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The treaty with Great Britain, ratified by King George, was returned to the United States government in February, much to the relief of its friends, and indeed of all parties. “We are wasting our time in the most insipid manner, waiting for the treaty,” wrote John Adams to his wife on the tenth of January. “Nothing of any consequence will be done till that arrives, and is mauled and abused, and then acquiesced in. For the antis must be more numerous than I believe them, and made of sterner stuff than I conceive, if they dare hazard the surrender of the posts and the payment for spoliations, by any resolution of the house that shall render precarious the execution of the treaty on our part.”

The federal constitution declaring a treaty, when duly ratified by the contracting powers, to be the law of the land, Washington, on the last day of February, issued a proclamation announcing the one just concluded with Great Britain, as such. This had been a mooted point. The president's proclamation decided that the treaty was law without further action of Congress; and it now remained for that body to make provision for carrying it into effect. The president sent it to both houses on the first day of March, with the following brief message:—

This action was the signal for both parties to prepare for a great struggle. The opposition, who had openly denied the right of the president to even negotiate a treaty of commerce, because, they said, it practically gave to the executive and senate the power to regulate commerce, were highly offended because the president had ventured to issue this proclamation before the sense of the house of representatives had been declared on the obligations of the instrument. This feeling assumed tangible form when, on the seventh of March, Edward Livingston, of New York, offered a resolution calling upon the president for copies of all papers relating to the treaty. This resolution, as modified on motion of Madison, was as follows:—

A warm debate immediately arose, and speedily took the form of a discussion on the nature and extent of the treaty-making power. “The friends of the administration maintained,” says Marshall, “that a treaty was a contract between two nations, which, under the constitution, the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, had a right to make; and that it was made when, by and with such advice and consent, it had received his final act. Its obligations then became complete on the United States, and to refuse to comply with its stipulations was to break the treaty and to violate the faith of the nation.

“The opposition contended that the power to make treaties, if applicable to every object, conflicted with powers which were vested exclusively in Congress. That either the treaty-making power must be limited in its operations, so as not to touch objects committed by the constitution to Congress, or the assent and co-operation of the house of representatives must be required to give validity to any compact, so far as it might comprehend those objects. A treaty, therefore, which required an appropriation of money or any act of Congress to carry it into effect, had not acquired its obligatory form until the house of representatives had exercised its powers in the case. They were at full liberty to make, or to withhold, such appropriation, or other law, without incurring the imputation of violating any existing obligation, or breaking the faith of the nation.”[91]

At the outset, a member had inquired the object of Mr. Livingston's motion, since on that would depend its propriety. It was contended, that if the impeachment of either Mr. Jay or the president was intended, it was a proper motion; but not so if the constitutionality of the treaty was to be questioned, because that must depend on the treaty itself. It was further inquired whether the house proposed to consider whether a better treaty might not have been made. Mr. Livingston did not disavow either of the objects suggested, but stated as his principal reason, a firm conviction that the house was vested with a discretionary power, allowing it to carry the treaty into execution or not. This consideration was made the chief point in the debate, in which Albert Gallatin took a leading part in favor of the resolution, well supported by Madison, Livingston, Giles, and Baldwin, and others of less note. It was opposed by Smith, of South Carolina, Murray, Harper, Hillhouse, and others. About thirty speeches on either side were made, and the debate did not terminate until the twenty-fourth of the month.

During this debate, the eloquent Fisher Ames was a member of the house, but was compelled by ill health to be silent. It was a great trial for the patriot, for he saw the need of soldiers for the contest. He had been, from the beginning, a warm friend of the government; and now, at what he deemed a crisis, he wished to lift up his voice in defence of its measures. To a friend in Springfield he wrote on the ninth of March, saying:—

Ames grew stronger; and at length, in the final debate in Congress upon the subject of the treaty, his eloquence was heard, like the tones of a trumpet, and with great effect, as we shall presently observe.

Livingston's motion was carried, on the twenty-fourth of March, by the decisive vote of sixty-two to thirty-seven. A committee of the house, deputed for the purpose, carried the vote to the president, who replied that he would take the request into consideration. He immediately summoned a cabinet council, and laid the matter before them in the form of two queries; first, on the right of the house, under the circumstances, to make such a call; and secondly, whether it would be expedient to furnish the papers, even though the belief might be entertained that the house had no right to call for them. He also referred the matter to Colonel Hamilton for his opinion.

