An ancient philosopher once remarked that people who cudgelled their brains about the nature of the moon reminded him of men who discussed the laws and institutions of a distant city of which they had heard no more than the name. The true philosopher, he said, should turn his glance within, should study himself and his notions of right and wrong; only thence could he derive real profit. This ancient formula for happiness might be restated in the familiar words of the Psalm: "Dwell in the land, and verily thou shalt be fed." To-day, if he could rise from the dead and walk about among us, this philosopher would marvel much at the different turn which matters have taken. The motions of the moon and the other heavenly bodies are accurately known. Our knowledge of the motions of our own body is by far not so complete. The mountains and natural divisions of the moon have been accurately outlined on maps, but physiologists are just beginning to find their way in the geography of the brain. The chemical constitution of many fixed stars has already been investigated. The chemical processes of the animal body are questions of much greater difficulty and complexity. We have our MÉcanique cÉleste. But a MÉcanique sociale or a MÉcanique morale of equal trustworthiness remains to be written. Our philosopher would indeed admit that we have made great progress. But we have not followed his advice. The patient has recovered, but he took for his recovery exactly the opposite of what the doctor prescribed. Humanity is now returned, much wiser, from its journey in celestial space, against which it was so solemnly warned. Men, after having become acquainted with the great and simple facts of the world without, are now beginning to examine critically the world within. It sounds absurd, but it is true, that only after we have thought about the moon are we able to take up ourselves. It was necessary that we should acquire simple and clear ideas in a less complicated domain, before we entered the more intricate one of psychology, and with these ideas astronomy principally furnished us. To attempt any description of that stupendous movement, which, originally springing out of the physical sciences, went beyond the domain of physics and is now occupied with the problems of psychology, would be presumptuous in this place. I shall only attempt here, to illustrate to you by a few simple examples the methods by which the province of psychology can be reached from the facts of the physical world—especially the adjacent province of sense-perception. And I wish it to be remembered that my brief attempt is not to be taken as a measure of the present state of such scientific questions. It is a well-known fact that some objects please us, while others do not. Generally speaking, anything that is constructed according to fixed and logically followed rules, is a product of tolerable beauty. We see thus nature herself, who always acts according to fixed rules, constantly producing such pretty things. Every day the physicist is confronted in his workshop with the most beautiful vibration-figures, tone-figures, phenomena of polarisation, and forms of diffraction. A rule always presupposes a repetition. Repetitions, therefore, will probably be found to play some important part in the production of agreeable effects. Of course, the nature of agreeable effects is not exhausted by this. Furthermore, the repetition of a physical event becomes the source of agreeable effects only when it is connected with a repetition of sensations. An excellent example that repetition of sensations is a source of agreeable effects is furnished by the copy-book of every schoolboy, which is usually a treasure-house of such things, and only in need of an AbbÉ Domenech to become celebrated. Any figure, no matter how crude or poor, if several times repeated, with the repetitions placed in line, will produce a tolerable frieze. Also the pleasant effect of symmetry is due to the repetition of sensations. Let us abandon ourselves a moment to this thought, yet not imagine when we have developed it, that we have fully exhausted the nature of the agreeable, much less of the beautiful. First, let us get a clear conception of what symmetry is. And in preference to a definition let us take a living picture. You know that the reflexion of an object in a mirror has a great likeness to the object itself. All its proportions and outlines are the same. Yet there is a difference between the object and its reflexion in the mirror, which you will readily observe. Hold your right hand before a mirror, and you will see in the mirror a left hand. Your right glove will produce its mate in the glass. For you could never use the reflexion of your right glove, if it were present to you as a real thing, for covering your right hand, but only for covering your left. Similarly, your right ear will give as its reflexion a left ear; and you will at once perceive that the left half of your body could very easily be substituted for the reflexion of your right half. Now just as in the place of a