We have seen that during the night of the 7th/8th November, the enemy had retreated all along the line. The enemy opposite our right flank-guard withdrew towards Hebron, that is, north-east into the JudÆan Hills. He was pursued for a short distance by the yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were captured. The yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the mounted troops for the more important work of the pursuit of the enemy's main body. The enemy force that thus escaped into the hills there reorganized, and later descended to the Plain on the flank of our pursuing force with a view to creating a diversion; but of this, more anon.

On the afternoon of the 7th, when it was seen that our Sheria operations in the centre had been successful, the cavalry were ordered to push forward from there in the direction of Huj, which was the terminus of the enemy's branch railway line from Deir Sineid. Had this force of cavalry been able to push forward and join up with the cavalry that had worked round by the sea and were engaging the enemy rearguard at Beit Hanun, the bulk of the Turkish force engaged upon this front might have been surrounded and captured. The mounted troops on the right moved towards Huj, but met with considerable opposition from hostile rearguards. On this account, and through difficulty in watering horses, the consummation devoutly to be desired was not attained.

It will be remembered that the Gaza operations had the effect of almost turning the enemy's right flank as long ago as November 2nd, and that, by the evening of the 7th, the force advancing along the coast had already established itself on the north bank of the Wadi Hesi, some 6 miles or so behind the enemy's defensive line.

Throughout the 7th, Turkish rearguards clung to Beit Hanun and to the Atawineh and Tank systems to the east of Ali Muntar. The effect of this was, that, when our troops eventually got under way in pursuit of the retreating Turks, those near the sea had several miles' start of those further inland. This feature, a pursuit in echelon with the left flank advanced, continued throughout these operations. And so we shall see that Jaffa fell into our hands some weeks before the capture of Jerusalem had even been attempted.

The bulk of the Turkish army retreated northwards along the Coastal Plain. Here ran their railway, their main line of communications, and also an excellent road from Gaza to Jerusalem. Little or no opportunity was afforded of catching the disorganized enemy in narrow defiles, as happened in the rout of the following autumn, but the open Plain offered ample opportunities for a hasty retreat, of which the enemy fully availed themselves.

"During the 8th, then, the advance was continued, and interest was chiefly centred in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish rearguard which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. Considerable captures of prisoners, guns, ammunition and other stores were made, especially at Huj and Deir Sineid, but no large formed body of the enemy was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered considerable opposition." At this time the brunt of the work was being borne by the cavalry and the Royal Flying Corps, the infantry not having yet been ordered forward. "Near Huj, a fine charge by some squadrons of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured twelve guns, and broke the resistance of a hostile rearguard."

"It soon became obvious from the reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination.

"Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the mounted troops, directing them on to the line El Tine-Beit Duras, that is, on to a line a little to the south-west of Junction Station, with orders to press the enemy relentlessly. A portion of the infantry was ordered forward in support.

"By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of the railhead."

The 54th Division had hitherto been principally engaged between Gaza and the sea. The 52nd Division, therefore, passed through the 54th and took up the pursuit along the coast, the pursuit along the Gaza-Jerusalem road falling to the lot of the 75th.

On the night of the 8th, our regiment was relieved in the trenches at the Apex, and, on the 9th, the 75th Division concentrated behind the line, ready to take its part in the pursuit. Next day we all went forward in column of route. We crossed No Man's Land along the enemy's old front line trenches by Ali Muntar. Having looked out upon this scene for months through glasses, telescopes and periscopes, it was interesting now to obtain a close view of these fortress defences.

But there were other sights that met our eyes, sad and gruesome, that can be better imagined than described. Portions of the enemy's wire, and of the gentle slopes in front, were littered with the remains of brave lads that had fallen in the sad days of March and April. It was strange that, in their own interests, the Turks had not buried these bodies. Instead they had left them lying there for months, beneath an almost tropical sun, and had actually fixed up their new wire entanglements over the unburied bodies. In some cases death had evidently been instantaneous. In others, where death had come more slowly, lads were to be found grasping open testaments or letters from home. It seemed so sad that these poor fellows, who had endured the hardships of the Desert and marched victoriously across Sinai, should, like Moses, have been privileged to see, but not to enter, the Promised Land.

