Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban, son of Albin le Prestre and AimÉe Carmagnol, was born May 1, or, by other accounts, May 15, 1633, at St. Leger-de-Foucheret, a small village between Saulieu and Avallon, in the province of Burgundy. He became an orphan at an early age, his father having lost both his life and fortune in the public service. Under the protection and instruction of M. de Fontaines, prior of St. John at Semur, he acquired some knowledge of geometry, a science then but little cultivated among military men. At seventeen years of age he deserted his home, and entered as a volunteer in the regiment of CondÉ, then employed in the Spanish service, in which his zeal and abilities soon procured him a commission. Nor was it long before he showed his talent for the science of engineering. In 1652 he was employed in the erection of the fortifications of Clermont, in Lorraine; and the same year, serving at the first siege of S^te. Menehould, he made several lodgments, and during the assault swam the river under the enemy’s fire. Public notice was taken of this exploit; and by this means Vauban’s family heard, for the first time, that he had embraced the military profession. In 1653 he was taken prisoner by a French corps, and conducted to Cardinal Mazarin, who thought it worth while to purchase his services with a lieutenancy in the regiment of Bourgogne. In the same year he served as an engineer under the Chevalier de Clerville, at the second siege of S^te. Menehould; and the charge of repairing the fortifications of that town, when retaken by the troops of Louis XIV., was confided to him.

In May, 1655, Vauban received his commission as engineer, and in the following year he was rewarded for his services with the command of a company in the regiment of the MarÉchal de la FertÉ. Not to mention the numerous situations in which he bore an active but subordinate part, we proceed at once to the year 1658, in which he had the chief direction of the sieges of Gravelines, Ypres, and Oudenarde; where, being free to act on his own opinions, yet still doubting his strength, he showed, by judicious though slight innovations, what might be ultimately expected from his matured experience. He was also charged with the improvement of the port and fortifications of Dunkerque, on the surrender of that once important place to France by the treaty of October 17, 1662.

When the war with Spain was renewed in 1667, Vauban had the principal direction of the sieges at which Louis XIV. presided in person. At Douay he received a musket-wound in his cheek, the scar of which is preserved by Coisevox and Lebrun in his bust and portraits. The capture of Lille, after only nine days of open trenches, procured for him a lieutenancy in the Guards and a pension, accompanied with the far more gratifying commendations of his sovereign. Hostilities were ended by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1668, in which year he prepared designs for the citadel of Lille, for Ath, and several other places; and in 1669 the king appointed him governor of the citadel of Lille, the first reward of this description created in France.

Soon after the peace Vauban accompanied the minister Louvois on a mission to the Duke of Savoy, and furnished plans for the fortifications of Verrue, Verceil, and the citadel of Turin. Returning to Flanders, the works of Dunkerque were prosecuted under his immediate direction with unexampled activity. Three corps of 10,000 men relieved each other daily, every four hours, proceeding from the camp with their arms, and resuming them on the completion of their task. In the midst of these labours he prepared his first work on the attack of fortresses, for the instruction of Louvois, pointing out in it many of the errors committed in former sieges, and proposing remedies for them.

The war with Holland, which commenced in 1672, afforded Vauban many opportunities of displaying his superior abilities. Louis again took the field in person; and again Vauban had the principal direction of the sieges of which the king was a spectator. Previous to the siege of Maestricht, in 1673, the regular method of assaulting a fortified place was to excavate a trench parallel to the general contour of the fortress, and from batteries erected near it to fire indiscriminately on the works and the town. On this occasion Vauban introduced three parallel trenches, connected by oblique or zigzag approaches, which enabled him to place large bodies of infantry near the head of his attack, each successive parallel more closely shutting in the garrison, and restraining their offensive operations.

In 1674 Vauban was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. In the following year he had the magnanimity to second with his recommendation the ineffectual application made by his rival, Coehorn, for employment by the French government.

In 1676 Vauban’s services were rewarded with the rank of Major-General; and in 1677 the mode of attack adopted at Maestricht was perfected at Valenciennes, where the fronts attacked were completely shut in by the parallels, the flanks of which rested on the Scheldt and the marsh of Bourlin.