The cabinet members were unanimous in opinion, that he ought not to comply with the requisitions of the house. Each of them stated, in writing, the grounds of his opinion; and Chief-Justice Ellsworth, who had lately been appointed to the bench of the supreme court of the United States, had, while the debate was in progress, drawn up an opinion coincident with the views of Washington and his cabinet. Hamilton also transmitted to the president a long and able paper, in which, with his usual force of unanswerable logic, he sustained the action of the cabinet, and fortified the president's views. In acknowledging the receipt of this paper on the thirty-first of March, the president said:—

Washington gave a decided negative to the request of the house. It appears to have been unexpected. The opposition were not prepared for such boldness and firmness on the part of the executive, and it “appeared to break,” says Marshall, “the last cord of that attachment which had theretofore bound some of the active leaders of the opposition to the person of the president.” Amid all the excitements of party contests, there was real affection and respect for Washington on the part of those who were politically opposed to him; but this act, so much like defiance of the popular will as expressed by the house of representatives, in the eyes of the unreflecting, seemed, for the moment, to extinguish every lingering spark of affection in the bosom of his old friends, now his political enemies.

After a week's delay, the president's message was taken up in committee of the whole, with two resolutions offered by Blount, of North Carolina, declaratory of the sense of the house respecting its own power on the subject of treaties. These embodied doctrines contrary to those expressed in the message. The first, after disclaiming any pretensions on the part of the house to “any agency in making treaties,” asserted, that “when a treaty stipulated regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the constitution to the power of Congress, it must depend for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law to be passed by Congress,” and that the house had a right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of such law, and pass or reject it as they might determine. The second resolution asserted, that in applications to the president for information, the house was not bound to specify for what purpose such information was wanted.

These resolutions took a rather less untenable position than had been maintained in argument, and were quite inexplicit on an essential part of the question. After a brief debate, in which Madison was chief speaker in favor of the resolutions, they were adopted by a vote of fifty-seven to thirty-five.

While this exciting subject was before Congress, the treaties with the Indians, with the dey of Algiers, and with Spain respecting the navigation of the Mississippi, had been ratified by the president and senate, and communicated to the house of representatives. It was moved to refer them to the committee of the whole house; but, for several days in succession, the motion was voted down. It was finally carried; and on the thirteenth of April, the moment the committee of the whole was organized by the chairman taking his seat, Mr. Sedgwick, of Massachusetts, arose and moved “that provision ought to be made by law for carrying into effect, with good faith, the treaties lately concluded with the dey and regency of Algiers, the king of Great Britain, the king of Spain, and certain Indian tribes northwest of the Ohio.” The opposition were completely surprised by this unexpected movement, and an angry altercation ensued. They complained loudly of the manner in which an attempt was made to force action upon the four treaties together, and resented what they deemed the ungenerous sharp practice of their opponents, because it was in contravention of the solemn vote of the house lately recorded upon their journals, declaratory of their right to exercise a free discretion over the subject. It was contended, on the other hand, that, as the four treaties formed part of one system, if one was rejected, it might be expedient to reject the others also. After a warm debate, it was agreed to dispose of the other treaties before taking up that with Great Britain. In accordance with this determination, the action of the house on the other treaties was such as not to contradict the claim set up by Blount's resolutions, and they were disposed of without any difficulty.

The treaty with Great Britain was taken up on the fifteenth of April. Its friends, in and out of Congress, supposing that on a subject which had so long agitated the community, the mind of every member was settled, and that an attempt to make converts by either party through debates would be futile, urged an immediate decision of the matter. They felt confident that the majority would not dare to meet the country on such an issue as the withholding of means for the execution of the treaty; but that majority, though knowing they had the power to break the treaty, were unwilling to do so without first embracing an opportunity for giving satisfactory reasons for their action. They therefore called for discussion. “The expectation,” says Marshall, “might not unreasonably be entertained, that the passions belonging to the subject would be so inflamed by debate as to produce the expression of a public sentiment favorable to their wishes; and if in this they should be disappointed, it would be certainly unwise, either as a party or as a branch of the legislature, to plunge the nation into embarrassments in which it was not disposed to entangle itself, and from which the manner of extricating it could not be distinctly perceived.”

