutions built on the presumptive truth of such a principle can succeed.

"This position," he added, "is supported by the conduct of the officers of the American army, as well as by that of all other men. At the commencement of the dispute, in the first effusions of zeal, when it was believed the service would be temporary, they entered into it without regard to pecuniary considerations. But finding its duration much longer than had been at first expected, and that, instead of deriving advantage from the hardships and dangers to which they are exposed, they were, on the contrary, losers by their patriotism, and fell far short of even a competency for their wants, they have gradually abated in their ardour; and, with many, an entire disinclination to the service, under present circumstances, has taken place. To this, in an eminent degree, must be ascribed the frequent resignations daily happening, and the more frequent importunities for permission to resign, from some officers of the greatest merit.

"To this also may be ascribed the apathy, inattention, and neglect of duty, which pervade all ranks; and which will necessarily continue and increase, while an officer, instead of gaining any thing, is impoverished by his commission, and conceives he is conferring, not receiving a favour, in holding it. There can be no sufficient tie on men possessing such sentiments. Nor can any method be adopted to compel those to a punctual discharge of duty, who are indifferent about their continuance in the service, and are often seeking a pretext to disengage themselves from it. Punishment, in this case, would be unavailing. But when an officer's commission is made valuable to him, and he fears to lose it, you may exact obedience from him.

"It is not indeed consistent with reason or justice that one set of men should make a sacrifice of property, domestic ease, and happiness; encounter the rigours of the field, the perils and vicissitudes of war, without some adequate compensation, to obtain those blessings which every citizen will enjoy in common with them. It must also be a comfortless reflection to any man, that, after he may have contributed to secure the rights of his country, at the risk of his life, and the ruin of his fortune, there will be no provision made to prevent himself and his family, from sinking into indigence and wretchedness." With these and other arguments, General Washington recommended, in addition to present compensation, a half pay and pensionary establishment for the army.

"I urge my sentiments," said he, "with the greater freedom, because I can not, and shall not, receive the smallest benefit from the establishment; and can have no other inducement for proposing it, than a full conviction of its utility and propriety."

The wants and distresses of the army, when actually seen by the committee of congress, made a much deeper impression than could have been received from any statement whatever. They endeavoured to communicate to congress the sentiments felt by themselves, and to correct the errors which had been committed. But a numerous body, if it deliberate at all, proceeds slowly in the conduct of executive business; and will seldom afford a prompt corrective to existing mischiefs, especially to those growing out of its own measures.

February 5.

Much of the sufferings of the army was attributed to mismanagement in the quartermaster's department, which, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief, had long remained without a head. This subject was taken up early by the committee, and proper representations made respecting it. But congress still remained under the influence of those opinions which had already produced such mischievous effects, and were still disposed to retain the subordinate officers of the department in a state of immediate dependence on their own body. In this temper, they proposed a plan which, not being approved in camp, was never carried into execution.

While congress was deliberating on the reforms proposed, the distresses of the army approached their acme, and its dissolution was threatened. Early in February, the commissaries gave notice that the country, to a great distance, was actually exhausted; and that it would be impracticable to obtain supplies for the army longer than to the end of that month. Already the threatened scarcity began to be felt, and the rations issued were often bad in quality, and insufficient in quantity. General Washington found it necessary again to interpose his personal exertions to procure provisions from a distance.

In the apprehension that the resources of the commissary department would fail before the distant supplies he had taken measures to obtain could reach him, and that the enemy designed to make another incursion into the country around Philadelphia, for the purpose of gleaning what yet remained in possession of the inhabitants, he detached General Wayne, with orders to seize every article proper for the use of an army within fifteen miles of the Delaware, and to destroy the forage on the islands between Philadelphia and Chester.

To defeat the object of this foraging party, the inhabitants concealed their provisions and teams, and gave to the country every appearance of having been entirely pillaged. Before any sufficient aid could be obtained by these means, the bread, as well as the meat, was exhausted, and famine prevailed in camp.

In an emergency so pressing, the Commander-in-chief used every effort to feed his hungry army. Parties were sent out to glean the country; officers of influence were deputed to Jersey, Delaware and Maryland; and circular letters were addressed to the governors of states by the committee of congress in camp and by the Commander-in-chief, describing the wants of the army, and urging the greatest exertions for its immediate relief.

Fortunately for America, there were features in the character of Washington which, notwithstanding the discordant materials of which his army was composed, attached his officers and soldiers so strongly to his person, that no distress could weaken their affection, nor impair the respect and veneration in which they held him. To this sentiment is to be attributed, in a great measure, the preservation of a respectable military force, under circumstances but too well calculated for its dissolution.

