  [Sidenote: Annexation movement] The disturbances which followed the passing of the 'Rebellion Losses Bill' have been described in the preceding chapter chiefly as they affected the person of the Governor. But it may be truly said that this was the aspect of them that gave him least concern. He felt, indeed, deeply the indignities offered to the Crown of England through its representative. But there was some satisfaction in the reflection that, by taking on himself the whole responsibility of sanctioning the obnoxious Bill, he had drawn down upon his own head the chief violence of a storm which might otherwise have exploded in a manner very dangerous to the Empire. 'I think I might say,' he writes, 'with less poetry but with more truth, what Lamartine said when they accused him of coquetting with the Rouges under the Provisional Government: "Oui, j'ai conspirÉ! J'ai conspirÉ comme le paratonnerre conspire avec le nuage pour dÉsarmer la foudre."' But the thunder-cloud was not entirely disarmed; and it burst in a direction which popular passion in Canada has always been too apt to take, threats of throwing off England and joining the American States. As far back as March 14, 1849, we find Lord Elgin drawing Lord Grey's attention to this subject. There has been (he writes) a vast deal of talk about 'annexation,' as is unfortunately always the case here when there is anything to agitate the public mind. If half the talk on this subject were sincere, I should consider an attempt to keep up the connection with Great Britain as Utopian in the extreme. For, no matter what the subject of complaint, or what the party complaining; whether it be alleged that the French are oppressing the British, or the British the French—that Upper Canada debt presses on Lower Canada, or Lower Canada claims on Upper; whether merchants be bankrupt, stocks depreciated, roads bad, or seasons unfavourable, annexation is invoked as the remedy for all ills, imaginary or real. A great deal of this talk is, however, bravado, and a great deal the mere product of thoughtlessness. Undoubtedly it is in some quarters the utterance of very sincere convictions; and if England will not make the sacrifices which are absolutely necessary to put the colonists here in as good a position commercially as the citizens of the States—in order to which free navigation and reciprocal trade with the States are indispensable—if not only the organs of the league but those of the Government and of the Peel party are always writing as if it were an admitted fact that colonies, and more especially Canada, are a burden, to be endured only because they cannot be got rid of, the end may be nearer at hand than we wot of. In these sentences we have the germs of views and feelings which time only made clearer and stronger;—indignation at that tendency, so common in all minorities, to look abroad for aid against the power of the majority; faith in the idea of Colonial Government, if based on principles of justice and freedom; and, as regards the particular case of Canada, the conviction that nothing was wanted to secure her loyalty but a removal of the commercial restrictions which placed her at a disadvantage in competing with her neighbours of the Union. To understand the scope of his policy during the next few years, it will be necessary to dwell at some length on each of these points; but for the present we must return to the circumstances which gave occasion to the letter which we have quoted. [Sidenote: Manifesto.] While ready, as that letter shows, to make every allowance for the utterances of thoughtless folly, or of well-founded discontent on the part of the people, Lord Elgin felt the necessity of checking at once such demonstrations on the part of paid servants of the Crown. Accordingly, when an elaborate manifesto appeared in favour of 'annexation,' bearing the signatures of several persons—magistrates, Queen's counsel, militia officers, and others—holding commissions at the pleasure of the Crown, he caused a circular to be addressed to all such persons with the view of ascertaining whether their names had been attached with their own consent. Some of these letters were answered in the negative, some in the affirmative, and others by denying the right of the Government to put the question, and declining to reply to it. Lord Elgin resolved, with the advice of his executive council, to remove from such offices as are held during the pleasure of the Crown, the gentlemen who admitted the genuineness of their signatures, and those who refused to disavow them. [Sidenote: Remedial measures.] 'In this course, says Lord Grey,[1] 'we thought it right to support him; and a despatch was addressed to him signifying the Queen's approval of his having dismissed from Her service those who had signed the address, and Her Majesty's commands to resist to the utmost any attempt that might be made to bring about a separation of Canada from the British dominions,' But the necessity for such acts of severity only increased Lord Elgin's desire to remove every reasonable ground of complaint and discontent; to shut out, as he said, the advocates of annexation from every plea which could grace or dignify rebellion. He felt, indeed, an assured confidence that, by carrying out fearlessly the principle of self-government, he had 'cast an acorn into time,' which could not fail to bring forth the fruit of political contentment. But, in the meantime, for the immediate security of the connection between the colony and the mother-country he thought, as we have already seen, that two measures were indispensable, viz. the removal of the existing restrictions on navigation, and the establishment of reciprocal free trade with the United States. Judging after the event we may, perhaps, be inclined to think that the importance which he attached to the latter of these measures was exaggerated; especially as the annexation movement had died away, and content, commercial as well as political, had returned to the Province long before it was carried. But we cannot form a correct view of his policy without giving some prominence to a subject which occupied, for many years, so large a share of his thoughts and of his energies. Writing to Lord Grey on November 8, 1849, he says:— [Sidenote: 'Reciprocity.'] The fact is, that although both the States and Canada export to the same neutral market, prices on the Canada side of the line are lower than on the American, by the amount of the duty which the Americans levy. So long as this state of things continues there will be discontent in this country; deep, growing discontent You will not, I trust, accuse me of having deceived you on this point. I have always said that I am prepared to assume the responsibility of keeping Canada quiet, with a much smaller garrison than we have now, and without any tax on the British consumer in the shape of protection to Canadian products, if you put our trade on as good a footing as that of our American neighbours; but if things remain on their present footing in this respect, there is nothing before us but violent agitation, ending in convulsion or annexation. It is