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1794

Madison's resolutions elicited very warm, and at times, violent debates. The subject was of a purely commercial nature; but the questions it involved were so interwoven with political considerations, that the debates inevitably assumed a political and partisan aspect. The federalists plainly saw that the recommendations in Jefferson's report, and in the resolutions of Madison, hostility to England and undue favor toward France, neither position being warranted by a wise policy, nor consistent with neutrality. The republicans, on the other hand, regarded the scheme as equitable in itself, and as absolutely necessary for the assertion of the rights of neutral nations, and the protection of American commerce from insult, aggression, and plunder. These debates, which commenced on the thirteenth of January, continued until the third of February, with few intermissions; and the house was so nearly equally divided in sentiment, that the first resolution, authorizing commercial restrictions, was passed by a majority of only five. This was subsequently rejected in the senate by the casting vote of the vice-president, and the further consideration of the whole subject was postponed until March. When it was resumed, the progress of events had given such new complexion to the whole matter, that it was indefinitely postponed.

A new and important subject for legislation was brought up at this time. Very soon after the close of the Revolution, the piratical practices of corsairs belonging to the Barbary powers on the southern shores of the Mediterranean sea, and particularly of Algiers, had suggested the importance of a naval establishment for the protection of the infant commerce of the new-born nation. Many American merchant-ships, trading in the Mediterranean sea, were captured by these corsairs, their cargoes appropriated by the pirates, and their crews sold into slavery. Toward the close of 1790, President Washington called the attention of Congress to the subject, and at the same time Mr. Jefferson, the secretary of state, who had made himself thoroughly acquainted with the facts when in France, gave many interesting details in an official report on the subject.

Colonel David Humphreys was appointed a commissioner to treat with the dey or governor of Algiers concerning his corsairs; but that semi-barbarian—proud, haughty, and avaricious—was not disposed to relinquish his share of the profitable sea-robberies carried on under his sanction. “If I were to make peace with everybody,” he said, “what should I do with my corsairs? What should I do with my soldiers? They would take off my head for the want of other prizes, not being able to live on their miserable allowance!”

This was certainly good logic for the perplexed dey, but it did not convince Humphreys of the justice of piratical practices; and, at the close of 1793, he wrote to the government of the United States, “If we mean to have a commerce, we must have a navy to defend it. Besides, the very semblance of this would tend more toward enabling us to maintain our neutrality, in the actual critical state of affairs in Europe, than all the declarations, reasonings, concessions, and sacrifices, that can possibly be made.”

Washington had communicated to the house on the twenty-third day of December, in a confidential message, the state of affairs with Algiers; and its consideration with closed doors brought about a debate as to whether the public should at any time, or under any circumstances, be excluded from the galleries of the halls of Congress. This, however, interrupted the business only for a short time.

On the second of January, a committee was appointed to report the amount of force necessary to protect American commerce against the Algerine corsairs, and the ways and means for its support. This was the first committee of ways and means ever appointed by Congress, questions of that sort having been hitherto referred to the secretary of the treasury. It indicated an opposition majority in the house, but, as we have seen in the case of Madison's resolutions, it was very small.

Finally, in the spring of 1794, Congress passed an act to provide for a naval armament, because, as the preamble recited, “the depredations committed by the Algerine corsairs on the commerce of the United States, render it necessary that a naval force should be provided for its protection.” The bill met with strenuous opposition: first, because the time required to form a navy would be too long, the pressing exigency of the case requiring immediate action; and, secondly, because it would be cheaper to purchase the friendship of Algiers by paying a money-tribute, as had been done for some time by European nations, or to purchase the protection of those nations. It appears strange that suggestions so degrading to the character of a free and independent nation should not have been met with indignant rebuke.

The bill was passed by a small majority. The president was authorized to provide four frigates, to carry forty-four guns each, and two to carry thirty-six guns each, and to equip, man, and employ them. The act also gave him some discretion about the size and metal of the vessels. Washington, impressed with the stern necessity that called for this armament, immediately ordered the six vessels to be built, one each at Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Portsmouth in Virginia, and Portsmouth in New Hampshire. He also, with the advice and consent of the senate, proceeded to appoint six naval commanders and other officers; and thus was commenced the navy of the United States.[64]

During the progress of the debates on Madison's resolutions, Washington communicated to Congress evidences of efforts on the part of Genet to excite the people of portions of the Union against the Spanish authorities on its southwestern border, and to organize military expeditions against Louisiana and the Floridas. It was now determined to bear with the insolence and mischievous meddling of the French minister no longer; and, at a cabinet council, it was agreed that his diplomatic functions should be suspended, the privileges resting thereon to be denied him, and his person arrested. This was the only course for the government to pursue for the preservation of its dignity, and perhaps the safety of the republic. This resolution was about to be put into execution, when a despatch was received from Gouverneur Morris announcing Genet's recall. The French minister of foreign affairs had, as soon as he heard of Genet's misconduct, reprobated it as unauthorized by his government, and appointed M. Fauchet secretary of the executive council to succeed him. At the same time the French government asked the recall of Gouverneur Morris, whose views of democracy, as he saw it daily in Paris, did not coincide with the doctrines of the Jacobins. Morris was recalled, and Washington, with a liberal spirit, nominated James Monroe, a political opponent, as his successor. He knew that Monroe would be acceptable to the French Convention, and likely, therefore, to be useful to his government.

