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Mr. Jay's mission to England had been from its inception a cause of much anxiety to Washington. Its object was beneficent and patriotic in the highest degree, and yet it had been opposed with the bitterest party spirit, and regarded with distrust even by friends of the administration, who had watched the ungenerous and despotic course of the British government toward the United States ever since the peace of 1783.

Mr. Jay's instructions contemplated three important objects to be obtained by treaty. These were, compensation for the losses sustained by American merchants in consequence of the orders in council; a settlement of all existing disputes in relation to the treaty of peace; and a commercial treaty. Great discretion was to be given to the envoy. He was to consider his instructions as recommendatory, not as peremptory. Only two restrictions were imposed upon him. One was, not to enter into any stipulation inconsistent with the existing engagements of the United States with France; the other was, not to conclude any commercial treaty that did not secure to the United States a direct trade in their own vessels, of certain defined burdens, with the British West India islands, in whatever articles were at present allowed to be carried in British bottoms.

Mr. Jay was fully impressed with the importance of his mission and the necessity of prompt action. He arrived at Falmouth on the evening of the eighth of June, and the same night he forwarded a letter to Lord Grenville, the secretary for foreign affairs, announcing his arrival. He reached London a few days afterward, took lodgings at the Royal Hotel, Pall Mall, and on the fifteenth addressed the following note to Lord Grenville:—

Mr. Jay's appearance in London was at a time when all Europe was in a state of the most feverish excitement. Robespierre and his bloody companions were revelling in all the wantonness of irresponsible power. The Reign of Terror was at its height, and the resentment against France by all true friends of freedom in Europe, and especially the British nation, was hot and uncompromising. England, supported by Russia, Austria, and Spain, was waging war against the revolutionists; and at the moment of Jay's arrival, the nation was madly rejoicing because of a splendid victory obtained by Lord Howe over the French fleet. The fact that a large party in the United States warmly sympathized with France, the late proceedings of Congress manifesting a disposition hostile to Great Britain, and the remaining soreness of wounded pride experienced by England in the loss of her colonies, combined with the stirring events then occurring in Europe, made the moment apparently inauspicious for a mission like that of Mr. Jay. It required, on the part of the minister, the exercise of the most discreet courtesy.

The views entertained by the two nations as to their rights and interests were so opposed, on several points, that reconciliation appeared almost impossible. The Americans complained that, contrary to express provisions of the treaty of 1783, a large number of negroes had been carried away by the evacuating British armies at the South, and for the losses thereby sustained by the owners compensation was demanded. The British contended that the claim in the treaty referred to did not apply to negroes who had been set at liberty in the course of the war, under proclamations of the British commanders; and as those carried away were all of that kind, no compensation should be allowed.

The Americans also complained of the continued occupancy of the western posts by British garrisons, and attributed the protracted hostility of the Indian tribes, to the influence of the British commanders there. They also alleged numerous invasions of their neutral rights, not only under the orders in council, issued as instructions to the commanders of British cruisers, but in the seizure of many vessels without sufficient warrant, and their condemnation by the local admiralty courts. They also complained of the impressment into the British service of seamen from on board American vessels, and the exclusion of American shipping from the trade to the British West Indies.

The British were unwilling to relinquish their right of impressment, as a means of manning their fleets at that important crisis; and they regarded the claim of the Americans to an equal participation in the West India trade as unreasonable, because it would require England to renounce the long-settled principles of her commercial system. The most important questions to be settled, and those which involved matters most dangerous to the peace between the two countries, were those of neutral rights and the occupancy of the western posts. Such in brief were the chief points in the controversy to be settled by treaty.

“By a deportment respectful yet firm,” says Marshall, “mingling a decent deference for the government to which he was deputed, with a proper regard for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those little asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern, and smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by the real interests of both nations.”[75]

Mr. Jay found Lord Grenville commissioned by the king to treat with him, and the sincerity and candor of each soon led to the highest degree of mutual confidence. “Instead of adopting the usual wary but tedious mode of reducing every proposition to writing,” says Mr. Jay's biographer,[76] “they conducted the negotiation chiefly by conferences, in which the parties frankly stated their several views, and suggested the way in which the objections to these views might be obviated. It was understood that neither party was to be committed by what passed in these conversations, but that the propositions made in them might be recalled or modified at pleasure. In this manner the two ministers speedily discovered on what points they could agree, where their views were irreconcilable, and on what principles a compromise might be effected.”

