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As we have observed, Washington enjoyed the pleasures of retirement and partial repose at Mount Vernon, for about two months in the summer of 1796. Yet he was not wholly free from the cares and anxieties incident to his official station. His Farewell Address to his countrymen, as we have seen, was then carefully prepared for the public consideration; but subjects of more immediate importance, connected with national affairs, demanded and received his attention.

Jay's treaty had relieved the country from all apprehension of immediate war with Great Britain, and, at the same time, it had increased the unfriendly feeling between the government of the United States and that of France. The latter had discovered that Washington's original proclamation of neutrality, and his efforts to preserve that position for his government, were sincere, and not, as had been hoped, mere tricks to deceive the British cabinet; and the French Directory, and their partisans in America, were disappointed and greatly chagrined.

For a long time the administrators of government in France, exercising a most intolerant and relentless despotism, had been jealous of every act of friendship, or even of leniency performed toward Great Britain by the Americans; and Mr. Monroe, an avowed partisan of France, was received, at first with distrust. But with singular adroitness, discretion, and good judgment, Monroe managed to place himself, very speedily, high in the estimation of the government to which he was accredited. We have already noticed, incidentally, his presentation of the American flag to the National Convention of France, and the reciprocity of the compliment by M. Adet, almost a year afterward. The inauguration of these courtesies by Monroe at Paris, had been immediately followed by a public display of national amity, in which the representative of the United States so thoroughly committed his government to a political alliance with France, as to make Washington's plan of neutrality appear like a piece of diplomatic finesse. It was ordained that the American minister should be formally received by the French government, in a public manner. He was, accordingly, introduced into the National Convention, where he presented a written address, glowing with the warmest expressions of friendship for France and the French people, and admiration of their magnanimity, their fortitude, their valor, and their wisdom.

To this the president of the convention replied, with even greater enthusiasm. He alluded to the union of the two governments, as “not merely a diplomatic alliance,” but as “the sweetest, the most frank fraternity”—“for ever indissoluble—for ever the dread of tyrants, the safeguard of the liberties of the world, and the preserver of all the social and philanthropic virtues.

“In bringing to us, citizen,” continued the president, “the pledge of this union, so dear to us, you could not fail to be received with the liveliest emotions. Five years ago, a usurper of the sovereignty of the people would have received you with the pride which belongs to vice, thinking it much to have given to the minister of a free people some token of an insolent protection. But to-day, the sovereign people themselves, by the organ of their faithful representatives, receive you; and you see the tenderness, the effusion of soul, that accompanies the simple and touching ceremony! I am impatient to give you the fraternal embrace, which I am ordered to give in the name of the French people. Come and receive it in the name of the American people, and let this spectacle complete the annihilation of an impious coalition of tyrants.”

At this affectionate appeal Monroe stepped forward, and received the president's “national embrace,” and afterward, the warm congratulations of the assembly. He was offered the confiscated house of one of the nobility as a place of residence; and, for a few days, he was the idol of the French people. Then came the less ethereal operations of the grave business of his office; and when the pageant was all over—the apotheosis completed—Mr. Monroe found himself afflicted with many cares, and assailed by many annoyances. Clamorous American ship-masters and merchants flocked to his diplomatic residence, and preferred urgent claims; some for cargoes which they had been compelled to sell to the French government, and some asking the liquidation of dishonored bills, drawn by French agents in America, in payment for provision shipped to France, or the French West Indies. In many forms complaints and claims were made by Monroe's countrymen upon the French government, and the minister found a host of unpleasant duties to perform, for he did not wish to break the charm of that “sweetest, most frank fraternity,” to the preservation of which he had so recently pledged his constituents. He, therefore, made some extraordinary concessions in relation to claims founded on breaches of the French treaty, in the seizure of enemy's goods in American vessels. He asked the French government to rescind the order authorizing such seizures, not because it would be just—be in accordance with treaty provisions—but because it would be for the pecuniary and commercial interests of France to do so. He was even so careful not to wound French pride, as to assure that government that he had no instructions to complain of that order as a breach of the treaty; and that, should it be thought productive of real benefit to France, the American government and people would bear it, not only with patience, but with pleasure.

When intelligence of Monroe's theatrical performances at his reception reached his government, it produced much mortification, and the secretary of state, in an official letter, suggested to him that the American cabinet expected nothing more than a private reception, and an oral speech; and reminded him that the government he was sent to represent was neutral, and that such a display might be offensive to other governments, especially to those of England and Spain, with both of whom important negotiations were then in progress. He was also reminded that circumstances might arise, when it would be necessary “to explain away or disavow an excess of fervor, so as to reduce it down to the cool system of neutrality.”

