The importance of the subject treated in this study, as well as the prominent part played by the Australian evidence in the problem of kinship, will, it is believed, amply justify a detailed inquiry into the institution of the family in Australia. It is, however, always desirable for a monograph like the present one, besides being a mere collection and description of facts, to have a sufficiently wide theoretical scope. It ought to demonstrate some general principle upon the particular example treated, and to approach the problem from a new standpoint.

I wish here shortly to indicate how far a slight and imperfect attempt in this direction has been made. In describing the facts of family life in Australia I have tried to show that even if the problems of origins and development of an institution be put aside and the inquiry be limited to the actual facts (in this case to the actual working of the aboriginal kinship organization), there are plenty of subjects of great theoretical importance, some of which, as yet not fully considered by sociologists. On the other hand, I have tried to show that in dealing with purely sociological problems it is necessary, in order to do justice to the complexity and fulness of social phenomena, to draw into the field of inquiry a series of facts often hitherto partially or completely neglected. The facts of daily life, the emotional side of family relations, the magico-religious ideas of the aborigines about kinship and sexual relations, customary as well as legal norms—all these factors must be taken impartially into careful consideration in order to give the full picture of an institution as it embraces living man in a living society. In other words each social institution must be studied in all its complex social functions as well as in its reflexion in the collective psychology.

As a matter of fact, by a certain tendency to fanciful construction, natural in all early speculations about a new domain of facts, many problems in the study of primitive kinship have been artificially simplified, others unduly complicated and obscured. Thus, for instance, when in the discussion of primitive forms of marriage the whole problem of the position of the children and of the emotional attitude of the parents towards them has been neglected; or when different legal terms have been applied to undifferentiated societies and legal ideas attributed to primitive man, without asking how far and under what conditions this may be done; or, again, when the sexual aspect has been treated as the only essential feature of marriage. On the other hand, the concepts of "primitive promiscuity," "descent through females only," "mother-right" and "father-right" have proved meaningless and abstruse; the two latter, of course, as far only as they have been used in the majority of cases without a satisfactory definition.

It is easy to see why such somewhat artificial conceptions have found their way into the study of primitive marriage and kinship. In the early days of these studies work had been done not by specialists, who would try to apply to a new set of problems new methods, but by men learned in other branches of science, who looked at the facts, not full in the face, but from a peculiar and often remote standpoint. The illustrious founder of these studies on the Continent, the Swiss savant Bachofen, was a student of history of law and classical culture, and he was chiefly concerned with establishing the primitive mother-right of the prehistoric Greeks and Romans. The chief theoretical interest of the eminent ethnographer Morgan was the unravelling of the riddle of primitive forms of marriage out of the invaluable material contained in his tables of kinship terms. McLennan assigns a prominent place in his investigations to factors which had hardly ever played a very important part in primitive society, as, for instance, marriage by capture, female infanticide and levirate. It is evident that in all these and similar speculations the chief attention was not drawn to the actual working of the social mechanism, but to survivals, rudiments and fictitious primeval conditions. And the method of sociological thinking has not been developed upon living social forms, but upon shadows and petrified remains. Whenever concrete institutions have been theoretically treated, they were approached with preconceived ideas, as, for instance, in the well-known monograph of Fison and Howitt, and in the book of Herr H. Cunow—both works relating to Australian kinship organization. When reading the theoretical chapters of the latter, one has the impression that the Australian tribes were a museum of sociological fossils from various ancient epochs of which the petrified form has been rigidly preserved, but into whose inner nature it is quite hopeless to inquire. The understanding of actual facts is sacrificed to sterile speculation upon a hypothetical earlier state of things.

Prof. Tylor's well-known article (Journ. Anthrop. Inst. xviii.) was, perhaps, the first protest against this loose and far-fetched treatment of the subject. He based his method of research on the firm ground of a statistical survey of facts, and his method of reasoning on the philosophically sound principle of inquiring into the mutual dependence of phenomena.