While at Fort Cumberland, in October, Washington received a most gratifying letter from Mr. Jay, accompanied by despatches from Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state. They came by the Packet William Penn. Mr. Jay's letter was dated the fifth of August. Concerning the business of his mission he wrote as follows:—

To Mr. Randolph he wrote: “I shall persevere in my endeavors to acquire the confidence and esteem of this government—not by improper compliances, but by that sincerity, candor, truth, and prudence, which, in my opinion, will always prove to be more wise and more effectual than finesse and chicane. Formal discussions of disputed points should, in my judgment, be postponed until the case becomes desperate; my present object is to accommodate, rather than to convert or convince. Men who sign their names to arguments seldom retract. If, however, my present plan should fail, I shall then prepare and present such formal, and at the same time such temperate and firm, representations as may be necessary to place the claims and conduct of the two governments in their proper point of view.”

A treaty was finally signed at London, on the nineteenth of November, 1794, by Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville, and submitted to their respective governments for ratification. It was defective in some parts and objectionable in others; but, as it was the best that could be obtained, Mr. Jay was induced to sign it.

In a private letter to Washington, written on the same day that he signed the treaty, Mr. Jay said, “To do more was impossible. I ought not to conceal from you,” he added, “that the confidence reposed in your personal character was visible and useful throughout the negotiation.” To the secretary of state he wrote:—

This treaty provided for the establishment of three boards of commissioners; one to determine the eastern boundary of the United States, by deciding which was the river St. Croix named in the treaty of peace in 1783; another to ascertain the amount of losses which British subjects had experienced in consequence of legal impediments to the recovery of debts due them by citizens of the United States, contracted before the Revolution—such amount, on their report being made, to be paid by the government of the United States; and a third to estimate the losses sustained by American citizens in consequence of irregular and illegal captures by British cruisers, for which the sufferers had no adequate remedy in suits of law—such losses to be paid by the British government.

It was provided that the western posts should be given up to the United States on the first of June, 1796, in consideration of the adjustment of the ante-revolutionary debts, the then residents in their respective neighborhoods having the option of remaining, or of becoming American citizens. The important Indian traffic in the interior was left open to both nations, by a mutual reciprocity of inland trade and free intercourse between the North American territories of the two nations, including the navigation of the Mississippi. The British were to be allowed to enter all American harbors, with the right to ascend all rivers to the highest port of entry. This reciprocity did not extend to the possessions of the Hudson's Bay company, nor to the admission of American vessels into the harbors of the British North American colonies, nor to the navigation of the rivers of those colonies below the highest port of entry.

It was stipulated that the subjects or citizens of one government, holding lands in the dominions of the other government, should continue to hold them without alienage; nor, in the event of war or other national differences, should there be any confiscation by either party of debts, or of public or private stocks, due to or held by the citizens or subjects of the other. In a word, there should be no disturbance of existing conditions of property; and merchants and traders on each side should enjoy the most complete protection and security for their property.

The foregoing is the material substance of the first ten articles of the treaty, which it was declared should be perpetual; the remaining eighteen, having reference chiefly to the regulation of commerce and navigation between the two countries, were limited in their operations to two years after the termination of the war in which Great Britain was then engaged.

The commercial portion of the treaty provided for the admission of American vessels into British ports in Europe and the East Indies, on terms of equality with British vessels. But participation in the East Indian coasting trade, and the trade between European and British East Indian ports, was left to rest on the contingency of British permission. The right was also reserved to the British to meet the existing discrimination in the American tonnage and import duties by countervailing measures. American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons burden, were to be allowed to trade to the British West Indies, but only on condition of a renunciation, during the continuance of the treaty, of the right to transport from America to Europe any of the principal colonial products. British vessels were to be admitted into American ports without any further addition to the existing discriminating duties, and on terms equal to the most favored nations.

It was also stipulated that privateers should give bonds, with security, to make equivalent restitution for any injury they might inflict upon neutrals, in the event of the condemnation of any prize. Other provisions, favorable to neutral property captured by privateers, were made; and it was determined that the list of contraband articles should include, besides ammunition and warlike implements, all articles serving directly for the equipment of vessels, except unwrought iron and fir-plank.

