UPON THE EASTERN ARCHIPELAGO. It is with diffidence that I take up my pen to offer a few remarks upon the prospects afforded to our commerce and manufactures by the opening of the Eastern Archipelago. Hitherto I have done little more than narrate what I have seen, and have seldom made any attempt to express what I have thought. However, as my thoughts have been generated from what I have observed, whether I am correct or not in my opinions, I shall venture to lay them before my readers. How it is that until lately we have never taken any notice of this immense archipelago it is difficult to say, unless we are to suppose that, up to the present, the other portions of the inhabited globe have been found sufficient to consume our manufactures as fast as they could be produced. It does appear strange that an assemblage of islands, which, large and small, amounting to about 12,000 in number, equal in territory to any continent, and so populous, for the inhabitants, including the more northern islands, are estimated at fifty millions, should have hitherto been unnoticed, and, at all events, have not attracted the attention of our government. Moreover, there are such facilities of communication, not being compelled, as with the Chinese, Latterly we have been at some trouble and expence in forcing our trade with China, little aware that almost in the route to China we had an opening for commerce, which, in a few years, judiciously managed, will become by far the most lucrative of the two, and what perhaps is still more important, may be the means of a most extended trade with China, as we can drive the Chinese from the archipelago, and supply China from them ourselves; but of that hereafter. It was the settlement at Sincapore which first gave us a notion of the trade which might be carried on with this archipelago. Every year large fleets of prahus have come up to Sincapore laden with commodities for barter, and have taken in exchange European goods to a certain extent; but their chief object has been to obtain gunpowder and shot, to carry on their piratical expeditions. In fact, they are traders when they can only obtain what they want by exchange; but when they can obtain it by force, they then change their character, and become pirates. But our possession of Labuan has brought us about eight hundred miles nearer to these people, and enables us to take more effectual steps towards the suppression of piracy than we have hitherto done; for this we may lay down as an axiom, that we never shall reap the advantages promised to us by commerce in this archipelago till we have most effectually put an end to the piracy which has existed in these quarters for centuries. Before I go on, I cannot help here observing how much this country is indebted The largest, and perhaps the most important of the islands in this archipelago, although at present the most barbarous, and the most hostile to us, is that of Papua, or New Guinea. The inhabitants are as well inclined to commerce as the other natives of the archipelago, and do at present carry on a considerable trade with the Chinese, who repair there every year in their junks, which they fill with valuable cargoes adapted for the Chinese market. The Chinese have found the trade with New Guinea so lucrative, that they are doing all that they can to secure the monopoly of it, and with this view take every occasion, and do all that they possibly can, to blacken the character of the Europeans in the minds of the inhabitants. It is to this cause that the Papuan's hostility to Europeans, and especially to the English, is to be ascribed; and before we have any chance of commerce with this people, it is necessary that the Chinese should be driven away from the island, that they may no longer injure us by their malicious fabrications. This will be but a just retribution for the falsehoods and lies which they have circulated to our disadvantage. And there is another reason why we should be little scrupulous in taking this measure, which is, that one of their principal articles of commerce with the Papuans consists in slaves, which are taken on board by the Chinese, and sold at Borneo, and the adjacent islands of the archipelago, at a great profit. To obtain these slaves, the Chinese stimulate the Papuan tribes to war with each other, as is done for the same purpose in Africa. As this traffic is very considerable, and we are as Borneo is, however, the island (or continent) to which our first attention will be particularly devoted. Up to the present we know little of it except its coasts and a portion of its rivers; but it is here that our principal attention must be given, as in its rivers and the island of Sooloo the chief piratical hordes exist. We have already had some sharp conflicts with them, and have given them some severe lessons; but although we have given them a momentary check, and some idea of our immense superiority, we must not imagine that two or three successful conflicts are sufficient to put an end to a system which has been carried on for centuries, and which is so universal, that the whole of the present generation may be said to have been "born pirates." In fact, we shall be compelled to subdue them wholly, to destroy them in all their fastnesses, to leave them without a prahu in their possession, to depose or confine their chiefs, to destroy their forts, and to carry on a war of extermination for some years, before we shall put down the piratical system which at present exists. It is not quite so easy a task as may be imagined to reform so many millions of people: for it must be remembered that it is not only at Borneo that we shall have to act, but that we must destroy the power of the sultan of Sooloo, and other tribes who frequent other islands, and who follow the same profession. It must not be forgotten that one of the principal objects of these piratical excursions is to procure slaves for sale at other ports; and perhaps this is by far the most profitable part of the speculation. As long as there is no security for the person, commerce must languish, and be proportionably checked. In putting down these marauders, we are, therefore, putting down the slave trade The occupation of Labuan and Sarawak will, I should imagine, prove hardly sufficient to effect the important change to be desired, i. e. that of the total suppression of piracy. Stations, with forts, must be established at the mouths of the principal rivers, that we may have a constant watch upon the movements of the occupants. In so doing In our first attempts to establish, a peaceful and secure commerce with this archipelago, it appears to me that it would be advisable for the Government to take some share in the venture. Ten or twelve schooners, well manned, confided to intelligent officers, and armed with one heavy gun, and swivels in the gunwales, should sail for Labuan, with assorted cargoes, with the view of both trading and checking piracy. Much depends upon the way in which the barter is first commenced, and it would be as well