After crossing No Man's Land, we marched along past pleasanter sights, great stacks of ammunition, gas cylinders, and other interesting captures. We enjoyed glimpses of how the enemy here had made himself comfortable; still more did we enjoy glimpses of how we here had made the enemy uncomfortable. Huge craters there were, made by naval guns shelling from the sea. These guns had bombarded the enemy communications behind his front line, and had obtained direct hits on the track and rolling stock, causing a train or two, valuable booty, to fall into our possession. Bomb holes were to be seen, made by our aircraft in their efforts to destroy the bridges on the enemy's line of retreat.

We bivouacked on the night of the 10th at Deir Sineid. For the next two days we marched forward, close upon the heels of the pursuing cavalry, but not close enough yet to come into action or to deploy from column of route. All along our route lay evidences of the enemy's rout. At one time, we were passing a convoy of prisoners being shepherded along by a few cavalry; at another, a party of refugees hurrying back with their worldly possessions to those homes to which they knew they could now return in safety. Here and there lay the body of some unfortunate Turk; while all along the line lay the wreckage of vehicles and the carcases of transport animals.

Throughout these days the troops suffered considerably from thirst. A hot exhausting wind was blowing, and the men were heavily laden for long-distance route marching in a semi-tropical country. Water was the ever-recurring trouble. A little for the men to carry on with was generally procurable, but the difficulty of watering the animals at times became acute. The usual tidings were, that there was plenty of water at the next village. When the next village was reached the tidings proved to be true, but so long was the queue of animals already waiting to be watered, that fresh arrivals stood but little chance. At many places the water was insufficient; and "even when water was found in sufficient quantities, it was usually in wells and not on the surface; consequently, if the machinery for working the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not available, the process of watering a large quantity of animals was slow and difficult."

Meanwhile, how were our cavalry progressing? A glance at the map will show that, after the fall of Gaza, the next point of tactical importance in Palestine was Junction Station. With this in our hands, Jerusalem would be cut off from railway communication with the outer world, and quantities of rolling stock, supplies, war material and possibly prisoners, should fall into our hands. While still pursuing the retreating enemy, therefore, the cavalry had been directed to make Junction Station their next objective.

The portion of the enemy's force that had withdrawn into the hills towards Hebron now made a descent from the hills to the Plain. Their object was to threaten the flank of our pursuing cavalry, create a diversion, and thus relieve the pressure from their main body. From Hebron, a couple of difficult tracks wind down the mountains to the village of Beit Jibrin, where they join a road coming from Bethlehem and Jerusalem. This latter road reaches the Plain and Beersheba railway at Arak el Menshiyeh. This was the spot, then, towards which the counter-attack, or demonstration from the hills, was organized.

"It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be short of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily, and to be in a generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and that this threat could practically be disregarded. The Imperial Camel Corps, however, was ordered to move to the neighbourhood of Tel el Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any counterstroke from the hills; while orders were issued for the main pursuit to be pressed so that Junction Station might be reached with all speed. The Hebron group made an ineffective demonstration in the direction of Arak el Menshiyeh on the 10th, and then retired north-east so as to prolong the enemy's line towards Beit Jibrin."

Close to the sea, the advance-guard of the 52nd Division pushed on as far as Burkah on the 11th, and, on the 12th, the yeomanry pushed north and seized Tel el Murreh, on the right or northern bank of the Nahr Sukereir and close to its mouth.

"The operations of these days showed a stiffening of the enemy's resistance on the general line of the Wadi Sukereir, with centre about El Kustineh. Reports from the R.F.C. indicated the total hostile forces opposed to us on this line at about 15,000; and this increased resistance, coupled with the capture of prisoners from almost every unit of the Turkish force, tended to show that we were no longer opposed to rearguards, but that all the remainder of the Turkish Army, which could be induced to fight, was making a last effort to arrest our pursuit south of the important Junction Station.