Through this severe experiment on their fortitude, the native Americans persevered steadily in the performance of their duty; but the conduct of the Europeans, who constituted a large part of the army, was, to a considerable extent, less laudable; and at no period of the war was desertion so frequent as during this winter. Aided by the disaffected, deserters eluded the vigilance of the parties who watched the roads, and great numbers escaped into Philadelphia with their arms.

In a few days, the army was rescued from the famine with which it had been threatened, and considerable supplies of provisions were laid up in camp. It was perceived that the difficulties which had produced such melancholy effects, were created more by the want of due exertion in the commissary department, and by the efforts of the people to save their stock for a better market, than by any real deficiency of food in the country.

This severe demonstration seems to have convinced congress that their favourite system was radically vicious, and the subject was taken up with the serious intention of remodeling the commissary department on principles recommended by experience. But such were the delays inherent in the organization of that body, that the new system was not adopted until late in April.

At no period of the war had the situation of the American army been more perilous than at Valley Forge. Even when the troops were not entirely destitute of food, their stock of provisions was so scanty that a quantity sufficient for one week was seldom in store. Consequently, had General Howe moved out in force, the American army could not have remained in camp; and their want of clothes disabled them from keeping the field in the winter. The returns of the first of February exhibit the astonishing number of three thousand nine hundred and eighty-nine men in camp, unfit for duty for want of clothes. Scarcely one man of these had a pair of shoes. Even among those returned capable of doing duty, many were so badly clad, that exposure to the cold of the season must have destroyed them. Although the total of the army exceeded seventeen thousand men, the present effective rank and file amounted to only five thousand and twelve.

While the sufferings of the soldiers filled the hospitals, a dreadful mortality continued to prevail in those miserable receptacles of the sick. A violent putrid fever swept off much greater numbers than all the diseases of the camp.

If then during the deep snow which covered the earth for a great part of the winter, the British general had taken the field, his own army would indeed have suffered greatly, but the American loss is not to be calculated.

Washington's Headquarters at Valley Forge

Washington's Headquarters at Valley Forge

Here on December 17, 1777, after the Battles of Brandywine and Germantown and the occupation of Philadelphia by the British, Washington established his headquarters for what may be paradoxically termed the darkest winter of the Revolutionary War. The American Commander-in-Chief chose this place partly for its defensibility and partly to protect Congress, then in session at York, Pennsylvania, from a sudden British attack. It was here that Washington and Baron Steuben planned the reorganization of the American army, and it was here, May 1, 1778, that news reached Washington of the consummation of the French alliance.

Happily, the real condition of Washington was not well understood by Sir William Howe; and the characteristic attention of that officer to the lives and comfort of his troops, saved the American army. Fortunately, he confined his operations to those small excursions that were calculated to enlarge the comforts of his own soldiers, who, notwithstanding the favourable dispositions of the neighbouring country, were much distressed for fuel, and often in great want of forage and fresh provisions. The vigilance of the parties on the lines, especially on the south side of the Schuylkill, intercepted a large portion of the supplies intended for the Philadelphia market; and corporal punishment was frequently inflicted on those who were detected in attempting this infraction of the laws. As Captain Lee was particularly active, a plan was formed, late in January, to surprise and capture him in his quarters. An extensive circuit was made by a large body of cavalry, who seized four of his patrols without communicating an alarm. About break of day the British horse appeared; upon which Captain Lee placed his troopers that were in the house, at the doors and windows, who behaved so gallantly as to repulse the assailants without losing a horse or man. Only Lieutenant Lindsay and one private were wounded. The whole number in the house did not exceed ten.[99] That of the assailants was said to amount to two hundred. They lost a sergeant and three men with several horses, killed; and an officer and three men wounded.

The result of this skirmish gave great pleasure to the Commander-in-chief, who had formed a high opinion of Lee's talents as a partisan. He mentioned the affair in his orders with strong marks of approbation; and, in a private letter to the captain, testified the satisfaction he felt. For his merit through the preceding campaign, congress promoted him to the rank of major, and gave him an independent partisan corps to consist of three troops of horse.

While the deficiency of the public resources, arising from the alarming depreciation of the bills of credit, manifested itself in all the military departments, a plan was matured in congress, and in the board of war, without consulting the Commander-in-chief, for a second irruption into Canada. It was proposed to place the Marquis de Lafayette at the head of this expedition, and to employ Generals Conway and Starke, as the second and third in command.

