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The publication of the contents of the treaty produced a blaze of excitement throughout the country. The author of the treaty, the senators who approved of its ratification, and the president, were all vehemently denounced. Great indignation had already been expressed because the entire negotiation had been involved in mysterious secrecy; because the document had not been immediately made public on its reception by the president; and because the senate deliberated upon it with closed doors. The partisans of France had used every effort, during the spring and summer, to excite the people against Great Britain; and it was evident, from the tone of opposition writers and declaimers, that no possible adjustment of difficulties with that country, which might promise a future friendly intercourse between the two nations, would be satisfactory.[79]

It was asserted that any treaty of amity and commerce with Great Britain under the circumstances, whatever might be its principles, was a degrading insult to the American people, a pusillanimous surrender of their honor, and a covert injury to France. They affected to regard the compact as an alliance; an abandonment of an ancient ally of the United States, whose friendship had given them independence, and whose current victories, at that moment challenging the admiration of the world, still protected them, for an alliance with the natural enemy of that friend, and with an enemy of human liberty. They spoke of the court of Great Britain as the most faithless and corrupt in the world, and denounced the result of Jay's mission as a surrender of every just claim upon a rapacious enemy for restitution on account of great wrongs.

These denunciations had great immediate effect. All acknowledged that the treaty was not as favorable to the United States as the latter had a right to expect; and “public opinion did receive a considerable shock,” says Marshall. Men unaffected by the spirit of faction felt some disappointment on its first appearance; therefore, when exposed to the public view, continues Marshall, “it found one party prepared for a bold and intrepid attack, but the other not ready in its defence. An appeal to the passions, prejudices, and feelings of the nation might confidently be made by those whose only object was its condemnation; while reflection, information, and consequently time, were required by men whose first impressions were not in its favor, but who were not inclined to yield absolutely to those impressions.”

As we have observed, Washington, for a specific purpose, withheld his signature in ratification of the treaty. The vote of the senate recommending its ratification, with the stipulation that one article should be added, suspending so much of another as seemed requisite, and requesting the president to open without delay further negotiation on that head, presented serious questions to his mind. He had no precedent for his guide. Could the senate be considered to have ratified the treaty before the insertion of the new article? Was the act complete and final, so as to make it unnecessary to refer it back to that body? Could the president affix his official seal to an act before it should be complete? These were important questions, and demanded serious reflection.

The opponents of the treaty, aware of the cause of the delay in its ratification, resolved to endeavor to intimidate the president and prevent his signing it. The most violent demonstrations, by word and deed, were made against it. On the fourth of July, a great mob assembled in Philadelphia, and paraded the streets with effigies of Jay and the ratifying senators. That of Jay bore a pair of scales: one was labelled “American Liberty and Independence;” and the other, which greatly preponderated, “British Gold.” From the mouth of the figure proceeded the words, “Come up to my price, and I will sell you my country.” The effigies were committed to the flames amid the most frightful yells and groans.

Public meetings were assembled all over the country to make formal protests against the treaty. They were called ostensibly to “deliberate upon it,” but they were frequently tumultuous, and always declamatory. A large meeting was held in Boston on the tenth of July. The chief actors there denounced the treaty as not containing one single article honorable or beneficial to the United States. It was disapproved of by unanimous vote, and a committee of fifteen, appointed to state objections, in an address to the president, reported no less than twenty. They were adopted by the meeting without debate, and were sent to the president accompanied by a letter from the selectmen of Boston. Only a few of the stable inhabitants of Boston appear to have been concerned in this matter, and the wealthy merchants and some other rich men who attended the meeting, and whose fears were excited by the leaders of the opposition, were made mere tools of on the occasion.

A meeting for a similar purpose was held in front of the city-hall, in Wall street, New York, on the eighteenth of July, pursuant to a call of an anonymous handbill. There the opposition gathered in great numbers, and there also was a large number of the friends of the treaty, who succeeded at first in electing a chairman. They were then about to adjourn to some more convenient place, when Brockholst Livingston, Mr. Jay's brother-in-law, and a leader of the opposition, urged the meeting to proceed instantly, as the president might ratify the treaty at any moment. Indeed, the whole Livingston family, with the eminent chancellor at their head, were now in the ranks of the opposition, and exerted a powerful influence. “With more than thoughtless effrontery,” says Doctor Francis, “they fanned the embers of discontent.”

