Newcastle had not been many days in York, when he heard a rumour that the enemy was advancing from the South into Derbyshire, and he marched thither at once, that is to say early in November, 1643. He posted some troops in different parts of the county, and fortunately he met with no serious opposition. On the contrary, he was able to raise a considerable force both of cavalry and of infantry. The rumour of the advance of an army from the South proved groundless, and he went peacefully to his own houses of Bolsover and Welbeck, where he stayed for a little time, making them his winter quarters.

Unfortunately, the pleasures of his hearth and home were marred by the arrival of some very unwelcome information,[82] namely, that the Scots were about to invade England with a large army, which was to fight on the side of the Parliament. This was serious news, indeed, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Royalist army in the North of England, which would necessarily be called upon to check the invasion.

“At this time,” [83] we read in Clarendon, “nothing troubled the King so much as the intelligence he received from Scotland, that they had already formed their army, and resolved to enter England in the winter season.... The circumstance of the time made the danger of the invasion the more formidable; for the Earl of Newcastle, lately created a Marquis, had been compelled with his army, as much by the murmours and indisposition of his officers, as by the season of the year, to quit his design upon Hull, and to retire to York.” Clarendon adds that the garrison at Hull had “made many strong infalls into the country and defeated some of his” (Newcastle’s) “troops”.

The report of the expected advance of an army from Scotland greatly alarmed the nervous “nobility and gentry of Yorkshire,” who sent to implore Newcastle to return to their assistance, once more promising to raise 10,000 men to strengthen his army. Newcastle marched back to York,—not to please the nobility and gentry of that county, who had promised, and yet failed to provide, a force of 10,000 men for him, on a former occasion—but because it was necessary to proceed to York on his way North against the Scots. When he reached York, he found that the nobility and gentry had not raised so much as a single man to add to his army. Therefore he had himself to raise what men he could for the defence of the county, when he was actually on his march towards the North against the enemy.

The military situation was now greatly changed. Hitherto the Parliamentary army had lain between the King in the South and Newcastle in the North. If Hull could have been taken and its garrison captured, Newcastle would have marched to the South and the army of the Parliament would soon have been attacked on both sides at once. Now, on the contrary, it was Newcastle who was likely to be attacked on both sides at once, by the Scots from the North and by Fairfax from the South.

On 19 January, 1644, the Scottish army of 21,000 men crossed the border and Newcastle marched to the city from which he took his title. He came there in February, and on the 13th he wrote[84] to the King, announcing his arrival there, and stating that he had had to march his army through thawing snow and floods. He added that, the day after his arrival, the Scots attacked the town; but that the town’s soldiers were very faithful and drove the enemy a mile from its walls. He lamented that he would not be able to take more than 5000 foot and 3000 horse into the field, or 8000 in all, against the enemy’s 20,000 or more; and he complained of want both of arms and of ammunition.

According to the Duchess, the Scottish General was ignorant of Newcastle’s arrival, expected no opposition, consequently approached the town incautiously and was repulsed with considerable loss. She writes as to what immediately followed:—

“The Enemy being thus stopt before the Town, thought fit to quarter near it, in that part of the Country; and so soon as my Lords Army was come up, he” (i.e., Newcastle) “designed one night to have fallen into their Quarter; but by reason of some neglect of his Orders in not giving timely notice to the party designed for it, it took not an effect answerable to his expectation. In a word, there were three Designs taken against the Enemy, whereof if one had but hit, they would doubtless have been lost; but there was so much Treachery, Jugling and Falshood in my Lord’s own Army” (were the poets and the divines quarrelling?) “that it was impossible for him to be successful in his Designs and Undertakings. However, though it failed in the Enemies Foot-Quarters, which lay nearest the Town; yet it took good effect in their Horse Quarters, which were more remote; for my Lord’s Horse, Commanded by a very gallant and worthy Gentleman”—can this have been the reinstated Goring?—“falling upon them, gave them such an Alarm, that all they could do, was to draw into the Field, where my Lord’s Forces charged them, and in a little time routed them totally, and kill’d and took many Prisoners, to the number of 1500.”

Whitelock gives a slightly different account of this affair. “The Scots besieged Newcastle, and took a main outwork, and beat back the enemy sallying out upon them. The Marquess of Newcastle being in the town, burnt a hundred houses in the suburbs; the inhabitants clamour against him. Seven of the Parliamentary frigates lay in the mouth of the haven to stop their passage by seas. The Marquess ordered the firing of the coal-mines, but that was prevented by General Leslie’s surprising of all the boats and vessels.”

The Scots withdrew; but they went Southwards and got into Newcastle’s rear. Both armies manoeuvred against each other in various parts of the county of Durham, for some time, without coming into actual collision, the Scots seeming anxious to avoid an engagement; indeed their failure to take an immediate initiative with their large preponderance in numbers was the cause of much discontent and grumbling among the supporters of the Parliament in London.

On more than one occasion, we have seen the King desiring that Newcastle should march his army to the support of that in the South. The tables were now turned. On 16 February, Newcastle wrote to Charles, urging him to send troops to the North against the powerful Scottish army, and expressing a strong opinion that, unless reinforcements were sent thither, and sent very speedily, the King would be in danger of losing his crown.