that it should not be left in the hands of adventurers, whose mercenary feelings might induce them to excite doubt or irritation in the minds of the natives, and, by such means, do great mischief, and impede the trade. The constant appearance of these vessels in the archipelago, the knowledge that they were sent, not only to barter, but also to protect the well-disposed against violence and rapine, would soon produce most beneficial effects, and would impose confidence. Merchant vessels which entered the trade should be empowered, by letters of marque, to put down piracy, and should be armed in a similar way. Although there is little doubt but that in a short time vessels would sail from Labuan with full cargoes for Europe, still it is more than probable that the most important part of the trade, and which would employ most vessels, would The expedition of Mr. Murray to the river Coti, on the south side of Borneo, although, from imprudence, it ended not only unsuccessfully but tragically, fully establishes that an opening for commerce is to be established. In this expedition Mr. Murray, by his imprudence and unguarded conduct, brought upon himself the attack of the natives, in which he lost his own life, and the vessels with great difficulty escaped. Since that failure, no English vessels have attempted to trade to the south of Borneo; but we discovered that the Macassar boats paid the coast an occasional visit, under Dutch colours, exchanging beads and other trumpery for rich cargoes of ivory and skins. We also discovered that commercial negotiations with this country would not be attended with any risk, provided that the vessels employed were well armed, and the arrangements European manufactures would be eagerly purchased by the natives, and would be paid for in ivory, rough ores, or dollars. Mr. Wyndham, who has settled at Sooloo, has already sent a vessel to trade on the south-east side of the island, near Gonong Tabor. So much for the southern portion of this immense archipelago. We have still to examine the more northern. Indeed, when we look upon the map, and see the quantity of territory with which we may eventually find the means of trading,—the millions who, but for the jealousy of the governments, would be glad to receive our manufactures,—we are lost in conjecture as to what extent it might eventually be driven. In the north we should certainly have more difficulties to contend with; and it will require that the whole of the naval force in India should be, for a time, devoted to this object. I believe it is as much from their utter ignorance of our power, as from any other cause, that we have hitherto been so unsuccessful at Japan; but the object we have in view may be effected, provided that a certain degree of the fortiter in re be combined with the suaviter in modo. The Japanese now carry on a large trade with China, and also a confined trade with the Dutch, to whom they have allowed a factory upon a small island; but they treat the Dutch with the greatest indignity, and the Dutch submit to it, and, in so doing, have rendered the Europeans vile in the estimation of the Japanese. This is the error which must be destroyed by some means or other, even if it should be necessary to pick a quarrel with them, as we have already done with the Chinese. At the same time that I admit the expediency of so doing, I by no means assert that we shall be altogether justified. There is another point worthy of consideration, which is, that a whale fishery dÉpÔt might be made with great success in this archipelago, I shall conclude with a reflection which I made while I was on the coast, leaving the reader to agree with me or not, as he may be disposed. How is it, as I have already observed, that all the colonies founded by other nations, either languish or have been swept away,—not all, perhaps, as yet, but the major portion of them; while every colony founded by our little island appears to flourish, till it becomes so powerful as not only no longer to require the nursing of the mother country, but to throw off its dependence, and become a nation of itself? How is it that it can so truly be said that the sun never sets upon the English flag? It cannot be from any want of energy, or activity, or intelligence, or judgment in other nations; for surely in these qualifications we are not superior to the French or to the Dutch, although we may be to the present race of Spaniards and Portuguese. Our colonies have not been more carefully fostered than theirs: on the contrary, they have been neglected, and, if not neglected, they have been but too often oppressed. Why, then, should this be? Can religion have any thing to do with this? Can it be that Providence has imperceptibly interfered, and has decided that England FOOTNOTES: THE END. London: TRANSCRIBER'S NOTES: The author's original (and inconsistent) spelling of place and person names has been preserved, although in some cases, the modern equivalents are substantially different. In the original text, most illustration captions had terminating punctuation but a few did not. In this transcription, terminating punctuation has been added to those captions which did not have them in order to remain consistent with the style most commonly seen in the text. Lithographs facing pages 85, 142, 199 and 201 were missing a line specifying the publisher "Longman & Co" which is present in the other lithographs. It is possible that the pages used for this transcription had been physically truncated. The original appearance of the physical page has been preserved and the publisher line, if missing, has not been added. Inconsistencies in hyphenation of words preserved. (orang outang, orang-outang; blowpipe, blow-pipe; bow-man, bowman; daylight, day-light; flagstaff, flag-staff; goodwill, good-will; gunshot, gun-shot; lighthouse, light-house; parang, pa-rang; pineapples, pine-apples; tomtoms, tom-toms; whitewashed, white-washed; pic nic, pic-nic; Nepa palm, nepa-palms) In the original text, the characters in abbreviations were separated by either a half-space or a full-space. This has been standardized to a full-space in all cases for this transcription. Pg. 19, unusual or archaic spelling of "musquitos" retained. (musquitos, scorpions, lizards, and centipedes) Pg. 20, there is a reference to date 27th May. Context suggests it should probably be 27th July. The original text has been preserved. (On the 27th May every thing had been prepared) Pg. 21, "wth" changed to "with". (delightful bay studded with small) Pg. 35, unusual or archaic spelling of "phrensy" retained. (The lovers were in a state of phrensy) Pg. 90, unusual or archaic spelling of "segars" retained. (We had plenty of wine and segars) Pg. 206, word after comma begins with uppercase, most probably it represents the start of an unspoken thought in the author's mind. Original text retained. (and we became more rational, Why were we ordered home?) Pg. 211, "dÉpot". On Pgs. 227 and 230, it is spelled "dÉpÔt". Original spelling preserved in all cases. |