  The establishment of the principle of direct communication with the Imperial Government at the capital had always been regarded as one of the most important objects of Lord Elgin's mission. When, therefore, in reply to his letter addressed to the Prime Minister, there came an answer from a provincial officer, he returned it at once, and wrote again to the Prime Minister, pointing out that, by refusing to correspond with him directly, the Minister had broken the existing treaty, by which it was agreed that 'Her Britannic Majesty's Chief High Officer shall correspond with the Chinese High Officers, both at the capital and in the provinces, under the term "communication;"' and announcing that he should proceed at once to the North, in order that he might place himself in more immediate communication with the High. Officers of the Imperial Government at the capital. Accordingly, he arranged with Baron Gros that they should meet in the Gulf of Pecheli, at the mouth of the Peiho, backed by their respective fleets, and with the moral support of the presence of the Russian and American Plenipotentiaries. In carrying out these plans everything depended, in his judgment, on acting promptly; and he was therefore most desirous that the supporting force should collect at once at the appointed spot, and that it should include a considerable number of gunboats of light draught, capable of passing over the mud-banks which form a bar at the mouth of the Peiho river. In this, however, he was disappointed, and many weeks elapsed before any vigorous measures could be taken. The delay, as may be supposed, caused him much annoyance and anxiety at the time; and he especially regretted it afterwards, because it prevented him from personally visiting Pekin, as he might have done at this time under circumstances peculiarly favourable; and thus left the delicate question of access to the capital to be settled by his successor, with no such advantage.[1] [Sidenote: Advance to the Peiho.] H.M.S. 'Furious,' at sea.—April 11th.—Here we are, gliding through the smoothest possible sea, with a gentle wind, and this time favourable, which relieves us of all the smoke and ashes of the funnel,—an advantage for our eyes as well as conducive to our comfort. We are in the midst of the Yellow Sea, going about eight knots, dragging a gunboat astern to save her coal. This is the only gunboat I have got. I trust, both on private and public grounds, that we may succeed, because otherwise the consummation might be put off for a year, or at least till the autumn, and God knows what might happen in the interval. The Russian Plenipotentiary, with his own small vessel—dragging behind him, however, a junk well laden with coals and provisions—sailed the day before me. I followed on the 10th (yesterday). The French and American are to follow. It is amusing to see how we play our parts. Putiatine and I are always together, visiting every port, looking into everything with our own eyes. Our colleagues, with their big ships, arrive sooner or later at the great places of rendezvous. [Sidenote: Aground.] April 13th, Nine P.M.—We had an adventure this afternoon. I was on the paddle-box bridge watching, as we passed between the town of Tung- Chow Foo (a long wall, as it seemed, stretching for about four miles, with a temple at the nearest end) and the island of Meantau, when I felt a shock,—and, behold! we were aground. Our gunboat, which we towed, not being able to check its speed at a moment's notice, ran foul of us, and we both suffered a little in the scuffle. We got off in about two hours. On the whole, I am rather glad that we have a gunboat with us, for if anything serious did happen, it would be rather awkward, under existing circumstances, to be cast on the coast of China. It is as well to have two strings to one's bow. April 14th.—This morning it was thick and pretty rough. It is now (4 P.M.) very bright and comparatively smooth. We have seen no land to-day, nor, indeed, anything but sea and a few junks. Shall we meet any vessels at the rendezvous? A few hours will tell. [Sidenote: The rendezvous.] April 15th.—We saw, at about 5 P.M. yesterday, Russian at anchor, and went towards her, but were afterwards obliged to remove to some distance, as we had not water enough where she is. While we were going to our berth, the 'Pique' came in sight. So here we are—'Pique' 'Furious' and 'Slaney' (gunboat), in an open sea, land not even risible. Captain Osborn started off this morning, in the gunboat, to sound and find out what chance we have of getting over the bar at the mouth of the Peiho. Putiatine came on board this morning. He has sent to the shore a note announcing his arrival. I am not disposed to do anything of the kind. The best plan, as it appears to me, is to move steadily up the river as soon as we can get ever the bar, and let the Chinese stop us if they dare. Putiatine says that he will follow me, if I pass without any resistance being offered, but that he must not go first, as his Government forbids him to provoke hostilities. This division of labour suits me very well. April 19th.—I have nothing to write about. You may imagine what it is to be at anchor in this gulf with nothing to do…. If I had had my gunboats, I might have been up the Peiho ere this. I might perhaps have brought the Emperor to his senses…. Meanwhile Reed is arrived. Gros is last, but he is bringing his Admiral and force with him. April 21st.