better that I should worry you with my importunity, than that I should be chargeable with having neglected to give you due warning. You have a great opportunity before you— obtain reciprocity for us, and I venture to predict that you will be able shortly to point to this hitherto turbulent colony with satisfaction, in illustration of the tendency of self-government and freedom of trade, to beget contentment and material progress. Canada will remain attached to England, though tied to her neither by the golden links of protection, nor by the meshes of old-fashioned colonial office jobbing and chicane. But if you allow the Americans to withhold the boon which you have the means of extorting if you will, I much fear that the closing period of the connection between Great Britain and Canada will be marked by incidents which will damp the ardour of those who desire to promote human happiness by striking shackles either off commerce or off men. Even when tendering to the Premier, Lord John Russell, his formal thanks on being raised to the British peerage—an honour which, coming at that moment, he prized most highly as a proof to the world that the Queen's Government approved his policy—he could not forego the opportunity of insisting on a topic which seemed to him so momentous. It is (he writes) of such vital importance that your Lordship should rightly apprehend the nature of these difficulties, and the state of public opinion in Canada at this conjuncture, that I venture, at the hazard of committing an indiscretion, to add a single observation on this head. Let me then assure your Lordship, and I speak advisedly in offering this assurance, that the disaffection now existing in Canada, whatever be the forms with which it may clothe itself, is due mainly to commercial causes. I do not say that there is no discontent on political grounds. Powerful individuals and even classes of men are, I am well aware, dissatisfied with the conduct of affairs. But I make bold to affirm that so general is the belief that, under the present circumstances of our commercial condition, the colonists pay a heavy pecuniary fine for their fidelity to Great Britain, that nothing but the existence to an unwonted degree of political contentment among the masses has prevented the cry for annexation from spreading, like wildfire, through the Province. This, as your Lordship will perceive, is a new feature in Canadian politics. The plea of self-interest, the most powerful weapon, perhaps, which the friends of British connection have wielded in times past, has not only been wrested from my hands, but transferred since 1846 to those of the adversary. I take the liberty of mentioning a fact, which seems better to illustrate the actual condition of affairs in these respects than many arguments. I have lately spent several weeks in the district of Niagara. Canadian Niagara is separated from the state of New York by a narrow stream, spanned by a bridge, which it takes a foot passenger about three minutes to cross. The inhabitants are for the most part U.E. loyalists,[2] and differ little in habits or modes of thought and expression from their neighbours. Wheat is their staple product—the article which they exchange for foreign comforts and luxuries. Now it is the fact that a bushel of wheat, grown on the Canadian side of the line, has fetched this year in the market, on an average, from 9_d_. to 1_s_. less than the same quantity and quality of the same article grown on the other. Through their district council, a body elected under a system of very extended suffrage, these same inhabitants of Niagara have protested against the Montreal annexation movement. They have done so (and many other district councils in Upper Canada have done the same) under the impression that it would be base to declare against England at a moment when England has given a signal proof of her determination to concede constitutional Government in all its plenitude to Canada. I am confident, however, that the large majority of the persons who have thus protested, firmly believe that their annexation to the United States would add one-fourth to the value of the produce of their farms. I need say no more than this to convince your Lordship, that while this state of things subsists (and I much fear that no measure but the establishment of reciprocal trade between Canada and the States, or the imposition of a duty on the produce of the States when imported into England, will remove it), arguments will not be wanting to those who seek to seduce Canadians from their allegiance. Shortly afterwards he writes to Lord Grey:— It is not for me to dispute the point with free-traders, when they allege that all parts of the Empire are suffering from the effects of free-trade, and that Canadians must take their chance with others. But I must be permitted to remark, that the Canadian case differs from others, both as respects the immediate cause of the suffering, and still more as respects the means which the sufferers possess of finding for themselves a way of escape. As to the former point I have only to say that, however severe the pressure in other cases attendant on the transition from protection to free-trade, there is none which presents so peculiar a specimen of legislative legerdemain as the Canadian, where an interest was created in 1843 by a Parliament in which the parties affected had no voice, only to be knocked down by the same Parliament in 1846. But it is the latter consideration which constitutes the specialty of the Canadian case. What in point of fact can the other suffering interests, of which the Times writes, do? There may be a great deal of grumbling, and a gradual move towards republicanism, or even communism; but this is an operose and empirical process, the parties engaged in it are full of misgivings, and their ranks at every step in advance are thinned by desertion. Not so with the Canadians. The remedy offered to them, such as it is, is perfectly definite and intelligible. They are invited to form a part of a community, which is neither suffering nor free- trading, which never makes a bargain without getting at least twice as much as it gives; a community, the members of which have been within the last few weeks pouring into their multifarious places of worship, to thank God that they are exempt from the ills which afflict other men, from those more especially which afflict their despised neighbours, the inhabitants of North America, who have remained faithful to the country which planted them. Now, I believe, that if these facts be ignored, it is quite impossible to understand rightly the present state of opinion in Canada, or to determine wisely the course which the British Government and Parliament ought to pursue. It may suit the policy of the English free-trade press to represent the difficulties of Canada as the consequence of having a fool for a Governor-General; but, if it be permitted me to express an opinion on a matter of so much delicacy, I venture to doubt whether it would be safe to act on this hypothesis. My conviction on the contrary is, that motives of self-interest of a very gross