The whole problem has been set on a new basis and its treatment recast in the fundamental treatise of Prof. Westermarck on the History of Human Marriage. Several of the most important aspects of the question which had been omitted in the speculations of the previous writers have received in it their full treatment; in taking into account, in its manifold aspects, the biological basis of the problem he has shown how many of the current conceptions about primitive marriage and kinship could not hold good in the light of a closer criticism. Besides this merely critical contribution, and besides the biological argument, the History of Human Marriage constitutes a valuable addition to the purely sociological treatment of the problem. By resolving the problem of marriage into that of family, by pointing to the importance of the relations between parents and children, of the mode of living, etc., the author has shown that marriage is rooted in a complex of sociological conditions, and that there are many points to be treated before we arrive at definite conclusions and broad generalizations.

Another important aspect of the problem has received its full treatment by Mr. Crawley in his study of primitive marriage (the Mystic Rose; compare the note in the Addenda at the end of this volume). Working out thoroughly some conceptions suggested already by Prof. Frazer in his Golden Bough, the author has shown the social importance of the ideas about human relations and in particular about sexual relations as held by primitive man.

The tendency towards a reform in the method of sociological treatment of kinship and family has been shown not only from the side of purely theoretical writers. Some of the modern field workers, who happily for our science are at the same time distinguished scholars, have achieved a considerable advance in the method of collecting evidence. This refers in the first place to the Cambridge School of Ethnology, whose members under the lead of Dr. Haddon have obtained such remarkable results from their work in the Torres Straits Islands. Dr. Rivers, who specially worked out the chapter on kinship in the joint publication of this Expedition, has, by the introduction of the genealogical method of inquiry as well as by the systematic study of the functions of kin, given perhaps the most useful instruments of inquiry into the social working of family and kinship organization. Thus both our theoretical conceptions and our methods of getting at the facts are certainly approaching more and more the first postulate of scientific study: the possibility of an adequate description of facts and their mutual dependences as they exist now in living primitive societies. Only on a basis of such knowledge are further speculations fruitful.

As regards the general principles of sociological method much has been done in recent times by the French school of sociology, grouped round the editor of the AnnÉe Sociologique. The important question, how methodically to present evidence, has received its full attention in the excellent works of Dr. Steinmetz and his pupil, Dr. Nieboer, which are examples of a clear and conclusive way of utilizing ethnological sources. I am glad to acknowledge my intellectual indebtedness to both these schools.

I have tried to collect sufficiently complete evidence, and in this endeavour have used some of the older sources whose trustworthiness might perhaps be disputed. But many of their observations are highly valuable if properly interpreted; and moreover it was necessary to bring their statements into line with the newer evidence for the sake of critical comparison, as much of what they say has been uncritically accepted and given without reference by some secondhand compilers (for instance, Waitz-Gerland, vol. vi.; Cunow) and hence found its way into the newer sociological literature.

The statements I have taken from the different authors are quoted at length, and I do not think that I have thus uselessly increased the bulk of the volume. By an unprejudiced collection of evidence, which is, moreover, presented in a manner independent of, and accessible without reference to, the theoretical discussion, I hope to have given a useful compilation of observations which may serve for further theoretical purposes other than those of the present writer.

In order to make short and yet clear references possible a list of the works quoted is given at the end. With its help the short indications in the footnotes will be perfectly plain. In this place I wish to express my deep gratitude to Mr. J. Martin White, whose munificence has made the publication of this book possible. As a student of sociology at the University of London I am indebted to Mr. Martin White, who, as it is well known, has founded the chairs of Sociology at this university, and furthers these studies in various ways—not the least by his personal contact with and interest shown in the students and their work.

I had, while working on the present book, the privilege of personal intercourse with Prof. Westermarck, a privilege I value more than I can express. I owe much to Dr. Rivers for the constant aid and counsel generously given me during my studies. Much assistance was given to me by Mr. Wheeler, who freely put at my disposal his extensive knowledge of the subject. I have to thank Dr. Tallqvist for several important remarks upon some pages of my proofs.

But my debt is the greatest to Miss Helena Hadley, without whose kind help I could not have overcome the difficulties of writing in what is for me an acquired tongue. Her advice and criticism, both as regards style and thought, were quite invaluable for me, and this is only a feeble acknowledgment of my indebtedness and feelings of gratitude.

B. M.