The French government, evidently insincere in their “national embraces,” and believing the other party to be equally so, determined to test the friendship of their allies. At that time the republic was heavily pressed with pecuniary embarrassments, and the United States were asked for a loan to relieve that pressure. Monroe, without the least particle of authority, unhesitatingly expressed his opinion, that his government would give to their dear ally any aid in their power to bestow; and he suggested three sources whence money might be obtained, namely: the separate states, the general government, and individuals. He went so far as to enter into a formal agreement concerning the equivalent in services, which France should give for such pecuniary aid, the most important of which was an active alliance in seizing the western posts still held by the British, and the conquest of the Louisiana country, inhabited by the French and Spanish, west of the Mississippi. France was also to assist the United States through a war with England and Spain, if one should occur. This would practically place the American republic in the position of an entire dependent upon the European one—a position utterly unnecessary, and incompatible with the interests and dignity of a free and independent nation.

Mr. Monroe urged his government to loan France five millions of dollars, in order to secure her good will and active alliance. But his proposition met with no favor at home, except among the ultra partisans of the French republic; and he was officially reminded that it had been, and still was, the invariable policy of the president to have his country as independent as possible of every nation upon the face of the earth—a policy which he had pursued from the beginning; “not assumed now for the first time, but wise at all times, and certain, if steadily pursued, to protect his country from the effects of commotions in Europe.”

Jay's mission, from the beginning, had produced uneasiness and distrust in the diplomatic circles of France and Spain, and perplexed Monroe and his political friends. Giving greater latitude to the spirit of his instructions than their letter could possibly warrant, Monroe assured the French government that Jay's authority was strictly limited to a demand of reparation for injuries; and this assurance produced the impression that Jay had no authority to conclude a treaty of navigation and commerce. Not more than a fortnight after Monroe made these assurances, intelligence came that a treaty of commerce had actually been negotiated with the British government, and signed by the contracting parties.

Mr. Monroe's imprudence, and his zeal in the cause of France, now placed him in an unpleasant dilemma. He received from Mr. Jay the assurance that he would soon send him, in cipher, the principal heads of the treaty. But that would not be sufficient to appease the offended French government, and Mr. Monroe immediately sent a confidential person to Mr. Jay for a complete copy of the document. “'Tis necessary to observe,” he said, “that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to, so it will be useless for me to make to it any communication short of that. I mention this that you may know precisely the state of my engagements here, and how I deem it my duty to act under them, in relation to this object.”

Mr. Jay, as in duty bound, civilly declined to send a copy of the treaty; and in his reply to Mr. Monroe's letter, took the occasion to give that gentleman his views on national independence and the duties of ministers.

“You must be sensible,” he said, “that the United States, as a free and independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers which mutual convenience may dictate, provided those arrangements do not interdict or oppugn their prior engagements with other states.

“Whether this adjustment was consistent with our treaty with France? struck me as being the only question which would demand or receive the consideration of that republic; and I thought it due to the friendship subsisting between the two countries, that the French government should have, without delay, the most perfect satisfaction on that head.” He then referred to his former communications, and gave him the following exact and literal extract from the treaty:—

After speaking of his former intention to communicate to Mr. Monroe some of the most interesting particulars of the treaty, “but in the most perfect confidence,” Mr. Jay continued:—

Soon after this, John Trumbull, Mr. Jay's secretary of legation, was about to pass through Paris, and he was authorized to make to Mr. Monroe a confidential communication concerning the provisions of the treaty. But the incensed minister refused to receive this or any communication in a form that he could not instantly lay before the French government. He afterward attempted to obtain a copy of the treaty from Thomas Pinckney, who passed through Paris on his way to Spain, but that gentleman would not betray Jay's confidence, and Monroe and the French government were compelled to wait until the authorized publication of the treaty the following summer.

Mr. Monroe felt himself aggrieved by what he deemed the want of confidence in him by the president and his cabinet, who had appointed him. He felt that the administration had injured him; and that the honor and credit of the United States were compromised by their refusal to redeem his promises of aid to the French republic, their “ally and friend.” His first and natural impulse was to resign his post, but alleged patriotic, as well as personal considerations, induced him to remain. He held the most intimate private relations with the members of the Committee of Public Safety and other officers of the French government, and appears to have enjoyed their confidence while he remained there. But, whether from his undue attachment to the French republic, his opposition to Jay's treaty, or his mistaken notions of American interests, Mr. Monroe appears to have done little, after his correspondence with Mr. Jay, to allay ill feeling toward his country on the part of the French government. He had been specially instructed, when sent envoy to France, to explain the views and conduct of the government of the United States in forming the treaty with England; and for this purpose ample documents were furnished him. But it appears from his own letters (published in his defence after his return, in 1796),[105] that he omitted to use them. Uninstructed in the truths which should have been given them, the French government utterly misinterpreted the actions and misconceived the views of the United States; and when informed that the house of representatives would execute the treaty made by Jay, they became very bitter in their resentment, and exhibited their animosity by allowing a French privateer to capture an American merchant-vessel.