and palpable description are suggesting treasonable courses to the Canadian mind at present, and that it is a political sentiment, a feeling of gratitude for what has been done and suffered this year in the cause of Canadian self-government, which is neutralising these suggestions. Again, on December 29,1849, he writes as follows:— [Sidenote: Free navigation.] I believe that the operation of the free navigation system will be what you anticipate, to a great extent at least, and that it will tend materially to equalise prices on the two sides of the line. At the same time I do think, that there are circumstances in this country which falsify, in some degree, the deductions at which one arrives from reasoning founded on the abstract principles of political economy. One of these circumstances is the power which the farmers in the Western States, having no rents to pay, have of holding back their grain when prices do not suit them. You must have observed what hoards they poured forth when they were tempted by the famine prices of 1847; and I cannot but think that this power of hoarding, coupled with an indifferent harvest, must account for the great disparity of price, which has obtained during the course of the present year in the New York market for bonded grain, and grain for the home consumption. I fully expect, however, to see the price of Canadian grain, bonded at New York, rise, now that it can be exported to Liverpool in the New York liners, which will carry it for ballast. Nevertheless, I think that Sir Robert Peel's dictum with respect to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, on the day on which he retired last from office, when he observed that thenceforward, even when the poor suffered from the high price of bread, they would not ascribe that suffering to the fact of their bread being taxed, applies with at least equal force to the reciprocity question as affecting the Canadian farmers. For sure am I that, so long as there is a duty on their produce when it enters the States, and none on the introduction of United States produce into England, they will ascribe to this cause alone the differences of price that may occasionally rule to their disadvantage. The history of the two measures which Lord Elgin so ardently desired, and which in the foregoing and many similar letters he so urgently pressed, was eminently characteristic of the two Legislatures, through which they had respectively to be carried. [Sidenote: Repeal of Navigation Laws.] In England, the repeal of restrictive Navigation Laws was contended for by thoughtful statesmen on grounds of public policy. The protective and conservative instincts of the old country, fortified by the never-absent spirit of party, resisted the change. When fairly beaten by force of argument in the House of Commons, they entrenched themselves ha the House of Lords; and it was only after a hot struggle that the Act was passed in June 1849, of which one effect was, by lowering freights, to increase the profits of the Canadian trade in wheat and timber, and thus to advance, in a very important degree, the commercial prosperity of the colony. [Sidenote: Reciprocity Treaty.] The delays which retarded the settlement of the Reciprocity Treaty were due to causes of another kind. The difficulty was to induce the American Congress to pay any attention at all to the subject. In the vast multiplicity of matters with which that Assembly has to deal, it is said that no cause which does not appeal strongly to a national sentiment, or at least to some party feeling, has a chance of obtaining a hearing, unless it is taken up systematically by 'organizers' outside the House. The Reciprocity Bill was not a measure about which any national or even party feeling could be aroused. It was one which required much study to understand its bearings, and which would affect different interests in the country in different ways. It stood, therefore, especially in need of the aid of professional organizers; a kind of aid of which it was of course impossible that either the British or the Canadian Government should avail itself. Session after session the Bill was proposed, scarcely debated, and set aside. At last, in 1854, after the negotiations had dragged on wearily for more than six years, Lord Elgin himself was sent to Washington in the hope—'a forlorn hope,' as it seemed to those who sent him—of bringing the matter to a successful issue. It was his first essay in diplomacy, but made under circumstances unusually favourable. He was personally popular with the Americans, towards whom he had always entertained and shown a most friendly feeling. They appreciated, moreover, better perhaps than it was appreciated at home, the consummate ability, as well as the rare strength of character, which he had displayed in the government of Canada; and the prestige thus attaching to his name, joined to the influence of his presence, and his courtesy and bonhomie, enabled him in a few days to smooth all difficulties, and change apathy into enthusiasm. Within a few weeks from the time of his landing he had agreed with Mr. Marcy upon the terms of a Treaty of Reciprocity, which soon afterwards received the sanction of all the Governments concerned. The main concessions made by the Provinces to the United States in this treaty were, (1) the removal of duties on the introduction, for consumption in the Provinces, of certain products of the States; (2) the admission of citizens of that country to the enjoyment of the in-shore sea-fishery; (3) the opening-up to their vessels of the St. Lawrence and canals pertaining thereto. A good deal of misconception prevailed at the time as to the amount of the concession made under the second head. The popular impression on this point was, that a gigantic monopoly was about to be surrendered; but this was far from being the case. The citizens of the United States had already, under the Convention of 1818, access to the most important cod-fisheries on the British coasts. The new treaty maintained in favour of British subjects the monopoly of the river and freshwater fisheries; and the concession which it made to the citizens of the United States amounted in substance to this, that it admitted them to a legal participation in the mackerel and herring fisheries, from illegal encroachments on which it had been found, after the experience of many years, practically impossible to exclude them.