—Gros arrived last evening. He is very well disposed, and ready to act with me. The French Admiral may be expected any day. We are going to make a communication to Pekin to invite a Plenipotentiary to meet us here, as we cannot go up to Tientsin. About a week afterwards the bar was crossed; but it was not until three more weeks had passed that the forts at the mouth of the river were taken, in order to secure the passage of the Envoys up to Tientsin. [Sidenote: Taking of the forts.] May 21st.—I have spent during the last three weeks the worst time I have passed since 1849, and really I have not been capable of writing. The forts were taken yesterday. The Chinese had had several weeks to prepare, and their moral was greatly raised by our hesitations and delays. The poor fellows even stood at their guns and fired away pretty steadily. But as they hardly ever hit, it is of very little consequence how much they fire. As soon as our men landed they abandoned the forts and ran off in all directions. We have hardly had any loss, I believe; but the French, who blundered a good deal with their gunboats, and then contrived to get blown up by setting fire to a powder magazine, have suffered pretty severely. I fancy that we have got almost all the artillery which the Chinese Empire possesses in this quarter…. This affair of yesterday, in a strategical point of view was a much more creditable affair than the taking of Canton. Our gunboats and men appear to have done well, and though they were opposed to poor troops, still they were troops, and not crowds of women and children, who were the victims of the bombardment at Canton. May 22nd.—Would that you had been a true prophet! Yet there is something of inspiration in your writing on the 1st of March: 'I was fancying you even now, perhaps, ascending the Peiho with a train of gunboats!' May 23rd.—These wretched Chinese are for the most part unarmed. When they are armed, they have no notion of directing their firearms. They are timorous, and without either tactics or discipline. I will venture to say that twenty-four determined men, with revolvers and a sufficient number of cartridges, might walk through China from one end to another. May 25th.—No news since I began this letter, except a vague report that the Admirals are moving up the river slowly, meeting with no resistance, rather a friendly reception, from the people. I am surprised that we have not yet heard anything from Pekin. I hope the Emperor will not fly to Tartary, because that would be a new perplexity. I am not quite in such bad spirits as last week, because at least now there is some chance of our getting this miserable war finished, and thus of my obtaining my liberty again…. We ought to have a mail from England any day…. Changes of Government have this inconvenience, that of course the new-comers cannot possibly take time to read over previous correspondence, so that they must be but partially informed on many points,… but no doubt at this distance it is practically impossible for Government to give instructions, and all the responsibility must rest on the agent on the spot. At this moment, when I am moving up to Pekin, I am receiving the despatches of the Government commenting upon the Canton proceedings, and asking me: What do you intend to do next? May 27th.—I have been pacing the deck looking at the dancing waves sparkling under a bright full moon. It is the third time, I think, that I have seen it since I have been in this gulf. I had a message last night late from the Admiral, stating that he is within two miles of Tientsin! I sent Frederick up that he might see what is going on, and let me know when I ought to advance. I had also a communication from the Chinese Plenipotentiaries, but it was not of much importance. I do not think that these poor, timorous people have any notion of resisting. I only trust that they may make up their minds to concede what is requisite at once, and enable us all to have done with it. May 28th.—The last news from Canton shows that the kind of panic which had been, in my opinion most needlessly, got up, is subsiding, and the General has sent up a few men—for which I ought to thank him, as he had only been asked whether he could supply any if wanted. May 29th.—I have a short despatch from the new Government, giving me latitude to do anything I choose if I will only finish the affair. Meanwhile Frederick writes from Tientsin to recommend me to proceed thither, and I intend to be off this afternoon. There appears to be on the part of the Chinese no attempt at resistance, but on the other hand no movement to treat. This passivity is, of course, our danger, and it is one which slowness on our part tends to increase. However, we must hope for the best. [Sidenote: On the Peiho.] Yamun, Tientsin.—May 30th.