Fauchet was a keen diplomatist, and came as the representative of an administration more radical in its democracy than the one that appointed Genet. The Girondists had fallen, and the government of France had passed into the hands of Danton and Robespierre, the leaders of the Jacobins. The Reign of Terror was now in full force. The republican constitution had been suspended, and the Convention had assumed despotic powers with bloody proclivities. Even the warmest sympathizers with the French Revolution, in America, stood appalled at the aspect of affairs there; and many began to doubt, after all, whether English liberty was not preferable to French liberty.[65]

Fauchet arrived at Philadelphia in February, and Genet had liberty to return to France. But he did not choose to trust his person to the caprices of his countrymen in that time of anarchy and blood, and he remained in America. He married Cornelia Tappen, daughter of Governor Clinton, of New York, and became a resident of that state. He at once disappeared from the firmament of politics, but was an excellent citizen of his adopted country, and took great interest in agriculture. His course as minister has been ably defended; but the verdict of impartial history condemns it as unwise and unwarrantable, to say the least. He died at his residence in Greenbush, opposite Albany, in July, 1834.

Another subject now violently agitated the American people. The news of the British orders in council concerning the French colonial trade had produced great excitement in commercial circles at Philadelphia and New York. It was considered a flagrant act of injustice toward neutrals, and both parties vehemently condemned the British government. In Congress a resolution was offered for the raising of fifteen thousand men to serve two years, and for other preparations for war; and it was at this juncture that Madison's commercial resolutions, as we have observed, were called up, debated, and indefinitely postponed. While the debates on these resolutions were pending, the feeling against Great Britain was further stimulated by the publication, in New York, of a reputed speech of Lord Dorchester (Carleton), governor of Canada, to a deputation of Indians of Lower Canada, who had attended a great council of savage tribes, in the Ohio country, in 1793. In this speech, Dorchester, it was alleged, openly avowed his opinion that war between the United States and Great Britain would be commenced that year, and that “a new line between the two nations must be drawn by the sword.” This document was pronounced a forgery. But it had its intended effect in increasing the hatred of Great Britain in the hearts of a very large portion of the American people. Congress, under the excitement of the moment, passed a joint resolution, laying an embargo for thirty days, and afterward for thirty days longer, for the purpose of preventing British supply-ships carrying provisions to their fleet in the West Indies. It was also proposed to enroll an army of eighty thousand minute-men, to man forts and be ready for action; also an additional standing army of twenty thousand men.

War with Great Britain now seemed inevitable. To avert it, was Washington's most anxious solicitude; and, firm in his purpose of preserving for his country neutrality and peace, he resolved to make an experiment for the maintenance of both, by sending an envoy extraordinary to England to open negotiations anew. It required great heroism to attempt such a course; for the popular excitement was intense, and the idea of holding any further intercourse with England was scouted as pusillanimous. The tri-colored cockade was seen upon every side, and the partisans of the French regicides appeared again to rule the popular will for the hour.

While the public mind was thus agitated, the president received despatches from Mr. Pinckney, the resident American minister in London, advising him that the offensive orders in council of the previous November, concerning neutral ships, had been revoked, and that Lord Grenville, in conversation, had assured Mr. Pinckney that that measure had not been intended for the special vexation of American commerce, but to distress France. This intelligence subdued the belligerent tone of the opposition for a moment; yet they showed no reluctance to an open rupture with Great Britain, affecting to regard Grenville's words as insincere. Their vehement opposition to the appointment of a special envoy was speedily renewed, and unscrupulous partisans kept up the war-cry. The opposition press and the democratic societies used every means to inflame the populace and increase the exasperation of their feelings toward Great Britain; and they declared that the crisis had arrived when decision and energy, not moderation toward that government, was demanded.

But these manifestations had no sensible effect upon Washington. His purpose had been adopted after mature reflection. His sagacious mind perceived clearly the probability of success, and his moral heroism, as on all other occasions, was proof against animadversions. He hesitated only when the question, Who shall be appointed? was presented.

Washington's first preference for the mission was Hamilton; but the earliest intimation of this preference that reached the public ear raised a storm of opposition. The proposed mission itself was condemned as a cowardly advance to the British government; and a member of the house of representatives addressed an earnest letter to the president, opposing the mission in general terms, and in an especial manner deprecating the appointment of Hamilton as the envoy to be employed. Senator James Monroe also took upon himself the task of remonstrating with Washington, in writing, against the nomination of Hamilton, assuring him that it would be injurious to the public interest and to the interest of the president himself; and proposed to explain his reasons at a private interview. Washington declined the interview, but requested Mr. Monroe to submit to him, in writing, any facts he might possess which would disqualify the secretary of the treasury for the mission; and added: “Colonel Hamilton and others have been mentioned, but no one is yet absolutely decided upon in my mind. But, as much will depend, among other things, upon the abilities of the person sent, and his knowledge of the affairs of this country, and as I am alone responsible for a proper nomination, it certainly behooves me to name such a one as, in my judgment, combines the requisites for a mission so peculiarly interesting to the peace and happiness of this country.” Nothing more was heard from Mr. Monroe on the subject.