At this siege it was determined to assault an earthen crown-work, and Vauban proposed to make the attack during the day. Five Marshals of France, Louvois, Monsieur, and even the king himself, opposed this advice. Vauban was immoveable; he maintained that it was the only way to avoid confusion and mistakes, to surprise the enemy, and to overpower him by opposing fresh troops to his wearied garrison. “Night,” said he, “has no shame! Open day and the eye of the commander restrain the cowardly, animate the feeble, and add fresh courage to the brave.” The king at length yielded to his arguments. The enemy was found, as he had predicted, harassed with watching, sleeping, or absent in the fortress seeking provisions. The crown-work, and a ravelin which served as an interior intrenchment, were successively carried. The enemy, retreating into the PatÉ, an extensive irregular work covering the place, was promptly pursued. Four grenadiers got possession of a sally port, while others entered by a subterraneous passage. The besieged fled into the body of the place, and raised the bridge. An immediate and vigorous assault soon placed the disputed works in the possession of the assailants, who, pushing forward to the canal which traverses the city, intrenched themselves in the houses bordering it. They were strongly and speedily supported, and thus the place was taken at a single assault, justifying Vauban’s advice, even beyond his most sanguine expectations. His services on this occasion were rewarded with a gratuity of 25,000 crowns.

Cambray was besieged next. The town surrendered after a few nights of open trenches. The citadel was then attacked. Du Metz proposed assaulting the ravelin: Vauban opposed this counsel, representing that the strength of the work, and the vigour of the defence, prescribed an attack en rÈgle. “Sire,” said he to the king, “you will lose some one who is of more value than the ravelin.” The success at Valenciennes inspired the troops with temerity: assault was given, the ravelin was carried, and a lodgment in it was commenced; but the enemy brought a heavy fire to bear on the work and its approaches, and then sallying forth speedily drove back the assailants. Du Metz reproached Parisot, the engineer who traced the lodgment, with having caused the failure of the attack. Vauban however insisted that the work was lost, not through any vice in the lodgment, but because the assault could not be sufficiently supported. The siege was then proceeded with in the ordinary manner, and the ravelin secured with the loss of five men only. “I will believe you another time,” said the king to Vauban, and he kept his word. A practicable breach being made, Louis expressed his intention of giving no quarter to the three thousand men who formed the garrison, and had so vigorously defended themselves. Vauban alone ventured to oppose his views, representing that such conduct was contrary to the usages of warfare among civilized nations; that the place would be taken, but would cost more bloodshed; and, “Sire,” he added, “I would rather have preserved 100 soldiers to your majesty than have deprived the enemy of 3000.”

Vauban succeeded to the Chevalier de Clerville, as Commissary-General of the Fortifications of France, in December, 1677. In 1678 he received the congratulations of Colbert on the success attending the execution of his projects for the improvement of the Port of Dunkerque, which, having been previously used only by fishermen, was now made accessible to vessels carrying forty guns. It would be useless to reckon all the labours of this part of his life: the fortifications of Maubeuge, Thionville, Sarre-Louis, Phalzbourg, BÉfort, and the citadel of Strasburg, were among the new works projected by him, while all the principal ports and fortifications of France were more or less improved by his master-hand.

The war of 1683 contributed to the increase of Vauban’s reputation. The siege of Luxemburg, in 1684, was carried on under his direction; and he here displayed an admirable presence of mind when discovered one evening by the enemy, in reconnoitring the works of the place. He instantly made a signal to them not to fire, and, instead of retreating, advanced towards them; they mistook him for one of their own officers, and having skirted the glacis, he retired slowly without exciting further suspicion. After having surmounted the many difficulties presented by the nature of the ground over which the attack was necessarily carried, the assailants attained the covered way. To drive the enemy out of its long branches, Vauban caused elevated parapets to be constructed on their prolongations, whence a plunging musketry-fire was thrown into the covered way, and the mass of its defenders were compelled to retreat; the few who remained concealed behind the traverses being gradually dislodged, as the crowning of the covered way was extended along the crest of the glacis. This siege was remarkable both for the difficulties which were overcome, and for the improvements made in the method of conducting an attack and protecting the troops employed in it.

