CHAPTER XIV.

Previous

Ti-ping Revolution in 1861.—Official Correspondence.—Its Review.—Professions of Neutrality.—How carried out.—Captain Dew's Interpretation.—Ti-ping Remonstrance.—Cause of British Hostility.—Mr. Bruce's Assertions.—Mr. Bruce's Second Despatch.—Mr. Bruce's Difficulty.—His Inconsistency.—Despatch No. 3.—Inconsistent Statements.—Ti-pings approach Ningpo.—Interview with Ti-ping Chiefs.—Mr. Hewlett's Interview with "Fang."—General Hwang's Despatch.—General "Fang's" Despatch.—Capture of Ningpo.—British Intervention.—Ti-ping Moderation.—Open Hostilities commenced.—Commander Bingham's Despatch.—Taeping Reply.—Commander Bingham's Rejoinder.

In order to form a just appreciation of the position of the Ti-ping revolution at the close of the year 1861, it becomes necessary to review briefly the political relations of each party engaged in it from the period of ratification of the Yang-tze expedition treaty of neutrality with the Ti-pings (by Admiral Hope), and the commencement of actual hostilities against them at the opening of the year 1862.

By the following review of the official correspondence (as given in Blue Book form of "Papers relating to the Rebellion in China" for 1861) men of every party, partial or impartial, may form an opinion as to British policy in China.

Exactly thirty-six days after his solemn pledges of non-intervention—given in accordance with his instructions from Lord Elgin—to the Ti-ping authorities, at their capital, Admiral Hope, upon hearing of the capture of Chapoo, penned the following orders, dated H.M.S. Scout, Nagasaki, May 8, to Captain Dew, H.M.S. Encounter:—

"You are further to put yourself in communication with the leader of the rebel forces, and to point out to him that the capture and destruction of the town of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, and, therefore, that you require him to desist from all hostile proceedings against the town, and, without committing yourself to the necessity of having recourse to force, you will remind him of what took place last year at Shanghae, and the impossibility of his capturing the place should you find yourself compelled to assist in its defence, a course, you will add, you are unwilling to adopt, as placing you in a hostile position in regard to the Taepings generally, with whom we have no wish to quarrel."

In this despatch the Admiral states he has no "wish to quarrel" with the Ti-pings, yet, in violation of his own pledges, and his orders to "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," he constitutes himself dictator over their operations—operations unavoidable during their expulsion of the Manchoos, and essential to their self-preservation, general interests, and military honour—and interferes between the belligerents and their natural rights; and then continues as follows:—

"You will further, immediately on your arrival at Ningpo, place yourself in communication with the Chinese authorities for the purpose of ascertaining what their means of resistance are, and the probabilities of their proving successful; and should you find them amenable to advice, you will point out to them such measures as circumstances may render expedient, and you will place every obstruction in the way of the capture of the town by the rebels...."

At this time not only was British national faith pledged to a neutral course, but the Admiral's actions were diametrically opposed to his instructions.

Mr. Bruce, writing some time previously to Lord Russell upon this subject, in a despatch dated Tien-tsin, January 3, 1861, states:—

"But I have directed Mr. Sinclair" (Consul at Ningpo) "not to undertake the defence of the city, and to confine his efforts, should it be attacked, to a mediation, which may save the place from being the scene of pillage and massacre."

In a despatch to Admiral Hope, upon the same affair, Mr. Bruce writes:—

"I do not consider myself authorized to protect the town of Ningpo from the insurgents...."

In his instructions to the consul at Ningpo, Mr. Bruce stated:—

"But I do not consider myself authorized to afford any military protection to the town of Ningpo, or to take any active measures against the insurgents.... Your language should be, that we take no part in this civil contest, but that we claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties...."

These professions of neutrality received the following sanction from the British Government:—

LORD J. RUSSELL TO MR. BRUCE.
"Foreign Office, March 28, 1861.

"Sir,—Her Majesty's Government approve the instructions which you gave to Mr. Consul Sinclair, as reported in your dispatch of the 3rd of January last, with reference to the probability of the rebel forces attacking Ningpo.

"I am, &c.,
(Signed) "J. Russell."

How, then, can Admiral Hope's offering "every obstruction in the way of the capture" of Ningpo by the Ti-pings be accounted for, otherwise than as the result of secret instructions from the British Government; for it would indeed be preposterous to imagine that the Admiral dared act in direct opposition to the public orders, or that, having done so, his disobedience would have received the unqualified approval his "every obstruction" policy did.

Admiral Hope, in a despatch to Mr. Bruce, of the same date as the "every obstruction" one, in detailing his plan, wrote:—

"There can be no doubt of the importance of Ningpo to our trade under existing circumstances, and should you therefore find it expedient to sanction forcible interference for its security, I request you will communicate with Captain Dew direct...."

By this it appears that a British Admiral would have felt himself justified in considering his Government's orders, his own pledges, and the national honour, secondary in consequence to the temporary advantages arising from "our trade." Lord Russell, upon receipt of the Admiral's "every obstruction" despatch, instructed Mr. Bruce as follows:—

"I have received ... a copy of Vice-Admiral Hope's letter to you of the 8th May, respecting the measures adopted by him for the defence of Ningpo.... I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice-Admiral Hope's measures should be approved.... You will understand, however, that Her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects."

Professions of neutrality are here reiterated, although at the same time the Admiral's hostile policy is approved of. Meanwhile, in the face of these plain orders to "observe neutrality," Admiral Hope thus addressed the Ti-ping chief in command of Chapoo:—

"The following communication from Vice-Admiral Sir James Hope, K.C.B., commanding the naval forces of Great Britain in China, is made to the General commanding the Taeping troops at Chapoo:—

"1. I have been informed that the troops under your orders have lately captured the town of Chapoo, and that there is an intention on their part of advancing on Ningpo.

"2. As the capture of Ningpo would be extremely injurious to British trade, and that of foreigners generally, I beg you to desist from advancing on that town within a distance of two marches.