Hamilton, with his usual disinterestedness, relieved the president by advising him to choose, for the proposed envoy, Chief-Justice Jay. In a long letter to the president, written on the fifteenth of April, in which he took a general and comprehensive view of national affairs and the relative position of the country to England, he recommended him to nominate, as special minister to England, a person who should “have the confidence of those who think peace still within our reach, and who may be thought qualified for the mission,” with an observation to Congress that it was done “with an intention to make a solemn appeal to the justice and good sense of the British government;” at the same time, to make an “earnest recommendation that vigorous and effectual measures may be adopted to be prepared for war.”

Hamilton then alluded to the fact that Washington had contemplated nominating him for the mission; and after saying that he was well aware of the obstacles that existed, and that he would be “completely and entirely satisfied with the election of another,” he nominated Mr. Jay, as “the only man in whose qualifications for success there would be thorough confidence.... I think,” he continued, “the business would have the best chance possible in his hands, and I flatter myself that his mission would issue in a manner that would produce the most important good to the nation.”

“Let me add, sir,” said Hamilton in conclusion, “that those whom I call the sober-minded men of the country, look up to you with solicitude on the present occasion. If happily you should be the instrument of still rescuing the country from the dangers and calamities of war, there is no part of your life, sir, which will produce to you more real satisfaction, or true glory, than that which shall be distinguished by this very important service.”

Washington took Hamilton's advice, and, in the following message to the senate, nominated Mr. Jay for the mission:—

Mr. Jay had recently arrived in Philadelphia from New York, and consented to accept the nomination. It was confirmed by the senate on Saturday, the nineteenth of April, by a majority of eighteen to eight; Aaron Burr being among the few who opposed it, it being his practice to dissent from every measure proposed by Washington.

Conscious of the urgency of his mission, Mr. Jay made immediate preparations for his departure; and on the twelfth of May he embarked at New York, with Colonel John Trumbull, the artist, as his secretary. He was accompanied to the ship by about a thousand of his fellow-citizens, who desired thus to testify their personal respect and their interest in his mission of peace. A few days preceding, the Democratic Society of Philadelphia issued a most inflammatory denunciation of the mission and the minister; and the opposition in the lower house of Congress succeeded in adopting a resolution to cut off all intercourse with Great Britain. It was lost in the senate by the casting vote of Vice-President Adams; “not,” as Washington remarked in a letter to Tobias Lear on the sixth of May, “as it is said and generally believed, from a disinclination to the ulterior expedience of the measure, but from a desire to try the effect of negotiation previous thereto.” Mr. Monroe, acting under instructions from the Virginia legislature, proposed in the senate to suspend by law the article of the treaty of peace which secured to British creditors the right of recovering in the United States their honest debts. This proposition was frowned down by every right-minded man in that chamber.

Another delicate matter connected with the foreign relations of the United States now occupied the mind of Washington. The French government, as we have observed, on recalling Genet, asked that of the United States to recall Mr. Morris. Washington was anxious to appoint a judicious successor—one that would be acceptable to the French, and who would not compromise the neutrality of his own country. He confided in Pinckney, and desired Mr. Jay, in the event of his mission being successful, to remain in London as resident minister. Pinckney would then be sent to France. But Jay would not consent to the arrangement. Washington then offered the French mission to Robert R. Livingston, chancellor of the state of New York, who, with his extensive and influential family connections, was in politics a republican. Livingston declined, and the president finally offered it to James Monroe. He consented to serve, and his nomination was confirmed by the senate on the twenty-eighth of May. Soon after this, John Quincy Adams, son of the vice-president, was appointed minister at the Hague in place of Mr. Short, Jefferson's secretary of legation in France, who went to Spain to ascertain what Carmichael, the American minister there, was doing, his government being unable to hear from him except at long intervals.

Mr. Monroe arrived in Paris toward the middle of August, and immediately sent to the president of the convention the following letter:—

“Citizen-President:—Having, several days since, arrived with a commission from the president of the United States of America, to represent those states in quality of minister plenipotentiary at the capital of the French republic, I have thought it my duty to make my mission known as early as possible to the national representatives. It belongs to them to determine the day, and to point out the mode, in which I am to be acknowledged the representative of their ally and sister republic. I make this communication with the greater pleasure, because it affords me an opportunity, not only to certify to the representatives of the free citizens of France my personal attachment to the cause of liberty, but to assure them at the same time, in the most positive way, that the government and people of America take the highest interest in the liberty, success, and prosperity of the French republic.”