Benson John Lossing

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american envoys in paris—directory seeking money—talleyrand and his agents—propositions for an apology, loan, and bribe—indignant refusal—attempts to frighten the envoys—two of them ordered out of france—they all leave—excitement in the united states—congress prepares for war—patriotic addresses to the president—hamilton calls washington to the rescue of his country—washington's response—the president perplexed—he turns to washington—appeal of the secretary of war—washington's replies—is appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of the united states—hamilton urges him to accept—the president sends him a commission—secretary of war at mount vernon—washington accepts the appointment—his selection of officers.

The three United States envoys—Pinckney, Gerry, and Marshall—met in Paris on the fourth of October, 1797, and were approached by the wily diplomat, M. de Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, in a spirit not at all pleasing either to their expectations or their desires. They had been sent upon a mission of peace, charged with honorable purposes, and were met with propositions insulting and disgraceful. On their arrival, the envoys sent a joint letter to Talleyrand, informing him of their presence and purposes, and requesting him to appoint a time for receiving copies of their letters of credence. He informed them that he was then engaged upon a report to the Directory on American affairs, and that, when it should be completed, he would inform them what was to be done. At the same time he sent them permits (cards of hospitality) to reside in Paris meanwhile.

The Directory had resolved to extort money from the envoys, if possible; and in the course of a few days after their first communication with Talleyrand, that minister, through secret agents, began to sound them. One of these informed them that he had, as if by accident, learned through Talleyrand's private secretary that the Directory were very much exasperated at the tone of the president's speech at the opening of the special session of Congress. Another, a partner in a noted commercial house in Paris, volunteered to answer their drafts to any amount; a third called on them, and, in a private interview with Pinckney, said that he had a message from Talleyrand, suggesting a plan by which a reconciliation between the two governments might be brought about. That “plan” proposed that some of the most offensive passages in the president's speech should be expunged or softened before the envoys should be received; a loan to be made to the republic; and a douceur to the Directory of nearly two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The envoys were astonished, but resolved to treat the matter in such a way that they might ascertain the real sentiments of the French government, without exciting suspicions.

Shortly afterward (October twentieth), Talleyrand's secret agent again appeared before the envoys, and introduced Mr. Bellamy, a citizen of Hamburg, who came as an intimate friend of the minister for foreign affairs, but without, as he said, any diplomatic authority. He assured the envoys that Talleyrand was well disposed toward the United States; that if the offensive portions of the president's speech should be expunged, the loan made, and the douceur given, a new treaty would be made, and all would be well. “We want money,” said Bellamy, speaking for his principals—“a great deal of money.”

Another conference was held on the following day, when the secret agent and Bellamy breakfasted with the envoys. It was stated that the Directory insisted upon an apology, or its equivalent, for the offensive words of the president; but Bellamy gave it as his private opinion that the matter might be compromised with money. At that conference the amount of the loan was fixed at six millions four hundred thousand dollars, to be secured by Dutch “inscriptions,” or obligations extorted from them by the French; and the douceur to the Directory at two hundred and fifty thousand dollars.

“The proposition for a loan can not be met by any construction of our instructions,” said the envoys. “One of us, however, will return home and consult our government on that point, provided the Directory will agree to suspend, in the interval, all further captures of American vessels, and all proceedings on captures already made.” The agents of the Directory were quite surprised at this answer. Bellamy spoke of the resentment of that body, and said that, if money could not be had from the envoys, the apology would be expected. To his astonishment, he was informed that such a proceeding was wholly out of the question; that the president had exercised his constitutional privilege in giving to Congress his ideas on national affairs, and that in doing so he had only stated facts in regard to French relations with which the American people were already familiar. The agents seemed greatly astonished at the audacity of the envoys, and withdrew, satisfied that they could accomplish nothing.