It was also provided that no vessel attempting to enter a blockaded port should be captured, unless previously notified of the blockade; that neither nation should allow enlistments within its territory by any third nation at war with the other; nor should the citizens or subjects of either be allowed to accept commissions from such third nation, or to enlist in its service—citizens or subjects acting contrary to this stipulation to be treated as pirates. Provision was also made for the exercise of hospitality and courtesy between ships-of-war and privateers of the two countries; also for prohibiting the arming of privateers of any nation at war with either of the contracting parties, or fitting them out in the ports of the other; and for excluding the privateers of a third nation from the ports of the contracting parties, which had made prizes of vessels belonging to citizens or subjects of either country. It was also agreed that neither nation should allow vessels or goods of the other to be captured in any of its bays or other waters, or within cannon-shot of its coast.

It was further stipulated, that in the event of war between the two nations, the citizens or subjects of each, residing within the limits of the other, should be allowed to continue peaceably in their respective employments, so long as they should behave themselves properly. It was also provided that fugitives from justice, charged with murder or forgery, should be mutually given up.

Such was the substance of the famous treaty, the ratification of which caused a tempest in the political atmosphere, whose fury shook the Union to its foundation, and proved to the utmost test the stability of the character and popularity of Washington.

Rumors of the conclusion of a treaty reached the Congress before its adjournment in March, 1795; but the treaty itself did not arrive until two days afterward. The president received it on the fifth of March, but its contents were kept a profound secret for several months. Washington studied it carefully, fully digested every article, and resolved to ratify it, should it be approved by the senate. Parts of it he approved, parts he disapproved; but he saw in it the basis for a satisfactory adjustment of the relations of the two governments, and a guaranty of peace.

The president issued a circular calling the senate together in June, for the purpose of considering the treaty. He resolved to keep its provisions a secret until that time, because there was a predisposition in the public mind to condemn it. Already, as we have seen, the appointment of a special envoy to negotiate with Great Britain had been denounced as a cowardly overture, and degrading to the United States; and it was declared that the mission of a special envoy, if one was to be sent, should be to make a formal and unequivocal demand of reparation for wrongs inflicted on our commerce, the payment of damages to owners of slaves carried away, and the immediate surrender of the western posts.

A large party in the United States had resolved that the treaty, whatever it might be, especially if it should remove all pretexts for a war with Great Britain, should be rejected; and, even before its arrival, preparations for opposition were made. In the course of a few days after Washington received it, and had submitted it, under the seal of strict privacy, to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, sufficient information concerning it leaked out to awaken public distrust, and yet not enough was known for the formation of any definite opinion concerning it. But instantly the opposition press commenced a crusade against it.

“Americans, awake!” cried a writer in one of these. “Remember what you suffered during a seven-years' war with the satellites of George the Third (and I hope the last). Recollect the services rendered by your allies, now contending for liberty. Blush to think that America should degrade herself so much as to enter into any kind of treaty with a power, now tottering on the brink of ruin, whose principles are directly contrary to the spirit of republicanism.

“The United States are a republic. Is it advantageous to a republic to have a connection with a monarch? Treaties lead to war, and war is the bane of a republican government. If the influence of a treaty is added to the influence which Great Britain has already in our government, we shall be colonized anew.

“Commercial treaties are an artificial means to obtain a natural end—they are the swathing bands of commerce that impede the free operations of nature. Treaties are like partnerships; they establish intimacies which sometimes end in profligacy, and sometimes in ruin and bankruptcy, distrust, strife, and quarrel.

“No treaty ought to have been made with Great Britain, for she is famed for perfidy and double dealing; her polar star is interest; artifice, with her, is a substitute for nature. To make a treaty with Great Britain is forming a connection with a monarch; and the introduction of the fashions, forms, and precedents of monarchical governments has ever accelerated the destruction of republics.

“If foreign connections are to be formed, they ought to be made with nations whose influence would not poison the fountain of liberty, and circulate the deleterious streams to the destruction of the rich harvest of our Revolution. France is our natural ally; she has a government congenial with our own. There can be no hazard of introducing from her, principles and practices repugnant to freedom. That gallant nation, whose proffers we have neglected, is the sheet-anchor that sustains our hopes; and should her glorious exertions be incompetent to the great object she has in view, we have little to flatter ourselves with from the faith, honor, or justice of Great Britain. The nation on whom our political existence depends, we have treated with indifference bordering on contempt. Citizens, your only security depends on France; and, by the conduct of your government, that security has become precarious.