"3. Should these my wishes be disregarded, and I sincerely trust they may not be, as it would be with deep regret that I should place my forces in a hostile position towards the Taepings, with whom we wish to maintain amicable relations, I may be compelled to assist in the defence of Ningpo, and in that case I need hardly point out to you the hopelessness of success on your part, whilst what occurred at Shanghae last year is still fresh in your memories.

(Signed) "R. Dew, Captain.

"Encounter, June 11, 1861."

In this despatch the Ti-ping general is insulted by menace; an unmanly reference is made to Shanghae; a hostile attitude is threatened if the Ti-pings capture cities the possession of which is most essential to the success of their cause—and yet, withal, a wish "to maintain amicable relations" is professed!

Upon the 8th August, 1861, after the singular interpretation of neutrality by his subordinates and Admiral Hope, Earl Russell indited the following order to Mr. Bruce:—

"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China. If British subjects are taken prisoners by either party, you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital punishment, but otherwise you should abstain from all interference in the civil war."[43]

When the massacre before Shanghae, in 1860, is remembered, when the subsequent approval of Admiral Hope's hostile intentions is considered, and when the various modes in which our pledges of neutrality were indirectly violated are counted, this despatch will require no comment.

In fulfilment of the desire (to maintain neutrality, "as they have done hitherto," upon the part) of his Government, Captain Dew gave all the assistance he possibly could to the Manchoo defenders of Ningpo; besides framing eight plans[44] for the defence of the city against the Ti-pings; according to Mr. Bruce:—

"He fitted twelve heavy guns with carriages, &c., to mount on the walls."

Again, in the same despatch,[45] Mr. Bruce states:—

"Captain Dew had gone farther, than he was strictly warranted in doing, in his desire to save the city of Ningpo...."

We are forced to believe this fitting of heavy guns, and defence of Chinese cities, a part of the neutrality Her Majesty's Government had "hitherto" maintained, and in their opinion a true interpretation of this order, "that excepting intercession for British prisoners our authorities should abstain from all interference in the civil war!"

Captain Dew's next interpretation of this order took the form of a buccaneering exploit against the Ti-ping custom-houses. Upon the occupation of the country between the silk districts and Shanghae by the Ti-pings, Europeans were sent in charge of the silk boats plying on the inland waters, one being placed with each valuable boat load, in order to pass it through the Ti-ping territory as foreign property. Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Captain Dew,[46] writes:—

"The consequence is, that foreign escorts go inland without passports, and a number of irresponsible seamen are introduced into the country ... the result of this state of things cannot be good.... The principal danger to be feared by persons sending up country arises, not so much from the acts of the rebels themselves, as from the squeezing and plundering propensities of the Imperialist forces, and from the pilfering attacks of lawless peasantry.... Both kinds of marauders might be kept in good check through visits made periodically by Her Majesty's gun-boats.... If you approve of this scheme, I would suggest your sending a gun-boat up in the course of the next few days...."

Captain Dew having approved the "scheme," we will proceed to notice what he did. Instead of paying attention to "both kinds of marauders" pointed out by Consul Medhurst as the "principal danger," the Captain, towards the middle of June, as stated in The Friend of China, employed himself about the following piratical outrage:—

"Sixteen boats freighted with bales of silks and cocoons, with some Europeans in charge of them, and belonging to European firms in Shanghae, were passing a Taeping custom-house at Loo-chee, some distance up the Shanghae or Wong-poo river. They were brought to, and a small duty of four dollars per bale of silk was demanded. The boats belonging to two of the firms paid the duty and proceeded on their voyage, but the person in charge of the boats belonging to Messrs. Adamson & Co., of Shanghae, refused to pay it, and he was then told he could not proceed until the duty was paid, and the boat and bales of silk were consequently taken possession of. This was construed into an act of 'atrocious piracy,' and the Flamer and Captain Dew went to Loo-chee to demand restitution. Explanations were given by the Taeping Governor of the district, but they were unavailing; the unqualified restoration of the silk was insisted on under a threat of bombardment; the boats and bales of silk were therefore surrendered to Captain Dew, but as some small arms were missing, Captain Dew took possession of the guns of the custom-house, and seized some customs' police, and took them away with him to be detained until the arms missing from the boat should have been returned. The letter written by the Governor of the district, named Wan, to the authorities of Shanghae, consequent upon this outrage, is dignified and forbearing, and it were well for us to act in the spirit it manifests. The above are only examples of our professed neutrality; many others, however, have occurred."

The following are extracts from the letter written upon the subject by the Ti-ping chief, Wan:—

"I find on inquiry, that the silk, &c., lost by your merchant, was seized in lieu of duties, in consequence of an attempt on his part to get by the custom-house and evade payment of duties, on which he was arrested, and your charge, therefore, that he was plundered, is utterly without foundation.

"The Truly Sacred Lord who has established the Divine Dynasty, has also established custom-houses wherever the country is quiet, and by his law all merchants who pass these must pay the regular duties, and your merchant in daring to force his way through and evade the payment of customs, and you in coming here and making a disturbance and squeezing the money back, have behaved in a manner at utter variance with propriety....

"A special communication."

Meanwhile, Mr. Bruce, the chief diplomatist, unable to justify this increasing aggression otherwise, fiercely assailed the Ti-ping theology and civil administration. In a despatch to Lord Russell, dated at "Pekin, June 23, 1861,"[47] he takes upon himself to state (supremely indifferent to, or rather ignoring, the valuable testimony of the Revs. Griffith, John, Edkins, Medhurst, Muirhead, Legge, &c.):—

"The evidence of all classes of observers seems unanimous, both as to the destructive nature of the insurrection, and as to the blasphemous and immoral character of the superstition on which it is based."

Does Mr. Bruce and those who agree with him, venture to term our Bible the so-called "blasphemous and immoral superstition?"—for on that, and that alone, is the Ti-ping faith established. The following extracts from the same dispatch, and two others, having been approved by Her Majesty's Government, contain a complete key to the course taken against the Ti-pings, and lay bare a policy deduced from false premises, and founded upon utter violation of principle. The three despatches under consideration consist of—1. Mr. Bruce to Lord Russell, June 23, 1861; 2. Mr. Bruce to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, Pekin, June 16; 3. Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope's reply to Mr. Bruce, dated, ImpÉrieuse, Hong-kong, July 11.—Dispatch No. 1 states:—

"In the enclosed letter to Sir James Hope, to which I beg to draw your Lordship's attention, I have stated at length the dangers to which the progress of the insurrection exposes British interests in China.... Our permanent interests are those of trade, the prosperity of which is linked with order and tranquillity. We have, in addition, a temporary interest arising out of the indemnities payable from the custom-house revenue, which is, however, intimately linked with the former.