—Only look at my date, does it not astonish you? I hardly yet realise to myself where I am. I started at about 4.30 P.M. yesterday from the 'Furious,' crossed the bar, at the forts at the entrance of the river, picked up Gros and the French mission, whose vessel could not get on, and moved on to this place. The night was lovely—a moon nearly full. The banks, perfectly flat and treeless at first, became fringed with mud villages, silent as the grave, and trees standing like spectres over the stream. There we went ceaselessly on through this silvery silence, panting and breathing flame. Through the night-watches, when no Chinaman moves, when the junks cast anchor, we laboured on, cutting ruthlessly and recklessly through the waters of that glancing and startled river, which, until within the last few weeks, no stranger keel had ever furrowed! Whose work are we engaged in, when we burst thus with hideous violence and brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious recesses of the traditions of the past? I wish I could answer that question in a manner satisfactory to myself. At the same time, there is certainly not much to regret in the old civilisation which we are thus scattering to the winds. A dense population, timorous and pauperised, such would seem to be its chief product. I passed most of the night on deck, and at about 4 A.M. we reached a point in the centre of the suburb of Tientsin, at which the Great Canal joins the Tientsin or Peiho river. There I found the Admirals, Frederick, &c. Frederick had got this yamun for us, half of which I have had to give to my French colleague. It consists of a number of detached rooms, scattered about a garden. I have installed myself in the joss-house, my bedroom being on one side, and my sitting-room on the other, of the idol's altar. We have a letter informing us that the Emperor has named two great Officers of State to come here and treat, and our Admirals are in very good humour, so that matters look well for the present. June 1st.—I found my joss-house so gloomy and low, that I have returned to my first quarter in the garden, on a mound overlooking the river. It consists, of a single room, part of which is screened off by a curtain for a bedroom. It is hot during the day, but nothing much to complain of. I took a walk yesterday. The country is quite flat, cultivated in wheat, millet, &c. Instead of the footpaths of the southern parts of China, there are roads for carriages, and wheeled carts dragged by mules in tandem going along them. I have not been in the town, but some of the party were there this morning, and one had his pocket picked, which is a proof of civilisation. They say it is a poor place, the people stupid-looking and curious, but not as yet unfriendly. June 4th.—I am to have an interview with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries to-day. I devoutly hope it may lead to a speedy and satisfactory pacific settlement; but I am sending to Hong-Kong for troops, in order to be prepared for all eventualities. In sum, my policy has resulted in this:—I have complete military command of the capital of China, without having broken off relations with the neutral Powers, and without having interrupted, for a single day, our trade at the different ports of the empire. [Sidenote: Negotiations.] Tientsin.—June 5th—After sending off your letter yesterday, I went to have my first official interview with the Chinese Plenipotentiaries. I made up my mind, disgusting as the part is to me, to act the rÔle of the 'uncontrollably fierce barbarian,' as we are designated in some of the confidential reports to the Chinese Government which have come into our hands. These stupid people, though they cannot resist, and hardly even make a serious attempt to do so, never yield anything except under the influence of fear; and it is necessary therefore to make them feel that one is in earnest, and that they have nothing for it but to give way. Accordingly I got a guard of 150 marines and the band of the 'Calcutta,' and set off with all my suite in chairs, tambour battant for the place of rendezvous. It was about two-and-a-half miles off, and the heat of the sun very great. The road carried us through several narrow streets of the suburb, then across a plain, till we reached a temple at which the Plenipotentiaries were awaiting us. A dense crowd of Chinese men—I saw not one woman—lined the route. Curiosity chiefly was depicted on their countenances; some looked frightened; but I observed no symptoms of ill-will. At the entrance of the temple were two blind musicians, playing something like squeaking bagpipes. This was the Chinese band. We marched in with all our force, which drew up in a sort of court before an open verandah, where refreshments were set out, and the dignitaries awaited us. I was received by the Imperial Commissioner, and conducted to a seat at a small table covered with little plates of sweetmeats, &c. One of the Chinese Plenipotentiaries sat on either side of me. It was a very pretty scene, and the place was decorated in very good taste with flowers, &c. As my neighbours showed no disposition to talk, I began by asking after their health and that of the Emperor. They then said that they had received the Emperor's orders to come down to treat of our affairs. I answered, that although I was much grieved by the neglect of the Prime Minister to answer the letters I had addressed to him, yet as they had on their cards stated that they had 'full powers,' I had consented to have this interview in order that we might compare our powers, and see whether we could treat together. I told them that