This young nobleman, possessing an excellent heart, and all the military enthusiasm of his country, had left France early in 1777, in opposition to the will of his sovereign, to engage in the service of the United States. His high rank, and supposed influence at the court of Versailles, secured him the unlimited respect of his countrymen in America; and, added to his frankness of manners and zeal in their cause, recommended him strongly to congress. While the claims of others of the same country to rank were too exorbitant to be gratified, he demanded no station in the army; would consent to receive no compensation, and offered to serve as a volunteer. He had stipulated with Mr. Deane for the rank of major general without emolument; and, on his arrival in America, that rank was conferred on him, but without any immediate command. In that capacity, he sought for danger, and was wounded at the battle of Brandywine. He attached himself with the ardour of youth to the Commander-in-chief, who smoothed the way to his receiving a command in the army equal to his rank.

The first intimation to General Washington that the expedition was contemplated, was given in a letter from the president of the board of war of the 24th of January, inclosing one of the same date to the Marquis, requiring the attendance of that nobleman on congress to receive his instructions. The Commander-in-chief was requested to furnish Colonel Hazen's regiment, chiefly composed of Canadians, for the expedition; and in the same letter, his advice and opinion were asked respecting it. The northern states were to furnish the necessary troops.

Without noticing the manner in which this business had been conducted, and the marked want of confidence it betrayed, General Washington ordered Hazen's regiment to march towards Albany; and the Marquis proceeded immediately to the seat of congress. At his request, he was to be considered as an officer detached from the army of Washington, to remain under his orders, and Major General the Baron de Kalb was added to the expedition; after which the Marquis repaired in person to Albany to take charge of the troops who were to assemble at that place in order to cross the lakes on the ice, and attack Montreal.

On arriving at Albany, he found no preparations made for the expedition. Nothing which had been promised being in readiness, he abandoned the enterprise as impracticable. Some time afterward, congress also determined to relinquish it; and General Washington was authorized to recall both the Marquis de Lafayette, and the Baron de Kalb.

While the army lay at Valley Forge, the Baron Steuben arrived in camp. This gentleman was a Prussian officer, who came to the United States with ample recommendations. He was said to have served many years in the armies of the great Frederick; to have been one of the aids de camp of that consummate commander; and to have held the rank of lieutenant general. He was, unquestionably, versed in the system of field exercise which the king of Prussia had introduced, and was well qualified to teach it to raw troops. He claimed no rank, and offered to render his services as a volunteer. After holding a conference with congress, he proceeded to Valley Forge.

Although the office of inspector general had been bestowed on Conway, he had never entered on its duties; and his promotion to the rank of major general had given much umbrage to the brigadiers, who had been his seniors. That circumstance, in addition to the knowledge of his being in a faction hostile to the Commander-in-chief, rendered his situation in the army so uncomfortable, that he withdrew to York, in Pennsylvania, which was then the seat of congress. When the expedition to Canada was abandoned, he was not directed, with Lafayette and De Kalb, to rejoin the army. Entertaining no hope of being permitted to exercise the functions of his new office, he resigned his commission about the last of April, and, some time afterwards, returned to France.[100] The Baron Steuben appointed inspector general.On his resignation, the Baron Steuben, who had, as a volunteer, performed the duties of inspector general, much to the satisfaction of the Commander-in-chief, and of the army, was, on the recommendation of General Washington, appointed to that office with the rank of major general, without exciting the slightest murmur.

This gentleman was of real service to the American troops. He established one uniform system of field exercise; and, by his skill and persevering industry, effected important improvements through all ranks of the army during its continuance at Valley Forge.

While it was encamped at that place, several matters of great interest engaged the attention of congress. Among them, was the stipulation in the convention of Saratoga for the return of the British army to England. Boston was named as the place of embarkation. At the time of the capitulation, the difficulty of making that port early in the winter was unknown to General Burgoyne. Consequently, as some time must elapse before a sufficient number of vessels for the transportation of his army could be collected, its embarkation might be delayed until the ensuing spring.

On receiving this unwelcome intelligence, he applied to General Washington to change the port of embarkation, and to substitute Newport, in Rhode Island, or some place on the Sound, for Boston. If any considerations not foreseen should make this proposal objectionable, he then solicited this indulgence for himself and his suite. This request was communicated to congress, in terms favourable to that part of the application which respected General Burgoyne and his suite; but the objections to any change in the convention which might expedite the transportation of the army, were too weighty to be disregarded; and the General pressed them earnestly on congress. This precaution was unnecessary. The facility with which the convention might be violated by the British, and the captured army be united to that under General Howe, seems to have suggested itself to the American government, as soon as the first rejoicings were over; and such was its then existing temper, that the faith and honour of British officers were believed to be no securities against their appearing again in the field. Under this impression, a resolution had passed early in November, directing General Heath to transmit to the board of war a descriptive list of all persons comprehended in the convention, "in order that, if any officer, soldier, or other person of the said army should hereafter be found in arms against these states in North America, during the present contest, he might be convicted of the offence, and suffer the punishment in such case inflicted by the law of nations."