The friends of the treaty did not shrink from discussion; and the debate, which lasted a fortnight, was opened by Madison with a speech, elaborate in its details and carefully prepared. He maintained that there was the grossest want of reciprocity exhibited in that part of the treaty that related to the settlement of disputes growing out of the compact of 1783. The British, he asserted, got all they asked—the debts due their merchants with damages in the shape of interest. We got nothing, he said, for the valuable negroes carried away, and we received nothing for damages accruing from the long detention of the western posts. And they, he said, were received with conditions respecting the Indian trade which made them almost useless to us, as to influence over the savage tribes, in which alone their greatest value consisted; and he considered the agreement to pay the American claims for spoliations as no offset for the loss of the negroes.

The same want of reciprocity, he said, prevailed in the portion of the treaty respecting neutral rights and the law of nations. By it we yielded the favorite principle, long ago enunciated, that “free ships make free goods,” and had actually added naval stores and even provisions to the list of contraband articles. He severely animadverted upon the provisions which conceded to British subjects the right to hold lands within the territory of the United States; the stipulation concerning the navigation of the Mississippi; and the permission to open all American ports to British shipping, while our own vessels were excluded from the colonial harbors.

The latter measure, allowing Great Britain to retain her colonial monopoly and preserve intact her colonial system, he denounced as “a phenomenon which had filled him with more surprise than he knew how to express.” And more vehement than all, because it interfered with his favorite scheme of commercial coercion, was Madison's denunciations of the provisions which prevented the Americans from retaliating upon the British, in the event of their making commercial restrictions to our disadvantage by further discriminations. He concluded with scouting the idea that war would ensue if the treaty should be rejected, because the hostilities England were then waging with France were quite as much as she was able to manage at that time.

Madison's speech alarmed the country, especially the sensitive mercantile classes, for whose losses, by spoliations, the treaty made provision, and those who were dependant upon trade, because they feared its influence in causing the inexecution of the treaty, and consequent war with Great Britain, by which their interests would be seriously effected. Other classes were also alarmed; indeed, all who loved peace and deprecated quarrels, much less physical contests, with other nations, trembled for the fate of the treaty. The country was violently agitated. Public meetings were held in all parts of the United States, and the strength of parties was once more fully tried. Petitions were sent in to Congress from all the great marts of business in the country in favor of ratification; while counter meetings were held and counter petitions were sent in from various places. Insurance against captures on the high seas could no longer be obtained for vessels or goods; and a sudden blow was given to commerce, which threatened financial ruin.

To add to the confusion, Bond, the British chargÉ des affaires, had intimated, that if the house of representatives, refused the necessary appropriation to carry the treaty into effect, the western posts would not be given up at the stipulated time, now near at hand. He also took that occasion to insist upon an explanatory article concerning a clause in Wayne's treaty with the Indians, by which they had agreed to allow no trader to reside among them, unless licensed by the authorities of the United States; for it seemed to be in contradiction with the provisions of the treaty under consideration, a mutual free-trade with the Indian tribes being guarantied thereby. This menace and this demand created much irritation; yet it did not in the least affect the tide of popular sentiment in favor of the treaty which was continually rising. This fact was clearly discerned by both parties, and the friends of the treaty protracted the debate, in order that, before the vote should be taken, public opinion might be so expressed, as to have an omnipotent effect in its favor.

At this moment, when the debate had been going on for several days and the spirit of the opposition began to flag, Albert Gallatin came to the support of his party, in a speech which at once gave him the position of republican leader in the house, the honor of which had been divided between Madison and Giles, of Virginia. Gallatin was a native of Geneva, in Switzerland, and then only thirty years of age. He had been only eleven years in the country, two of which he had served the people of his adoption in a military capacity. After the Revolution he established himself on the Monongahela, in western Pennsylvania, where his talents soon caused him to be called into public life. He was engaged, as we have seen, in the Whiskey Insurrection, but with patriotic intentions, as he alleged; and by a large popular vote he was elected to a seat in the house of representatives. Although a foreign accent was plainly visible when he spoke, he was so fluent in language, so earnest in manner, and so logical in argument, that his youth and foreign birth were forgotten for the moment, and he was listened to with the greatest pleasure.