Hamilton, Rufus King, and other speakers, occupied the balcony of the city-hall. The former, with sweet and persuasive tones, had uttered conciliatory words, and spoken in favor of adjournment, when the meeting became a good deal disturbed by conflicting sentiments and stormy passions. Just then an excited party of the opposition, who had held a meeting at the Bowling Green, with William L. Smith, a son-in-law of Vice-President Adams, as chairman, and who had burned a copy of the treaty in front of the government house, marched up Broadway, with the American and French flags unfurled, and joined the meeting. The turbulence of the assembly was greatly increased by this addition; and while Hamilton and King “were addressing the people in accents of friendship, peace, and reconciliation, they were treated in return with a shower of stones, levelled at their persons, by the exasperated mob gathered in front of the city-hall.”[80]

“These are hard arguments,” said Hamilton, who was hit a glancing blow upon the forehead by one of the stones. A question was finally taken on a motion to leave the decision on the treaty to the president and senate, when both sides claimed a majority. Then some person, utterly ignoring the presence of a chairman, moved the appointment of a committee of fifteen, to report to another meeting (to be held two days afterward) objections to the treaty. He read a list of names of gentlemen that should form that committee, and, at the close of clamorous shouts, he declared them duly appointed by the vote. The meeting finally broke up in great confusion. The adjourned meeting was attended by only the opponents of the treaty; and Brockholst Livingston, chairman of the committee of fifteen, reported twenty-eight condemnatory resolutions, which were adopted by unanimous vote.

“These resolutions,” says Hildreth, “while expressing great confidence in the president's wisdom, patriotism, and independence, were equally confident that his 'own good sense' must induce him to reject the treaty, as 'invading the constitution and legislative authority of the country; as abandoning important and well-founded claims against the British government; as imposing unjust and impolitic restraints on commerce; as injurious to agriculture; as conceding, without an equivalent, important advantages to Great Britain; as hostile and ungrateful to France; as committing our peace with that great republic; as unequal toward America in every respect; as hazarding her internal peace and prosperity; and as derogatory from her sovereignty and independence.”[81]

On the very next day (July 22), the New York Chamber of Commerce, representing the commercial interests of that city, adopted resolutions diametrically opposed to those offered by Livingston. These set forth that the treaty contained as many features of reciprocity as, under the circumstances, might be expected; that the arrangements respecting British debts were honest and expedient; and that the agreement concerning the surrender of the western posts and for compensation for spoliations, and their prevention in future, were wise and beneficial. If the treaty had been rejected, they said, war with all its attendant calamities would have ensued, and they were satisfied with what had been done.

On the twenty-fourth of July a similar meeting was held in Philadelphia. Among the leaders who denounced the treaty by speech and acts were Chief-Justice M'Kean, Alexander J. Dallas (the secretary of the commonwealth), General Muhlenburg (late speaker of the house of representatives), and John Swanwick (representative elect in Congress). A committee of fifteen was appointed by the meeting to convey the sentiments of the assemblage to the president, who was then at Mount Vernon, in the form of a memorial. That instrument was read twice and agreed to without debate. The treaty was then thrown to the populace—consisting chiefly, as Wolcott said in a letter to the president, of “the ignorant and violent classes”—who placed it upon a pole, and, proceeding to the house of the British minister, burned it in the street in front of it. They performed a like ceremony in front of the dwelling of the British consul, and also of Mr. Bingham, an influential federalist, with loud huzzas, yells, and groans.

At the South, equally hostile feelings toward the treaty and its friends were manifested. John Rutledge, then chief justice of South Carolina, denounced the treaty in violent language at a public meeting. He said it was destitute of a single article that could be approved, and reproached Jay with being either a knave or a fool—with corruption or stupidity—in having signed it. The stanch old patriot, Christopher Gadsden, denounced it in terms equally decisive; and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, at the close of a violent harangue, moved to request the president to take steps to have Jay impeached. “If he had not made this public exposure of his conduct and principles,” said Pinckney, “he might one day have been brought forward, among others, as a candidate for our highest office: but the general and deserved contempt which his negotiations have brought both his talents and principles into, would for ever, he trusted, secure his fellow-citizens from the dangerous and unwise use which such a man would have made of the powers vested in a president.”