An interview between the envoys and Talleyrand was arranged for the twenty-seventh. The minister repeated, in substance, the proposition of his agents; but the representatives of America were firm. Finally, after more unofficial interviews with other agents of the Directory, who had endeavored to frighten the American ministers by menaces of the hostility of France; who had painted, in glowing colors, the immense power and resources of the French nation, and the dangers to be apprehended from its indignation; who claimed that in the friendship of France alone could America look for safety—the envoys told them plainly: “Gentlemen, we will not give you a dollar. Before coming here, we should not have thought it possible that such an offer would have been made to us. A transaction such as you propose, would be disgraceful to all parties concerned.” And then it was that Pinckney made that terse and indignant remark which has become proverbial: “Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute!”

Startled by the indignation and boldness of the envoys, the agent of the executive government intimated that if they would pay, for the private use of the Directory, the sum named, by way of fees, as they would pay a lawyer, they might remain in Paris until they should receive further orders from home respecting the loan required for the government. This base proposition to purchase the services of the Directory was rejected with disdain; and the French executive government, in the persons of its agents, withdrew abashed, and did not prosecute the disgraceful measures any further. Indeed, the envoys refused to have any further intercourse with them.

The American ministers remained several months in Paris, urging the objects of their mission at all proper times, but without success. The Directory refused to acknowledge them in their official character, and they were, from time to time, importuned for money by Talleyrand, in his unofficial visits to them. Finally, perceiving that their reception was out of the question, they prepared a full statement, in a letter addressed to Talleyrand, in which they made explanations, and gave proofs unequivocal of the friendliness of the government of the United States toward that of France. To this Talleyrand made an elaborate reply, and the envoys, in April, met it with a rejoinder.

Talleyrand's tactics were now changed, and he endeavored by various attempts to induce Pinckney and Marshall, who were federalists, voluntarily to relinquish their station, and leave negotiations with Gerry, who belonged to the republican party, and was supposed to sympathize with the French Directory. In this the wily diplomat did not succeed. Satisfied that nothing could seduce them from the path of rectitude, the Directory ordered those two envoys to quit the territories of the French republic immediately; while, to aggravate the insult to the American government, Mr. Gerry, because he belonged to a party favorable to France, was permitted to remain. Gerry, frightened (as he afterward said, in excuse for his conduct) by Talleyrand's threat of an immediate declaration of war against the United States by France if he should leave, consented to remain. Yet he refused to sanction the expulsion of his colleagues. He would not treat independently of them; and, finally, the entire embassy returned home. Marshall left France at the middle of April, Gerry on the twenty-sixth of July, but Pinckney was detained until October, on account of the ill health of his daughter.

During the whole time of these attempts at negotiation, the French Directory allowed many gross insults to the United States government to be perpetrated. Open war was waged upon American commerce by French cruisers; and the American flag floating over a vessel was deemed a sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of such vessel.

When the final despatches of the envoys reached the public eye and ear in the United States, there was an outburst of indignation over all the land, that proclaimed the dignity of true patriotism in the presence of mere party considerations. The nation felt insulted by the attempt to degrade the republic into a tributary dependant of France; and the indignities offered to the representatives of their government, and the injuries inflicted upon their commerce, were resented with great warmth. The words of Pinckney were reported, and in every part of the continent was heard the cry—“Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!” And yet there were those slavish enough to justify France, by criminating the American government. The Aurora was foremost in this labor; and, preparatory to such defense, it had published Talleyrand's reply to the statement of the envoys, which had been received by Bache before it reached the government of the United States.

It was argued that the intentions of France were not really hostile; that men under British influence, who wished for war, had misrepresented her conduct; that, admitting her position to be hostile, she only demanded those marks of friendship which, at a critical moment, she had herself afforded America; that the real interests of the United States required a compliance with the demands of the Directory for a loan and a bribe; that it would cost more money to resist than to comply; that resistance would be inevitably ineffectual; and that national honor was never secured by national defeat.

But such logic, degrading and unpatriotic in tendency, did not suit the temper of the American people at that time. A war-spirit was aroused not easily to be appeased, except by the ministrations of justice. In Congress, vigorous measures for defence and retaliation were adopted. Means for administering chastisement for injuries received, and for repelling those which were threatened, were provided with willing alacrity. A regular army was authorized. A regiment of artillerists and engineers was added to the permanent establishment; and the president was authorized to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, to serve during the continuance of existing difficulties with France, if not sooner discharged. He was also authorized to appoint officers for a provisional army, and to receive and organize volunteer corps, which should be exempt from ordinary militia duty.

