Our advance had hitherto been northwards along the low country, and had already reached a point on the Maritime Plain some miles north of the parallel of Jerusalem. It now wheeled to the right and struck into the Hills, with the object of getting astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road and of thus capturing the Holy City.

It will be remembered, from our survey of the geography of Palestine, that the ridge of the JudÆan Hills runs approximately north and south, and that along the top of this ridge runs a first-class metalled road connecting Nablus with Jerusalem. From this ridge spurs run east and west down towards the Maritime Plain. These spurs are steep, bare and stony, and in places, precipitous, and are separated from one another by narrow valleys. Between such spurs, a few miles to the north-west of Jerusalem, sweeps down the Valley of Ajalon, with the villages of Beit-ur el-Foka (Beth-horon the Upper) and Beit-ur el-Tahta (Beth-horon the Lower), where Joshua won his memorable victory over the five kings of the Amorites. It was here that the routed hosts of the Amorites were pursued in panic, and near here that the sun and moon "stood still" at the bidding of Joshua. Further to the south, another gorge, or pass, roughly parallel to the Valley of Ajalon, leads down to the Plain, and along this pass runs the metalled road through Kurzet-el-Enab (Kirjath-Jearim), Saris and Bab-el-Wad, to Ramleh and Jaffa; this is the road followed by the Pilgrims. Other paths were shown upon the map, but these were found to be mere tracks on the hillside or up the stony beds of wadis, and, without considerable improvement, were impracticable for wheeled guns or transport. The only routes along which guns, other than mountain artillery, could be moved, were the two first-class roads running northwards and westwards out of Jerusalem.

Ten miles north of Jerusalem, along the Nablus road, at a height of nearly 3,000 feet above sea level, is the village of Bireh. This commanding position overlooks the Jordan Valley and all the surrounding country. This was the point which General Allenby decided to make his next objective. Reports had indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem, and in the known or suspected state of the demoralisation of the enemy, it was felt that considerable risks could be taken. Thus a bold and immediate dash for Bireh seemed to be indicated. Furthermore, an advance on this objective would take our forces well clear of Jerusalem itself. And so this plan best conformed with the determination that had previously been arrived at, that fighting should be within five miles of the Holy City.

The general idea of the operation was, that our troops should move up into the hills, some going by the Valley of Ajalon, and some by the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road as far as Enab, and thence by the "Roman road" running north-east. Although it was thought likely that the Turks, reinforced from Damascus, and perhaps from Aleppo, would come down and attack our new line, yet it was hoped that Bireh would be reached before serious opposition was encountered. The enemy, however, changed his mind. Having, early in November, decided to withdraw from Jerusalem, he now determined to hold it till the bitter end. Turkish resistance stiffened immensely. Pushed far into the hills, as were our advanced troops, and without much artillery support, it was found impossible for them to reach Bireh in the first stride; and further operations upon a more elaborate scale had to be undertaken before Jerusalem could be captured.

But we anticipate. Let us, then, return to the middle of November, at which time our forces had captured, and were holding, positions covering Jaffa, Ramleh and Junction Station. On the 17th November, the yeomanry commenced to move from Ramleh through the hills direct on Bireh, vi the valley of Ajalon and Lower Beth-horon; and, by the evening of the 18th, one portion of the yeomanry had reached Lower Beth-horon, while another portion had occupied Shilta.

On the 19th, the infantry commenced its advance. Latron and Anwas were captured in the morning. For nearly 4 miles, between Bab el Wad (2½ miles east of Latron) and Saris, the Jaffa-Jerusalem road passes through a narrow gorge or defile. The remainder of the day was spent in clearing this defile up to Saris. "These narrow passes from the plain to the plateau of the JudÆan range have seldom been forced, and have been fatal to many invading armies." The natural facilities for defence in this pass were undoubtedly very strong. "Had the attempt not been made at once, or had it been pressed with less determination, the enemy would have had time to reorganize his defences here, and the conquest of the plateau would then have been slow, costly and precarious."

The character of the fighting now changed, and more nearly resembled the mountain warfare of the north-west frontier of India. The bulk of this hill fighting fell upon the 75th Division, whose Indian experience proved invaluable. It was interesting to note the points of resemblance and of distinction between hill fighting here and on the Indian frontier.

