A Hood says, “As soon as I arrived upon the Emmitsburg road I placed one or two batteries in position and opened fire. A reply from the enemy’s guns soon developed his lines. His left rested on or near Round Top, with line bending back and again forward, forming, as it were, a concave line, as approached by the Emmitsburg road. A considerable body of troops was posted in front of their main line, between the Emmitsburg road and Round Top Mountain. This force was in line of battle upon an eminence near a peach-orchard.

“I found that in making the attack according to orders,?—?viz., up the Emmitsburg road,?—?I should have first to encounter and drive off this advanced line of battle; secondly, at the base and along the slope of the mountain, to confront immense boulders of stone, so massed together as to form narrow openings, which would break our ranks and cause the men to scatter whilst climbing up the rocky precipice. I found, moreover, that my division would be exposed to a heavy fire from the main line of the enemy in position on the crest of the high range, of which Round Top was the extreme left, and, by reason of the concavity of the enemy’s main line, that we would be subject to a destructive fire in flank and rear, as well as in the front; and deemed it almost an impossibility to clamber along the boulders up this steep and rugged mountain, and, under this number of cross fires, put the enemy to flight. I knew that if the feat was accomplished, it must be at a most fearful sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers as ever engaged in battle.

“I considered it my duty to report to you at once my opinion that it was unwise to attack up the Emmitsburg road, as ordered, and to urge that you allow me to turn Round Top and attack the enemy in flank and rear. Accordingly, I despatched a staff-officer, bearing to you my request to be allowed to make the proposed movement on account of the above stated reasons. Your reply was quickly received: ‘General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.’ I sent another officer to say that I feared nothing could be accomplished by such an attack, and renewed my request to turn Round Top. Again your answer was, ‘General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.’ During this interim I had continued the use of the batteries upon the enemy, and had become more and more convinced that the Federal line extended to Round Top, and that I could not reasonably hope to accomplish much by the attack as ordered. In fact, it seemed to me the enemy occupied a position by nature so strong?—?I may say impregnable?—?that, independently of their flank fire, they could easily repel our attack by merely throwing and rolling stones down the mountain-side, as we approached.

“A third time I despatched one of my staff to explain fully in regard to the situation, and suggest that you had better come and look for yourself. I selected, in this instance, my adjutant-general, Colonel Harry Sellers, whom you know to be not only an officer of great courage, but also of marked ability. Colonel Sellers returned with the same message: ‘General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.’ Almost simultaneously, Colonel Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and repeated the above orders.

“After this urgent protest against entering the battle of Gettysburg, according to my instructions,?—?which protest is the first and only one I ever made during my entire military career,?—?I ordered my line to advance and make the assault.

“As my troops were moving forward, you rode up in person; a brief conversation passed between us, during which I again expressed the fears above mentioned, and regret at not being allowed to attack in flank around Round Top. You answered to this effect: ‘We must obey the orders of General Lee.’ I then rode forward with my line under a heavy fire. In about twenty minutes after reaching the Peach-Orchard I was severely wounded in the arm and borne from the field.

“With this wound terminated my participation in this great battle. As I was borne off on a litter to the rear, I could but experience deep distress of mind and heart at the thought of the inevitable fate of my brave fellow-soldiers, who formed one of the grandest divisions of that world-renowned army; and I shall ever believe that had I been permitted to turn Round Top Mountain, we would not only have gained that position, but have been able finally to rout the enemy.”

B “The Campaign of Gettysburg,” by Lieutenant-General James Longstreet. One of a series of papers on the Civil War by different distinguished participants, both Union and Confederate, in Colonel A.K. McClure’s Philadelphia Weekly Times, 1877.

C “From Manassas to Appomattox,” by James Longstreet, Lieutenant-General Confederate Army. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1896. Revised, 1903.

D See “Advance and Retreat,” General J.B. Hood’s Biography, page 55. It is from this letter that I obtain the information concerning Hood’s proposed flank movement on Round Top. It was General Hood’s letter which informed historians that “General Lee’s orders are to attack up the Emmitsburg road.” See Hood’s letter as to this; also that of Colonel Fairfax at page 63 of this work.

E For General Pendleton’s official report, see Part II., Vol. XXVII., War Records, pp. 346–354. That is the volume in which will be found all the other Confederate reports referred to in the text.

F Several years ago General Longstreet hastily prepared in the rough quite an elaborate history of the Mexican War, the publication of which was forestalled by the book of a brother officer in that war, of which he had no hint. The incidents and historical data of this short story are from that unpublished history, with the addition of General Longstreet’s comments on the official personnel of the armies of Taylor and Scott, and their subsequent careers in the Union and Confederate armies.

G This brief review of a few of Longstreet’s famous engagements before and after Gettysburg has been compiled chiefly from his war history and his war papers published a few years since by the Century Company.

H Swinton, Decisive Battles of the War, p. 378.