"On the morning of the 13th November, the situation was, that the enemy had strung out his force on a front of 20 miles from El Kubeibeh on the north to about Beit Jibrin to the south. The right half of his line ran roughly parallel to, and only about five miles in front of, the railway to the north of Junction Station, which was the main line of supply from the north."

We have seen that our pursuit along the sea coast had a considerable start of that further to the right, and the rapidity of this pursuit had dictated to the enemy this rather unsatisfactory position which he was forced to take up. His right flank was already almost turned. In so far as he could do so, he held a strong position on the line of heights running north and south near the right flank of his position, on which heights stand the villages of Katrah and El Mughar.

The 12th was a day of preparation. On the 13th, an attack was delivered against the enemy's position by the 75th Division on the right and the 52nd on the left, the extreme right of the attack being protected by the Australian Mounted Troops, who had pressed forward towards Balin Berkussie and Tel es Safi. The country over which the attack took place is open and rolling. It is dotted with small villages surrounded by mud walls, with plantations of trees and thick cactus hedges outside the walls. These hedges afforded admirable opportunities for the concealment of machine guns. In spite of heavy machine gun fire, the 75th attacked and captured the village of El Mesmiye. A turning movement was directed against the enemy's right flank. There was a dashing charge of mounted troops, who galloped across the Plain under heavy fire and turned the enemy's position from the north. The Kahan El Mughar position, protecting the enemy's right flank, fell to the 52nd Division. After this, the enemy resistance weakened, and by the evening his forces were in retreat. Early the following morning we occupied Junction Station.

The enemy's flight from Junction Station was precipitate. Two trains escaped shortly before our occupation, one of which was believed to have contained Von Kressenstein himself. Nevertheless our captures of rolling stock and material were considerable. The enemy's army had now been broken into two separate parts, which retired eastwards towards Jerusalem and northwards through Ramleh towards Tul Keram.

Throughout the 14th our mounted troops pressed on toward Ramleh and Ludd. On the right, Naaneh, on the railway to Ramleh, was attacked and captured in the morning. On the left, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had a smart engagement at Ayun Kara, 6 miles south of Jaffa, where the Turks made a determined counter-attack, and were only repulsed at the point of the bayonet.

On the morning of the 15th our mounted troops dislodged a hostile rearguard, which had taken up a position on the high ground, flanking the railway north of Junction Station, and covering the main road from Jaffa to Jerusalem. This is the site of Gezer, one of the most ancient of the Canaanitish cities in Palestine, and one of the first objects of interest sought by the eye of the tourist on his journey up from Jaffa to Jerusalem. Thus, commanding both the railway and the main Jerusalem road, this position might have considerably delayed our advance had it been held with determination. As it was, our mounted troops were able to occupy Ramleh and Ludd that evening and to push forward patrols to within a short distance of Jaffa.

Jaffa, the ancient port of Jerusalem, was occupied without further opposition on the evening of the 16th.

"The situation was now as follows. The enemy's army, cut in two by our capture of Junction Station, had retired partly east into the mountains towards Jerusalem, and partly north along the Plain. The nearest line on which these two portions could reunite was the line Tul Keram-Nablus." Although Jerusalem itself could still be supplied along the road connecting it with Nablus, or along the road across the Jordan to Ammam Station on the Hejaz Railway, yet "reports from the R.F.C. indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem and withdraw to organize on the line Tul Keram-Nablus.

"On our side, the mounted troops had been marching and fighting continuously since October 31st, and had advanced a distance of 75 miles measured in a straight line from Asluj to Jaffa. The infantry, after their last fighting at Gaza, had advanced, in nine days, distances of from 40 to 70 miles, with two severe engagements and continual advanced-guard fighting. The railway was being pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and every opportunity was taken of landing stores at points along the coast; but the landing of stores was dependent on a continuance of favourable weather, and might at any moment be stopped for several days together.

"A pause was therefore necessary to await the progress of railway construction. But before our position in the Plain could be considered secure, it was essential to push forward into the hills, and to obtain a hold of the one good road which traverses the JudÆan range from north to south, from Nablus to Jerusalem."