The meeting appointed a committee of fifteen to report their sentiments at another gathering. It was done on the twenty-second of July. The report contained severe criticisms upon the several articles of the treaty, and recommended a memorial to the president, asking him not to ratify it. Meanwhile the populace trailed a British flag through the streets, and then burned it at the door of the British consul.

While these meetings were occurring in the principal cities, the opposition press all over the country was alive with the subject, and its denunciations were sometimes so violent that it was difficult to find words strong enough to express them. The Democratic Societies, vivified by the excitement, were also active with a sort of galvanic life. One of these in South Carolina resolved, “That we pledge ourselves to our brethren of the republican societies throughout the Union, as far as the ability and individual influence of a numerous society can be made to extend, that we will promote every constitutional mode to bring John Jay to trial and to justice. He shall not escape, if guilty, that punishment which will at once wipe off the temporary stain laid upon us, and be a warning to traitors hereafter how they sport with the interests and feelings of their fellow-citizens. He was instructed, or he was not: if he was, we will drop the curtain; if not, and he acted of and from himself, we shall lament the want of a guillotine.”

The Pendleton Society of the same state declared their “abhorrence and detestation of a treaty which gives the English government more power over us as states than it claimed over us as colonists—a treaty, involving in it pusillanimity, stupidity, ingratitude, and treachery.”

In Virginia, the grand panacea for all political evils of the federal government, disunion, was again presented. The following specimen of the prescription, taken from a Virginia newspaper, will suffice as an example:—

Even at that early period of the republic, neither newspaper editors, nor political combinations, nor gatherings of clamorous assemblies, could make any sensible impression on the real strength of the Union.

Nor did these individual or public demonstrations move Washington from his steady march in the line of duty, or in his allegiance to what he discerned to be truth and justice. On his way to his home on the Potomac, he was overtaken at Baltimore, on the eighteenth of July, by the committee from Boston, bearing to him the proceedings of the great public meeting there on the subject of the treaty. He immediately sent the papers back to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, with a request that he would confer upon the subject with the other two secretaries and the attorney-general, and transmit the opinion of the cabinet to him as early as possible. The whole affair, he had no doubt, was intended to place him “in an embarrassed situation.” The cabinet members, after consultation, wrote out replies to the Boston authorities in accordance with their views, and sent them to the president. He weighed them carefully, and on the twenty-eighth of July he addressed the following letter to the selectmen of Boston:—[82]

To these noble sentiments Washington firmly adhered, and they were the basis of his replies to all similar communications. Before this letter was sent, Washington received many private and public letters on the subject, as well as newspaper accounts of meetings all over the country. He perceived that a crisis had arrived, when he must act promptly and energetically, in accordance with his convictions of right. He saw that the excitement throughout the Union was becoming formidable, and he resolved to return to Philadelphia immediately, summon his cabinet, and propose to ratify the treaty without delay—notwithstanding such return would be to him a great personal sacrifice. “Whilst I am in office,” he said to Randolph in his letter announcing his determination to return, “I shall never suffer private convenience to interfere with what I conceive to be my official duty.” This was one of the great maxims of his life.

“I view the opposition,” he said, “which the treaty is receiving from the meetings in different parts of the Union, in a very serious light; not because there is more weight in any of the objections which are made to it than was foreseen at first, for there is none in some of them, and gross misrepresentations in others; nor as it respects myself personally, for this shall have no influence on my conduct, plainly perceiving, and I am accordingly preparing my mind for it, the obloquy which disappointment and malice are collecting to heap upon me. But I am alarmed at the effect it may have on, and the advantage the French government may be disposed to make of, the spirit which is at work to cherish a belief in them that the treaty is calculated to favor Great Britain at their expense. Whether they believe or disbelieve these tales, the effect it will have upon the nation will be nearly the same; for, whilst they are at war with that power, or so long as the animosity between the two nations exists, it will, no matter at whose expense, be their policy, and it is to be feared will be their conduct, to prevent us from being on good terms with Great Britain, or her from deriving any advantages from our trade, which they can hinder, however much we may be benefitted thereby ourselves. To what length this policy and interest may carry them is problematical; but when they see the people of this country divided, and such a violent opposition given to the measures of their own government pretendedly in their favor, it may be extremely embarrassing, to say no more of it.