[3] The duration of the Treaty was limited to ten years, and has not been extended; but it is not too much to hope that it has had some effect in engendering feelings of friendliness, and of community of interest, which may long outlast itself. [Sidenote: Views of Government.] It has been already noticed that the 'annexation movement' of 1849 died away without serious consequences; and extracts which have been given above sufficiently show to what cause Lord Elgin attributed its extinction. The powerful attraction of the great neighbouring republic had been counteracted and overcome by the more powerful attraction of self- government at home. The centrifugal force was no longer equal to the centripetal. To create this state of feeling had been his most cherished desire; to feel that he had succeeded in creating it was, throughout much obloquy and misunderstanding, his greatest support. [Sidenote: Duty of supporting authority,] From the earliest period of his entrance into political life he had always had the strongest sense of the duty incumbent on every public man of supporting, even in opposition, the authority of Government. The bitterest reproach which he cast upon the Whigs, in his first Tory 'Letter to the Electors of Great Britain' in 1835, was that when they found they could not carry on the government themselves, they tried to make it impossible for any other party to do so. Nor was he less severe, on another occasion, in his reprehension of 'a certain high Tory clique who are always cavilling at royalty when it is constitutional; circulating the most miserable gossip about royal persons and royal entertainments,' &c.; busily 'engaged in undermining the foundations on which respect for human institutions rests.' Writing, in May 1850, to Mr. Gumming Bruce, a Tory and Protectionist, he said— I shall not despair for England whether Free-traders or Protectionists be in the ascendant, unless I see that the faction out of power abet the endeavours of those who would make the Government of the country contemptible. Read Montalembert's speeches. They are very eloquent and instructive. He had as full a faith in his religion, and what he considered due to his religion, as you can have in your Corn Laws. Yet observe how bitterly he now repents having aided those who have undermined in the French public all respect for authority and the powers that be. If all that your Protectionist friends want to do is to put themselves, or persons in whom they have greater confidence than the present Ministry, in office, their object is, I confess, a perfectly legitimate one. What I complain of is the system of what is termed damaging the Government, when resorted to by those who have no such purpose in view; or at least no honest intention of assuming responsibilities which they are endeavouring to render intolerable to those who are charged with them. [Sidenote: especially in Colonies.] But if this 'political profligacy' was, in his judgment, the bane of party government at home, a still stronger but, perhaps, more excusable tendency to it threatened to defeat the object of responsible government in Canada. Accustomed to look abroad for the source and centre of power, a beaten minority in the Colonial Parliament, instead of loyally accepting its position, was never without a hope of wresting the victory from its opponents, either by an appeal to opinion in the mother-country, always ill-informed, and therefore credulous, in matters of colonial politics, or else by raising a cry of 'separation' or 'annexation.' The evil effects of this state of things need hardly be pointed out. On the one hand the constant reference to opinion in England, not in the shape of constitutional appeal but by ex-parte statements, produced a state of chronic irritation against the mother-country. 'There is nothing,' wrote Lord Elgin, 'which makes the colonial statesman so jealous as rescripts from the Colonial Office, suggested by the representations of provincial cliques or interests, who ought, as he contends, to bow before the authorities of Government House, Montreal, rather than those of Downing Street.' On the other hand it was not easy to know how to deal with politicians who did not profess to own more than a qualified and provisional allegiance to the constitution of the Province and the Crown of England. The one hope in both cases was to foster a 'national and manly tone' of political morals; to lead all parties alike to look to their own Parliament, and neither to the London press nor the American hustings, for the solution of all problems of Provincial government. But while thus zealously defending, the fortress of British connection committed to his care, Lord Elgin was dismayed to find that its walls were crumbling round him? undermined by the operations of his own Mends; that there had arisen at home a school of philosophic statesmen, strong in their own ability, and strengthened by the support of the Radical economists, according to whom it was to be expected and desired that every colony enjoying constitutional government should aim at emancipating itself entirely from allegiance to the mother-country, and forming itself into an independent Republic. With such views he had no sympathy. The 'Sparta' which had fallen to his lot was the position of a colonial governor, and that position he felt it his duty to 'adorn' and to maintain. Moreover, believing firmly in the vitality of the monarchical principle, as well as in its value, he contended that it is an error to suppose that a constitutional monarchy, in proportion as it becomes more liberal, tends towards republicanism; and further, that if such tendency existed it would be retrograde rather than progressive. The views of Colonial Government, its objects and its difficulties, which have been here briefly epitomised, are displayed in full in the following letters, together with a variety of opinions on kindred topics. They are given as characteristic of Lord Elgin; but they may, perhaps, have an interest of their own, as bearing on important questions which still await solution. To the Earl Grey. November 16,1849. [Sidenote: Maintenance of British connection.] Very much, as respects the result of this annexation movement, depends upon what you do at home. I cannot say what the effect may be if the British Government and press are lukewarm on the subject. The annexationists will take heart, but in a tenfold greater degree the friends of the connection will be discouraged. If it be admitted that separation must take place, sooner or later, the argument in favour of a present move seems to be almost irresistible. I am prepared to contend that with responsible government, fairly worked out with free-trade, there is no reason why the colonial relation should not be indefinitely maintained. But look at my present difficulty, which may be increased beyond calculation, if indiscreet expressions be made use of during the present crisis. The English Government thought it necessary, in order to give moral support to their representative in Ireland, to assert in the most solemn manner that the Crown never would consent to the severance of the Union; although, according to the O'Connell doctrine, the allegiance to the Crown of the Irish was to be unimpaired notwithstanding such severance. But when I protest against Canadian projects for dismembering the empire, I am always told 'the most eminent statesmen in England have over and over again told us, that whenever we chose we might separate. Why, then, blame us for discussing the subject?' * * * * * To the Earl Grey. January 14,1850. [Sidenote: Colonial interests the sport of home parties.] I am certainly less sanguine than I was as to the probability of retaining the colonies under free-trade. I speak not now of the cost of their retention, for I have no doubt but that, if all parties concerned were honest, expenses might be gradually reduced. I am sure also that when free-trade is fairly in operation it will be found that more has been gained by removing the causes of irritation which were furnished by the constant tinkering incident to a protective system, than has been lost by severing the bonds by which it tied the mother-country and the colonies together. What I fear is, that when the mystification in which certain questions of self-interest were involved by protection is removed, factions both at home and in the colonies will be more reckless than ever in hazarding for party objects the loss of the colonies.