Let us trace the fortunes of the 20th Corps, whom we last saw engaged in the fighting about Beersheba. After the fall of Gaza and Beersheba, most of the mounted troops went forward in pursuit of the enemy along the Maritime Plain. These were closely followed up and supported by the 21st Corps, i.e. the 52nd and 75th Divisions, with the 54th following close upon their heels. It was impossible at this time to supply more than a limited number of troops far forward of railhead. So the Divisions of the 20th Corps after their successful operations at Beersheba and Sheria, were first moved backwards to rest and re-equip, before going forward again into the field zone. Of these 20th Corps Divisions, the 60th were the first to go forward. Following along the main Gaza-Junction Station road, in the footsteps of the 75th and 54th Divisions, the 60th arrived at Junction Station on the 22nd November, on which date the head-quarters of the 20th Corps also moved up to, and opened at, Junction Station. The 60th Division were now lent to the 21st Corps. They moved forward next day, following along the Jerusalem road to Enab, and about the 24th or 25th began to take their place in the fighting on the Neby Samwil ridge. Shortly after the 60th came forward the 74th. By the time that they got sufficiently far forward, the 20th Corps were taking over from, and relieving, the 21st, and the 74th Division soon found itself in the zone of operations to the west and north-west of Jerusalem. The 10th Division remained in the neighbourhood of Gaza for a few weeks, until the possibilities of supply permitted their also going forward. The 53rd Division did not go forward by the Maritime Plain at all. They remained about Beersheba until the 4th December. Then they moved forward, without meeting with opposition, along the higher road, that is, through Hebron towards Bethlehem; and subsequently arrived in the hills at such time and place as their presence was required for manoeuvring the enemy out of Jerusalem.

While these reliefs were in progress, several determined counter-attacks were delivered by the enemy in their attempt to dislodge us from the positions of advantage that we had already gained. At this time our line was, of necessity, somewhat thinly held, especially towards the sea. The Imperial Camel Corps, whom we last saw protecting the right flank of the pursuit from the threat near Beit Jibrin, had been moved across to the extreme left, where they and cavalry held positions on the north bank of the River Auja, protecting Jaffa. Further to the right, the line was carried on by the 54th Division, who thus linked up, along the ridge north of the Valley of Ajalon, with the 52nd and 75th Divisions then fighting in the neighbourhood of Neby Samwil. "On the 25th November our advanced posts north of the River Auja were driven back across the river. An attack on the night of the 29th succeeded in penetrating our outpost line north-east of Jaffa; but next morning the whole hostile detachment, numbering 150, was surrounded and captured by the Australian Light Horse. Attacks were also delivered against the left flank of our position in the hills from Beit-ur el-Foka to El Burj and the Neby Samwil ridge. One such attack was delivered on the 30th near El Burj, when a counter-attack by Australian Light Horse took 200 prisoners and practically destroyed the attacking battalion. There was particularly heavy fighting between El Burj and Beit-ur el-Foka, but all these attacks were successfully resisted and severe losses were inflicted on the enemy. All efforts by the enemy to drive us off the Neby Samwil ridge were completely repulsed.

"These attacks in no way affected our positions nor impeded the progress of our preparations. Favoured by a continuance of fine weather, preparations for a fresh advance against the Turkish positions west and south of Jerusalem proceeded rapidly. Existing roads and tracks were improved and new ones constructed to enable heavy and field artillery to be placed in position and ammunition and supplies brought up. The water supply was also developed. By December 4th all reliefs were complete." A line was then held from Kushel, about 5 miles to the west of Jerusalem, along the ridge that runs north-east some 3 or 4 miles to Neby Samwil. From this point, the line bent back at a right angle, and ran along the northern ridge of the Valley of Ajalon through Beit Izza and Beit Dukka to Beit-ur el-Tahta (Beth-horon the Lower), from which point it was carried west and north-west to the sea.

The enemy held a line approximately facing our Kushel-Neby Samwil line, protecting Jerusalem from attack from the west or north-west, his front line being distant about three miles from the city, and artillery and machine guns being posted in the outskirts of the city itself. He had two good lines of supply or retreat, namely the north road from Nablus and the eastern road through Jericho and across the Jordan to Amman Station on the Hejaz Railway. It will be remembered that, in the words of the Psalmist, "The Hills stand round about Jerusalem." The Turks were able to select positions of considerable natural strength in these surrounding hills. In fact, the country is one continual succession of hills and valleys, the hillsides steep and rocky, the valleys deep and strewn with boulders. These positions of natural strength the enemy had improved by the construction of trenches and strong points and other devices of modern field engineering.