The new fortresses of Mont-Royal, Landau, and Fort Louis, together with extensive projects for the improvement of the canal of Languedoc, formed part of Vauban’s labours during the truce of Ratisbon. He likewise prepared a general project for the improvement and defence of all the ports, roadsteads, and coasts of France. To his exertions the French are indebted for the first general statistical account of their country, he having caused blank forms to be prepared and printed, which he distributed, to be filled up by the several intendants, governors, and other public functionaries with whom his frequent journeys through the country in the execution of his ordinary duties brought him acquainted. Louis XIV. afterwards caused these returns to be made generally throughout France.

The war of 1688 commenced with the siege of Philisbourg, where the Dauphin commanded in person, and Vauban directed the attacks. He here tried the effect of firing en ricochet, of which he was the original proposer. The superiority of this method of attack was not so decisively shown in this first instance as on subsequent occasions: still it proved so far effectual in subduing the fire of the town, as to cause its surrender after twenty-four days of open trenches. The Duc de Montausier said in a letter to the Dauphin, “I do not offer you my congratulation on the fall of Philisbourg: you had a good army, mortars, guns, and Vauban.” On the same occasion, Louis XIV. wrote thus to the successful engineer:—“You know, long since, in what estimation I hold you, and the confidence I have both in your knowledge and affection. Believe that I do not forget the services you render me, and that I am particularly pleased with your conduct at Philisbourg. If you reciprocate the feelings of my son you must be on the best of terms, for I feel assured that he, equally with myself, knows how to esteem and value you. I cannot conclude without earnestly recommending you to preserve yourself for the benefit of my service.”

Manheim and Franckenthal were next besieged and taken. On the surrender of the latter, the Dauphin presented Vauban with four pieces of artillery, to be selected by him from the arsenals of the conquered fortresses, to ornament his chateau of Bazoches. He was this year promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. The difficulty with which the obstacles presented at the siege of Philisbourg were overcome, induced Vauban to renew, with greater earnestness, his project for the formation of a corps of sappers, originally suggested shortly after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. Louvois, though he yielded to Vauban’s arguments in favour of this new force, postponed its formation, and subsequent events prevented his adding this to the other establishments which he created.

When the reverses suffered by the French armies in 1689, the disordered finances, and the exhausted resources of the kingdom, had reduced Louis XIV. to the greatest difficulties, Vauban alone had courage to propose the re-establishment of the edict of Nantes. In a manuscript addressed to Louvois, he says, “Forcible conversions, and the belief that they yield no faith to sacraments, the profanation of which they make a jest, have inspired an universal horror of the conduct of the clergy. If it is resolved to proceed, either the new Protestants must be exterminated as rebels, or banished as madmen: both execrable projects, opposed to every Christian virtue, dangerous to religion itself; for persecution propagates sects, as was proved when, after the massacre of St. Bartholomew, a new census showed that the Protestants had increased in number not less than 110,000.” He proposed, therefore, to re-establish, purely and simply, the edict of Nantes; to restore all civil rights to the Protestants and their clergy; to recall the one from exile; to deliver the others from the galleys; to leave their consciences free; and to permit the re-opening and rebuilding of their places of worship.

After the fall of Mons, in 1691, Vauban greatly strengthened that fortress; placing outworks in the marshes, inaccessible to an enemy, and seeing in reverse all the points of attack.

In 1692 Vauban directed the operations of the siege of Namur, where Coehorn commanded the stronghold of Fort William. The army watched with eagerness this struggle between the rival engineers, one of whom defended his own work. Fort William was soon taken, and the triumph rested with Vauban. The order of St. Louis, the first restricted to the reward of military distinction, was instituted before the campaign of 1693. It is said to have been suggested by Vauban, who was one of the seven Grand Crosses named at its creation.

In 1693 he conducted, with his usual skill, the siege of Charleroi, a place which he had fortified, and of which he might well be supposed to know the weakest points; yet it was confidently believed among the besiegers that their celebrated engineer had at last made a mistake, in having selected the strongest fronts as points of attack. Vauban soon convinced them of their error, by the capture of Charleroi.