No other notice was taken of the application made by General Burgoyne to congress through the Commander-in-chief, than to pass a resolution "that General Washington be directed to inform General Burgoyne that congress will not receive, nor consider, any proposition for indulgence, nor for altering the terms of the convention of Saratoga, unless immediately directed to their own body."

Contrary to expectation, a fleet of transports for the reception of the troops reached Rhode Island, on its way to Boston, in the month of December. But, before its arrival, the preconceived suspicions of congress had ripened into conviction several circumstances combined to produce this result. General Burgoyne, dissatisfied with the accommodations prepared for his officers in Boston, had, after a fruitless correspondence with General Heath, addressed a letter to General Gates, in which he complained of the inconvenient quarters assigned his officers, as a breach of the articles of the convention. This complaint was considered by congress as being made for the purpose of letting in the principle, that the breach of one article of a treaty discharges the injured party from its obligations.

This suspicion was strengthened by the indiscreet hesitation of General Burgoyne to permit the resolution requiring a descriptive list of his troops to be executed. His subsequent relinquishment of the objection did not remove the impression it had made.

It was also alleged, that the number of transports was not sufficient to convey the troops to Europe; nor was it believed possible that Sir William Howe could have laid in, so expeditiously, a sufficient stock of provisions for the voyage.

These objections to the embarkation of Burgoyne's troops were strengthened by some trivial infractions of the convention, which, it was contended, gave congress a strict right to detain them. It was stipulated that "the arms" should be delivered up; and it appeared that several cartouch boxes and other military accoutrements, supposed to be comprehended in the technical term arms, had been detained. This was deemed an infraction of the letter of the compact, which, on rigid principle, justified the measures afterwards adopted by congress.

The whole subject was referred to a committee who reported all the circumstances of the case, whereupon congress came to several resolutions, enumerating the facts already mentioned, the last of which was in these words: "Resolved, therefore, that the embarkation of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, and the troops under his command, be suspended, until a distinct and explicit ratification of the convention of Saratoga shall be properly notified by the court of Great Britain to congress."

These resolutions, together with the report on which they were founded, were transmitted to the several states, and to General Washington. Two copies of them were sent to General Heath, with directions to deliver one of them to General Burgoyne, and with farther directions, "to order the vessels which may have arrived, or which shall arrive, for the transportation of the army under Lieutenant General Burgoyne, to quit, without delay, the port of Boston."

On receiving these resolutions, General Burgoyne addressed a letter to congress, containing papers, on which he founded a defence of his conduct, and insisted on the embarkation of his army, as stipulated in the convention; but the committee, to whom these papers were referred, reported their opinion, after the most attentive consideration of them, to be, "that nothing therein contained was sufficient to induce congress to recede from their resolves of the 8th of January last, respecting the convention of Saratoga." This application was accompanied by another letter from General Burgoyne, to be delivered if the army should still be detained, in which, in consideration of the state of his health, he solicited permission to return to England. This request was readily granted.

The impression made on the British nation by the capitulation of Burgoyne, notwithstanding the persevering temper of the king, at length made its way into the cabinet, and produced resolutions in favour of pacific measures.

After the rejection of repeated motions made by the opposition members tending to the abandonment of the American war, Lord North gave notice, in the House of Commons, that he had digested a plan of reconciliation which he designed shortly to lay before the house.

In conformity with this notice, he moved for leave to bring in, "first, A bill for removing all doubts and apprehensions concerning taxation by the Parliament of Great Britain in any of the colonies and plantations of North America.

"Second. A bill to enable his Majesty to appoint commissioners with sufficient powers to treat, consult, and agree upon the means of quieting the disorders now subsisting in certain of the colonies of North America."

The first contained a declaration that Parliament will impose no tax or duty whatever payable within any of the colonies of North America, except only such duties as it may be expedient to impose for the purposes of commerce, the net produce of which should always be paid and applied to and for the use of the colonies in which the same shall be respectively levied, in like manner as other duties collected under the authority of their respective legislatures are ordinarily paid and applied.

The second authorized the appointment of commissioners by the crown, with power to treat either with the existing governments, or with individuals, in America; provided that no stipulations which might be entered into should have any effect until approved in Parliament, other than is afterward mentioned.

It is then enacted, that the commissioners may have power "to proclaim a cessation of hostilities in any of the colonies, to suspend the operation of the non-intercourse law; and farther, to suspend, during the continuance of the act, so much of all or any of the acts of Parliament which have passed since the 10th day of February, 1763, as relates to the colonies.