These measures of Congress were fully approved by the great mass of the people. The president received addresses from all parts of the Union, whose spirit attested the patriotic sentiment of the nation; and the executive, in turn, warmed by like sentiments, made responses that sustained the ardor of the people.

Then arose spontaneously in every mind the question, “Who shall command our army in this crisis?” and in every mind was the same response. All hearts turned instinctively toward Washington as the only man in the nation fitted for that important trust. The loud, harsh voice of party spirit was hushed to a whisper; and men who had joined in the clamor of reproach against the late president because of his public measures, were among the first, in this hour of peril, to turn to him as the only leader in whom they might implicitly trust. Intimations of this nature reached Washington almost daily while Congress were busy in preparing for war; and finally, near the close of May, Hamilton, in a confidential and highly interesting letter, wrote to him, saying:—

“At the present dangerous crisis of public affairs, I make no apology for troubling you with a political letter. Your impressions of our situation, I am persuaded, are not different from mine. There is certainly great probability that we may have to enter into a very serious struggle with France; and it is more and more evident that the powerful faction which has for years opposed the government is determined to go every length with France. I am sincere in declaring my full conviction, as the result of a long course of observation, that they are ready to new model our constitution, under the influence or coercion of France; to form with her a perpetual alliance, offensive and defensive; and to give her a monopoly of our trade, by peculiar and exclusive privileges. This would be in substance, whatever it might be in name, to make this country a province of France. Neither do I doubt that her standard, displayed in this country, would be directly or indirectly seconded by them, in pursuance of the project I have mentioned.

“It is painful and alarming to remark that the opposition faction assumes so much a geographical complexion. As yet, from the south of Maryland, nothing has been heard but accounts of disapprobation of our government, and approbation of our apology for France. This is a most portentous symptom, and demands every human effort to change it.

“In such a state of public affairs, it is impossible not to look up to you, and to wish that your influence could in some proper mode be brought into direct action.” Hamilton then suggested the propriety of Washington's taking a tour southward, which would call out the people in public demonstrations, and would give him an opportunity of expressing sentiments which would throw the weight of his character into the scale of the government, and revive an enthusiasm for his person that might be turned into a right channel. He concluded by saying: “You ought to be aware, my dear sir, that in the event of an open rupture with France, the public voice will again call you to command the armies of your country; and, though all who are attached to you will, from attachment, as well as public considerations, deplore an occasion which should once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a right, yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labor may demand, to give it efficacy, this further—this great sacrifice.”

Notwithstanding these alarm-bell notes from Hamilton, in whose political sagacity Washington had unbounded confidence, he could not bring himself to believe that actual war between the two countries would ensue. “You may be assured,” he replied, “that my mind is deeply impressed with the present situation of our public affairs, and not a little agitated by the outrageous conduct of France toward the United States, and at the unparalleled conduct of its partisans, who aid and abet their measures. You may believe further, from assurances equally sincere, that, if there was anything in my power, which could be done with consistency, to avert or lessen the danger of the crisis, it should be rendered with hand and heart.

“But, my dear sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as it is to be prepared at all points for the worst that can happen—and no one is more disposed to this measure than I am—I can not make up my mind yet for the expectation of open war, or, in other words, for a formidable invasion by France. I can not believe, although I think them capable of anything bad, that they will attempt to do more than they have done; or that, when they perceive the spirit and policy of this country rising into resistance, and that they have falsely calculated upon support from a large part of the people thereof to promote their views and influence in it, they will not desist even from these practices, unless unexpected events in Europe, and their possession of Louisiana and the Floridas, should induce them to continue the measure. And I believe further, that, although the leaders of their party in this country will not change their sentiments, they will be obliged, nevertheless, to change their plan, or the mode of carrying it on, from the effervescence which is appearing in all quarters, and from the desertion of their followers, which must frown them into silence, at least for awhile.