Gallatin had heard the speeches on both sides with marked attention, and was prepared to take new ground in his own. Quoting from Vattel on the law of nations, he went on to show that slaves, being real estate, were not a subject of booty, but, on the restoration of peace, fell back to their former owners, like the soil to which they were attached. He attempted to excite, evidently for party purposes, sectional hatred by declaring that while the rights of the South and West had been sacrificed by the treaty, in respect to negroes, the Indian trade, and the navigation of the Mississippi, means had been found to protect the commercial interests of the North. With the same breath, however, he denounced the commercial articles of the treaty as utterly worthless, and adroitly charged the senate, by insinuation, with ignorance respecting the East Indian trade, falsely assuming that because the treaty did not, by express provisions, secure the East Indian coasting trade, and the direct voyage from India to Europe by American vessels, that these privileges had been relinquished.

Like Madison, he regarded the provision respecting neutrals as yielding everything to the semi-piratical policy of Great Britain. He contended strenuously for the dishonest measure of sequestration of private debts due to British subjects, as a means of coercion, and condemned that most just provision of the treaty, bearing upon that subject, without stint. While we have promised full indemnity to England, he said, for every possible claim against us, we had abandoned every claim of a doubtful nature, and agreed to receive the western posts under the most degrading restrictions concerning the trade with the Indians. We had gained nothing, he said, by the arrangements respecting trade and navigation, while we had parted with “every pledge in our hands, every power of restriction, every weapon of self-defence.”

He admitted that if this treaty should be rejected, another as favorable might not be obtained; but he argued, that while the United States would lose the western posts and the indemnity for spoliations, they would be pecuniary gainers by escaping the payment of the British debts. He did not wish, nor did his party, an utter rejection of the treaty, but a suspension or postponement of it, until the British should cease their encroachments, and reparations for such wrongs might be obtained. He scouted as utterly chimerical, the idea that war would necessarily follow such postponement, or even a positive rejection; and he treated the menaces of the dissolution of the Union with scorn. He significantly asked, Who will dissolve the government? The opposition majority had no motive for doing it, and he did not believe that the federalists would, at the first failure of their power, revenge themselves by overthrowing the government. He expressed his belief that the people, from one end of the Union to the other, were strongly attached to the constitution, and that they would punish any party or set of men who should attempt to subvert it. He rested in full security on the people, against any endeavor to destroy the Union or the government. He regarded the cry of disunion and of war as designed only to work upon the fears of Congress, and force an acquiescence in the treaty. “It was the fear of being involved in a war,” he said, “that the negotiations with Great Britain had originated; under the impression of fear the treaty had been negotiated and signed; fear had promoted its ratification; and now, every imaginary mischief was conjured up to frighten the house, to deprive it of that discretion which it had the right to exercise, to force it to carry this treaty into effect.” He also charged the merchants of Philadelphia and other seaports[94] with having formed a combination to produce alarm, and to make their efforts more effectual, had also combined to cease insuring vessels, purchasing produce, or transacting any business, to induce the people to join in the attempt to force the house to pass laws for carrying the treaty into effect.”“To listen calmly to this denunciation of Washington and Jay,” says Hildreth, “as having pusillanimously surrendered the honor of their country—Washington in setting on foot and in ratifying, and Jay in having negotiated, the treaty—coming as it did from the mouth of one whose evident youth and foreign accent might alone serve to betray him as an adventurer, whose arrival in the country could hardly have been long anterior to the termination of the Revolutionary struggle, was somewhat too much for human nature to bear. There was also something a little provoking in the denunciation of the merchants as having conspired to terrify the house, coming from a man who had first obtained general notoriety, it was now hardly four years since, by the publication of his name at the bottom of a series of resolutions, of which the avowed object was to frighten public officers from the discharge of their duty by threats of a social interdict and non-intercourse—a method of proceeding which had ended in violent resistance to the laws and armed insurrection. Nor is it very surprising, all things considered, that many of the federalists were inclined to look on Gallatin as a foreign emissary, a tool of France, and employed and paid to make mischief.”[95]