"To grant pardon to any number or description of persons, and to appoint a governor in any colony in which his majesty had heretofore exercised the power of making such appointments."

These bills passed both houses of Parliament with inconsiderable opposition.

Intelligence of the treaty between the United States and France having been received by the minister about the time of their being introduced, copies of them, before they had gone through the requisite forms, were hurried to America, to be laid before congress and the public, in the hope and expectation that they might counteract the effects which it was feared the treaty with France would produce.

General Washington received early information of their arrival, and entertained serious fears of their operation. He was apprehensive that the publication of a proposition for the restoration of peace on the terms originally required by America, would greatly increase the numbers of the disaffected; and immediately forwarded the bills to congress in a letter suggesting the policy of preventing their pernicious influence on the public mind by all possible means, and especially through the medium of the press.

This letter was referred to a committee, consisting of Messrs. Morris, Drayton, and Dana, by whom a report was made, investigating the bills with great acuteness as well as asperity. This report, and the resolutions upon it, were ordered to be published. Other resolutions were passed the succeeding day, recommending it to the states to pardon under such limitations as they might think proper to make, such of their misguided fellow-citizens as had levied war against the United States.

This resolution was accompanied by an order directing it to be printed in English and in German, and requesting General Washington to take such measures as he should deem most effectual for circulating the copies among the American recruits in the enemy's army.[101]

During these transactions, the frigate La Sensible arrived with the important intelligence that treaties of alliance and of commerce, had been formed between the United States of America and France. The treaties themselves were brought by Mr. Simeon Deane, the brother of the American Minister in Paris.

This event had long been anxiously expected, and the delay attending it had been such as to excite serious apprehension that it would never take place.

France was still extremely sore under the wounds inflicted during the war which terminated in 1763. It was impossible to reflect on a treaty which had wrested from her so fair a part of North America, without feeling resentments which would seek the first occasion of gratification.

The growing discontents between Great Britain and her colonies were, consequently, viewed at a distance with secret satisfaction; but rather as a circumstance which might have some tendency to weaken and embarrass a rival, and which was to be encouraged from motives of general policy, than as one from which any definite advantage was to be derived. France appears, at that time, to have required, and wished for, repose. The great exertions of the preceding disastrous war had so deranged her finances, that the wish to preserve peace seems to have predominated in her cabinet. The young monarch, who had just ascended the throne, possessed a pacific unambitious temper, and the councils of the nation were governed by men alike indisposed to disturb the general tranquillity. The advice they gave the monarch was, to aid and encourage the colonies secretly, in order to prevent a reconciliation with the mother country, and to prepare privately for hostilities, by improving his finances, and strengthening his marine; but to avoid every thing which might give occasion for open war. The system which for a time regulated the cabinet of Versailles, conformed to this advice. While the utmost attention was paid to the Minister of Britain, and every measure to satisfy him was openly taken, intimation was privately given to those of the United States, that these measures were necessary for the present, but they might be assured of the good will of the French government.

During the public demonstration of dispositions favourable to England, means were taken to furnish aids of ammunition and arms, and to facilitate the negotiation of loans to the United States; and the owners of American privateers, though forbidden to sell their prizes, or to procure their condemnation, found means to dispose of them privately.

Meanwhile, another party was formed in the cabinet, to whose political system subsequent events gave the ascendency. Its avowed object was to seize the present moment to revenge past injuries, humble the haughty rival of France, and dismember her empire.

Matters remained in a fluctuating state until December, 1777. Privately encouraged, but discountenanced publicly, the prospects of the American Ministers varied according to the complexion of American affairs.

Intelligence of the convention of Saratoga reached France early in December, 1777. The American deputies took that opportunity to press the treaty which had been under consideration for the preceding twelve months; and to urge the importance, at this juncture, when Britain would, most probably, make proposals for an accommodation,[102] of communicating to congress, precisely, what was to be expected from France and Spain.

They were informed by M. Girard, one of the secretaries of the king's council of state, that it was determined to acknowledge the independence of the United States, and to make a treaty with them. That his Most Christian Majesty was resolved not only to acknowledge, but to support their independence. That in doing this, he might probably soon be engaged in a war; yet he should not expect any compensation from the United States on that account; nor was it pretended that he acted wholly for their sakes; since, besides his real good will to them, it was manifestly the interest of France that the power of England should be diminished by the separation of her colonies. The only condition he should require would be that the United States, in no peace to be made, should give up their independence, and return to their obedience to the British government.