The general idea of the operations for the capture of Jerusalem was the simultaneous pressure of three Divisions, whereby the enemy should be driven off his main roads, and the city be isolated, and so forced to surrender. The 60th and 74th Divisions had already arrived in the fighting zone and were occupying positions in the line, the 60th on the right, about Kushel, and the 74th about Neby Samwil. On December 4th, the 53rd Division commenced their march from Beersheba up the Hebron-Jerusalem Road. No opposition was met, and, by the evening of the 6th, the head of this column was ten miles north of Hebron. The infantry were directed to reach the Bethlehem area by the 7th, and a line about three miles south of Jerusalem by dawn on the 8th. The 8th was the date fixed for the commencement of the renewed operations against Jerusalem.

"On the 7th the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost continuous. The hills were covered with mist at frequent intervals throughout the fighting, rendering observation from the air and visual signalling impossible." Great was the discomfort caused to the men by this rain, fog and mud. The cold was intense, and soldiers who had borne the brunt of a long day's fighting could not sleep, but just lay huddled together longing for the dawn. An even more serious effect of the rain was to jeopardise the supply arrangements, by converting the roads into seas of liquid mud, rendering them almost impassable, in places quite impassable for camels and mechanical transport.

By dawn on the 8th, all the troops were in their allotted positions, except the 53rd Division. It had been recognized that these troops on the extreme right might be delayed and fail to reach the positions assigned to them by dawn on the 8th, and arrangements had accordingly been made for the protection of our right flank west of Jerusalem in case of such delay occurring. This contingency did occur. The 53rd Division was held up by mud and fog, and by roads blown up by the enemy, so that, by the morning of the 8th, it was still some distance south of Jerusalem; on that day it exercised little or no influence on the fighting.

During the darkness of the night of the 7th/8th December, and in weather such as we have described, portions of the 60th Division clambered down the mountain side, crossed the deep wadi bed in front of the right of our line, and crept up the steep terraced sides of the opposite ridge where ran a portion of the Turkish line. One brigade was to make a frontal attack, while another was to turn the left flank of the enemy's position, by scaling a spur to the south-west of the village of Ain Karim. These two brigades stormed the main line of works before daylight and captured the western defences of Jerusalem. Considerable rifle and artillery fire was experienced from the outskirts of Jerusalem, so that it was necessary for our troops to throw back their right and form a defensive flank facing eastwards towards the city. Artillery support from our own guns soon became difficult, owing to the length of the advance and the difficulty of moving guns forward. It thus became difficult for these troops to attain their subsequent objectives in the direction of the Nablus road north of Jerusalem. Accordingly, it was decided, early in the afternoon, to consolidate the line gained and resume the advance next day, when the right column (the 53rd Division) would be in a position to exert its pressure.

Meanwhile, the task of the 74th Division was to swing forward, with their left resting and pivoting on Neby Samwil, to capture Beit Iksa village and works, and so to swing forward to the Nablus road. They each captured their first objective, and we were preparing for a further advance. But the delay on the right made it desirable to check for the time the advance on the left, and to consolidate the positions already attained.

By nightfall, our line ran from Neby Samwil to the east of Beit Iksa, through Lifta, to a point of about 1½ miles west of Jerusalem, whence it was thrown back facing east. Thus, our main line had swung forward, circling on its pivot at Neby Samwil, with its extreme right flank refused. The refused right flank afforded protection against the fire coming from the city. The main directions of our advance, however, now menaced, not so much Jerusalem itself, as the main Nablus road a few miles to the north of the city. All the enemy's prepared defences west and north-west of Jerusalem had been captured, and our troops were within a short distance of the Nablus-Jerusalem Road.

That night the Turks withdrew. On the following morning, the 9th December, the 74th and 60th Divisions, driving back rearguards, occupied a line across the Nablus-Jerusalem road 4 miles north of Jerusalem.

In the meantime, the 53rd Division had arrived on the scene of operations to the south of Jerusalem. They bore right-handed, cleared the Mount of Olives, which commands Jerusalem from the east, drove the enemy away eastwards, and occupied a position east of Jerusalem across the Jericho road.

These operations isolated Jerusalem. At about noon on the 9th December, 1918, the city was surrendered.

Two days later General Allenby made his official entry into Jerusalem. It was a simple ceremony. The General entered the city on foot, preceded by his aides-de-camp, and accompanied by the commanders of the French and Italian detachments, by the French, Italian and American military attachÉs, and by a few members of the General Staff. Outside the Jaffa Gate he was received by the Military Governor, and a guard of honour composed of representatives of troops from the various portions of the British Empire, which had taken part in the recent operations; while, inside the walls, were small parties from the French and Italian detachments which those countries had sent to assist us in Palestine. Inside the city, at the base of the Tower of David, the ceremony was concluded by the reading of the Proclamation. Its terms promised that every person could pursue his lawful business without interruption, and that every sacred building, monument, holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer of whatsoever form of the great religions of mankind, would be maintained and protected according to the existing customs and beliefs of those to whose faiths they were sacred.

CHAPTER XI