"What is to become of these interests if the ports fall into the hands of the rebels?"

Here we have the true cause of British hostility to the Ti-pings. Not that our Government feared the trading "interests" would suffer if the Ti-pings captured the treaty ports—by no means; but they dreaded the certain loss of the "temporary interest arising out of the indemnities." They knew full well, as a quotation from dispatch No. 3 will prove, the Ti-pings had never injured our trade; that although the capture of the ports might cause a temporary stagnation, those who would take them came as their "brothers" in Christ, and ultimately would have established a free and general commerce throughout the country; but they also knew that the success of the Ti-pings would imperil their existence, by stopping the indemnification for the last unnecessary and aggressive war with China, and by sweeping away the immense revenue derived from the vile opium traffic.

In the same despatch, Mr. Bruce, with his usual acumen, winds up his syllogism of fallacious assertions—"The nature of the insurrection is destructive" and its religion "blasphemous and immoral;" the insurrectionists are able to capture the Imperial cities, therefore, the "commercial prosperity" of the treaty ports and the "temporary interests" would be destroyed by the success of the Ti-pings—in the following words:—

"The motives of the far larger part of the force are, I apprehend, a desire to live on the spoils of the rich and industrious, to carry off women, and to lead a life of alternate adventure and licence, with little feeling for the Taeping cause.... I see, therefore, little hopes of communities like those of Shanghae and Ningpo escaping destruction.... The commercial prosperity of the ports would receive a fatal blow.... The proceeds of the custom-houses would fall off, and nothing but force would enable us to receive the proportion of duties we are entitled to" (the indemnities) "under the convention of Pekin, out of their diminished receipts."

Now, I submit, these forebodings with regard to the indemnity having been verified by the capture of Ningpo and the rapid success of the Ti-pings, led to the participation of England in the Chinese internecine war. If Mr. Bruce, by the above-quoted statements, intended to advise his Government to assist the Imperialists—and they cannot admit of any other interpretation—how can that distinguished and consistent statesman reconcile them with his strong disapproval of any such policy expressed only a few months before, and which I have already quoted in a previous chapter:—

"No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation, as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness."

Mr. Bruce first states, the worst possible policy England could choose would be to interfere against the Ti-pings; and then he declares, if we do not interfere, "that nothing but force would enable us to receive" indemnities and enjoy trade. The present British Government has thought fit to adopt the suicidal course pointed out by Mr. Bruce, and now it has experienced the fact that "no course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation." The last testimony of Mr., or rather, Sir F. Bruce; of Mr. Lay, C.B., late Inspector-General of Chinese Customs; of Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., late Admiral of the so-called Anglo-Chinese flotilla; and of all who have the least opportunity of knowing anything about the subject, unite in confessing the evil of the past policy exercised towards the Ti-pings, and state that the Manchoo Government, despite the fact that it owes its very existence to the help of the British, has thoroughly returned to its exclusiveness, its evasion of treaty obligations, and its hatred of the "outer-barbarians" who have saved it from extinction.

We will now proceed to notice despatch No. 2, addressed by Mr. Bruce to Admiral Hope, which affords further proof of the false principles on which British interference was founded:—

"The Government will soon be in possession of the accounts ... of the agreement entered into by the rebels not to attack Shanghae for a twelvemonth, and of the corresponding assurance that, if we are not molested in trading up the river, our desire and intention are to remain neutral in the civil contest now in progress in China....

"Her Majesty's Government will probably abstain from rendering active assistance at present to the Imperial Government, both on account of the assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents, and on account of the serious and indefinite consequences to which any such intervention would in all probability lead."

The signification of the "at present" will be seen upon perusal of the following paragraph, which exactly describes the plan very shortly adopted by the British Government, in direct violation of those "assurances of neutrality we have given to the insurgents":—

"Another course is open to consideration, namely, that of taking the open ports or the principal ones under our protection and safeguard, and declaring that we will repel by force any attack upon them by the insurgents. Considering that by treaty we have an interest in the revenue derived at these ports from trade, and that this, the only source of our indemnities, would be materially diminished, if not altogether destroyed, should they be assaulted and captured ... I think it may be urged, with truth, in justification of such a course, that it affords the best means of protecting our interests.... But this course is not unattended with difficulty. The insurgents would naturally object, that in leaving the revenue and administration of these places in Imperial hands, we do in reality assist the Imperialists."

This conclusion is correct; for, so impossible was it to usurp the treaty ports and not "in reality assist the Imperialists," that the mask was thrown off by openly making war upon the Ti-pings. The only "difficulty" to allude to, which indeed is really almost creditable to the conscience of Mr. Bruce, was the fact that England was pledged to the opposite policy; but it must be remembered that the only tie which bound her to carry out that policy was one of justice and honour, while strong temptations to its violation were in existence; also, that it is not the lot of every minister to be able to discern how the commercial interests of his country may be best provided for.

"To this we should reply that we exercise the legitimate right of self-defence in protecting our own interests, and that if in doing so we are obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents, the cause is to be found in the ruthless nature of the war they wage."

This excuse is the principal one given by the British Ministry to justify its breach of faith; but "the cause" must, from what has already been stated, be regarded as utterly false.

But, should we for a moment admit the hypothetical "ruthless nature of the war they wage," by what right were we "obliged to limit the belligerent rights of the insurgents," when it is universally admitted that the Imperialists are quite as ruthless, if not more so? Moreover, did the British Government attempt to limit the belligerent rights of either North or South in America? yet the one was ruthless enough, and the cotton trade was injured. Unscrupulous persons who would justify the destruction of semi-civilized people, when it can be done with impunity, may say these cases are not parallel; nevertheless, the only difference is, that with America we have treaties allowing Englishmen to settle and trade everywhere, while in China the treaty limits the settling and trading to certain parts. The principle of non-intervention applies quite as strongly to the one nation as the other; moreover, the Ti-pings never did, or would have attempted to, blockade the trade of any port at which Europeans were settled. Did either belligerent so far study foreign interests in America?