[4] Our system depends a great deal more on the discretion with which it is worked than the American, where each power in the state goes habitually the full length of its tether: Congress, the State legislatures, Presidents, Governors, all legislating and vetoing, without stint or limit, till pulled up short by a judgment of the Supreme Court. With us factions in the colonies are clamorous and violent, with the hope of producing effect on the Imperial Parliament and Government, just in proportion to their powerlessness at home. The history of Canada during the past year furnishes ample evidence of this truth. Why was there so much violence on the part of the opposition here last summer, particularly against the Governor-General? Because it felt itself to be weak in the province, and looked for success to the effect it could produce in England alone. And how is this tendency to bring the Imperial and Local Parliaments into antagonism, a tendency so dangerous to the permanence of our system, to be counteracted? By one expedient as it appears to me only; namely, by the Governor's acting with some assumption of responsibility, so that the shafts of the enemy, which are intended for the Imperial Government, may fall on him. If a line of demarcation between the questions with which the Local Parliaments can deal and those which are reserved for the Imperial authority could be drawn, (as was recommended last session by the Radicals), it might be different; but, as it is, I see nothing for it but that the Governors should be responsible for the share which the Imperial Government may have in the policy carried out in the responsible-government colonies, with the liability to be recalled and disavowed whenever the Imperial authorities think it expedient to repudiate such policy. * * * * * To the Duke of Newcastle. Quebec: February 18, 1853. [Sidenote: Distribution of honours.] Now that the bonds formed by commercial protection and the disposal of local offices are severed, it is very desirable that the prerogative of the Crown, as the fountain of honour, should be employed, in so far as this can properly be done, as a means of attaching the outlying parts of the empire to the throne. Of the soundness of this proposition as a general principle no doubt can, I presume, be entertained. It is not, indeed, always easy to apply it in these communities, where fortunes are precarious, the social system so much based on equality, and public services so generally mixed up with party conflicts. But it should never, in my opinion, be lost sight of, and advantage should be taken of all favourable opportunities to act upon it. There are two principles which ought, I think, as a general rule to be attended to in the distribution of Imperial honours among colonists. Firstly, they should appear to emanate directly from the Crown, on the advice, if you will, of the Governors and Imperial Ministers, but not on the recommendation of the local executives. And, secondly, they should be conferred, as much as possible, on the eminent persons who are no longer actively engaged in political life. If these principles be neglected, such distinctions will, I fear, soon lose their value. * * * * * To the Earl Grey. Toronto: March 23,1850. [Sidenote: Speech of Lord J. Russell.] Lord John's speech on the colonies seems to have been eminently successful at home. It is calculated too, I think, to do good in the colonies; but for one sentence, the introduction of which I deeply deplore—the sting in the tail. Alas for that sting in the tail! I much fear that when the liberal and enlightened sentiments, the enunciation of which by one so high in authority is so well calculated to make the colonists sensible of the advantages which they derive from their connection with Great Britain, shall have passed away from their memories, there will not be wanting those who will remind them that, on this solemn occasion, the Prime Minister of England, amid the plaudits of a full senate, declared that he looked forward to the day when the ties which he was endeavouring to render so easy and mutually advantageous would be severed. And wherefore this foreboding? or, perhaps, I ought not to use the term foreboding, for really to judge by the comments of the press on this declaration of Lord John's, I should be led to imagine that the prospect of these sucking democracies, after they have drained their old mother's life-blood, leaving her in the lurch, and setting up as rivals, just at the time when their increasing strength might render them a support instead of a burden, is one of the most cheering which has of late presented itself to the English imagination. But wherefore then this anticipation—if foreboding be not the correct term? Because Lord John and the people of England persist in assuming that the Colonial relation is incompatible with maturity and full development. And is this really so incontestable a truth that it is a duty not only to hold but to proclaim it? Consider for a moment what is the effect of proclaiming it in our case. We have on this continent two great empires in presence, or rather, I should say, two great Imperial systems. In many respects there is much similarity between them. In so far as powers of self-government are concerned it is certain that our colonists in America have no reason to envy the citizens of any state in the Union. The forms differ, but it may be shown that practically the inhabitants of Canada have a greater power in controlling their own destiny than those of Michigan or New York, who must tolerate a tariff imposed by twenty other states, and pay the expenses of war undertaken for objects which they profess to abhor. And yet there is a difference between the two cases; a difference, in my humble judgment, of sentiment rather than substance, which renders the one a system of life and strength, and the other a system of death and decay. No matter how raw and rude a territory may be when it is admitted as a state into the Union of the United States, it is at once, by the popular belief, invested with all the dignity of manhood, and introduced into a system which, despite the combativeness of certain ardent spirits from the South, every American believes and maintains to be immortal. But how does the case stand with us? No matter how great the advance of a British colony in wealth and civilisation; no matter how absolute the powers of self-government conceded to it, it is still taught to believe that it is in a condition of pupilage