missing right ear a left ear cannot be put, unless the lobule of the ear be turned upwards, or the opening into the concha backwards, so, despite all similarity of form, the reflexion of an object can never take the place of the object itself. The reason of this difference between the object and its reflexion is simple. The reflexion appears as far behind the mirror as the object is in front of it. The parts of the object, accordingly, which are nearest the mirror will also be nearest the mirror in the reflexion. Consequently, the succession of the parts in the reflexion will be reversed, as may best be seen in the reflexion of the face of a watch or of a manuscript. It will also be readily seen, that if a point of the object be joined with its reflexion in the image, the line of junction will cut the mirror at right angles and be bisected by it. This holds true of all corresponding points of object and image. If, now, we can divide an object by a plane into two halves so that each half, as seen in the reflecting plane of division, is a reproduction of the other half, such an object is termed symmetrical, and the plane of division is called the plane of symmetry. If the plane of symmetry is vertical, we can say that the body is vertically symmetrical. An example of vertical symmetry is a Gothic cathedral. If the plane of symmetry is horizontal, we can say that the object is horizontally symmetrical. A landscape on the shores of a lake with its reflexion in the water, is a system of horizontal symmetry. Exactly here is a noticeable difference. The vertical symmetry of a Gothic cathedral strikes us at once, whereas we can travel up and down the whole length of the Rhine or the Hudson without becoming aware of the symmetry between objects and their reflexions in the water. Vertical symmetry pleases us, whilst horizontal symmetry is indifferent, and is noticed only by the experienced eye. Whence arises this difference? I say from the fact that vertical symmetry produces a repetition of the same sensation, while horizontal symmetry does not. I shall now show that this is so. Let us look at the following letters: d b q p It is a fact known to all mothers and teachers, that children in their first attempts to read and write, constantly confound d and b, and q and p, but never d and q, or b and p. Now d and b and q and p are the two halves of a vertically symmetrical figure, while d and q, and b and p are two halves of a horizontally symmetrical figure. The first two are confounded; but confusion is only possible of things that excite in us the same or similar sensations. Figures of two flower-girls are frequently seen on the decorations of gardens and of drawing-rooms, one of whom carries a flower-basket in her right hand and the other a flower-basket in her left. All know how apt we are, unless we are very careful, to confound these figures with one another. While turning a thing round from right to left is scarcely noticed, the eye is not at all indifferent to the turning of a thing upside down. A human face which has been turned upside down is scarcely recognisable as a face, and makes an impression which is altogether strange. The reason of this is not to be sought in the unwontedness of the sight, for it is just as difficult to recognise an arabesque that has been inverted, where there can be no question of a habit. This curious fact is the foundation of the familiar jokes played with the portraits of unpopular personages, which are so drawn that in the upright position of the page an exact picture of the person is presented, but on being inverted some popular animal is shown. It is a fact, then, that the two halves of a vertically symmetrical figure are easily confounded and that they therefore probably produce very nearly the same sensations. The question, accordingly, arises, why do the two halves of a vertically symmetrical figure produce the same or similar sensations? The answer is: Because our apparatus of vision, which consists of our eyes and of the accompanying muscular apparatus is itself vertically symmetrical. Whatever external resemblances one eye may have with another they are still not alike. The right eye of a man cannot take the place of a left eye any more than a left ear or left hand can take the place of a right one. By artificial means, we can change the part which each of our eyes plays. (Wheatstone's pseudoscope.) But we then find ourselves in an entirely new and strange world. What is convex appears concave; what is concave, convex. What is distant appears near, and what is near appears far. The left eye is the reflexion of the right. And the light-feeling retina of the left eye is a reflexion of the light-feeling retina of the right, in all its functions. The lense of the eye, like a magic lantern, casts images of objects on the retina. And you may picture to yourself the light-feeling retina of the eye, with its countless nerves, as a hand with innumerable fingers, adapted to feeling light. The ends of the visual nerves, like our fingers, are endowed with varying degrees