I had brought mine, and I at once exhibited them, giving them a translation of the documents. They said they had not powers of the same kind, but a decree of the Emperor appointing them, and they brought out a letter which was wrapped up in a sheet of yellow paper. The chief Plenipotentiary rose and raised the paper reverentially over his head before unfolding it. I thought the terms of this document rather ambiguous, besides which I was desirous to produce a certain effect; so when it had been translated to me, I said that I was not sufficiently satisfied with it to be able to say on the spot whether I could treat with them or not; that I would, if they pleased, take a copy of it and consider the matter; but that I would not enter upon business with them at present. So saying I rose, moved to the front of the stage, and ordered the escort to move and the chairs to be brought. This put the poor people into a terrible fluster. They made great efforts to induce me to sit down again, but I acted the part of the 'uncontrollably fierce' to perfection, and set off for my abode. I had hardly reached it when I received two cards from my poor mandarins, thanking me for having gone so far to meet them, &c. June 12th.—I have gone through a good deal since we parted. Certainly I have seen more to disgust me with my fellow-countrymen than I saw during the whole course of my previous life, since I have found them in the East among populations too timid to resist and too ignorant to complain. I have an instinct in me which loves righteousness and hates iniquity, and all this keeps me in a perpetual boil. [Sidenote: Treaty signed.] June 29th.—I have not written for some days, but they have been busy ones…. We went on fighting and bullying, and getting the poor Commissioners to concede one point after another, till Friday the 25th, when we had reason to believe all was settled, and that the signature was to take place on the following day…. On Friday afternoon, however, Baron Gros came to me with a message from the Russian and American Ministers, to induce me to recede from two of my demands—1. A resident minister at Pekin; and, 2. Permission to our people to trade in the interior of China; because, as they said, the Chinese Plenipotentiaries had told them that they had received a decree from the Emperor, stating that they should infallibly lose their heads if they gave way on these points…. The resident minister at Pekin I consider far the most important matter gained by the Treaty; the power to trade in the interior hardly less so…. I had at stake not only these important points in my treaty, for which I had fought so hard, but I know not what behind. For the Chinese are such fools, that it was impossible to tell, if we gave way on one point, whether they would not raise difficulties on every other. I sent for the Admiral; gave him a hint that there was a great opportunity for England; that all the Powers were deserting me on a point which they had all, in their original applications to Pekin, demanded, and which they all intended to claim if I got it; that therefore we had it in our power to claim our place of priority in the East, by obtaining this when others would not insist on it? Would he back me?… This was the forenoon of Saturday, 26th. The Treaty was to be signed in the evening. I may mention, as a proof of the state of people's minds, that Admiral Seymour told me that the French Admiral had urged him to dine with him, assuring him that no Treaty would be signed that day! Well, I sent Frederick to the Imperial Commissioners, to tell them that I was indignant beyond all expression at their having attempted to communicate with me through third parties; that I was ready to sign at once the Treaty as it stood; but that, if they delayed or retracted, I should consider negotiations at an end, go to Pekin, and demand a great deal more, &c…. Frederick executed this most difficult task admirably, and at 6 P.M. I signed the Treaty of Tientsin…. I am now anxiously waiting some communication from Pekin. Till the Emperor accepts the Treaty, I shall hardly feel safe. Please God he may ratify without delay! I am sure that I express the wish just as much in the interest of China as in ours. Though I have been forced to act almost brutally, I am China's friend in all this. [Sidenote: Articles of the Treaty.] It may be well here to recapitulate the chief articles of the Treaty thus concluded, which may be briefly summed up as follows:— The Queen of Great Britain to be at liberty, if she see fit, to appoint an Ambassador, who may reside permanently at Pekin, or may visit it occasionally, at the option of the British Government; Protestants and Roman Catholics to be alike entitled to the protection of the Chinese authorities; British subjects to be at liberty to travel to all parts of the interior, under passports issued by their Consuls; British ships to be at liberty to trade upon the Great River (Yangtze); Five additional ports to be opened to trade; The Tariff fixed by the Treaty of Nankin to be revised; British subjects to have the option of clearing their goods of all transit duties by payment of a single charge, to be calculated as nearly as possible at the rate of 2-1/2 per cent. ad valorem; The character 'I' (Barbarian) to be no longer