from which it must pass before it can attain maturity. For one I have never been able to comprehend why, elastic as our constitutional system is, we should not be able, now more especially when we have ceased to control the trade of our colonies, to render the links which bind them to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the component parts of the Union…. One thing is, however, indispensable to the success of this or any other system of Colonial Government. You must renounce the habit of telling the Colonies that the Colonial is a provisional existence. You must allow them to believe that, without severing the bonds which unite them to Great Britain, they may attain the degree of perfection, and of social and political development, to which organised communities of free men have a right to aspire. Since I began this letter I have, I regret to say, confirmatory evidence of the justice of the anticipations I had formed of the probable effect of Lord John's declaration. I enclose extracts from two newspapers, an annexationist, the Herald of Montreal, and a quasi annexationist, the Mirror of Toronto. You will note the use they make of it. I was more annoyed however, I confess, by what occurred yesterday in council. We had to determine whether or not to dismiss from his offices a gentleman who is both M.P.P., Q.C., and J.P., and who has issued a flaming manifesto in favour, not of annexation, but of an immediate declaration of independence as a step to it. I will not say anything of my own opinion on the case, but it was generally contended by the members of the Board, that it would be impossible to maintain that persons who had declared their intention to throw off their allegiance to the Queen, with a view to annexation, were unfit to retain offices granted during pleasure, if persons who made a similar declaration with a view to independence were to be differently dealt with. Baldwin had Lord John's speech in his hand. He is a man of singularly placid demeanour, but he has been seriously ill, so possibly his nerves are shaken—at any rate I never saw him so much moved. 'Have you read the latter part of Lord J. Russell's speech?' he said to me. I nodded assent. 'For myself,' he added, 'if the anticipations therein expressed prove to be well founded, my interest in public affairs is gone for ever. But is it not hard upon us while we are labouring, through good and evil report, to thwart the designs of those who would dismember the Empire, that our adversaries should be informed that the difference between them and the Prime Minister of England is only one of time? If the British Government has really come to the conclusion that we are a burden to be cast off whenever a favourable opportunity offers, surely we ought to be warned.' I replied that while I regretted as much as he could do the paragraph to which he referred, I thought he somewhat mistook its import: that I believed no man living was more opposed to the dismemberment of the Empire than Lord J. Russell: that I did not conceive that he had any intention of deserting the Colonies, or of inviting them to separate from England; but that he had in the sentence in question given utterance to a purely speculative, and in my judgment most fallacious, opinion, which, was shared, I feared, by very many persons both in England and the Colonies: that I held it to be a perfectly unsound and most dangerous theory, that British Colonies could not attain maturity without separation, and that my interest in labouring with them to bring into full play the principles of Constitutional Government in Canada would entirely cease if I could be persuaded to adopt it. I said all this I must confess, however, not without misgiving, for I could not but be sensible that, in spite of all my allegations to the contrary, my audience was disposed to regard a prediction of this nature, proceeding from a Prime Minister, less as a speculative abstraction than as one of that class of prophecies which work their own fulfilment. I left the Council Chamber disheartened, with the feeling that Lord J. Russell's reference to the manhood of Colonies was more likely to be followed by practical consequences than Lamartine's famous 'quand l'heure aura sonnÉ' invocation to oppressed nationalities. It is possible, indeed, that I exaggerate to myself the probable effects of this declaration. Politicians of the Baldwin stamp, with distinct views and aims, who having struggled to obtain a Government on British principles, desire to preserve it, are not, I fear, very numerous in Canada; the great mass move on with very indefinite purposes, and not much inquiring whither they are going. Of one thing, however, I am confident; there cannot be any peace, contentment, progress, or credit in this colony while the idea obtains that the connection with England is a millstone about its neck which should be cast off, as soon as it can be conveniently managed. What man in his senses would invest his money in the public securities of a country where questions affecting the very foundations on which public credit rests are in perpetual agitation; or would settle in it at all if he could find for his foot a more stable resting-place elsewhere? I may, perhaps, be expressing myself too unreservedly with reference to opinions emanating from a source which I am no less disposed than bound to respect. As I have the means, however, of feeling the pulse of the colonists in this most feverish region, I consider it to be always my duty to furnish you with as faithful a record as possible of our diagnostics. And, after all, may I not with all submission ask, Is not the question at issue a most momentous one? What is it indeed but this: Is the Queen of England to be the Sovereign of an Empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its roots deep into fresh earth and drawing new supplies of vitality from virgin soils? Or is she to be for all essential purposes of might and power, Monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely—her place and that of her line in the world's history determined by the productiveness of 12,000 square miles of a coal formation, which is being rapidly exhausted, and the duration of the social and political organization over which she presides dependent on the annual expatriation, with a view to its eventual alienization, of the surplus swarms of her born subjects? If Lord J. Russell, instead of concluding his excellent speech with a declaration of opinion which, as I read it, and as I fear others will read it, seems to make it a point of honour with the Colonists to prepare for separation, had contented himself with resuming the statements already made in its course, with showing that neither the Government nor Parliament could have any object in view in their Colonial policy but the good of the Colonies, and the establishment of the relation between them and the mother-country on the basis of mutual affection; that, as the idea of maintaining a Colonial Empire for the purpose of exercising dominion or dispensing patronage had been for some time abandoned, and that of regarding it as a hot-bed for