of sensitiveness. The two retinÆ act like a right and a left hand; the sensation of touch and the sensation of light in the two instances are similar. Examine the right-hand portion of this letter T: namely, T. Instead of the two retinÆ on which this image falls, imagine feeling the object, my two hands. The +, grasped with the right hand, gives a different sensation from that which it gives when grasped with the left. But if we turn our character about from right to left, thus: +, it will give the same sensation in the left hand that it gave before in the right. The sensation is repeated. If we take a whole T, the right half will produce in the right hand the same sensation that the left half produces in the left, and vice versa. The symmetrical figure gives the same sensation twice. If we turn the T over thus: +, or invert the half T thus: L, so long as we do not change the position of our hands we can make no use of the foregoing reasoning. The retinÆ, in fact, are exactly like our two hands. They, too, have their thumbs and index fingers, though they are thousands in number; and we may say the thumbs are on the side of the eye near the nose, and the remaining fingers on the side away from the nose. With this I hope to have made perfectly clear that the pleasing effect of symmetry is chiefly due to the repetition of sensations, and that the effect in question takes place in symmetrical figures, only where there is a repetition of sensation. The pleasing effect of regular figures, the preference which straight lines, especially vertical and horizontal straight lines, enjoy, is founded on a similar reason. A straight line, both in a horizontal and in a vertical position, can cast on the two retinÆ the same image, which falls moreover on symmetrically corresponding spots. This also, it would appear, is the reason of our psychological preference of straight to curved lines, and not their property of being the shortest distance between two points. The straight line is felt, to put the matter briefly, as symmetrical to itself, which is the case also with the plane. Curved lines are felt as deviations from straight lines, that is, as deviations from symmetry. It appears, however, unquestionable that the phenomena mentioned have, in the main, their origin in the peculiar structure of our eyes. It will therefore be seen at once that our notions of what is beautiful and ugly would undergo a change if our eyes were different. Also, if this view is correct, the theory of the so-called eternally beautiful is somewhat mistaken. It can scarcely be doubted that our culture, or form of civilisation, which stamps upon the human body its unmistakable traces, should not also modify our conceptions of the beautiful. Was not formerly the development of all musical beauty restricted to the narrow limits of a five-toned scale? The fact that a repetition of sensations is productive of pleasant effects is not restricted to the realm of the visible. To-day, both the musician and the physicist know that the harmonic or the melodic addition of one tone to another affects us agreeably only when the added tone reproduces a part of the sensation which the first one excited. When I add an octave to a fundamental tone, I hear in the octave a part of what was heard in the fundamental tone. (Helmholtz.) But it is not my purpose to develop this idea fully here. Look at the reflexion of your piano in the mirror. You will at once remark that you have never seen such a piano in the actual world, for it has its high keys to the left and its low ones to the right. Such pianos are not manufactured. If you could sit down at such a piano and play in your usual manner, plainly every step which you imagined you were performing in the upward scale would be executed as a corresponding step in the downward scale. The effect would be not a little surprising. For the practised musician who is always accustomed to hearing certain sounds produced when certain keys are struck, it is quite an anomalous spectacle to watch a player in the glass and to observe that he always does the opposite of what we hear. But still more remarkable would be the effect of attempting to strike a harmony on such a piano. For a melody it is not indifferent whether we execute a step in an upward or a downward scale. But for a harmony, so great a difference is not produced by reversal. I always retain the same consonance whether I add to a fundamental note an upper or a lower third. Only the order of the intervals of the harmony is reversed. In point of fact, when we execute a movement in a major key on our reflected piano, we hear a sound in a minor key, and vice versa. It now remains to execute the experiments indicated. Instead of playing upon the piano in the mirror, which is impossible, or of having a piano of this kind built, which would be somewhat expensive, we may perform our experiments in a simpler manner, as follows: 1) We play on our own piano in our usual manner, look into the mirror, and then repeat on our real piano what we see in the mirror. In this way we transform all steps upwards into corresponding steps downwards. We play a movement, and then another movement, which, with respect to the key-board, is symmetrical to the first. 