The Turkish forces in Palestine, in the autumn of 1918, consisted of three armies, the 8th and the 7th, plus one added Division on the west of the Jordan, and the 4th army on the east. All were under the supreme command of the German General, Liman von Sanders.

The line held by the enemy west of the Jordan extended roughly from the sea, south of the Nahr el Falyk (some 14 miles north of Jaffa), across western Palestine approximately east, south-east to near Rafat, thence easterly and south-easterly, across the Nablus-Jerusalem Road, and so down to the Jordan Valley. Thus, a portion of his force was entrenched across the Maritime Plain, while the remainder was in the mountains of the Central Range. These mountains of Ephraim and Samaria form a rugged, isolated plateau, which is bounded on the north and east by the low-lying Valleys of Esdraelon and the Jordan. North-west, the mountains continue in a broken chain, till they fall precipitously to the sea at Cape Carmel.

There were two or three routes available to the enemy for supply or retreat, behind the Samaritan plateau. Most important of these was the railway, which, leaving the main Damascus-Hejaz line at Deraa, ran westwards down the Yarmuk Valley to the Jordan, thence through Beisan, and up the Vale of Jezreel and along the Plain of Esdraelon to Haifa. From El Afule, a junction in the middle of the Esdraelon Plain, the south-bound line branched off, and, passing through Jenin (close by Jezreel), wound its way among the mountains up to Messudieh Station, close to Samaria. Thence a short line ran on to Nablus, while the main line continued down the slope of the Wadi Shair to the Maritime Plain, which it reached at Tul Keram. The advanced enemy bases at Nablus and Tul Keram were served also by good roads. That from Tul Keram followed the line of the railway up to a point near Samaria, where it joined the main north-bound road leading from Nablus down to Jenin and El Afule. From El Afule it would be possible to go down the Vale of Jezreel (along the road where Jehu drove furiously) to Beisan, and thence northward up the Jordan Valley. But the better road from Jenin and El Afule leads across the Plain of Esdraelon to Nazareth and Tiberias and round the northern side of the Sea of Galilee to Damascus. Another road from Nablus leads eastwards, and, dropping steeply down along the Wadi Fara, leads to the Jordan, which it crosses by a ford at Jisr ed Damie. The places of tactical importance on the enemy lines of communication behind his advanced bases were, therefore, the railway junctions at Deraa and El Afule, the ford of Jisr ed Damie, and the towns of Beisan, Jenin and Nazareth.

The broad outline of General Allenby's plan of operations was an attack in overwhelming force against the enemy's positions on the Maritime Plain, followed by a right wheel of his left flank on a front of 16 miles from Rafat to the sea, thereby rolling up the Turkish line and driving them all into the Samaritan hills; meanwhile, his cavalry were to dash for the tactical points behind the Turkish line and so close all enemy lines of retreat.

Some weeks before the date fixed for the commencement of operations, the several Divisions were by turn withdrawn behind the line and put through a three weeks' course of intensive training. Then a rearrangement of the line took place, whereby an overwhelming force was concentrated on the left. The 60th Division, and most of the cavalry, were moved across to the extreme left from the Jordan Valley. Divisions in the line were so rearranged that the line from Rafat to the right was only held thinly, while the garrison of the line from Rafat to the sea was doubled by the addition of three more Divisions, including the 60th on the sea and a French Division at Rafat. All these movements were carried out with the utmost secrecy. The fact that the push was coming along the Maritime Plain was successfully camouflaged, and the enemy led to believe that the push would come up the Jordan Valley. The hotel at Jerusalem was closed, and got in readiness, ostensibly for occupation by G.H.Q. Empty lorries were run up and down the Jordan Valley. Tents were left standing there and dummy-horse lines arranged. Dummy horses were left in the Jordan Valley to convey to enemy aerial observers the impression that cavalry were still there in strength. All the marching towards the Jordan Valley was by day; all the marching towards the Maritime Plain was carried out by night, while by day these troops were hidden in the olive and orange groves that abound on this portion of the Plain. So successful were these ruses, and so complete the surprise, that enemy aerial reconnaissances, made a day before the attack, reported that there was unusual movement in the Jordan Valley and that there was no unusual movement on the coastal sector. The whole of the operations were a triumph of secrecy and of organization.