“To sum the whole up in a few words, I have never, since I have been in the administration of the government, seen a crisis, which in my judgment has been so pregnant with interesting events, nor one from which more is to be apprehended, whether viewed on one side or the other. From New York there is, and I am told will further be, a counter current; but how formidable it may appear I know not. If the same does not take place at Boston and other towns, it will afford but too strong evidence that the opposition is in a manner universal, and would make the ratification a very serious business indeed. But, as it respects the French, even counter resolutions would, for the reasons I have already mentioned, do little more than weaken in a small degree the effect the other side would have.”

Two days afterward (the thirty-first of July) he wrote to Mr. Randolph, informing him that he should not set out for Philadelphia until he should receive answers to some letters, and then said:—

Randolph, at Washington's request, had made a rough draft of a memorial, intended to meet all objections to the treaty. This had been sent to Mount Vernon, and in reference to it the president said:—

Washington arrived at Philadelphia on the eleventh of August. His return was hastened by a mysterious letter from Colonel Pickering, the secretary of war, dated the thirty-first of July. “On the subject of the treaty,” he said, “I confess I feel extreme solicitude, and for a special reason, which can be communicated to you only in person. I entreat, therefore, that you will return with all convenient speed to the seat of government. In the meantime, for the reason above referred to, I pray you to decide on no important political measure, in whatever form it may be presented to you. Mr. Wolcott and I (Mr. Bradford concurring) waited on Mr. Randolph, and urged his writing to request your return. He wrote in our presence, but we concluded a letter from one of us also expedient.”

On the day after his arrival, the president called a cabinet meeting. Mr. Pickering had already explained the mysterious hints in his letter, by handing to Washington some papers which had excited suspicions concerning Secretary Randolph's conduct. When the cabinet had convened, the president submitted the question, “What shall be done with the treaty?” Randolph not only insisted upon the repeal of the provision order already alluded to, as a preliminary to ratification, but took the ground that the treaty ought not to be ratified at all, pending the war with Great Britain and France. The other members of the cabinet were in favor of immediate ratification, with a strong memorial against the provision order. In this opinion Washington coincided, and on the eighteenth the ratification was signed by the president. Randolph was directed to complete the memorial which he had commenced, and also instructions for further negotiations.

Washington's feelings had been deeply moved by the papers which Pickering placed in his hands. The chief of these was a despatch of M. Fauchet, the French minister, to his government, late in the autumn of 1794, and which had been intercepted. In that despatch, Fauchet gave a sketch of the rise of parties in the United States, in substantial accordance with Jefferson's views, and then he commented freely upon the Whiskey Insurrection in western Pennsylvania, then drawing to a close. Echoing the sentiments of the democratic leaders, Fauchet, professing to have his information from Randolph, declared that the insurrection grew out of political hostility to Hamilton. It was Hamilton's intention, he said, in enforcing the excise, “to mislead the president into unpopular courses, and to introduce absolute power under pretext of giving energy to the government.”

In his further comments, the minister, in deprecation of the conduct of professed republicans, and the general co-operation with the president in putting down the insurrection, said: “Of the governors whose duty it was to appear at the head of the requisitions, the governor of Pennsylvania alone [Mifflin] enjoyed the name of republican. His opinions of the secretary of the treasury, and of his systems, were known to be unfavorable. The secretary of this state [Dallas] possessed great influence in the popular society of Philadelphia, which in its turn influenced those of other states; of course he merited attention. It appears that these men, with others unknown to me, were balancing to decide on their party. Two or three days before the proclamation was published, and of course before the cabinet had resolved on its measures, Mr. Randolph came to me with an air of great eagerness, and made to me the overtures of which I have given an account in my No. 6.[83]Thus, with some thousands of dollars, the republic could have decided on civil war or on peace! Thus the consciences of the pretended patriots of America already have their prices! What will be the old age of this government, if it is thus already decrepit?”

After speaking of Hamilton's financial schemes as the instrument of making “of a whole nation a stock-jobbing, speculating, and selfish people,” and asserting that “riches alone here fix consideration, and, as no one likes to be despised, they are universally sought after,” he makes some exceptions among the leading republicans by name, and continues:—

“As soon as it was decided that the French republic purchased no men to do their duty, there were to be seen individuals, about whose conduct the government could at least form uneasy conjectures, giving themselves up with scandalous ostentation to its views, and ever seconding its declarations. The popular societies [democratic] soon emitted resolutions stamped with the same spirit, which, although they may not have been prompted by love of order, might nevertheless have been omitted, or uttered with less solemnity. Then were seen, coming from the very men whom we have been accustomed to regard as having little friendship for the treasurer, harangues without end, in order to give a new direction to the public mind.”