applied in official documents to British subjects; The Chinese to pay 2,000,000 taels (about 650,000_l._) for losses at [Sidenote: Reasons for moderation.] In bringing this Treaty to a conclusion Lord Elgin might have said of himself as truly as of the brother who had so ably helped him in arranging its terms, that he 'felt very sensibly the painfulness of the position of a negotiator, who has to treat with persons who yield nothing to reason and everything to fear, and who are at the same time profoundly ignorant both of the subjects under discussion and of their own real interests.' Moreover he had constantly to recollect that, under the 'most favoured nation' clause, every concession made to British subjects would be claimed by the subjects, or persons calling themselves the subjects, of other Powers, by whom they were only too likely to be employed for the promotion of rebellion and disorder within the empire, or for the establishment of privileged smuggling and piracy along its coasts and up its rivers. In all these circumstances he saw grounds for exercising forbearance and moderation; and his forbearance and moderation were rewarded by the readiness with which the Emperor sanctioned the Treaty, and the amicable manner in which its details were subsequently settled. One exception there was to this moderation on his part, and to this readiness on theirs; viz. his insisting, against the earnest remonstrances of the Imperial Commissioners, backed by the intercession of the Russian and American envoys, on the right of sending an ambassador to Pekin. But it was an exception of that kind which is said to prove the rule; for the stipulation was one which could not lead to abuses, and which would be conducive, as he believed, in the highest decree to the true interests of both the contracting parties. He was convinced that so long as the system of entrusting the conduct of foreign affairs to a Provincial Government endured, there could be no security for the maintenance of pacific relations. On the one hand the Provincial Governors were entirely without any sentiment of nationality, caring for nothing but the interests of their own provinces: nor were they in a position to exercise any independence of judgment, their lives and fortunes being absolutely at the disposal of a jealous Government, so that it was generally their most prudent course to allow any abuses to pass unnoticed rather than risk their heads by reporting unwelcome truths. On the other Land the central Government, in which alone a national feeling and an independent judgment were to be looked for, was profoundly ignorant on all questions of foreign policy, and must continue to be so as long as the Department for Foreign Affairs was established in the provinces. For these reasons he regarded the principle that a British minister might henceforth reside at Pekin, and hold direct intercourse with imperial ministers at the capital, as being, of all the concessions in the Treaty, the one pregnant with the most important consequences.[2] [Sidenote: to be kept in reserve.] But, the right once secured, he was very desirous that it should be exercised with all possible consideration for the long-cherished prejudices of the Chinese on the subject, who looked forward with the utmost horror to the invasion of their capital by foreign ministers, with, their wives and establishments; these latter being, as it appeared, in their eyes more formidable than the ministers themselves. Accordingly, when the Imperial Commissioners addressed to him a very temperate and respectful communication, urging that the exercise of the Treaty-right in question would be of serious prejudice to China, mainly because, in the present crisis of her domestic troubles it would tend to cause a loss of respect for their Government in the minds of her subjects, he gladly forwarded their memorial to the Government in England, supporting it with the strong expression of his own opinion, that 'if Her Majesty's Ambassador should be properly received at Pekin when the ratifications were exchanged next year, it would be expedient that Her Majesty's Representative in China should be instructed to choose a place of residence elsewhere than at Pekin, and to make his visits either periodical, or only as frequent as the exigencies of the public service might require.' With much shrewdness he pointed out that the actual presence of a minister hi a place so uncongenial, especially during the winter months, when the thermometer falls to 40° below zero, might possibly be to the Mandarin mind less awe-inspiring than the knowledge of the fact that he had the power to take up his abode there whenever the conduct of the Chinese Government gave occasion; and that thus the policy which he recommended would 'leave in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, to be wielded at its will, a moral lever of the most powerful description to secure the faithful observance of the Treaty in all time to come.' [Sidenote: Return southward.] At Sea, Gulf of Pecheli.—July 5th.