Some desultory fighting took place in the beginning of March, of which Newcastle gave an account to the King; and, as a specimen of his military dispatches, parts of it shall be given here. They can be read, or skipped at the reader’s pleasure.[85]

(Dispatch communicating the doings of the army under the Marquis of Newcastle to the King.) It is headed “A True relation of all the observable passages that have happened in these (northern) parts since my last to your Majesty; with the reason of the impossibility of making good the Tyne against the Scots.... Sir Thos. Riddell sent about 50 musketeers from Tynemouth Castle to destroy some corn in the enemies’ quarters, from whence they were drawn out, as he was informed: But it seems his intelligence betrayed them to the enemy and about 45 of them were taken prisoners, who being carried to Leslie (Earl of Leven) he sent them to me as a token, and I returned him thanks for his civility, with this answer, that I hoped very shortly to repay that debt with interest, which I did in a few days.”

“Colonel Dudley from his quarters about Prudhoe marched over the river with some horse and dragoons and fell into a quarter of the enemy’s in Northumberland, and slew and took all that was in it, 55 prisoners, and gave such an alarum to four of their quarters that they quitted them in disorder and with some loss; in which (skirmish) we should have suffered no loss at all, had not Colonel Brandling been taken prisoner through the unfortunate fall of his horse; and Colonel Dudley perceiving a greater force preparing to assult him, retreated, and in his retreat took 8 of the Scots prisoners, both horses and men, but they took 4 of his dragoons, whose horses were so weak they could not pass the river.... Upon Wednesday the 6th inst. at one o’clock afternoon our first troops passed Newbridge, and a while after the enemy appeared with some horse; when they advanced toward us with more than they first discovered, after some bullets had been exchanged, and they appeared again in greater force, we backed our party with Lord Henry (Percy’s) regiment,—Lieutenant Colonel Schrimsher (Scrimegour) commanding them—being part of Colonel Dudley’s brigade, with which he drew up after them, with whom also we sent some musketeers; which caused the enemy that day to look upon us at a farther distance.”

It would appear much to Newcastle’s credit that he was able to manoeuvre for some time against an army nearly three times the size of his own, were it not doubtful whether the credit was not due to King (Lord Ethyn), to whom he is known to have left much of the work which should properly have been done by himself. As to his other generals they seem to have been Newcastle’s chief source of weakness. Here is a story of disaster told by the Duchess:—

“A great misfortune befel My Lords Forces in Yorkshire; for the Governour whom he had left behind with sufficient Forces for the defence of that Country, although he had orders not to encounter the Enemy, but to keep himself in a defensive posture; yet he being a man of great valour and courage, it transported him so much that he resolved to face the Enemy, and offering to keep a Town that was not tenable, was utterly routed, and himself taken prisoner, although he fought most gallantly.”

Of this affair, Whitelock gives a fuller account:—[86]

The forces of Newcastle were hard pressed throughout their return to York. The Duchess’s account says that Newcastle’s rear had to fight the enemy every day of the journey; but that the retreat was made in excellent order.

News of Newcastle’s retreat to York caused great disappointment among the Royalists at Court, and his enemies took the opportunity of blaming his whole conduct of the war. These complaints were conveyed to him in letters by his friends. Their effect upon him was so great that he lost heart and, as is pretty evident from the following letter, he had written to the King expressing a wish to resign his command.

(MS. Harl., 6988, art. 104. Orig. Entirely in the King’s hand.)

The question presents itself whether the tongues and pens of those who were dissatisfied with Newcastle’s conduct of the campaign in the North, spoke and wrote with no foundation for dissatisfaction. Perhaps both the blame and the praise which were his due are pretty fairly allotted on one of the pages of Hume:—[88]

Undoubtedly this is true. His own expenditure upon the war was enormous, as the Duchess assures us and as contemporary writers testify; and his personal influence brought many great men, followed by large numbers of their servants, dependants and tenants, into the Royalist army. Again, his “humane behaviour” made him and his army popular in the counties which they occupied, a condition as important as difficult of attainment in a civil war.

Hume continues: “But amidst all the hurry of action, his inclinations were secretly drawn to the soft arts of peace, in which he took delight; and the charms of poetry, music, conversation, often stole him from his rougher occupations. He chose Sir William Davenant, an ingenious poet, for his lieutenant general”—“as one of his lieutenants generals” would have been more accurate—“The other persons, in whom he placed confidence, were more the instruments of his refined pleasures, than qualified for the business which they undertook. And the severity and application, requisite to the support of discipline, were qualities in which he was entirely wanting.”

Very probably these defects were more accountable for Newcastle’s failures than “the juggling, falsehood and treachery in his army and amongst some of his officers” of which his Duchess was fond of complaining. And it is more than likely that Granger was right in saying that Newcastle “was much better qualified for a court than a camp”.[89]

Not the less should it be remembered that Newcastle was vastly outnumbered by his enemy from Scotland and that his troops which he had left in his rear had been defeated by his enemy in the South. Under such conditions even Napoleon would have been in difficulties.