Tracy, of Connecticut, replied to the most prominent points of Gallatin's speech. He denied that Vattel gave any such opinion as to slaves, as set forth by Gallatin; and called attention to the fact that the British did not refuse to restore them as booty, but because they were men set free by having joined the British standard, that freedom being the chief inducement held out to them. Other points he commented upon with equal force. He warmed with his theme, and at length became severely personal. The opposition, he said, ask, with an air of triumphant complacency, How is there to be war, if we are not disposed to fight, and Great Britain has no motive for hostilities? “But look at the probable state of things,” he continued: “Great Britain is to retain the western posts, and with them, the confidence of the Indians; she makes no compensation for the millions spoliated from our commerce, but adds new millions to our already heavy losses. Would Americans quietly see their government strut, look big, call hard names, repudiate treaties, and then tamely put up with new and aggravated injuries? Whatever might be the case in other parts of the Union, his constituents were not of a temper to dance round a whiskey-pole one day, cursing the government, and to sneak, the next day, into a swamp, on hearing that a military force was marching against them. They knew their rights, and, if the government were unable, or unwilling, to give them protection, they would find other means to secure it. He could not feel thankful to any gentleman for coming all the way from Geneva to accuse Americans of pusillanimity.”

This allusion to Gallatin elicited cries of order from many of the opposition, and for awhile the excitement in the house was intense. The chairman decided that Mr. Tracy was in order, and desired him to go on. He disclaimed any intention to be personal, asked pardon for any improprieties of which he might have been guilty in the heat of debate, and excused himself with the plea, that such charges against the American government and people, from such a source, were naturally very offensive.

Fourteen days had now been occupied with this debate, when Fisher Ames, of Massachusetts, whose feebleness of health had kept him away from the house a part of the session, and made him a quiet spectator until now, arose in his place, and addressed the assemblage on the great subject. It was known that he was to speak on that day (twenty-eighth of April), and the house was crowded with an audience eager to hear the orator. He was pale, tottering, hardly able to stand on his feet, when he first arose, but as he became warmed with the subject, his whole being seemed to gather strength every moment, and he delivered a speech which was never forgotten by those who heard it. It was the great speech of the session, exhibiting a wonderful comprehension of human nature and the springs of political action; logic the most profound; the most biting ridicule, and pathetic eloquence. His speech exhibits such a summary, in its allusions, to the scope of the arguments of the opposition, and throws such light upon the growth and state of parties, that we make long extracts from it.

“The suggestion a few days ago,” he said, “that the house manifested symptoms of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just to ourselves and the occasion. Let us not effect to deny the existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling into the debate, when, from the very structure of our own nature, we ought to anticipate the circumstance as a probability; and when we are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is a fact, how can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to the house, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears? Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability and effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been unexplored? It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments; and, when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibility that would require none. Every prejudice and feeling has been summoned to listen to some peculiar style of address; and yet we seem to believe and to consider a doubt as an affront, that we are strangers to any influence but that of unbiassed reason.... It is very unfairly pretended, that the constitutional right of this house is at stake, and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We hear it said, that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance against the design to nullify the existence of this assembly, and to make it a cypher in the government; that the president and senate, the numerous meetings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion and terror, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

“It is necessary to pause here, and inquire whether suggestions of this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and pernicious in all their influences. They oppose an obstacle in the path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for, as they were not reasoned up, they can not be reasoned down. They are higher than a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are indestructible. While this remains, it is vain to say to this mountain, be thou cast into the sea. For I ask of the men of knowledge of the world, whether they would not hold him for a blockhead, that should hope to prevail in an argument, whose scope and object is to mortify the self-love of the expected proselyte? I ask further, when such attempts have been made, whether they have not failed of success? The indignant heart repels the conviction that is believed to debase it.... Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of supposition, and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have yielded too suddenly to their own alarms for the powers of this house; that the addresses which have been made with such variety of forms, and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the subject once more in its singleness and simplicity....

After discussing the subject of bad faith on the part of the United States, in refusing to execute the treaty, with a clear and comprehensive view of the obligations of nations, Mr. Ames continued:—

The speaker then drew a picture of the national disgrace, in the eyes of the world, that would be caused by a breach of national faith; and he appealed with inexpressible power to the hearts and understandings of the members, on this all-important consideration. He probed, with keen and searching precision, the Jesuitical position assumed by the house, in disclaiming any participation in the treaty-making power, and yet claiming the right to decide upon the merits of a treaty, and to defeat its execution. He then dwelt upon the evils that would accrue, in the form of a loss to the mercantile community, of five millions of dollars promised in payment for spoliations; and the renewal of Indian wars on the frontier, if the western posts should not be given up.