To resume our review of despatch No. 2, Mr. Bruce continues:—

"The Government would, no doubt, wish to hear from you whether Nankin could be attacked with success by a purely naval force." ...

After deprecating any partial hostilities against the Ti-pings, the despatch continues:—

"And on the other hand, we should lose a favourable opportunity of placing our relations with the Emperor on a satisfactory footing, if we were deprived by some incidental event of the power of making our aid a matter of bargain with the Imperial Government.... The longer we are able to preserve an indifferent attitude between the two parties, the more inclined they will be to bid higher for our friendship and support."

What an accomplished frequenter of the Rialto the author of these creditable sentences would have made! This despatch was written on the 16th June, 1861; within seven months open hostilities were initiated against the Ti-pings by Admiral Hope, in direct violation of his Government's existing orders to maintain neutrality; and within nine months the British Government adopted the policy "of taking the open ports under our protection," and violated all pledges of neutrality by prosecuting a regular, though never openly declared, war upon the insurgents.

The following are the most important passages from despatch No. 3. They plainly state that our "commercial interests" would not suffer from the acts of the rebels, and that trade was not injured by them, although completely in their power.

After disapproving of any attack upon Nankin, Admiral Hope states:—

"The Taeping authorities will be open to easy access by us so long as Nankin remains the seat of Government; and from such experience as our short intercourse has afforded, I see a fair prospect of our acquiring sufficient influence with them to enable us to carry all points which are essential to our commercial interests, even to that of eventual abstinence from molesting the consular ports.

"It is further clear that we cannot afford to quarrel with them, as at any moment they might stop the whole trade of Shanghae, at this time by far the largest portion of that from China."

Nothing can be more to the point than this admission that the Ti-pings did not injuriously affect our trading interests; but the opium traffic and indemnities were threatened, and to save them the treaty ports were held against the victorious patriots.

In his reply to the three despatches quoted from, Earl Russell wrote:—

"I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree with Admiral Hope in regarding an attack on Nankin as highly impolitic, but it might be expedient to defend the treaty ports if the Chinese" (Manchoos) "would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression."

It will thus be seen Lord Russell did not authorize the defence of the treaty ports even "if the Chinese (Manchoos) would consent not to use those ports for purposes of aggression," as he indefinitely states that in event of such action upon the part of the Manchoo Government, "it might be expedient to defend" them. Yet, although even this ambiguous suggestion could not become an absolute order in the absence of the fulfilment of the condition precedent, the British authorities in China acted as though Lord Russell had imperatively ordered the military occupation of the ports, upon the proviso having been agreed to by the Imperial belligerent; and it was not till after the open violation of the oft-guaranteed neutrality by the commencement of systematic hostilities against the Ti-pings, that the Foreign Secretary publicly authorized the proceedings.

Admiral Hope declared "all points" could be carried with the Ti-pings, even regarding their avoidance of the treaty ports, "essential to our commercial interests." Most undoubtedly he was correct. The Ti-pings never injured the trade, and would have abstained from molesting the treaty ports had they been made neutral; but the ports having become the principal depÔts of the enemy, naturally compelled them to endeavour to obtain possession of them.

When the agreement or treaty of neutrality was made with the Ti-ping authorities by the leaders of the British expedition opening up the Yang-tze to trade, Mr. Parkes reported:—

"They wished to know, however, in which way the Admiral would use his influence to prevent their being attacked by the Imperialists from Shanghae; and whether one of their officers would be allowed to visit Shanghae, to learn what arrangements were made in this respect."

No such arrangements ever were made, although upon that condition had the Ti-pings consented to refrain from capturing Shanghae for "one year." When at length they were driven to attack the very citadel of the enemy, they truthfully gave this reason:—

"If there were no impish (Manchoo) forces at Shanghae and Woo-sung, the Chung-wang and She-wang would certainly not think of sending their troops to take those places."

Upon July 28, the British Consul at Shanghae wrote to Mr. Bruce:—

"The Imperialist authority does not extend beyond a circuit of from fifty to sixty miles from Shanghae, and I see no reason whatever to suppose that they will ever be able to drive the rebels beyond that limit.... The presence of foreign forces in this city alone saves its authorities from summary ejection. But, if the rebels were allowed to take possession, the country in our immediate vicinity would at once lapse into the wretched state of anarchy which exists beyond the rebel lines; the native population would inevitably disappear, property would miserably deteriorate." ...

Mr. Bruce, in his notice of this despatch to Lord Russell, states:—

"Your Lordship will observe that he states that the capture of Shanghae would be fatal to the commercial prosperity of the port. To me it is rather a matter of surprise that trade should continue at all.... The export of silk between June 1860 and June 1861 has, in spite of these disadvantages, amounted to 85,000 bales."

Directly after this we find Mr. Bruce bearing testimony that Ti-ping "success in any locality is attended with its total destruction!" Admiral Hope admitted that the insurgents had the Shanghae trade, "by far the largest portion of that from China," entirely in their power, but did not stop it; Mr. Medhurst (Shanghae Consul) declared the whole country within "fifty to sixty miles" was under Ti-ping jurisdiction; and Mr. Bruce notices the large export of silk from the districts where silk, he states, meets with "total destruction"! Now, common sense may inquire whether this totally destroyed country, "wretched state of anarchy," "native population that inevitably disappeared," and "property that miserably deteriorated," could have managed to produce 88,112 bales of silk in the year 1861? This, with only one exception, was the largest amount ever exported from China in one year. The silk districts were entirely in the possession of the Ti-pings, and every bale had passed through their hands. A reference to the table of statistics[48] will convince the most sceptical that the Ti-pings actually increased the valuable trade, but that since their expulsion from the silk districts, the produce and exportation of that article has fallen off more than one half.