forcing commerce and manufactures more recently renounced, a greater amount of free action and self-government might be conceded to British Colonies without any breach of Imperial Unity, or the violation of any principle of Imperial Policy, than had under any scheme yet devised fallen to the lot of the component parts of any Federal or imperial system; if he had left these great truths to work their effect without hazarding a conjecture which will, I fear, be received as a suggestion, with respect to the course which certain wayward members of the Imperial family may be expected to take in a contingency still confessedly remote, it would, I venture with great deference to submit, in so far at least as public feeling in the Colonies is concerned, have been safer and better. [Sidenote: 'Separation' and 'annexation.'] You draw, I know, a distinction between separation with a view to annexation and separation with a view to independence. You say the former is an act of treason, the latter a natural and legitimate step in progress. There is much plausibility doubtless in this position, but, independently of the fact that no one advocates independence in these Colonies except as a means to the end, annexation, is it really tenable? If you take your stand on the hypothesis that the Colonial existence is one with which the Colonists ought to rest satisfied, then, I think, you are entitled to denounce, without reserve or measure, those who propose for some secondary object to substitute the Stars and Stripes for the Union Jack. But if, on the contrary, you assume that it is a provisional state, which admits of but a stunted and partial growth, and out of which all communities ought in the course of nature to strive to pass, how can you refuse to permit your Colonies here, when they have arrived at the proper stage in their existence, to place themselves in a condition which is at once most favourable to their security and to their perfect national development? What reasons can you assign for the refusal, except such as are founded on selfishness, and are, therefore, morally worthless? If you say that your great lubberly boy is too big for the nursery, and that you have no other room for him in your house, how can you decline to allow him to lodge with his elder brethren over the way, when the attempt to keep up an establishment for himself would seriously embarrass him? * * * * * To the Earl Grey. Toronto: November 1, 1850. Sir H. Bulwer spent four days with us, and for many reasons I am glad that he has been here. He leaves us knowing more of Canada than he did when he came. I think too that both he and Sir E. Head return to their homes re-assured on many points of our internal policy, on which they felt doubtful before, and much enlightened as to the real position of men and things in this province. [Sidenote: Self-government not republican.] With one important truth 1 have laboured to impress them, and I hope successfully. It is this: that the faithful carrying out of the principles of Constitutional Government is a departure from the American model, not an approximation to it, and, therefore, a departure from republicanism in its only workable shape. Of the soundness of this view of our case I entertain no doubt whatever; and though I meet with few persons to whom it seems to have occurred (for the common belief of superficial observers is that we are republicanising the colonies), I seldom fail in bringing it borne to the understanding of any intelligent person with whom I have occasion to discuss it. The fact is, that the American system is our old Colonial system with, in certain cases, the principle of popular election substituted for that of nomination by the Crown. Mr. Filmore stands to his Congress very much in the same relation in which I stood to my Assembly in Jamaica. There is the same absence of effective responsibility in the conduct of legislation, the same want of concurrent action between the parts of the political machine. The whole business of legislation in the American Congress, as well as in the State Legislatures, is conducted in the manner in which railway business was conducted in the House of Commons at a time when it is to be feared that, notwithstanding the high standard of honour in the British Parliament, there was a good deal of jobbing. For instance our Reciprocity measure was pressed by us at Washington last session, just as a Railway Bill in 1845 or 1846 would have been pressed in Parliament. There was no Government to deal with. The interests of the Union, as a whole and distinct from local and sectional interests, had no organ in the representative bodies; it was all a question of canvassing this member of Congress or the other. It is easy to perceive that, under such a system, jobbing must become not the exception but the rule. Now I feel very strongly, that when a people have been once thoroughly accustomed to the working of such a Parliamentary system as ours, they never will consent to revert to this clumsy irresponsible mechanism. Whether we shall be able to carry on the war here long enough to allow the practice of Constitutional Government and the habits of mind which it engenders to take root in these provinces, may be doubtful. But it may be worth your while to consider whether these views do not throw some light on affairs in Europe. If you part with constitutional monarchies there, you may possibly get something much more democratic; but you cannot, I am confident, get American republicanism. It is the fashion to say, 'of course not; we cannot get their federal system;' but this is not the only reason, there are others that lie deeper. Look at France, where they are trying to jumble up the two things, a head of the State responsible to the people who elect him, and a ministry responsible to the Parliament. * * * * * To the Duke of Newcastle. March 26, 1853. It is argued that, by the severance of the connection, British statesmen would be relieved of an onerous responsibility for colonial acts of which they cannot otherwise rid themselves. Is there not, however, some fallacy in this? If by conceding absolute independence the British Parliament can acquit itself of the obligation to impose its will upon the Colonists, in the matter, for instance, of a Church Establishment, can it not attain the same end by declaring that, as respects such local questions, the Colonists are free to judge for themselves? How can it be justifiable to adopt the former of these expedients, and sacrilegious to act upon the latter? The true policy, in my humble judgment, is to throw the whole weight of responsibility on those who exercise the real power, for, after all, the sense of responsibility is the best security against the abuse of power; and, as respects the connection, to act and speak on this hypothesis—that there is nothing in it to check the development of healthy national life in these young communities. I believe that this policy will be found to be not only the safest, but also (an important consideration in these days) the most economical. * * * * * To the Earl Grey. Toronto: December 17, 1850. Although, as you