The system of ricochet firing, devised at Philisbourg, and employed with various success at subsequent sieges, was fully developed at the siege of Ath, in 1697, when Vauban placed his first batteries in the second parallel with such good effect as to reduce the place to surrender after only three days of open trenches.

During the peace of Ryswick, Vauban made a tour of the northern frontiers, in which he was occupied three years, preparing projects for canals and various other public works, as well as for the improvement of existing and the construction of new fortresses; among others, of Neuf-Brisach, his last work, in which he improved on his system of tower bastions, previously applied at BÉfort and Landau. In 1699 he was elected an honorary member of the French Academy; and, January 2, 1703, was promoted to the rank of Marshal of France; a dignity which he modestly wished to decline, lest it might, at a future period, deprive him of the opportunity of serving his country.

In the autumn of 1703 Vieux-Brisach was besieged by the army under the orders of the Duc de Bourgogne, who is reported to have thus addressed Vauban:—“Monsieur MarÉchal, you must lose your honour before this place: for either we shall take it, and if so, they will say you have fortified it badly; or we shall fail, and they will then say that you have ill assisted me.” “Monseigneur,” replied Vauban, “it is already known how I have fortified Brisach; they have yet to learn how you will take the places I have fortified.” The siege lasted only thirteen days, and was the last at which Vauban served. The following year he presented to the Duc de Bourgogne his treatise on the Attack of Fortresses, first published at the Hague by Pierre Dehoult, in 1737.

When Turin was attacked, in 1706, M. de la Feuillade rejected the project of attack submitted by Vauban, and the result was, that a perfect investment was not completed until after three months’ fighting. Louis XIV., annoyed at the duration of the siege, and at the progress of Prince Eugene, sent for Vauban, who, after pointing out the faults of the attack, offered to give his assistance as a volunteer. “Recollect,” said the king, “that this employment is beneath your dignity.” “Sire,” replied Vauban, “my dignity consists in serving my country. I will leave my baton at the door, and perhaps may assist M. de la Feuillade in taking the city.” La Feuillade refused the proffered aid, lest he should have to share with Vauban the honour of taking Turin: an honour, however, which he did not acquire, being forced to raise the siege after ninety-seven days of open trenches.

From the period of Vauban’s promotion to the dignity of Marshal of France, his active labours in the public service were necessarily much less numerous; much of his time being devoted to the arrangement of his numerous memoranda, projects, &c., a compilation extending to twelve volumes, entitled ‘Mes OisivetÉs,’ of which however seven volumes are lost. In 1706, after the battle of Ramillies, he was sent to command at Dunkerque, and on the coast of Flanders, where, by his presence, he reassured the timid, and prevented the destruction of a tract of land which it was proposed to inundate, in order to avert an attack on Dunkerque. This he did more effectually by forming an entrenched camp between that place and Borgues.

The imperfect defence of several of the fortresses of France during the same campaign induced him to commence a treatise on the defence of fortresses, which he did not live to complete.

The Duc de St. Simon affirms that Vauban’s days were shortened by chagrin, at having displeased his sovereign by the publication of his scheme of taxation, entitled Dixme Royale, and that Louis XIV. was so much offended as to be indifferent to the loss of a man beloved by his countrymen, and celebrated throughout Europe. According to Dangeau, on the contrary, so soon as Louis heard of Vauban’s illness, he sent his principal physician to attend him. Fontenelle distinctly states that his death, which took place March 30, 1707, was occasioned by an inflammation of the lungs.

An authorized edition of Vauban’s treatise on the Attack and Defence of Fortresses was published, in 1829, by M. le Baron de ValazÉ. His other works principally consisted of projects for the defence and improvement of France, and many of them are preserved in the depÔt, of fortifications, and in the collection of M. de Rosambo. A list of Vauban’s works may be found in the notes to ‘L’Histoire du Corps ImpÉrial du GÉnie, par A. Allent,’ the best authority for an account of his labours; the Eloges of Fontenelle and Carnot may also be consulted. Honest, independent, humane, Vauban is characterised by Voltaire as the “first of engineers and best of citizens.” The industry of his life may be estimated from the calculation that he improved, more or less, three hundred fortified or trading places, built thirty-three new fortresses, conducted fifty-three sieges, and was present in a hundred and fifty actions, greater or less.