THE PETERSBURG CAMPAIGN

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January 1951 NMP-PET-7007

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UNION TROOPS ADVANCE ON PETERSBURG
JUNE 15-18, 1864. PORTION OF ORIGINAL CONFEDERATE LINE CAPTURED AND NEW LINE BUILT NEARER CITY
JUNE 22-23, 1864. UNION ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE THE WELDON R. R. TURNED BACK
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JULY 30, 1864. THE CRATER. UNION ATTEMPT TO CAPTURE PETERSBURG BY SURPRISE FAILED.
AUGUST 16-21, 1864. UNION TROOPS CAPTURE THE WELDON R. R.
SEPTEMBER 29-30, 1864. BATTLE OF PEEBLES’ FARM. UNION LINES PUSHED WEST OF THE WELDON R. R.
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OCTOBER 27, 1864. BATTLE OF BURGESS MILL UNION DRIVE TOWARD THE SOUTHSIDE R. R. TURNED BACK
FEBRUARY 5-7, 1865. UNION TROOPS CUT BOYDTON PLANK ROAD AND EXTEND LINE TO HATCHER’S RUN
MARCH 25, 1865. FORT STEDMAN. CONFEDERATE OFFENSIVE FAILS.
APRIL 1, 1865. BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS. UNION VICTORY OPENS WAY TO SOUTHSIDE R. R.
APRIL 2, 1865. UNION FORCES BREAK THROUGH OUTER DEFENSES OF CITY AND REACH APPOMATTOX RIVER
NIGHT OF APRIL 2-3, 1865. CONFEDERATES EVACUATE PETERSBURG AND RETREAT WEST. UNION TROOPS ENTER CITY MORNING OF APRIL 3
UNION ARMY SETS OUT IN IMMEDIATE PURSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES ON APRIL 3

The next step was to send a division of infantry to gain possession of the siege lines north and south of the fallen bastion. When the breach had been sufficiently widened, Southern cavalry were to rush through and destroy telegraphic communication with Grant’s headquarters at City Point. They were also ordered to cut the military railroad. Additional reserves were to follow the cavalry.

The attack was scheduled for the morning of March 25. The 50 axemen and the 300 soldiers who were to make up the advance columns were given strips of white cloth to wear across their breasts in order to tell friend from foe. The officers in charge were given the names of Union officers known to be in the vicinity and were told to shout their assumed names if challenged. Beginning about 3 a. m., Confederates professing to be deserters crossed to the Union pickets with requests to surrender. Their actual purpose was to be near at hand to overwhelm the unsuspecting pickets when the attack began.

At 4 a. m. Gordon gave the signal, and the Confederates sprang forward. At first the attack went as planned. Blue-clad pickets were silenced so effectively that not a shot was fired. Union obstructions were quickly hewn down by the axemen, and the small vanguard of 300 swept through Battery 10 which stood immediately north of Fort Stedman. They then rushed into the fort from the northwest. The sleeping, or partially awakened, occupants were completely surprised and surrendered without a fight. Battery 11 to the south of Fort Stedman was also soon in Confederate hands. Union resistance in this early stage was ineffective, although Battery 11 was recaptured for a brief time.

More Confederates pressed into the torn line. While the three columns set out in the general direction of City Point and along the Prince George Court House Road behind Stedman, other infantry units moved north and south along the Federal emplacements. To the north they captured the fortifications as far as Battery 9 where they were stopped by the Union defenders. In the opposite direction they progressed as far as the ramparts of Fort Haskell. A desperate struggle ensued, but here, too, the Northerners refused to yield. Despite these checks, the Confederates were now in possession of about three-fourths of a mile of the Union line.

In the center of the Confederate attack the three small columns quickly advanced as far as Harrison’s Creek—a small stream which winds its way north to the Appomattox River 650 yards behind Fort Stedman. One of the columns succeeded in crossing the stream and continuing toward a small Union artillery post on the site of what had been Confederate Battery 8, but canister from the post forced the column back to the creek. Confusion took hold of the Confederates who were unable to locate the positions they had been ordered to capture in the rear of the Union line. Artillery fire from Northern guns on a ridge to the east held them on the banks of Harrison’s Creek. By 6 a. m. their forward momentum had been checked.

Union infantry then charged from the ridge to attack the Southerners. The forces joined battle along the banks of Harrison’s Creek and the Confederates were soon forced back to Fort Stedman. For a brief time they held their newly captured positions. At 7:30 a. m. Gen. John F. Hartranft advanced on them with a division of Northern troops. Heavy musket and artillery fire on Gordon’s men threatened them with annihilation unless they retired to their own lines soon. Shortly after 7:30 a. m., Gordon received an order from Lee to withdraw his men. The order was quickly dispatched across the open fields to the soldiers in the captured Union works. By now, however, the line of retreat was raked by a vicious crossfire and many Confederates preferred surrender to withdrawal. About 7:45 a. m., the Union line was completely restored and the forlorn Southern hope of a successful disruption of Northern communications, followed by secret withdrawal from the city, was now lost. Equally bad, if not worse, to the Confederates was the loss of more than 4,000 killed, wounded, and captured as compared to the Union casualties of less than 1,500.

Of the three Confederate plans of action before the Battle of Fort Stedman, now only the second—retreat—was possible. The situation demanded immediate action, for, even as Gordon had been preparing on March 24 to launch his attack, Grant had been engaged in planning more difficulties for the harassed defenders of Petersburg.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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