observe, it seems to be rather idle in us to correspond on what may be termed speculative questions, when we have so much pressing business on hand, I venture to say a few words in reply to your letter of the 23rd ult., firstly, because I presume to dissent from some of the opinions which you advance in it; and, secondly, because I have a practical object of no small importance in view in calling your attention to the contrasts which present themselves in the working of our institutions, and those of our neighbours in the States. My practical object is this: when you concede to the Colonists Constitutional Government in its integrity, you are reproached with leading them to Republicanism and the American Union. The same reproach is hurled with anathemas against your humble servant. Lord Stanley, if I rightly remember, in the debate on Ryland's case last year, stated amid cheers, that if you were in the habit of consulting the Ministers of the Crown in the Colony before you placed persons on the colonial pension List, he had no hesitation in saying you had already established a republic in Canada! Now I believe, on the contrary, that it may be demonstrated that the concession of Constitutional Government has a tendency to draw the Colonists the other way; firstly, because it slakes that thirst for self-government which seizes on all British communities when they approach maturity; and, secondly, because it habituates the Colonists to the working of a political mechanism, which is both intrinsically superior to that of the Americans, and more unlike it than our old Colonial system. Adopting, however, the views with respect to the superiority of the mechanism of our political system to that of our neighbours, which I have ventured to urge, you proceed to argue that the remedy is in their hands; that without abandoning their republicanism they and their confrÈres in France have nothing to do but to dismiss their Presidents and to substitute our constitution without a King, the body without the head, for their own, to get rid of the inconveniences which they now experience; and you quote with approbation, as an embodiment of this idea, the project submitted by M. GrÉvy and the Red Republicans to the French Constituent Assembly. [Sidenote: Value of the monarchical principle.] Now here I confess I cannot go along with you, and the difference between us is a very material one; for if the monarch be not an indispensable element in our constitutional mechanism, and if we can secure all the advantages of that mechanism without him, I have drawn the wrong moral from the facts. You say that the system the Red Republicans would have established in France would have been the nearest possible approach to our own. It is possible, I think, that we may be tending towards the like issues. It is possible, perhaps probable, that as the House of Commons becomes more democratic in its composition, and consequently more arrogant in its bearing, it may cast off the shackles which the other powers of the State impose on its self-will, and even utterly abolish them; but I venture to believe that those who last till that day comes, will find that they are living under a very different constitution from that which we now enjoy; that they have traversed the interval which separates a temperate and cautious administration of public affairs resting on the balance of powers and interests, from a reckless and overbearing tyranny based on the caprices and passions of an absolute and irresponsible body. You talk somewhat lightly of the check of the Crown, although you acknowledge its utility. But is it indeed so light a matter, even as our constitution now works? Is it a light matter that the Crown should have the power of dissolving Parliament; in other words, of deposing the tyrant at will? Is it a light matter that for several months in each year the House of Commons should be in abeyance, during which period the nation looks on Ministers not as slaves of Parliament but servants of the Crown? Is it a light matter that there should still be such respect for the monarchical principle, that the servants of that visible entity yclept the Crown are enabled to carry on much of the details of internal and foreign administration without consulting Parliament, and even without its cognisance? Or do you suppose that the Red Republicans, when they advocated the nomination of a Ministry of the House of Assembly with a revocable mandat, intended to create a Frankenstein endowed with powers in some cases paramount to, and in others running parallel with, the authority of the omnipotent body to which it owed its existence? My own impression is, that they meant a set of delegates to be appointed, who should exercise certain functions of legislative initiation and executive patronage so long as they reflected clearly, in the former the passions, and in the latter the interests of the majority for the time being, and no longer. It appears to me, I must confess, that if you have a republican form of government in a great country, with complicated internal and external relations, you must either separate the executive and legislative departments, as in the United States, or submit to a tyranny of the majority, not the more tolerable because it is capricious and wielded by a tyrant with many heads. Of the two evils I prefer the former. Consider, for a moment, how much more violent the proceedings of majorities in the American Legislatures would be, how much more reckless the appeals to popular passion, how much more frequently the permanent interests of the nation and the rights of individuals and classes would be sacrificed to the object of raising political capital for present uses, if debates or discussions affected the tenure of office. I have no idea that the executive and legislative departments of the State can be made to work together with a sufficient degree of harmony to give the maximum of strength and of mutual independence to secure freedom and the rights of minorities, except under the presidency of Monarchy, the moral influence of which, so long as a nation is monarchical in its sentiments, cannot, of course, be measured merely by its recognised power. [Sidenote: Influence of a Governor, under responsible Government.] Those who are most ready to concur in these views of Colonial Government, and to admire the vigour with which they were defended, and the consistency with which they were carried out, may still be inclined to ask whether the maintenance of them did not involve a species of official suicide: whether the theory of the responsibility of provincial Ministers to the provincial Parliament, and of the consequent duty of the Governor to remain absolutely neutral in the strife of political parties, had not a necessary tendency to degrade his office into that of a mere Roi fainÉant. He had in 1849, as Sir C. Adderley expresses it, 'maintained the principle of responsible Government at the risk of his life.' Was the result of his hard-won victory only to empty himself of all but the mere outward show of power and authority? |
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