There is another matter to be considered with regard to the political morality of Mr. Bruce. At the beginning of the year 1861 he officially stated:—

"It does not appear to me necessary to take any part in this conflict; but our material interests at Shanghae justify us in insisting on its being exempted from attack until the insurgents have sufficiently established their superiority to enable us to consider the contest as respects that part of China at an end. In that case, the population of the town will be quite ready to acknowledge the new power, and the authority of the Mandarins will fall without a blow."

Yet, when, according to the extracts from the despatch of Consul Medhurst, this "until" had arrived by the complete establishment of the Ti-ping superiority, Mr. Bruce singularly enough forgets his declaration of only a few months previous.

The Ti-pings at length, after successively capturing the important cities of Shou-shing, Fung-wha, YÜ-yaou, and Tsze-kee, came in contact with the British authorities at Ningpo. Having occupied every part of the Che-kiang and Kiang-su provinces, to the south of the Yang-tze, with the exception of the three treaty ports, Shanghae, Ningpo, and Chin-kiang, the Ti-pings, both to preserve their conquests and prosecute their cause, were obliged to advance upon those cities, which had become the strongholds of the enemy. Upon their approach to Ningpo, a conference was held by the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States. The official report of this meeting states:—

"It has been decided that the undersigned[49] shall proceed this day (28th Nov.), on board Her Majesty's gun-boat Kestrel, to the rebel head-quarters ... and having obtained an interview with the insurgent leaders, shall convey to them verbally, as well as in writing, the following message:—

"'1. That the undersigned take no part in this civil contest, but that they claim exemption from injury and annoyance at the hands of both parties." ...

This fresh pledge of neutrality, together with three other clauses respecting the forthcoming occupation of Ningpo, the foreign settlement, and the lives and property of the European residents, was given to the Ti-ping generals at YÜ-yaou and Fung-wha. Nothing could have been more satisfactory than the result of this communication. The following are extracts from the account given by Mr. Hewlett (Consular Interpreter) of the interview with the Ti-ping chiefs:—

"We at once informed Hwang (Commanding-General at YÜ-yaou) of the object of our visit," to which "he gave his unqualified assent, 'although,' he added, 'in the event of the Mandarins resisting, and of my having to attack Ningpo, I cannot be responsible for the lives of any of your countrymen who may remain inside the city. Otherwise, I will do all I can to prevent their being molested, and will at once behead any of my followers who dare to offer them any annoyance.'

"He assured us that his desire was to keep well with foreigners, with whom he was anxious to open trade; spoke of us as worshippers of the same God and the same Jesus as themselves, and denominated us—'Wai-hsiung-te'—their foreign brothers.

"He seemed to entertain no doubt whatever of being successful in his attack on Ningpo.

"Eager inquiries were made on all sides for foreign firearms, of which they seem to have but few—a want that would be sufficiently felt were they ever to come in contact with troops courageous enough to stand against them."

This paragraph may fairly account for the successes afterwards gained over the ill-armed Ti-pings by Major Gordon's and other troops, well provided with British artillery, shell, rifles, &c., &c.

"As far as human life is concerned, the rebels, at the capture of YÜ-yaou, appear to have used their opportunity with forbearance; we saw but few dead bodies, and of those some, as we were informed, were their own men who had been caught plundering and burning.

"Hwang having informed us that another body of troops, also under the She-wang's orders, and commanded by one Fang, a general of equal rank with himself, was advancing on Ningpo from the Fung-wha, or south-west side, we proceeded up that branch of the river early on Monday morning, the 2nd instant, and found the said insurgents encamped at a place called Pih-too, but ten miles from Ningpo."

The following account of Mr. Hewlett's interview with Fang is worthy of the best attention, proving, as it does, the earnest desire of the poor Ti-pings to be on terms of friendship, even brotherhood, with all the nations of their "foreign brethren;" and that any reasonable wish of the British authorities would have been complied with.

"We at once went ashore, and put ourselves in communication with the leader, Fang, a man of only 25 years of age, and a native of Kwang-se. We hastened to represent to him the serious injury to trade that must ensue on the capture of Ningpo by his forces, and the consequent loss that would accrue to foreign interests, besides the danger, in reality no slight one, to foreign life and property, to be apprehended both from the lawless characters in his own ranks, and equally so from the bands of unruly Cantonese and Chin-chew men at Ningpo, ever on the look-out for an opportunity of indiscriminate plunder. We ended by eagerly dissuading him from advancing on Ningpo.

"To our two objections Fang replied by assuring us that his party were most anxious to keep well with foreigners, who, indeed, were no other than their brothers, inasmuch as both worshipped one God and one Jesus; and that as for trade, that would be allowed to go on as formerly, while he begged us to feel quite at ease as to the persons and property of our countrymen, any molestation shown to whom would be followed by instant decapitation. Their object being the overthrow of the present dynasty, they could not allow Ningpo to remain in the hands of the Imperialists.

"It was with difficulty that we succeeded in persuading Fang to delay his attack on Ningpo for one week; another day, he said, was to have seen him there, had we not interposed.

"One could not help feeling struck with the earnestness and apparent sincerity of this young leader. Whilst alive to the dangers attending the cause in which he was engaged, he seemed to be confident that the support of Heaven would carry them through all their difficulties, and that, so aided, they must prevail. He told us that nearly the whole province was in their hands, or would be before long, and that Hang-chow, the provincial capital, would fall, 'as soon as Heaven should see fit to give it into their hands.'"

The General Hwang gave the following reply to the communication of the foreign representatives, which, together with Fang's, fairly expresses the aim and feeling of the Ti-ping Government:—

"HWANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT YU-YAOU, TO CONSUL HARVEY."

"Hwang, a noble of the rank of E,[50] with the prÆnomen 'Paon teen' ('Precious Heavenly'), and Commander-in-Chief of the chief army of his Highness Prince[51] Tsung, who is of the Royal body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, which is the dynasty patented under the true Divine Commission as the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace, addresses an official communication to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W. Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, Royal Navy; Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, in reference to the interview held (this day) for the purpose of deliberating on the maintenance of friendly relations between the respective countries.

"From the foundations of the heavens and the earth, the world has been divided into the central kingdom, China, and the external kingdoms, foreign countries. Each kingdom, whether China or those of foreign countries, has been ruled over by men of its own nation. (This has been the universal practice.)