This despatch had been intercepted at sea, found its way to the British cabinet, and was forwarded to Mr. Hammond, the British minister at Philadelphia. He placed it in the hands of Mr. Wolcott, the secretary of the treasury, for he ascribed the delay in the ratification of the treaty to Randolph's influence. It was translated by Mr. Pickering, and he, as we have seen, submitted it to the president on his arrival at the seat of government. Washington revolved it in his mind with great concern; but other matters of greater moment demanding his immediate attention after his arrival, he postponed all action upon it until the question of ratifying the treaty should be settled. On the day after the signing of that instrument, the president, in the presence of all the cabinet officers, handed the intercepted despatch to Mr. Randolph, with a request that he should read it and make such explanations as he might think fit.

This was the first intimation Mr. Randolph had of the existence of such a letter. He perused it carefully without perceptible emotion, and with equal composure he commented upon each paragraph in order. He declared that he had never asked for, nor received, any money from the French minister for himself or others, and had never made any improper communications to Fauchet of the measures of the government. He said that he wished more leisure to examine the letter, and he proposed to put further observations in writing. He complained, perhaps justly, of the president's manner in bringing the subject to his notice, without any private intimation of such intention; and he added, that in consideration of the treatment he had received, he could not think of remaining in office a moment longer.

On the same day Randolph tendered his resignation to the president. In his letter accompanying it, he said, “Your confidence in me, sir, has been unlimited, and, I can truly affirm, unabused. My sensations, then, can not be concealed, when I find that confidence so suddenly withdrawn, without a word or distant hint being previously dropped to me. This, sir, as I mentioned in your room, is a situation in which I can not hold my present office, and therefore I hereby resign it.

“It will not, however, be concluded from hence that I mean to relinquish the inquiry. No, sir—very far from it. I will also meet any inquiry; and to prepare for it, if I learn there is a chance of overtaking Mr. Fauchet before he sails, I will go to him immediately.[84]“I have to beg the favor of you to permit me to be furnished with a copy of the letter, and I will prepare an answer to it; which I perceive that I can not do with the few hasty memoranda which I took with my pencil. I am satisfied, sir, that you will acknowledge one piece of justice to be due on this occasion, which is, that until an inquiry can be made, the affair shall continue in secrecy under your injunction. For, after pledging myself for a more specific investigation of all the suggestions, I here most solemnly deny that any overture came from me, which was to produce money to me or any others for me; and that in any manner, directly or indirectly, was a shilling ever received by me; nor was it ever contemplated by me that one shilling should be applied by Mr. Fauchet to any purpose relative to the insurrection.”

On the following day, Washington wrote to Mr. Randolph: “Whilst you are in pursuit of means to remove the strong suspicions arising from this letter, no disclosure of its contents will be made by me, and I will enjoin the same on the public officers who are acquainted with the purport of it, unless something will appear to render an explanation necessary on the part of the government, and of which I will be the judge.” He afterward said, “No man would rejoice more than I, to find that the suspicions which have resulted from the intercepted letter were unequivocally and honorably removed.”

A message from Randolph reached Fauchet before he was ready to embark, and the minister wrote to the late secretary, a declaration, denying that the latter had ever indicated a willingness to receive money for his own use, and also affirming that, in his letter to his government, he did not say anything derogatory to Mr. Randolph's character. With this declaration from the retiring French minister, and a reliance upon the general tenor of his conduct while in the cabinet, Randolph proceeded to prepare his vindication, at the same time publicly boasting to his friends, with a vindictive spirit, that he would bring things to view which would affect Washington more than anything which had yet appeared. Among other things which he proposed to do, in order to damage the reputation of Washington, was, to undertake to show, by the president's own letter to him on the twenty-second of July, that he (Washington) was opposed to the treaty which he had now so eagerly signed; and that the intercepted despatch had been communicated to Washington as part of a scheme concocted between the British minister and the cabinet officers to insure the ratification of the treaty, to drive Randolph from office, and to crush the republican party in the United States.