“To enter into a treaty with Great Britain at the moment when we have evaded a treaty with France; to treat with an enemy against whom France feels an implacable hatred, an enemy who has neglected no means to desolate that country and crimson it with blood, is certainly insult. Citizens of America, sovereigns of a free country, your hostility to the French republic has been spoken of in the National Convention, and a motion for an inquiry into it has been only suspended from prudential motives—the book of account may soon be opened against you. What then, alas, will be your prospects! To have your friendship questioned by that nation is indeed alarming!”

Such was the logic—or rather the mad, seditious cry of faction—employed to forestall public opinion, and defeat the noble and humane intentions of the government. The Democratic Societies, though infirm and tottering, joined in the clamor. One of these in Virginia exclaimed, “Shall we Americans, who have kindled the spark of liberty, stand aloof and see it extinguished when burning a bright flame in France, which hath caught it from us? If all tyrants unite against a free people, should not all free people unite against tyrants? Yes, let us unite with France, and stand or fall together.”

The Massachusetts Society, in an address to all sister societies of the Union, put forth similar sentiments, and declared that the political interests of the United States and France were “one and indivisible.” The Pennsylvania Society exhorted that of New York to be ready and oppose the treaty if its provisions should be found dishonorable to the country; and newspapers and pamphleteers joined in the general cry of factious opposition.

The senate, pursuant to proclamation, assembled at Philadelphia on the eighth of June. Some changes had taken place in the material of that body, favorable to the government. Mr. Jay's treaty, with accompanying documents, was laid before it on the first day of the session. That gentleman had arrived from England a fortnight previously, and found himself elected governor of the state of New York by a large majority; and when he landed, he was greeted by thousands of his fellow-citizens, who gathered to welcome their new chief magistrate, and to testify their respect to the envoy who had so faithfully, as they believed, executed a mission of peace. A great crowd attended him to his dwelling, and the firing of cannon and ringing of bells attested the public joy. He immediately resigned his seat as chief justice of the United States, and three days after his arrival home he took the oath of office as governor of the state of New York.

The senate held secret sessions when considering the treaty, and for a fortnight it was discussed in that body with the greatest freedom and candor. Finally, on the twenty-fourth of June, the senate by a vote of twenty to ten—precisely a constitutional majority—advised the ratification of the treaty, that article excepted which related to the West India trade.

“An insuperable objection,” says Marshall, “existed to an article regulating the intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a fact which is understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention of the contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between the United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions of the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States of those articles which were the principal productions of the islands was to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for domestic consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern states. The senate, being informed of this fact, advised and consented that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be added thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which related to the intercourse with the West Indies.

“Although, in the mind of the president, several objections to the treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and, before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise and consent to an article which had not been laid before them, and whether their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of their power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under the advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be introduced into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these doubts; at the expiration of which, intelligence was received from Europe which suspended the resolution which the president had formed.

“The English papers contained an account, which, though not official, was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the eighth of June, 1793, for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed. In the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to favor the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband, might occasionally become so, a construction in which he had determined not to acquiesce, the president thought it wise to reconsider his decision. Of the result of this reconsideration there is no conclusive testimony. A strong memorial against this objectionable order was directed; and the propositions to withhold the ratification of the treaty until the order should be repealed; to make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon that event; and to adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice of the senate, connecting with that measure the memorial which had been mentioned, as an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification was made, were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his practice of withholding his opinion on controverted points until it should become necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination on these propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid before him.”[78]

The senate, on voting to recommend the ratification of the treaty, removed the seal of secrecy, but forbade any publication of the treaty itself. Regardless alike of the rules of the senate, and of official decorum, Senator Mason, of Virginia, sent to Bache, the editor of the Aurora (the democratic newspaper) a full abstract of the treaty, which was published on the second of July. In this, Mason had only anticipated Washington, who, to counteract statements concerning the contents of the treaty, and malignant comments which began to appear, had resolved to have the whole document published.

[75] Life of Washington, ii, 360.