2) We place a mirror beneath the music in which the notes are reflected as in a body of water, and play according to the notes in the mirror. In this way also, all steps upwards are changed into corresponding, equal steps downwards. 3) We turn the music upside down and read the notes from right to left and from below upwards. In doing this, we must regard all sharps as flats and all flats as sharps, because they correspond to half lines and spaces. Besides, in this use of the music we can only employ the bass clef, as only in this clef are the notes not changed by symmetrical reversal. You can judge of the effect of these experiments from the examples which appear in the annexed musical cut. (Page 102.) The movement which appears in the upper lines is symmetrically reversed in the lower. The effect of the experiments may be briefly formulated. The melody is rendered unrecognisable. The harmony suffers a transposition from a major into a minor key and vice versa. The study of these pretty effects, which have long been familiar to physicists and musicians, was revived some years ago by Von Oettingen. Listen to 1. Listen to 2. Listen to 3. Listen to 4. Listen to 5. Listen to 6. Listen to 7. Listen to 8. (See pages 101 and 103.)] Now, although in all the preceding examples I have transposed steps upward into equal and similar steps downward, that is, as we may justly say, have played for every movement the movement which is symmetrical to it, yet the ear notices either little or nothing of symmetry. The transposition from a major to a minor key is the sole indication of symmetry remaining. The symmetry is there for the mind, but is wanting for sensation. No symmetry exists for the ear, because a reversal of musical sounds conditions no repetition of sensations. If we had an ear for height and an ear for depth, just as we have an eye for the right and an eye for the left, we should also find that symmetrical sound-structures existed for our auditory organs. The contrast of major and minor for the ear corresponds to inversion for the eye, which is also only symmetry for the mind, but not for sensation. By way of supplement to what I have said, I will add a brief remark for my mathematical readers. Our musical notation is essentially a graphical representation of a piece of music in the form of curves, where the time is the abscissÆ, and the logarithms of the number of vibrations the ordinates. The deviations of musical notation from this principle are only such as facilitate interpretation, or are due to historical accidents. If, now, it be further observed that the sensation of pitch also is proportional to the logarithm of the number of vibrations, and that the intervals between the notes correspond to the differences of the logarithms of the numbers of vibrations, the justification will be found in these facts of calling the harmonies and melodies which appear in the mirror, symmetrical to the original ones. I simply wish to bring home to your minds by these fragmentary remarks that the progress of the physical sciences has been of great help to those branches of psychology that have not scorned to consider the results of physical research. On the other hand, psychology is beginning to return, as it were, in a spirit of thankfulness, the powerful stimulus which it received from physics. The theories of physics which reduce all phenomena to the motion and equilibrium of smallest particles, the so-called molecular theories, have been gravely threatened by the progress of the theory of the senses and of space, and we may say that their days are numbered. I have shown elsewhere We possess, however, a sense, which, with respect to the scope of the relations which it can comprehend, is richer than any other. It is our reason. This stands above the senses. It alone is competent to found a permanent and sufficient view of the world. The mechanical conception of the world has performed wonders since Galileo's time. But it must now yield to a broader view of things. A further development of this idea is beyond the limits of my present purpose. One more point and I have done. The advice of our philosopher to restrict ourselves to what is near at hand and useful in our researches, which finds a kind of exemplification in the present cry of inquirers for limitation and division of labor, must not be too slavishly followed. In the seclusion of our closets, we often rack our brains in vain to fulfil a work, the means of accomplishing which lies before our very doors. If the inquirer must be perforce a shoemaker, tapping constantly at his last, it may perhaps be permitted him to be a shoemaker of the type of Hans Sachs, who did not deem it beneath him to take a look now and then at his neighbor's work and to comment on the latter's doings. Let this be my apology, therefore, if I have forsaken for a moment to-day the last of my specialty. |