In India, frontier warfare is usually conducted against ill-organized semi-savages, unarmed with artillery or machine guns, but furnished with the instincts and cunning of beasts of prey. Here the conditions were reversed. The enemy were well provided with artillery and machine guns, both of which they had had abundant opportunity to post advantageously and use effectually; whereas we had difficulties in getting forward our guns and bringing them into action, and were at times without artillery assistance. On the other hand, our troops surpassed the enemy in their familiarity with mountain fighting.

Here, as in all mountain fighting, the cardinal principle was piquetting the heights—that is to say, the necessity of sending up piquets from the advanced-guard, who deny to the enemy all commanding eminences, before the main body and transport move up the defile which those eminences command. Our piquets had frequently to fight their way up to the heights, and to be prepared, on reaching the summit, to withstand a shelling or repulse a counter-attack. They had, therefore, to be stronger than is usually necessary in India, but had to be particularly careful not to concentrate too much upon the summit. In India, where the enemy generally fight a guerilla warfare, hanging on to rearguards and cutting off stragglers, the stiffest part of the fighting is to be expected during the subsequent withdrawal of the piquets from the heights. Here, the fighting was done by the advanced-guard, and during the taking of the heights, subsequent withdrawal being generally unmolested. Quickness in the attack was found to be of great value. In some cases the garrisons of heights were surprised and captured before they could get away; more than once the advanced-guard, pushing rapidly up the road, were able to cut off such garrisons as they were coming down the reverse slopes of their hills.

With regard to armament, our field artillery were able to assist with their 4.2 inch howitzers, but the 18-pounder field guns, with their flat projectory, were, at this stage, found to be of little use. During later stages of this mountain warfare, the 18-pounder came again into its own; but that was when suitable positions could be chosen deliberately, and when, through the length of the range or the use of reduced charges, they were able to drop their shells with a steep angle of descent. A high velocity gun, with a flat projectory, like our 18-pounder, has two disadvantages in mountain warfare. When the gun is firing from behind a steep hill, the shell, on leaving the gun, is liable to strike the hill in front instead of clearing the crest. When the projectile reaches the distant ridge (behind which the enemy are presumably taking cover), the angle of descent is not sufficiently steep to cause damage. More satisfactory results were obtainable with howitzers, whose high angle fire could both clear the forward crests and search the reverse slopes. Unfortunately, at this time, we had little or no mountain artillery up forward, while the wheeled guns were often badly handicapped for want of good roads. We had marched away from Gaza well enough supplied with artillery for normal or plain country fighting, but scarcely so for this very different fighting in the mountains.

Another disadvantage under which we laboured, through this abrupt merging from trench into mountain warfare, was the overloading of the men. For the latter class of warfare men must be lightly equipped; in India, even the men's great-coats are carried for them on pack-mules. Here, the men were, of necessity, loaded up as for trench fighting, and were carrying gas masks and extra bandoliers (50 rounds) of ammunition, making a total of 170 rounds per man.

The key to success in modern mountain fighting proved to be the rapidity with which roads could be constructed for bringing forward artillery.

The defile up to Saris having been piquetted and cleared on the 19th, Enab was captured on the 20th in the face of organized opposition. Other infantry had moved from the plain along the more northern track (the Ajalon Valley route) by Berfilja and Beit Likia, and, on this same 20th, they captured Beit Dukka. On the same day the yeomanry got to within 4 miles of the Nablus-Jerusalem road, but were stopped by strong opposition about Beihesnia, 3 or 4 miles west-south-west of Bireh.

In this night it rained, as only in tropical and semi-tropical countries it knows how. The men, clad in their Indian drill, were soaked immediately, and lay down on the road or in the streets of Enab, or slept where they stood, the picture of misery. An isolated Turk rushed down the road, determined to sell his life dearly. But he could find nobody enthusiastic enough to fight, or even to take sufficient interest in him to accept his surrender; until at last he found a military policeman, who, this being his job, had no alternative but to take him prisoner. At length dawn broke; and it then became clear that Enab was under Turkish observation. So a cold night of rain was followed by a hot morn of fire.

