We now found ourselves well established in the Mountains of Ephraim, and at no great distance from the enemy. After the taking of Ballut Ridge he had dropped back, and was soon seen to be entrenching and sangaring a new line from 2,000 to 4,000 yards further north. Ballut Ridge had been fixed as our final objective. Had there been possible roads by which guns and supplies could have been brought forward, an immediate pursuit or attack of the enemy might have proved successful; but, with such hopeless communications, deliberate action was a necessity.

After the Ridge had been captured, the enemy were pursued with all the fire from rifles, machine guns and artillery that could be brought to bear. Cavalry, or even infantry pursuit across these mountains was out of the question. An outpost line was established and the troops settled down to a wet and somewhat cheerless night. The mountain sides had been so steep that it had been impossible to bring up any comforts, and even the camels bearing the reserve supply of ammunition could only be got forward with extreme difficulty. Except for shelling, we were left unmolested during the night and next morning, which gave us the opportunity of constructing sangars, making tracks for the pack transport animals, and generally making ourselves more comfortable. Patrols were sent forward, and it was ascertained that the country to our immediate front was clear of the enemy.

The effect of this advance was to draw down reinforcements into this sector, and to divert into Palestine reserves of Turkish troops; these came largely from the Caucasus, where the total collapse of Russia had set many good Turkish troops at liberty. There was evidence that these troops had been intended for an offensive campaign in Mesopotamia. It is probable, therefore, that this advance, indirectly, yet substantially, contributed to the defence of Mesopotamia, for the Turkish offensive in that area never materialized. Two or three German Divisions came down to stiffen up the Turks, and from this time forward the resistance which we had to face became unmistakeably hardened. The days of campaigning de luxe had gone for ever. Before our "archies" could get forward, the Hun aeroplanes had very much their own way, and, flying low, dropped bombs and machine-gunned us in a manner that was most uncomfortable. Enemy artillery shelled any movements on the forward slope, and brought a searching fire to bear, in the hope of damaging our bivouac areas behind the crest. The manner in which the front line was held in the mountains by the Turks as well as by ourselves, was as follows. Strong sangars were constituted on the forward slope of a hill or ridge. By day these were occupied only by a small and well-protected observation party, at times supplemented with a Lewis gun team; and the remainder of the garrison were withdrawn behind the crest to bivouac areas on the reverse slope. At dusk, the garrison moved forward and manned the front line, being withdrawn again during the half-light of dawn. Thus the hostile artillery could never see a target upon which to fire. Searching a steep reverse slope with guns is almost impossible while, even with howitzers, unless observation can be obtained, an enormous amount of ammunition has to be fired to secure any result.

Meanwhile, preparations proceeded apace. With a genius little short of that which has made roads across the Himalayas and the Alps, roads were soon engineered down and up the steep sides of the Wadi, so that within two or three weeks it was possible to bring guns across the Wadi and over the Ballut Ridge. Water supplies, of which excellent springs were discovered in the bed of the wadi, were developed; later, the cisterns on the hills were closed down to prevent mosquito breeding and malaria.

On the 14th March, the enemy moved forward to counter-attack the Ballut Ridge line, but were caught in close formation by our artillery and the counter-attack never developed. On the 19th, a slight advance was made on our right, which brought the village of Beit Rima (possibly the Ramathaim of the Maccabees) within our line. Another forward move was evidently in the wind and patrolling activity increased all along our line.

A detailed account of one of these patrol incidents may be instructive as affording an example of how such a patrol should be handled. The patrol commander was an experienced soldier who had seen service with almost every battalion of the regiment and in most of the theatres of this war; his sleeve was covered with wound stripes, and hostile snipers only made him angry.

The orders which he received were to patrol as far as Ikba, and to protect some senior officers, who wished to make a reconnaissance and for whose safety he was responsible. He had under his command one platoon, consisting of three sections of riflemen and one of Lewis gunners; also one other officer to assist.

A glance at the sketch map will show Ballut Ridge, which formed our front line, and Three Bushes Hill, the most forward position held by the enemy. Ikba, or to give it its full name, Khurbet Umm el Ikba, thus lay in No Man's Land at no great distance from the enemy. Though standing on a hill and commanding an admirable view of the surrounding country, it is overlooked at a range of a mile from Three Bushes Hill, and also at shorter distances within effective rifle range from the points marked A, B and C, and, to some extent, from the point marked E. F is a lower knoll, commanded from Ikba. Both E and F are commanded from A.