“If I did not view things in this light, my mind would be infinitely more disquieted than it is; for, if a crisis should arrive when a sense of duty or a call from my country should become so imperious as to leave me no choice, I should prepare for the relinquishment, and go with as much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should do to the tomb of my ancestors.

“To say at this time, determinately, what I should do under such circumstances, might be improper, having once before departed from a similar resolution; but I may declare to you, that, as there is no conviction in my breast that I could serve my country with more efficiency in the command of the armies it might levy than many others, an expression of its wish that I should do so must, somehow or other, be unequivocally known, to satisfy my mind, that, notwithstanding the respect in which I may be held on account of former services, a preference might not be given to a man more in his prime; and it might well be supposed, too, that I should like precisely to know who would be my coadjutors, and whether you would be disposed to take an active part, if arms are to be resorted to.”[127]

President Adams found himself placed in a most perplexing position by the authority given him by Congress to form a provisional army, with its complement of major-generals and their subordinate officers. He had no military knowledge upon which his judgment might rely. Among the surviving officers of the Revolution, he perceived none in whom he felt implicit confidence as a wise adviser, or as a proper person for generalissimo of the new army; and, like all his fellow citizens, he turned to Washington as the MÆcenas upon whose sagacious counsels the safety of the republic depended in that critical hour. He well knew how painful it would be for the retired president to be again drawn into active public life; and he also well knew that it had ever been a controlling maxim of Washington's life never to allow personal considerations to interfere with the public welfare. Impressed with this fact, Adams wrote to Washington on the twenty-second of June, saying: “In forming an army, whenever I must come to that extremity, I am at an immense loss whether to call on all the old generals, or to appoint a young set. If the French come here, we must learn to march with a quick step, and to attack, for in that way only they are said to be vulnerable. I must tax you sometimes for advice. We must have your name, if you will in any case permit us to use it. There will be more efficiency in it than in many an army.”

Four days afterward, M'Henry, the secretary of war, wrote: “You see how the storm thickens, and that our vessel will soon require its ancient pilot. Will you—may we flatter ourselves that, in a crisis so awful and important, you will accept the command of all our armies? I hope you will, because you alone can unite all hearts and all hands, if it is possible that they can be united.”

The letters of the president and of the secretary of war were detained on the way. They both reached Washington on the fourth of July, and were answered on the same day. He assured the president that, as far as was in his power, he should be ready to support the administration; and, “to render it easy, happy, and honorable,” he said, “you may command me without reserve.” After alluding to his former opinion that the United States were in no danger of invasion from a foreign power, he added: “But this seems to be an age of wonders; and it is reserved for intoxicated and lawless France (for purposes of Providence far beyond the reach of human ken) to slaughter its own citizens, and to disturb the repose of all the world besides.

“From a view of the past and the present,” he continued, “and from the prospect of that which seems to be expected, it is not easy for me to decide satisfactorily on the part it might best become me to act. In case of actual invasion by a formidable force, I certainly should not intrench myself under the cover of age and retirement, if my services should be required by my country to assist in repelling it. If there be good cause—which must be better known to the government than to private citizens—to expect such an event, delay in preparing for it might be dangerous, improper, and not to be justified by prudence.”

After again expressing his conviction that the French would not, in the face of the unequivocal display of public opinion in the United States in favor of resenting the national insults, proceed to the extremity of actual war, he said: “Having with candor made this disclosure of the state of my mind, it remains only that I should add, that, to those who know me best, it is best known that, if imperious circumstances should induce me to renounce the smooth paths of retirement for the thorny ways of public life—at a period, too, when repose is most congenial to nature, and a calm indispensable to contemplation—it would be productive of sensations more easily conceived than expressed.”