From Enab, a "Roman road" leaves the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road and strikes away north-east to Biddu, and thence towards Bireh. In Roman days, this may have been an important road, but now it was found to be a mere rocky track, impassable for wheels, or for anything except infantry and pack animals. On the morning of the 21st, a portion of the 75th Division moved forward by this track, while another portion of the Division was left at Enab to cover the flank and demonstrate along the main Jerusalem road. The latter body drove hostile parties from Kushel, 2½ miles east of Enab, and secured this ridge. Meanwhile, progress along the "Roman road" was slow. The track was under hostile shell-fire, and it was found impossible to bring up guns to support the advance of the infantry. The advanced guard, pushing on towards Bireh, had got as far as Biddu, when it was held up there by intensive hostile shelling. The remainder of the leading brigade thereupon captured a commanding position about a couple of miles to the east of Biddu, and 2½ miles short of the Jerusalem-Nablus road. This commanding position was Neby Samwil.

Neby Samwil, one of the most prominent heights round Jerusalem, must always have been a place of considerable importance. It is identified with Mizpeh, one of the cities built by King Asa. Ecclesiastical tradition connects this place with Ramah, the birth and burial place of the prophet Samuel, whose tomb is said to lie under the Crusading Church, the ruins of which still exist here. To the honour of this prophet, the Moslems had erected a fine mosque upon this spot, which was a landmark for miles round. As subsequent events proved, Neby Samwil was the key to Jerusalem.

The question has been often asked: Who was the first to capture Neby Samwil? The honour has sometimes been claimed for the 60th Division. No doubt that Division fought here, and fought well. But at least two other divisions, the 52nd and the 75th, had been fighting on this hill for a day or so before the arrival of the 60th. As a matter of fact, this hill, the "key" to Jerusalem, was first captured by a brigade of the 75th Division, in honour of which a "key" was thereafter adopted as the proud distinguishing mark of this Division.

On Neby Samwil occurred some of the bitterest fighting in the Palestine campaign. Both sides realized the vital importance of the position. All the first night the hill was distinctly unhealthy. The trees were infested with snipers who picked off our men in the bright moonlight. Some refuge from the sniping was procurable inside the Mosque, but the Turkish artillery had no compunction in shelling the building and bringing it down in ruins. As the night progressed, more troops were poured on to the hill. The snipers were hunted down and summarily dealt with. Machine guns were established in the ruined Mosque and other appropriate positions, and preparations made to hold the hill at all costs. Towards the morning the Turks delivered a determined counter-attack. During the 22nd, the enemy made two counter-attacks on the Neby Samwil Ridge, which we repulsed. In one case, the Ghurkhas, having run out of ammunition, hurled down rocks and boulders upon the heads of the ascending enemy. At one time the Mosque was deserted by all except one machine-gun officer, who continued to work his gun single-handed. By this time the 52nd Division had come up and were, in some cases relieving, in some fighting side by side with, the 75th.

On the 23rd and on the 24th, determined and gallant attacks were made on the strong positions to the west of the Nablus road held by the enemy, who had brought up reinforcements and numerous machine guns, and could support his infantry by artillery fire from guns placed in position along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could not be brought up to give adequate support to our infantry, and both attacks failed. The yeomanry, who by the afternoon of the 21st had got to within a couple of miles of the Nablus road, were heavily counter-attacked, and fell back, after bitter fighting, on Beit-ur el-Foka (Upper Beth-horon).

This fighting had been taking place over classical and sacred ground. Troops fighting on Neby Samwil looked down upon the Holy City, still in the hands of the Turk. Our advanced dressing station was established in the beautiful monastery on the traditional site of Emmaus; here the men were dying on the very spot that the risen Christ had been made known to His disciples in the breaking of bread.

"The positions reached on the evening of the 21st practically marked the limit of the progress in this first attempt to gain the Nablus road. Positions had been won from which our final attack could be prepared and delivered with good prospects of success. Nevertheless, it was evident that a period of preparation and organization would be necessary before an attack could be delivered in sufficient strength to drive the enemy from his positions."

Orders were accordingly issued to consolidate the position gained and prepare for relief. The 60th Division had been lent to the 21st Corps, and had already taken their place in the fighting on Neby Samwil. Now the 21st Corps were gradually relieved and moved over to the left; while the operations about Jerusalem were taken over by the 20th Corps.

Country round Jerusalem

Country round Jerusalem

CHAPTER X