Moving forward before dawn, the patrol commander led his patrol forward down the Wadi Ikba. Each section was kept apart, and moved forward in single file under its own commander. To each section commander were given precise orders as to the position which he was to occupy, what he was to do, and when he was to withdraw. One section moved down the ridge on the right of the wadi, and took up a position at the point B. One section, with the junior officer, moved first along the wadi bed, and then, while it was still only half light, ascended the left-hand spur and took up a position at A. The Lewis-gun team occupied the hill at C. The remaining section, which had been kept in reserve at the hills about D, now moved forward and occupied Ikba. All being reported clear, the senior officers moved forward, arriving at Ikba just as the daylight became strong enough for them to obtain the forward view of the enemy country which they desired.

An even better view of the country seemed probable from the spur at A. So across there went the officers, including the patrol commander. By the time they arrived, rifle reports were cracking, and the situation was becoming interesting. The reconnaissance finished, the patrol commander gave the senior officers five minutes in which to withdraw, before the expiration of which he would not begin to withdraw his patrol.

Meanwhile, the enemy upon Three Bushes Hill, had espied the party in Ikba, and set out to capture the patrol. Creeping along under cover, they established themselves at the point E. Thence they started to move on to the point F, but came under fire from the section on point A. It became a case of running the gauntlet, but the section were shooting well and dropped their men. The section at Ikba was withdrawing; the enemy, failing to realize that the spur A was occupied, rushed across to A intending to shoot up the wadi at the section withdrawing from Ikba. They were greeted with a warm reception from the section already at A and beat a hasty retreat. The section at A now withdrew up the wadi, covered by the fire of the section still in position at B and by the Lewis gunners at C. The reserve section from Ikba, who had been the first to withdraw, had meanwhile taken up another section in rear, and, under their protection, the section at B and the Lewis-gunners from C withdrew up the wadi. The enemy had apparently had enough of it, for the pursuit was not pressed. A few rounds of shrapnel were fired at us as a parting present, but no casualties were sustained. This patrol commander had paid attention to, and illustrated the soundness of, the cardinal principles of mountain fighting, namely, the necessity for seizing and piquetting the commanding heights, and the support of the movement of one party of troops by the fire of other parties already in position. The plan of using the Lewis gun as a reserve of fire, kept well back to cover the retirement of the remainder, was undoubtedly sound. Had the commanding heights not been first secured, it is difficult to see how the patrol could have withdrawn in the face of the enemy without confusion and without casualty.

On the 27th March the whole line moved forward. The advance was only intended to be for a depth of about a mile, in order to secure a better tactical line for defence. None of the objectives were believed to be held by the enemy. Accordingly, the advance was carried out by night. A full moon, giving light throughout the night, facilitated the operation. As soon as daylight was gone, the whole line crept noiselessly forward, with bayonets fixed ready to meet any possible opposition with cold steel. Away to our right, the enemy detected movement, and put down a barrage. But their firing was somewhat wild; the barrage came down behind the advancing troops and caused no casualties. On our front the enemy had not awakened to what was taking place, and our objectives were attained without molestation. It was realized that our new positions would be overlooked from the enemy's observation posts on Three Bushes Hill and on Arara, and that, when they saw us by daylight occupying the nearer ridges, they would shell us unmercifully. Accordingly, the remainder of the night was not devoted to sleep, but to the intensive building of sangars on the new defensive line, and the preparations of bivouac areas in such few spots as might be under cover from view and from fire. When morning came, the enemy commenced to shell, but the night had not been wasted, and our fellows had made themselves secure.

This new line was not very comfortable. To such an extent was it overlooked by the enemy that all movement by day was out of the question, and even incinerator fires had for a time to be forbidden. The enemy attacked this new line a few days after it had been taken up. However, our artillery caught the enemy's troops in close order before they had been deployed, and so we experienced no greater inconvenience than a bombardment, doing no great damage. It was not expected that this new line would have to be held for any great length of time. Already preparations were being pushed on for another encounter with the enemy.

CHAPTER XVI