The paragraph in Washington's letter on which Randolph intended to base this charge was as follows: “My opinion respecting the treaty is the same now that it was; namely, not favorable to it, but that it is better to ratify it in the manner the senate have advised, and with the reservation already mentioned, than to suffer matters to remain as they are, unsettled.” The letter from which this is copied was on file in the office of the secretary of state; and Randolph, with evidences of a strangely bitter feeling toward Washington, applied to him for a copy of it, that he might publish it in his vindication. “You must be sensible, sir,” he said, “that I am inevitably driven to the discussion of many confidential and delicate points. I could, with safety, immediately appeal to the people of the United States, who can be of no party. But I shall wait for your answer to this letter, so far as it respects the paper desired, before I forward to you my general letter, which is delayed for no other cause. I shall also rely that any supposed error in the general letter in regard to facts will be made known to me, that I may correct it if necessary, and that you will consent to the whole affair, howsoever confidential and delicate, being exhibited to the world. At the same time, I prescribe to myself the condition not to mingle anything which I do not seriously conceive to belong to the subject.”

Utterly mistaking the character of Washington, and ungenerously presuming that the president would withhold his consent to the publication of the letter referred to, Randolph published in the Philadelphia Gazette, two days after he wrote to Washington, the paragraph in his application which has just been quoted, and with it a note to the editor, saying, “The letter from which the enclosed is an extract relates principally to the requisition of a particular paper. My only view at present is to show to my fellow-citizens what is the state of my vindication.”

Washington was then at Mount Vernon, and the letter, an extract from which was published, could not have reached him when that paragraph was made public. It passed Washington while on his way to Philadelphia, and he did not receive it until the twentieth of October, twelve days after it was written. On the following day, Washington, with a perfect consciousness of his own rectitude at all times and under all circumstances, and with a noble generosity to which his assailant showed himself a stranger, wrote to him as follows:—

“It is not difficult, from the tenor of your letter, to perceive what your objects are. But, that you may have no cause to complain of the withholding of any paper, however private and confidential, which you shall think necessary in a case of so serious a nature, I have directed that you should have the inspection of my letter of the twenty-second of July, agreeably to your request; and you are at full liberty to publish without reserve any and every private and confidential letter I ever wrote to you; nay, more—every word I ever uttered to you, or in your hearing, from whence you can derive any advantage in your vindication. I grant this permission, inasmuch as the extract alluded to manifestly tends to impress on the public mind an opinion that something has passed between us, which you should disclose with reluctance, from motives of delicacy with respect to me.”

In reference to Randolph's proposition to submit his vindication to the inspection of Washington, the latter remarked, “As you are no longer an officer of the government, and propose to submit your vindication to the public, it is not my desire, nor is it my intention, to receive it otherwise than through the medium of the press. Facts you can not mistake, and, if they are fairly and candidly stated, they will invite no comments.”

In December the pamphlet appeared, entitled, “A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation,” in which was a narrative of the principal events which we have just been considering, the correspondence between the president and Randolph, the whole of Fauchet's letter, and Randolph's remarks. “From the nature of the circumstances,” says Sparks, “Mr. Randolph had a difficult task to perform, as he was obliged to prove a negative, and to explain vague expressions and insinuations connected with his name in Fauchet's letter.” The statements which he made in proof of his innocence were not such as to produce entire conviction. “He moreover,” continues Sparks, “allowed himself to be betrayed into a warmth of temper and bitterness of feeling not altogether favorable to his candor. After all that has been made known, the particulars of his conversations with Fauchet and his designs are still matters of conjecture.”

In after life, Mr. Randolph deeply regretted the course that he pursued toward Washington at this time. In a letter to Judge Bushrod Washington, written in the summer of 1810, he said: “I do not retain the smallest degree of that feeling which roused me fifteen years ago against some individuals. For the world contains no treasure, deception, or charm, which can seduce me from the consolation of being in a state of good will towards all mankind; and I should not be mortified to ask pardon of any man with whom I have been at variance, for any injury which I may have done him. If I could now present myself before your venerated uncle, it would be my pride to confess my contrition, that I suffered my irritation, let the cause be what it might, to use some of those expressions respecting him, which, at this moment of my indifference to the ideas of the world, I wish to recall, as being inconsistent with my subsequent conviction.”[85]

It was thus with all the assaults ever made upon the character of Washington. They always failed to injure it in the slightest degree; and the sharpest and best-tempered shafts of malignity fell blunted and harmless from the invulnerable shield of his spotless integrity.