"But in the time of the Ming dynasty the Tartar imps, originally serfs from beyond the northern frontier, stole into China, and usurped the emblems of royalty [lit., seized upon the divine materials], making unclean and polluting the land to a degree that no tongue can tell of [lit., to a degree difficult for the fingers to reckon].

"Even till now, and during a period of more than 200 years, have they been going on in their wickedness, until at last their cup of iniquity is filled to the overflowing.

"At these their sins the Heavenly Father being exceeding wroth [lit., his anger was as an earthquake], would have destroyed the world; then Jesus, the Heavenly Elder Brother, out of his mercy and lovingkindness towards mankind, sent down the true and holy Lord, the Heavenly King, to wash out the stains of the northern serfs, and to set up anew the house of Han [i.e., to re-establish a purely native dynasty].

"These, then, are the times of changing the dynasty, and of reforming the kingdom prescribed by Heaven and submitted to by man.

"The command of the valiant troops of this great army has been conferred upon me by royal commission, with the allotted task of rooting out of the earth all that is unholy [lit., of destroying in the east and exterminating in the west, part of a complete sentence, signifying a thorough eradication of evil from all the four quarters of the globe], and of visiting on the heads of their rulers the afflictions of the people.

"The highest object of my mission is none other than the foundation and establishment of the dynasty; subordinate to that, my aim is the welfare of the people [lit., the black-haired multitudes], that I may weed out from among them those that oppress, and give peace to such as are true of heart.

"Hence it is that throughout the whole of my onward course 'there were none' (as it is written) 'that came not forth with meat and drink to welcome the soldiers of the King.'[52]

"Our great army having at this time invaded the province of Che-kiang, and the representatives of your several countries, stationed at Ningpo, having come this day to my head-quarters at YÜ-yaou, to deliberate about maintaining amicable relations with us, on the understanding of mutual non-interference, and having requested me to order my troops to abstain, on their arrival at Ningpo, from injuring the persons or property of your respective countrymen at that place, I hereby promise to issue the above orders to my troops, and to command them to respect the terms of the agreement.

"In case any of my troops should dare, contrary to my orders, to molest any of your countrymen or to injure their property, I will, on your arresting and handing over to me the offender, at once behead him.

"In the same way, if any of the subjects of your respective countries should, contrary to your orders, take upon themselves to assist the imps in repelling our advance, you will in your turn direct them to refrain from so doing.

"From and after this date the friendly arrangement now agreed upon is to be binding on both parties.

"Sincerely trusting that you will not allow yourselves to feel anxious about this matter, and with wishes for your good health, I beg to forward this special communication.

"19th day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [November 29, 1861].

The General Fang gave the following answer:—

"FANG, TAI-PING LEADER AT FUNG-HWA, TO CONSUL HARVEY.

"Fang, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, charged with the reduction of the disobedient, and a member of the Royal body-guard in the capital of the Heavenly Dynasty, &c., in official reply to F. Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul; W. Breck, Esq., United States Consul; Lieutenant H. Huxham, R.N.; Captain L. Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, requesting them to set their minds at rest.

"The Almighty God, the Supreme Lord, the Heavenly Father, and Jesus the Heavenly Elder Brother, sent our true and holy Lord, the Heavenly King, down into the world, and ordained him to be Ruler over the Central Kingdom. To destroy the imps, to deliver the people, and to rescue the Central Empire; these are the chief objects of his desires.

"The special task of chastising the nation[53] [lit., those without the palace doors], with a view to the establishment of the Dynasty, has now been conferred upon me by royal commission. My mission is simply to show compassion to the people, and to punish the crimes of their rulers.

"The troops of my great army have now entered the department of Ningpo, and I fully purpose capturing the departmental city, and making it revert to the King to serve as a basis from which we may give peace to and console the four estates of the nation [scholars, husbandmen, mechanics, and traders].

"I have this day received your letter, and informed myself completely of its contents; all the requisitions therein contained I promise to comply with. I will, therefore, order my troops to frame their conduct after the Divine pattern, and to abstain from tumult and acts of aggression.

"Wherefore I beg of you to set your minds at rest.

"Good faith, as a principle of action, being a most important desideratum, no retractation must be made in respect of the number of days conceded prior to our advance on the city.

"With reference to the persons and property of your respective countrymen, I will issue the strictest orders, forbidding either the one or the other to be injured in the very least degree. Trade shall be allowed to continue as usual, with the additional advantage of being conducted on a fairer footing. On no account will acts of violence or robbery be permitted.

"One word from the superior man is sufficient to settle any affair; he is true, he is sincere, and hence no mistake or misunderstanding can arise.

"Whilst forwarding this in reply, I beg to express my wishes for your happiness.

(Enclosed, twenty-one Proclamations.)

"22nd day of the 10th month of the 11th ('Sin-yew') year of the Heavenly Kingdom of Universal Peace" [2nd December, 1861].

Faithfully fulfilling that extraordinary example of their willingness to preserve friendship with foreigners—the promise to delay their occupation of Ningpo one week—the Ti-pings, immediately upon the expiration of the seven days, on the morning of December 9, moved up to the city walls, and within an hour Ningpo was completely in their possession; the Manchoos, Mandarins, regular troops, braves, pirates, and all, having fled from the city, scarcely striking a blow in its defence.

Although the British authorities contented themselves upon this occasion with underhanded hostility against the Ti-pings, the same unworthy procedure was equally as much a violation of the principle of their pledged neutrality as the open warfare they shortly commenced in the neighbourhood of Shanghae. As all assertions of this description require proof, it is necessary to encumber this narrative with extracts from the official documents that, for the honour of England, should remain in oblivion for ever, were they not necessary to prove the disreputable transactions of various officials, and my reasons for advocating the Ti-ping cause.

I have already noticed the singular sort of interpretation put upon the "no wish to quarrel," "the wish to maintain amicable relations," and the orders to "abstain from all interference in the civil war," "maintain an attitude of strict neutrality," &c., by Admiral Hope and Captain R. Dew. We will therefore conclude the review of "fitting twelve heavy guns," &c. at Ningpo, by one other example of breach of faith and neutrality.