On determining to take this decisive course, the cabinet of Versailles had despatched a courier to his Catholic majesty with information of the line of conduct about to be pursued by France. On his return, the negotiation was taken up in earnest, and a treaty of friendship and commerce was soon concluded. This was accompanied by a treaty of alliance eventual and defensive between the two nations, in which it was declared, that if war should break out between France and England during the existence of that with the United States, it should be made a common cause; and that neither of the contracting parties should conclude either truce or peace with Great Britain without the formal consent of the other, first obtained; and they mutually engaged "not to lay down their arms until the independence of the United States shall have been formally, or tacitly assured by the treaty, or treaties that shall terminate the war."

It was the wish of the ministers of the United States to engage France immediately in the war; and to make the alliance, not eventual, but positive. This proposition, however, was rejected.

In a few weeks after the conclusion of these negotiations, the Marquis de Noailles announced officially to the court of London, the treaty of friendship and commerce France had formed with the United States. The British government, considering this notification as a declaration of war, published a memorial for the purpose of justifying to all Europe the hostilities it had determined to commence.

Soon after their commencement, the Count de Vergennes received private intelligence that it was contemplated in the cabinet of London to offer to the United States an acknowledgment of their independence as the condition of a separate peace. He immediately communicated this intelligence to the American ministers, requesting them to lose no time in stating to congress that, though war was not declared in form, it had commenced in fact; and that he considered the obligations of the treaty of alliance as in full force; consequently that neither party was now at liberty to make a separate peace. Instructions of a similar import were given to the minister of France in the United States.

The despatches containing these treaties were received by the president on Saturday the second of May, after congress had adjourned. That body was immediately convened, the despatches were opened, and their joyful contents communicated.

In the exultation of the moment, the treaty of alliance, as well as that of commerce and friendship was published; a circumstance which, not without reason, gave umbrage to the cabinet of Versailles; because that treaty, being only eventual, ought not to have been communicated to the public but by mutual consent.

From this event, which was the source of universal exultation to the friends of the revolution, the attention must be directed to one which was productive of very different sensations.

Among the various improvements which struggling humanity has gradually engrafted on the belligerent code, none have contributed more to diminish the calamities of war, than those which meliorate the condition of prisoners. No obligations will be more respected by the generous and the brave; nor are there any, the violation of which could wound the national character more deeply, or expose it to more lasting or better merited reproach.

In wars between nations nearly equal in power, and possessing rights acknowledged to be equal, a departure from modern usage in this respect is almost unknown; and the voice of the civilized world would be raised against the potentate who could adopt a system calculated to re-establish the rigours and misery of exploded barbarism. But in contests between different parts of the same empire, those practices which mitigate the horrors of war yield, too frequently, to the calculations of a blind and erring resentment. The party which supports the ancient state of things, often treats resistance as rebellion, and captives as traitors. The opposite party, supporting also by the sword principles believed to be right, will admit of no departure from established usage, to its prejudice; and may be expected, if possessing the power, to endeavour, by retaliating injuries, to compel the observance of a more just and humane system. But they participate in the fault imputable to their adversaries, by manifesting a disposition to punish those whom they deem traitors, with the same severity of which they so loudly and justly complain, when they are themselves its victims.

General Gage, as Commander-in-chief of the British army, in the harshness of spirit which had been excited while governor of Massachusetts, not only threw all his prisoners into a common jail, but rejected every proposition for an exchange of them. When the command devolved on Sir William Howe, this absurd system was abandoned, and an exchange[103] took place to a considerable extent. But the Americans had not made a sufficient number of prisoners to relieve all their citizens, and many of them still remained in confinement. Representations were continually received from these unfortunate men, describing in strong terms, the severity of their treatment. They complained of suffering almost the extremity of famine, that even the supply of provisions allowed them was unsound, and that they were crowded into prison-ships, where they became the victims of disease.

When charged with conduct so unworthy of his character and station, Sir William Howe positively denied its truth.

It would be unjust to ascribe this excess of inhumanity to an officer who, though perhaps severe in his temper, did not mingle cruelties in his general system, which would excite universal indignation in other wars. It must be admitted that his supplies of provisions were neither good nor abundant; and that the American soldiers, in their own camp, were unhealthy. But the excessive mortality prevailing among the prisoners can be accounted for on no ordinary principles; and the candid, who were least inclined to criminate without cause, have ever been persuaded that, if his orders did not produce the distress which existed, his authority was not interposed with sufficient energy, to correct the abuses which prevailed.

The capture of General Lee furnished an additional ground of controversy on the subject of prisoners. As he had been an officer in the British service, whose resignation had not, perhaps, been received when he entered into that of America, a disposition was, at first, manifested to consider him as a deserter, and he was closely confined. On receiving information of this circumstance, congress directed General Howe to be assured that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, and five Hessian field-officers, should be detained, and should experience precisely the fate of General Lee. These officers were taken into close custody, and informed that the resolution announced to General Howe should be strictly enforced.