On the day before the main attack, a small advance was carried out by the right wing just west of the Jordan, occupying El Mugheir. This place is the junction of several roads leading from the west to the east of the Jordan. The object of this preliminary move was to prevent the Turks west of the river escaping by this route to the east, and also to draw the attention of the enemy towards the Jordan Valley and distract it from the coastal sector.

By the night of the 18th/19th September, our troops were in position. The Divisions occupying the line from the sea on the left were the 60th, the 7th and the 75th on the Plain, the 3rd where Plain and hills meet about Mejdel Yaba, the 54th and the French at Rafat. Thence the line was held by the 10th Division, assisted by a composite force, and, on the extreme right, about the recently captured Mugheir, by the 53rd. Cavalry were concentrated behind the 60th Division ready to dash forward directly the line should be broken.

At 4.30 on the morning of the 19th September, there suddenly opened an intensive bombardment of the enemy's coastal positions, carried out by all the artillery, trench-mortars and machine-guns that could be concentrated in this small sector, the navy also co-operating. After ten minutes' bombardment, the infantry moved forward and assaulted the enemy's front line positions, which were carried with but little opposition. Thereafter the barrage lifted and crept, being supplemented in places by smoke barrages dropped from aeroplanes. The infantry pushed forward and captured the enemy's second and third lines and strong points in rear. Shortly before seven o'clock, the 60th Division had broken right through the enemy defences by the sea, and had reached, and established a bridge-head at the Wadi Nahr el Falyk, a mile or so behind the enemy line. Engineers and pioneers got to work at once, and in a very short space of time had made roads and bridges through the enemy trench system, and over the Nahr el Falyk, by which cavalry and guns could be pushed forward. At 7.30, the cavalry passed through on their dash for the tactical points behind the enemy's lines.

Meanwhile, all along the line our infantry had taken their first objectives with little opposition, the enemy having been taken completely by surprise. The whole line advanced to a maximum depth of 5 miles, and then swung to the right, pivoting on Rafat. Such opposition as was encountered was met with at the strong points well behind the front line, where the enemy had had the time and opportunity to man his defences. For example, both at El Tireh and at Kalkilieh, stubborn resistance was encountered. Thus the line swung right-handed into the hills, crumpling up the whole enemy line west of Rafat. The 60th Division, after their break through, marched for the greater part of the day, and, by 5.30 in the afternoon, had reached Tul Keram. Our line, that evening, ran approximately south and north from Rafat to Tul Keram.

The cavalry passing through the gaps broken at the sea and close to Tabsor, pushed rapidly northward along the Coastal Plain. Some of them made for Tul Keram, and, passing thence up the Valley towards Nablus, had already reached Anebta before dark, cutting off large bodies of the retreating enemy with guns and transport between Tul Keram and the railway junction at Messudieh. Another strong cavalry force moved farther north. They passed through the mountains east of Mount Carmel that night, by the Musmus Pass (Megiddo), and, early on the following morning, the 20th, they charged the enemy holding the northern exit of the Pass and debouched on to the Plain of Esdraelon (Armageddon).

These seized the railway junction at El Afule. Some pushed on eastwards towards the Jordan and captured Beisan (Bethshan), some northwards and captured Nazareth, while some, turning southwards, took Jenin in reverse. By nightfall on the 20th all these tactical points were in our possession.

Yet another exploit remains to be chronicled. Far away across the eastern desert, but beautifully co-ordinated, and working as part of one great machine, moved a raiding force of the Arab troops of Hussein, King of the Hejaz. At the critical moment these swooped down upon the junction at Deraa, where they destroyed the railway in all directions, completely depriving the enemy of their main line of retirement.

Throughout the operations our airmen had the time of their lives. Some hovered all day over the enemy aerodrome at Jenin, and effectually prevented enemy machines from leaving the ground. Some maintained contact between the infantry and the higher command. Some, flying low, bombed and machine-gunned the retreating Turks, and completed their confusion.

The advance was continued on the 20th. On this day, the 10th Division, which had hitherto remained stationary to the right of Rafat, moved forward in a north-easterly direction, taking in rear the strong enemy position at Furkha. The whole line was now advancing and driving the retreating Turks towards Samaria and Nablus, and down the roads leading northwards and eastwards from these points. By the evening of the 20th, the Turkish resistance had collapsed everywhere on the west of the Jordan, except on the Turkish left in the Jordan Valley. Our right wing had advanced slightly, and occupied a line from near El Mugheir to Es Sawieh, while our left wing had swung round and reached the line Bidich-Baka-Messudieh Junction—that is to say, we were gradually closing in on Nablus from the south, south-west, and west. Owing to the tactical positions behind the enemy lines having been seized by our cavalry, all avenues of escape which might have been open to the enemy had been closed, except the fords across the Jordan between Beisan and Jisr-ed-Damieh.