—At last I am actually off—on my way home? May I hope that it is so? I got on Sunday the Emperor's assent to the Treaty, in the form in which I required it; sent immediately down to stop the troops, and set off myself on Tuesday at noon for the Gulf. We sailed yesterday afternoon, with the intention, if possible, of seeing the great Wall of China on our way to Shanghae, but we have not been very successful, and have now put about, and are moving southwards…. Frederick is going home with the Treaty, and I proceed via Japan…. July 14th.—Frederick embarks to-night, and sails to-morrow morning at four. I shall not know all that I lose, publicly and privately, by his departure, till he is gone…. Shanghae, Sunday, July 18th.—I have just returned from church. Such an ordeal I never went through. If a benevolent lady, sitting behind me, had not taken compassion on me, and handed me a fan, I think I should have fainted…. Everyone says that the heat here surpasses that felt anywhere else. They also affirm that this is an exceptional season. July 19th.—Writing has been an almost impossible task during these few last days. The only thing I have been able to do has been to find a doorway, or some other place, through which a draught was making its way, and to sit there reading…. In sending Frederick away, I have cut off my right arm, but I think, on the whole, it was better that he should take the Treaty home,… and of course he is better able than anyone else to explain what has been the real state of affairs here…. It is impossible to acknowledge too strongly the obligation I am under to him for the way in which he has helped me in my difficulties. [Sidenote: Yeh] July 21st.—As for Yeh, I cannot say very much for him; but the account given of him by the Captain of the 'Inflexible,' who took him to Calcutta, differs as widely as possible from that of the Times' Correspondent. He was very courteous and considerate, civil to everybody, and giving no trouble. I suppose that there is no doubt of the fact that he executed a vast number of rebels, and I, certainly, who disapprove of all that sort of thing, am not going to defend that proceeding. But it is fair to say that rebels are parricides by Chinese law, and that, in so far as we can judge, nothing could have been more brutal or more objectless than this Chinese rebellion. They systematically murdered all—men, women, and children—of the dominant race, and their supporters, on whom they could lay their hands. Certain Americans and Europeans took them up at first because they introduced a parody of some Christian doctrines into their manifestoes. But these gentlemen are now, I think, heartily ashamed of the sympathy which they gave them. July 26th.—I heard yesterday a good piece of news. The Emperor has named my friends, the Imperial Commissioners, to come down here to settle the tariff, &c. This, I think, proves that the Emperor has made up his mind to accept the Treaty and carry it out. I hope also that it will enable me to settle the Canton affair. A few days later, finding that some weeks must elapse before the Imperial Commissioners could arrive, he sailed for Nagasaki, in order to turn the interval to account by endeavouring to negotiate a treaty with the Japanese Government in accordance with the instructions which he had received when leaving England. [1] Those who remember the somewhat angry discussion which, arose afterwards about this delay, its causes and its consequences, may be struck with the fact that the subject is scarcely alluded to in any of the extracts here given. The omission is intentional: Lord Elgin's friends having no desire to rate up an extinct controversy which he would have been the last to wish to see revived, and respecting which, they have nothing to add to—as they have nothing to withdraw from— what he himself stated in the House of Lords on February 21, 1860. [2] Another article of the Treaty, though of less importance in itself, has been brought by recent events into so much prominence that it may be desirable to give in full the views of its author respecting it. In his despatch of July 12, having mentioned, as one of the principal commercial advantages obtained by British subjects, the settlement of the vexed question of the transit duties, he proceeds:— This subject presented considerable difficulty. As duties of octroi are levied universally in China, on native as well as foreign products, and as canals and roads are kept up at the expense of the Government, it seemed to be unreasonable to require that articles, whether of foreign or native production, by the simple process of passing into the hands of foreigners, should become entitled to the use of roads and canals toll-free, and should, moreover, be relieved altogether from charges to which they would be liable if the property of natives. On the other hand, experience had taught us the inconvenience of leaving the amount of duties payable under the head of transit-duties altogether undetermined. By requiring the rates of transit-duty to be published at each port; and by acquiring for the British subject the right to commute the said duties for a payment of 2-1/2 per cent. on the value of his goods (or rather, to speak more correctly, for the payment of a specific duty calculated at that rate), I hope that I have provided for the latter as effectual a guarantee against undue exactions on this head as can be obtained without an entire subversion, of the financial system of China. |
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