The sentiments of the Commander-in-chief on the subject of retaliation, seem to have been less severe than those of congress. So great was his abhorrence of the cruelties such a practice must generate, that he was unwilling to adopt it in any case not of absolute and apparent necessity. Not believing that of General Lee to be such a case, he remonstrated strongly against these resolutions. But congress remained inflexible; and the officers designated as the objects of retaliation, were kept in rigorous confinement until General Lee was declared to be a prisoner of war.[104]

The resolutions of congress respecting the prisoners taken at the Cedars, were also the source of much embarrassment and chagrin to the Commander-in-chief. Alleging that the capitulation had been violated on the part of the enemy, and that the savages had been permitted to murder some of the prisoners, and to plunder others, they withheld their sanction from the agreement entered into by General Arnold with Captain Forster, and refused to allow other prisoners to be returned in exchange for those liberated under that agreement, until the murderers should be given up, and compensation made for the baggage said to have been plundered. As the fact alleged was not clearly established, Sir William Howe continued to press General Washington on this subject. Reminding him of the importance of a punctilious observance of faith, plighted in engagements like that made by General Arnold, he persisted to hold the Commander-in-chief personally bound for an honourable compliance with military stipulations entered into by an officer under his authority.

General Washington, feeling the keenness of the reproach, pressed congress to change their resolution on this subject; but his remonstrances were, for a long time, unavailing.

After the sufferings of the prisoners in New York had been extreme, and great numbers had perished in confinement, the survivors were liberated for the purpose of being exchanged; but so miserable was their condition, that many of them died on their way home. For the dead as well as the living, General Howe claimed a return of prisoners, while General Washington contended that reasonable deductions should be made for those who were actually dead, of diseases under which they laboured when permitted to leave the British prisons.

Until this claim should be admitted, General Howe rejected any partial exchange. General Washington was immoveable in his determination to repel it; and thus all hope of being relieved in the ordinary mode appeared to be taken from those whom the fortune of war had placed in the power of the enemy.

In the mean time, the sufferings of the American prisoners increased with the increasing severity of the season. Information continued to be received, that they suffered almost the extremity of famine. Repeated remonstrances, made on this subject to the British general, were answered by a denial of the fact. He continued to aver that the same food, both in quantity and quality, was issued to the prisoners, as to British troops when in transports, or elsewhere, not on actual duty; and that every tenderness was extended to them, which was compatible with the situation of his army. He yielded to the request made by General Washington to permit a commissary to visit the jails, and demanded passports for an agent to administer to the wants of British prisoners.

When Mr. Boudinot, the American commissary of prisoners, who was appointed by General Washington to visit the jails in Philadelphia, met Mr. Ferguson, the British commissary, he was informed that General Howe thought it unnecessary for him to come into the city, as he would himself inspect the situation and treatment of the prisoners. There is reason to believe that their causes of complaint, so far as respected provisions, did not exist afterwards in the same degree as formerly; and that the strong measures subsequently taken by congress, were founded on facts of an earlier date.

But clothes and blankets were also necessary, and the difficulty of furnishing them was considerable. General Howe would not permit the purchase of those articles in Philadelphia; and they were not attainable elsewhere.

To compel him to abandon this distressing restriction, and to permit the use of paper money within the British lines, congress resolved, that no prisoner should be exchanged until all the expenditures made in paper for the supplies they received from the United States, should be repaid in specie, at the rate of four shillings and sixpence for each dollar. They afterwards determined, that from the 1st day of February, no British commissary should be permitted to purchase any provisions for the use of prisoners west of New Jersey, but that all supplies for persons of that description should be furnished from British stores.

Sir William Howe remonstrated against the last resolution with great strength and justice, as a decree which doomed a considerable number of prisoners, far removed into the country, to a slow and painful death by famine; since it was impracticable to supply them immediately from Philadelphia. The severity of this order was in some degree mitigated by a resolution that each British commissary of prisoners should receive provisions from the American commissary of purchases, to be paid for in specie, according to the resolution of the 19th of December, 1777.

About the same time, an order was hastily given by the board of war, which produced no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment; and exposed the Commander-in-chief to strictures not less severe than those he had applied to the British general.

General Washington had consented that a quartermaster, with a small escort, should come out of Philadelphia, with clothes and other comforts for the prisoners who were in possession of the United States. He had expressly stipulated for their security, and had given them a passport.