By the 21st, the retreating Turks had become a demoralized rabble, fleeing to the fords of the Jordan, like the discomfited Midianites, under Oreb and Zeeb, had fled more than three thousand years before from the pursuit of Gideon. Those who fled down the northward road were captured and collected by our cavalry at Jenin. Those who fled down the eastward road by the Wadi Fara, hoping to reach the still open ford at Jisr-ed-Damieh, met with a more cruel fate. This road led down a steep and narrow gorge, dominated by the heights east of Nablus. A brigade of the 10th Division was rushed forward by a forced march, and seized these heights, effectually closing the trap. Our airmen had already got the situation well in hand here, and the road soon became a veritable shambles. The enemy had been forced or shepherded by our infantry into this bottle-neck, and our airmen, swooping down to 200 feet and bombing the head of the column, soon made the road impassable. That accomplished, they flew up and down the struggling column, bombing and machine-gunning without let or hindrance. It seemed as though the unspeakable Turk had at last been delivered over to vengeance in this Valley of Death. An eye-witness[11] describes the scene.

"In no section of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow could there have been a more terrible picture of hopeless and irretrievable defeat. In this area alone, eighty-seven guns of various calibres, and fully a thousand horse and oxen-drawn vehicles, nearly a hundred motor-lorries, cars, field-kitchens, water carts, and a mass of other impedimenta blocked the road, with the carcases of thousands of animals and the bodies of dead Turks and Germans."

On the 22nd, our cavalry moved up the Jordan Valley and seized the ford at Jisr-ed-Damieh, thus cutting off the last possible means of escape. Prisoners were surrendering in thousands. They looked weak and exhausted; in many cases they had fled over a parched country and beneath a burning sun for three or four days, without touching a drop of water. Their plight was pitiable. By that evening, the Turkish armies west of the Jordan had ceased to exist.

There still remained the Turkish 4th army in Eastern Palestine. An expedition, consisting largely of cavalry, was sent against them. These crossed the Jordan Valley, and, moving up the eastern slopes, on the 23rd September captured Es Salt, and, on the 26th, Amman. A day or two later, the Turkish force south of Amman, about 10,000 strong, surrendered. The remainder of the Turkish 4th army tried to withdraw. They were closely pursued by our cavalry and airmen, and, to some extent, cut off by the Arab forces of the King of the Hejaz. Many prisoners were taken from this army, while, such as could do so, made their escape to Damascus.

The whole of Palestine, south of, and including the Plain of Esdraelon, was now in the hands of the British and their Arab allies. But there was still work to be done in a sweep forward towards Damascus. The Turks had some reserves at Damascus, and with these, and the remnants of their 4th army, they attempted to check our advance against that city. Accordingly, they sent a small force down to the Upper Jordan, that is, to the river north of the Sea of Galilee. This force, which consisted of Germans, Turks and Circassians, was rushed down from Damascus in motor-lorries, in order to deny the crossing at Jisr Benat Yakub. They blew up the bridge and covered the crossing with machine guns. On the 27th our cavalry, pushing north from Tiberias, swam the river both to the south and to the north of this crossing, and surprised and captured many of the enemy. They then, with armoured cars, pushed forward along the main Tiberias-Damascus road.

On the same day, other cavalry joined hands with the Arab army at Deraa. From this point, also, cavalry and armoured cars pushed northward. It seemed a question whether this force or that from Jisr Benat Yakub would be the first to reach Damascus, as both forces were rapidly approaching the city from the south and south-west respectively. The advance was still disputed by enemy rear guards, from whom prisoners and guns were captured. The enemy rear-guards were defeated, and, by the evening of the 30th, the city was partially surrounded.

Early on the morning of the 1st October, a British force and a portion of the Arab army of King Hussein occupied the city of Damascus.

In the course of a fortnight the enemy line had been broken; Samaria, Galilee, Eastern Palestine and Damascus had been conquered; three Turkish armies had been destroyed, with a loss of their entire war material; and over 350 guns and 71,000 prisoners had been captured.

CHAPTER XVIII