“On this theme,” he said, “my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words for them, if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal, I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every log-house beyond the mountains. I would say to the inhabitants, wake from your false security— your cruel dangers; your more cruel apprehensions are soon to be torn open again. In the daytime your path through the woods will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the blaze of your dwellings. You are a father—the blood of your sons shall fatten your cornfields. You are a mother—the war-whoop shall waken the sleep of the cradle.

“On this subject you need not expect any deception on your feelings. It is a spectacle of horror which can not be overdrawn. If you have nature in your hearts, they will speak a language, compared with which, all I have said, or can say, will be poor and frigid.... By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires—we bind the victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and orphans our decision will make—to the wretches that will be roasted at the stake—to our country—and I do not deem it too serious to say, to conscience and to God. We are answerable; and if duty be anything more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our country....

“The idea of war has been treated as a bugbear. This levity is, at least, unseasonable, and, most of all, unbecoming some who resort to it. Who has forgotten the philippics of 1794? The cry then was, reparation—no envoy—no treaty—no tedious delays. Now, it seems, the passion subsides, or, at least, the hurry to satisfy it. Great Britain, they say, will not wage war upon us.

“In 1794, it was urged by those who now say, no war, that if we built frigates, or resisted the piracies of Algiers, we could not expect peace. Now they give excellent comfort truly. Great Britain has seized our vessels and cargoes to the amount of millions; she holds the posts; she interrupts our trade, say they, as a neutral nation; and these gentlemen, formerly so fierce for redress, assure us, in terms of the sweetest consolation, Great Britain will bear all this patiently. But let me ask the late champions of our rights, will our nation bear it? Let others exult because the aggressor will let our wrongs sleep for ever. Will it add, it is my duty to ask, to the patience and quiet of our citizens, to see their rights abandoned? Will not the disappointment of their hopes, so long patronized by the government, now in the crisis of their being realized, convert all their passions into fury and despair?...

“Look again at this state of things. On the seacoast, vast losses uncompensated; on the frontier, Indian war and actual encroachment on our territory; everywhere discontent; resentments tenfold more fierce because they will be more impotent and humbled; national discord and abasement. The disputes of the old treaty of 1783, being left to rankle, will revive the almost extinguished animosities of that period. Wars in all countries, and most of all in such as are free, arise from the impetuosity of the public feelings. The despotism of Turkey is often obliged by clamor to unsheathe the sword. War might, perhaps, be delayed, but could not be prevented. The causes of it would remain, would be aggravated, would be multiplied, and soon become intolerable. More captures, more impressments would swell the list of our wrongs, and the current of our rage. I make no calculation of the arts of those whose employment it has been, on former occasions, to fan the fire; I say nothing of the foreign money and emissaries that might foment the spirit of hostility, because this state of things will naturally run to violence. With less than their former exertion they would be successful.

“Will our government be able to temper and restrain the turbulence of such a crisis? The government, alas! will be in no capacity to govern. A divided people, and divided councils! Shall we cherish the spirit of peace, or show the energies of war? Shall we make our adversary afraid of our strength, or dispose him, by the measures of resentment and broken faith, to respect our rights? Do gentlemen rely on the state of peace because both nations will be more disposed to keep it? because injuries and insults still harder to endure, will be mutually offered?...

“Is there anything in the prospect of the interior state of the country, to encourage us to aggravate the dangers of a war? Would not the shock of that evil produce another, and shake down the feeble and then unbraced structure of our government? Is this a chimera? Is it going off the ground of matter of fact to say, the rejection of the appropriation proceeds upon the doctrine of a civil war of the departments? Two branches have ratified a treaty, and we are going to set it aside. How is this disorder in the machine to be rectified? While it exists its movements must stop; and when we talk of a remedy, is that any other than the formidable one of a revolutionary interposition of the people? And is this, in the judgment even of my opposers, to execute, to preserve the constitution, and the public order? Is this the state of hazard, if not of convulsion, which they can have the courage to contemplate and to praise; or beyond which their penetration can reach and see the issue? They seem to believe, and they act as if they believed, that our union, our peace, our liberty, are invulnerable and immortal; as if our happy state was not to be disturbed by our dissentions, and that we are not capable of falling from it by our unworthiness. Some of them have, no doubt, better nerves and better discernment than mine. They can see the bright aspects and happy consequences of all this array of horrors. They can see intestine discords, our government disorganized, our wrongs aggravated, multiplied, and un-redressed, peace with dishonor, or war without justice, union, or resources, in 'the calm lights of mild philosophy.' ...