While they were travelling through the country, information was given to the board of war that General Howe had refused to permit provisions to be sent in to the American prisoners in Philadelphia by water. This information was not correct. General Howe had only requested that flags should not be sent up or down the river without previous permission obtained from himself. On this information, however, the board ordered Lieutenant Colonel Smith immediately to seize the officers, though protected by the passport of General Washington, their horses, carriages, and the provisions destined for the relief of the British prisoners; and to secure them until farther orders, either from the board or from the Commander-in-chief.

General Washington, on hearing this circumstance, despatched one of his aids with orders for the immediate release of the persons and property which had been confined; but the officers refused to proceed on their journey, and returned to Philadelphia.[105]

This untoward event was much regretted by the Commander-in-chief. In a letter received some time afterwards, General Howe, after expressing his willingness that the American prisoners should be visited by deputy commissaries, who should inspect their situation, and supply their wants required, as the condition on which this indulgence should be granted, "that a similar permit should be allowed to persons appointed by him, which should be accompanied with the assurance of General Washington, that his authority will have sufficient weight to prevent any interruption to their progress, and any insult to their persons." This demand was ascribed to the treatment to which officers under the protection of his passport had already been exposed.

General Washington lamented the impediment to the exchange of prisoners, which had hitherto appeared to be insuperable; and made repeated, but ineffectual efforts to remove it. General Howe had uniformly refused to proceed with any cartel, unless his right to claim for all the diseased and infirm, whom he had liberated, should be previously admitted.

At length, after all hope of inducing him to recede from that high ground had been abandoned, he suddenly relinquished it of his own accord, and acceded completely to the proposition of General Washington for the meeting of commissioners, in order to settle equitably the number to which he should be entitled for those he had discharged in the preceding winter. This point being adjusted, commissaries were mutually appointed, who were to meet on the 10th of March, in Germantown, to arrange the details of a general cartel.

The Commander-in-chief had entertained no doubt of his authority to enter into this agreement. On the fourth of March, however, he had the mortification to perceive in a newspaper, a resolution of congress calling on the several states for the amounts of supplies furnished the prisoners, that they might be adjusted according to the rule of the 10th of December, before the exchange should take place.

On seeing this embarrassing resolution, General Washington addressed a letter to Sir William Howe, informing him that particular circumstances had rendered it inconvenient for the American commissioners to attend at the time appointed, and requesting that their meeting should be deferred from the 10th to the 21st of March. The interval was successfully employed in obtaining a repeal of the resolution.

It would seem probable that the dispositions of congress on the subject of an exchange, did not correspond with those of General Washington. From the fundamental principle of the military establishment of the United States at its commencement, an exchange of prisoners would necessarily strengthen the British, much more than the American army. The war having been carried on by troops raised for short times, aided by militia, the American prisoners, when exchanged, returned to their homes as citizens, while those of the enemy again took the field.

General Washington, who was governed by a policy more just, and more permanently beneficial, addressed himself seriously to congress, urging, as well the injury done the public faith, and his own personal honour, by this infraction of a solemn engagement, as the cruelty and impolicy of a system which must cut off for ever all hopes of an exchange, and render imprisonment as lasting as the war. He represented in strong terms the effect such a measure must have on the troops on whom they should thereafter be compelled chiefly to rely, and its impression on the friends of those already in captivity. These remonstrances produced the desired effect, and the resolutions were repealed. The commissioners met according to the second appointment; but, on examining their powers, it appeared that those given by General Washington were expressed to be in virtue of the authority vested in him; while those given by Sir William Howe contained no such declaration.

This omission produced an objection on the part of the United States; but General Howe refused to change the language, alleging that he designed the treaty to be of a personal nature, founded on the mutual confidence and honour of the contracting generals; and had no intention either to bind his government, or to extend the cartel beyond the limits and duration of his own command.

This explanation being unsatisfactory to the American commissioners, and General Howe persisting in his refusal to make the required alteration in his powers, the negotiation was broken off, and this fair prospect of terminating the distresses of numerous unfortunate persons passed away, without effecting the good it had promised.

Some time after the failure of this negotiation for a general cartel, Sir William Howe proposed that all prisoners actually exchangeable should be sent in to the nearest posts, and returns made of officer for officer of equal rank, and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would admit; and that if a surplus of officers, should remain, they should be exchanged for an equivalent in privates.

On the representations of General Washington, congress acceded to this proposition, so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer, and soldier for soldier; but rejected the part which admitted an equivalent in privates for a surplus of officers, because the officers captured with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of General Howe. Under this agreement, an exchange took place to a considerable extent; but as the Americans had lost more prisoners than they had taken, unless the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation, many of their troops were still detained in captivity.