Washington and his cabinet were satisfied that the amity between the two nations would be wholly destroyed, if Mr. Monroe should remain longer in France, as the accredited representative of his government, and his recall was resolved upon.[106] To choose a proper person required great caution, sagacity, and discretion. It was the duty of the president to make the choice, and to take the responsibility of his appointment, the Congress not being in session. With great care, after consultation, he contemplated the character of his contemporaries in public life, and fixed upon two—John Marshall and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney—either of whom he considered well fitted for the responsible and delicate station. Marshall was the first choice, but private considerations compelled him to decline, when the president addressed the following letter to Mr. Pinckney:—

Mr. Pinckney accepted the appointment, and made immediate preparations for his departure for France. “Though my affairs have not, hitherto, been arranged as I could wish them,” he said in his letter of acceptance, “the manner in which you state our political situation, and the interests of this country as they relate to France, oblige me to accept your appointment without hesitation. I am only apprehensive that your friendship has been too partial to the little merit I may possess, and that matters intrusted to me may fail through my want of ability.”

Monroe had the misfortune to lose the confidence of his own government and that of the French republic at about the same time. Hoping that the house of representatives would refuse to execute the British treaty, and thus appease the French Directory, he had been quiet for some time, when, in February, 1796, he received a communication from De La Croix, the French minister for foreign affairs, informing him, that since the ratification of Jay's treaty, the Directory considered the alliance between France and the United States at an end; that Adet was to be recalled, and a special minister was to be sent out to make the announcement, and act as agent for his government. It was intimated, too, that Monroe could not fulfil the promises he had made, and that all the assurances of his inaugural as minister were fallacious. Monroe remonstrated, and in a special interview with the Directory, professed his willingness to answer all objections that might be made against the treaty. He was soon afterward furnished with a report on the subject of American relations, signed by De La Croix, in which the government was charged with the non-execution of treaty obligations, in several particulars. To these charges Monroe made a reply, which Washington considered very satisfactory: but it did not change the course of the Directory; and in the autumn they issued an “arret,” ordering the seizure of British property found on board American vessels, and of provisions bound for England. This was a direct violation of the provisions of the treaty between the United States and France, and exhibited a disposition decidedly hostile.

This correspondence reached the president soon after his appointment of Pinckney as Monroe's successor; and a little later he received a letter from Mr. Monroe, written in cipher, on the twenty-fourth of March, which had been unaccountably delayed in its transmission. In that communication Monroe took occasion to say, that a long, private letter, written by Washington to Gouverneur Morris toward the close of December, 1795, had got into the hands of the French Directory, and produced an ill effect. Washington replied to this letter on the twenty-fifth of August. He acknowledged the genuineness of the letter; “but,” he said, “I deny that there is anything contained in it that the French government could take exception to, unless the expression of an ardent wish that the United States might remain in peace with all the world, taking no part in the disputes of any part of it, should have produced this effect. I also gave it as my further opinion, that the sentiments of the mass of citizens in this country were in unison with mine.

“Confidential as this letter was expected to be, I have no objection to its being seen by anybody; and there is some mistake in saying I had no copy thereof, when there is a press one now before me, in which I discover no expression that in the eye of liberality and candor would be deemed objectionable.”

After summing up the substance of his letter, Washington said, in conclusion: “My conduct in public and private life, as it relates to the important struggle in which the latter nation is engaged, has been uniform from the commencement of it, and may be summed up in a few words: that I have always wished well to the French Revolution; that I have always given it as my decided opinion, that no nation had a right to intermeddle in the internal concerns of another; that every one had a right to form and adopt whatever government they like best to live under themselves; and that, if this country could, consistently with its engagements, maintain a strict neutrality, and thereby preserve peace, it was bound to do so by motives of policy, interest, and every other consideration that ought to actuate a people situated as we are, already deeply in debt, and in a convalescent state from the struggle we have been engaged in ourselves.

“On these principles I have steadily and uniformly proceeded, bidding defiance to calumnies calculated to sow seeds of distrust in the French nation, and to excite their belief of an influence possessed by Great Britain in the councils of this country, than which nothing is more unfounded and injurious.”