“Let me cheer the mind, weary, no doubt, and ready to despond on this prospect, by presenting another which it is in our power to realize. Is it possible for a real American to look at the prosperity of this country without some desire for its continuance, without some respect for the measures which, many will say, produced, and all will confess, have preserved it? Will he not feel some dread that a change of system will reverse the scene? The well-grounded fears of our citizens, in 1794, were removed by the treaty, but are not forgotten. Then they deemed war nearly inevitable, and would not this adjustment have been considered, at that day, as a happy escape from the calamity? The great interest and the general desire of our people was to enjoy the advantages of neutrality. This instrument, however misrepresented, affords Americans that inestimable security. The cause of our disputes are either cut up by the roots, or referred to a new negotiation after the end of the European war. This was gaining everything. This, alone, would justify the engagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapors of war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentrated in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm. This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was raging, and afforded, at the same time, the sure prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it the vivid colors will grow pale; it will be a baleful meteor, portending tempest and war.

“Let us not hesitate, then, to agree to this appropriation to carry it into faithful execution. Thus we shall save the faith of our nation, secure its peace, and diffuse the spirit of confidence and enterprise that will augment its prosperity. The progress of wealth and improvement is wonderful, and some will think, too rapid. The field for exertion is fruitful and vast; and if peace and good government should be preserved, the acquisitions of our citizens are not so pleasing as the proofs of their industry, as the instruments of their future success. The rewards of exertion go to augment its power. Profit is every hour becoming capital. The vast crop of our neutrality is all seed-wheat, and is sown again, to swell, almost beyond calculation, the future harvest of prosperity. In this progress what seems to be fiction is found to fall short of experience.... When I come to the moment of deciding the vote, I start back with dread from the edge of the pit into which we are plunging. In my view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation, have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it.

“I have thus been led by my feelings to speak more at length than I had intended. Yet I have, perhaps, as little personal interest in the event as any one here. There is, I believe, no member who will not think his chance to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public disorders, to make 'confusion worse confounded,' even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive the government and constitution of my country.”

With this touching peroration Mr. Ames closed his remarkable speech, and sat down. For a brief moment there was perfect silence in the house. “Judge Iredell and I happened to sit together,” wrote Vice-President Adams, describing the scene. “Our feelings beat in unison. 'My God! how great he is,' says Iredell; 'how great he has been!'—'Noble!' said I. After some time Iredell breaks out, 'Bless my stars! I never heard anything so great since I was born.'—'Divine!' said I; and thus we went on with our interjections, not to say tears, to the end. Tears enough were shed. Not a dry eye, I believe, in the house, except some of the jackasses who had occasioned the necessity of the oratory. These attempted to laugh, but their visages 'grinned horribly ghastly smiles.' They smiled like Foulon's son-in-law when they made him kiss his father's dead and bleeding hand. Perhaps the speech may not read as well. The situation of the man excited compassion, and interested all hearts in his favor. The ladies wished his soul had a better body.”[96]

The vote was about to be taken, immediately after the conclusion of Ames's speech, when the opposition, alarmed on account of the effect it had probably produced, carried an adjournment. There was a little speaking upon the subject the next day, but no one dared to attempt an answer to Ames's words, or assail his positions. The vote stood forty-nine to forty-nine, when General Muhlenburg, chairman of the committee of the whole, decided the matter by casting his vote for the resolution. It was reported to the house on the thirteenth of May, and, after some delay, the resolution, unamended, declaring that it was expedient to pass laws necessary for carrying the treaty into effect, was adopted, fifty-one to forty-eight, the northern members voting for and the southern against it.

[91] Life of Washington.