Washington concluded his letter with valuable hints about officering the provisional army. He suggested that the “old set of generals,” who were in the War for Independence, might not have “sufficient activity, energy, and health,” for the widely-different service into which they would be called; and that the more energetic of younger officers should be preferred. He specially advised the president to be very judicious in the choice of the general staff of the army. “If this corps,” he said, “is not composed of respectable characters, who have a knowledge of the duties of their respective departments—able, active, and firm, and of incorruptible integrity and prudence, and withal such as the commander-in-chief can place entire confidence in—his plans and movements, if not defeated altogether, may be so embarrassed and retarded as to amount nearly to the same thing.”

To M'Henry, Washington wrote with all the freedom of intimate friendship, saying: “I see, as you do, that clouds are gathering, and that a storm may ensue; and I find, too, from a variety of hints, that my quiet under these circumstances does not promise to be of long continuance.... As my whole life has been dedicated to my country, in one shape or another, for the poor remains of it, it is not an object to contend for ease and quiet, when all that is valuable in it is at stake, farther than to be satisfied that the sacrifice I should make of them is acceptable and desired by my country.

“The principles by which my conduct has been actuated through life would not suffer me, in any great emergency, to withhold any services I could render, required by my country; especially in a case where its dearest rights are assailed by lawless ambition and intoxicated power, contrary to every principle of justice, and in violation of solemn compacts and laws, which govern all civilized nations.... In circumstances like these, accompanied by an actual invasion of our territorial rights, it would be difficult at any time for me to remain an idle spectator under the plea of age and retirement. With sorrow, it is true, I should quit the shades of my peaceful abode, and the ease and happiness I now enjoy, to encounter anew the turmoils of war, to which, possibly, my strength and powers might be found incompetent. These, however, should not be stumbling-blocks in my own way; but there are other things highly important for me to ascertain and settle before I could give a decided answer to your question.

“First, the propriety, in the opinion of the public, so far as that opinion has been expressed in conversation, of my appearing again on a public theatre, after declaring the sentiments I did in my Valedictory Address, of September, 1796.

“Secondly, a conviction in my own breast, from the best information that can be obtained, that it is the wish of my country that the military force of it should be committed to my charge; and—

“Thirdly, that the army now to be formed should be so appointed as to afford a well-grounded hope of its doing honor to the country, and credit to him who commands it in the field. On each of these heads you must allow me to make observations.”

Washington then proceeded to give his views in detail, upon these three points, without reserve. He did not feel at liberty to do so to the president directly, because his excellency had only hinted his wishes in delicate terms. His habits of intimacy with the secretary of war, and that officer's more explicit solicitations, made him feel free to lay his sentiments before him. At the same time, he gave Mr. M'Henry liberty to show his letter to the president.

On the second of July, before Washington had received these letters, President Adams nominated him to the senate as “lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of all the armies raised and to be raised in the United States.” The senate confirmed the nomination, by unanimous vote, on the same day; and Secretary M'Henry was despatched to Mount Vernon a few days afterward, to bear the commission to Washington. He also bore a letter from the president, and open instructions concerning his interview with the new commander-in-chief.[128] “Mr. M'Henry, secretary of war,” wrote the president, “will have the honor to wait on you in my behalf, to impart to you a step I have ventured to take, which I should have been happy to have communicated in person, had such a journey, at this time, been in my power. My reasons for this measure will be too well known to need any explanation to the public. Every friend and every enemy to America will comprehend them at first blush. To you, sir, I owe all the apology I can make. The urgent necessity I am in of your advice and assistance—indeed, of your conduct and direction of the war—is all I can urge; and that is a sufficient justification to myself and to the world. I hope it will be so considered by yourself. Mr. M'Henry will have the honor to consult you upon the organization of the army, and upon everything relating to it.”

On the day of the nomination, M'Henry wrote to Washington, not knowing at that moment that he would be the bearer of the general's commission. After speaking of the nomination and the confirmation, he added: “Thus you are again called upon by all voices to fill a station which all think you alone qualified for at this moment. I know what must be your feelings, and how many motives you must have for preferring the privacy you are in the enjoyment of, to the troubles and perplexities of a commander of an army. This, however, is the crowning sacrifice which I pray to God you may agree to make for the sake of your country, and give the last finish to a fame nothing short of such a call and the present occasion could have been capable of increasing.”