The instructions to the Ningpo Consul by Mr. Bruce were to "take no part" in defending the city. The written guarantee forwarded to the leaders of the powerful advancing army were precisely similar. "The undersigned take no part in this civil contest." Now, in spite of these pledges, we have seen Admiral Hope order "every obstruction" to be placed before the Ti-pings. In his account of the capture of Ningpo he fairly admits his own faithlessness thus:—

"2. Everything had been done to assist the Imperialists in the defence of the town, except the use of force, in their favour, and their Lordships will not fail to observe how utterly useless such measures proved, in consequence of the cowardice and imbecility of the Mandarins."

This taking "no part" and at the same time doing "everything to assist" one belligerent requires no comment.

When the Ti-ping forces assaulted Ningpo, the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperialists ran away, and being lowered over the city wall with a number of retainers, received protection from the British Consul, who facilitated their escape. This same Consul, in his report of the city's capture to Lord Russell, states:—

"Ningpo is now in the full and unquestionable possession of the Taeping forces. I am glad to state that, up to the present time, there has been no slaughter, or massacre, or fires, within the walls; and that, with the exception of a few men killed, and a certain amount of destruction of property, the rebels have, so far, conducted themselves with wonderful moderation."

Admiral Hope, in his report to the Admiralty of the same event, states:—

"The behaviour of the rebels has been good hitherto, and they profess a strong desire to remain on good terms with foreigners."

Here we find the most positive proof that the principal alleged reason for the defence of Shanghae against the insurgents, namely, because their "success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," is utterly false. While "the ruthless nature of the war they wage" is thus urged (as though even it could justify the dishonouring of British pledges) against the Ti-pings, we find that upon the only occasion this theory was subjected to proof, by the reports of their most bitter opposers, they behaved "with wonderful moderation."

Mr. Parkes (late Secretary to Lord Elgin's Embassy), in a memorandum upon the capture of Ningpo, still further proves the great friendliness of the insurgents. He says:—

"The Ningpo rebels have shown the utmost desire to be on friendly terms with foreigners. Outside the south gate, which formed the point of attack, stands the establishment of the Sisters of Charity, which, if occupied, would form excellent cover for an assaulting force, as its upper windows command the city walls; yet, although they crouched underneath its enclosures, as they collected for their rush on the gate, they did not trespass for a moment within the premises. Another large Roman Catholic establishment was one of the first buildings they had to pass, as they poured into the city, flushed and excited with their success; but they only stopped to welcome a small knot of foreigners who were standing underneath the porch, and to charge their people to offer them no harm. Roman Catholics and Protestants they hailed indiscriminately as being of the same religion and fraternity as themselves....

"The house of one of the principal Chinese of Ningpo, who is well known at Shanghae, from his wealth and the prominent support he has always given to the Government, remain untouched, simply because he has hired a Frenchman to live in it, and give his name temporarily to the premises."

Now the ignorant and designing have delighted themselves by exhausting the most damnifying epithets upon the so-called "bloodthirsty marauders," "ruthless brigands," &c.; yet the following extract from the same memorandum (of an enemy, be it remembered) seems to indicate those persons as being either remarkably imaginative or mendacious:—

"It must be stated, however, to their credit, that as yet the capture of Ningpo, and it is believed also of the other cities of this province, has not been marked with those atrocities which the rebels are known to have committed elsewhere."

The "atrocities" committed elsewhere were those occasioned by the hard necessity of the war, and when the Ti-pings had no choice but to kill or be killed. But the question of Ti-ping atrocities could not possibly be construed into any fair cause of hostilities against them, it being a well-known fact that of the two belligerents they were by far the most humane.

The occupation of Ningpo by the Ti-ping forces may be justly considered the culminating point of their successes, and the termination of a period of British policy towards them, that period being the deceitful one. Almost immediately after that important event, the hitherto covert hostility of the British Government became exchanged for a more decided action, and the epoch of open hostility was established by the commencement of direct military operations against the Ti-pings from Shanghae, shortly followed by the same policy at Ningpo.

Some few days after the fall of Ningpo, Admiral Hope proceeded to Nankin for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of the promise by the Ti-ping authorities not to attack Shanghae for one year, as the former agreement expired at the end of 1861. The arrangement, however, was not again approved by the Ti-pings, not only because the British contracting officials had broken faith with regard to their pledge of preventing the Imperialists from using Shanghae for purposes of aggression against them, but from the fact that Shanghae had become the very arsenal and rallying-place of their enemy. To these principal and all-sufficient causes, others might be added, such as the undeniable belligerent right of the Ti-pings to capture any city just as they captured Ningpo.

The Ti-ping authorities having very properly refused to become a party to prejudice their own interest, Admiral Hope conducted the following communication with them, as if to find some pretext for making the approach of the Ti-pings upon Shanghae a casus belli. The correspondence is well worthy of the closest attention. The open arrogance and unsound reasoning of the British portion being no less conspicuous than the righteous tenor and sound argument of the Ti-pings.

"COMMUNICATION MADE BY COMMANDER BINGHAM TO THE TAEPING AUTHORITIES
AT NANKING, ON THE 27TH OF DECEMBER, 1861.

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of Her Majesty the Queen of England in the Chinese Seas, to acquaint you—

"1. That during the last year certain British subjects have sustained losses by robberies committed in the territories which are held by your armies, and that it is therefore necessary that you make immediate and satisfactory arrangements for their receiving compensation. These losses amount to 7,563 taels 1 mace 7 candarenes, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of silk, and 2 muskets, as shown by the accompanying list.

"2. That junks which carry British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and that they must be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination or any other molestation, in conformity with the agreement made with you in the early part of this year. That in order to insure that no junk hoists a British flag which is not entitled to do so, their papers will be examined by the senior officer here, who will take the British flag away from any vessel not entitled to wear it, and will give notice of having done so to the Chief Officer of the Customs.

"3. That the promise made by you that your troops should not approach within 100 li of Shanghae and Woo-sung has not been faithfully observed. The Commander-in-Chief now requires that, in proof of your good faith you select an officer of high rank who shall accompany him to Shanghae and who shall from thence proceed in company with one of his officers to the ports in its vicinity, which are held by your forces, so that the order on the subject may be shown to the officers commanding them, with the view of preventing further mistakes.