On the eighth of July, Hamilton wrote to Washington, saying: “I was surprised that your nomination had been without any previous consultation of you. Convinced of the goodness of the motives, it would be useless to scan the propriety of the step. It is taken, and the question is, 'What, under the circumstances, ought to be done?' I use the liberty which my attachment to you and to the public authorizes, to offer my opinion that you should not decline the appointment. It is evident that the public satisfaction at it is lively and universal. It is not to be doubted that the circumstances will give an additional spring to the public mind—will tend much to unite, and will facilitate the measures which the conjunction requires. On the other hand, your declining would certainly produce the opposite effects—would throw a great damp upon the ardor of the country, inspiring the idea that the crisis was not really serious or alarming. At least, then, let me entreat you—and in this all your friends, indeed all good citizens, will unite—that, if you do not give an unqualified acceptance, that you accept provisionally, making your entering upon the duties to depend on future events, so that the community may look up to you as their certain commander. But I prefer a simple acceptance.”

The meeting of Washington and the secretary of war was cordial, and their communications were free and unreserved. The former had reflected upon the situation of his country, and its demands upon his services, and had, though with a heavy heart, determined to accept the appointment, provided he could be permitted to select for the higher departments of the army, and especially for the military staff, those in whom he could place the greatest confidence. M'Henry assured him that his wishes in that respect would be complied with; and, before the secretary left, Washington gave him a list of officers, according to an arrangement which he should recommend.[129]

On the thirteenth of July, Washington wrote his letter of acceptance to President Adams, and placed it in the hands of the secretary of war, who left Mount Vernon on that day. “I can not express,” he said, “how greatly affected I am at this new proof of public confidence, and the highly flattering manner in which you have been pleased to make the communication; at the same time, I must not conceal from you my earnest wish that the choice had fallen on a man less declined in years, and better qualified to encounter the usual vicissitudes of war.

“You know, sir, what calculations I had made relative to the probable course of events on my retiring from office, and the determination I had consoled myself with, of closing the remnant of my days in my present peaceful abode. You will, therefore, be at no loss to conceive and appreciate the sensations I must have experienced to bring my mind to any conclusion that would pledge me, at so late a period of life, to leave scenes I sincerely love, to enter upon the boundless field of public action, incessant trouble, and high responsibility.

“It was not possible for me to remain ignorant of, or indifferent to, recent transactions. The conduct of the Directory of France toward our country, their insidious hostilities to its government, their various practices to withdraw the affections of the people from it, the evident tendency of their arts and those of their agents to countenance and invigorate opposition, their disregard of solemn treaties and the laws of nations, their war upon our defenceless commerce, their treatment of our minister of peace, and their demands amounting to tribute, could not fail to excite in me corresponding sentiments with those which my countrymen have so generally expressed in their addresses to you. Believe me, sir, no one can more cordially approve of the wise and prudent measures of your administration. They ought to inspire universal confidence; and will, no doubt, combined with the state of things, call from Congress such laws and means as will enable you to meet the full force and extent of the crisis.

“Satisfied, therefore, that you have sincerely wished and endeavored to avert the war, and exhausted to the last drop the cup of reconciliation, we can with pure hearts appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause, and may confidently trust the final result to that kind Providence which has heretofore and so often signally favored the people of these United States.

“Thinking in this manner, and feeling how incumbent it is upon every person, of every description, to contribute at all times to his country's welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when everything we hold dear is so seriously threatened, I have finally determined to accept the commission of commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States; with the reserve only, that I shall not be called into the field until the army is in a situation to require my presence, or it becomes indispensable by the urgency of circumstances.

“In making this reservation, I beg to be understood that I do not mean to withhold any assistance to arrange and organize the army which you may think I can afford. I take the liberty also to mention that I must decline having my acceptance considered as drawing after it any immediate charge upon the public, and that I can not receive any emoluments annexed to the appointment before entering into a situation to incur expense.”