"4. That a large and valuable British trade having sprung up at Kiu-kiang and Hankow, the Commander-in-Chief is under the necessity of requiring a promise from you that your forces will not approach these places within 100 li; also that you are distinctly to understand that Silver Island, the residence of the British Consul at Chin-kiang-foo, is not to be molested.

(Signed) "Henry M. Bingham.

"Renard, Nanking, December 27, 1861."


"REPLY OF THE TAEPING AUTHORITIES AT NANKING TO COMMANDER BINGHAM.

"Mung, the young Prince of Tsan, Jin, Prince of Chang, and Se, Prince of Shun, Defenders of the Court, Pillars of Heaven, in the Divine Kingdom of Universal Peace, being the Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, the Heavenly Elder Brother, and the Heavenly King, make this joint reply to Captain Bingham, British Senior Naval Officer at Nanking.

"On the 18th day (December 28) of the 11th month of the 11th or Sin-yew year of the Divine Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly Elder Brother, and Heavenly King, we received your letter setting forth four points, which you state you had been directed to communicate to us by the Naval Commander-in-Chief of your country.

"We have acquainted ourselves with the contents of your communication, which has occasioned us the greatest surprise; we bear in mind that while your country pays adoration to Jesus, our Divine Kingdom respectfully worships Shang-te.

"The worship of Jesus is the fount and origin of our religions, and thus from age to age we have been as one family; therefore when your country came to discuss matters with us in the spring, our Lord the Heavenly King issued to us his sacred commands ordering us to receive you with courtesy, and to deal with you in perfect sincerity, in order to mark our high regard for those who are allied with and are of the same origin as ourselves. Being thus united by our religion, which is the worship of Heaven, and also by our friendly (political) relations, it is above all things necessary that we should respectively adhere to our Heavenly principles both in mind and action, and that we should compare our wants with those of others, instead of seeking only our own profit at the expense of the interests of our fellow-men. It is thus that you prove your friendship to be indeed sincere.

"On considering the four proposals set forth in your communication, we find that our Divine Kingdom cannot assent to them, and we shall proceed to state in detail the grounds of our refusal.

"The first point is a demand for compensation for 7,360 taels and odd silver, 200 taels' worth of copper cash, 4,800 dollars, 20 bales of raw silk, and 2 muskets, all said to have been taken by people of our Divine Kingdom in the 5th, 6th, and 7th months of the present year at Soo-heu, Suh-kea-kiang, Lew-hoo, Kaou-ching (Laou-ching), and other places.

"There is an absence of right in this demand. Everything deserving of credit admits of proof. Although the places named are not 1,000 li distant from our capital, they are situated several hundreds of li from it, and nearly half a year has elapsed since the alleged occurrences took place.

"It is unreasonable to demand compensation for claims, when no proofs can be produced, and the assertion of such claims is in itself a very unfriendly act. Were we, of the Divine Kingdom, to put forward such unfounded claims, what course, may we ask, would your country pursue? If our nation have indeed established a custom-house at San-le-keaou, and exacted a double levy of duty in the manner stated, how is it, as your merchant-boats are constantly passing that spot, that a single instance only of such conduct should have occurred? We will not, however, take upon ourselves to deny that your boat had to submit to the exaction; but, granting that it occurred, it should be remembered that at this juncture, when a movement is going on throughout the Empire, local marauders and wandering people naturally take advantage of the opportunity afforded them to commit depredations. How, therefore, do you know that these robberies were not the work of parties of these vagabonds, simulating the appearance and profiting by the fear inspired by the troops of the Divine dynasty? Or how do you know that some of the Tartar imps have not personated the officers and troops of the Divine Kingdom, and in that feigned character plundered your merchant-boats, with a view, by these nefarious means, of causing ill-will between our two families? Moreover, if the places named have indeed been brought under the rule of our Celestial dynasty, our lieutenants must be there in garrison; and if these irregularities were committed by their troops, how is it that your country did not immediately bring them to the notice of those officers, in order that they may at once take steps for the punishment of the offenders? Instead of doing this, however, you allow a long time to elapse, and then you suddenly come to our capital to raise discussions with us on the subject at this distance!

"In the second point of your communication you claim, 'that junks which carry British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and must therefore be allowed to pass up and down the river free from examination or any other molestation, in conformity with the agreement made in the early part of this year.'

"On this we have to observe, that an agreement once entered into should be most faithfully and strictly adhered to, and cannot be departed from. Now in the agreement concluded with you in the spring, it is not stated that junks carrying British colours are no less British vessels than those which are foreign-built, and are therefore entitled to pass free from examination or molestation.

"The idea is now suddenly started by your country for the first time. But in the transaction of business, an open and straightforward course of action must be pursued, if distrust and suspicion are to be avoided. Suppose that a Chinese merchant has goods, the duties on which amount to a considerable sum, and that your country would not ask him to pay more than half that sum in return for a flag and papers which should free him from all charge on passing our custom-houses, is it not evident that the dishonest trader would gladly turn such an opportunity to account, and that in that case we should soon find that our custom-houses had been established to no purpose?

"Moreover, the rules of the custom-houses of our Divine Kingdom permit the merchants and people of all places, and those who still shave their heads, to pass to and fro, and trade in salt and other goods on payment of the duties that are defined by regulation. This institution has been too long in existence to make it reasonable that it now should be set aside.

"Again, in the former agreement, no arrangement whatever was made respecting the employment of Chinese junks by your country, the stipulation as to the free passage to the river being confined to vessels of your own country. We agreed to this arrangement as a friendly act to those who are of the same family as ourselves. But if native junks should be largely employed by your nation, we have good cause to fear the treachery of the Imperial imps, who will employ these junks in the furtherance of their own dark and evil designs by falsely passing them off as your trading-craft. If this were the case, how greatly would our difficulties of defence be increased!

"Furthermore, the customs form the most important source of revenue on which we depend for the support of the soldiers of our Divine dynasty; and if, by undue protection granted to native junks, the payment of duties is avoided, general indignation would be felt among all our princes, high functionaries, officers, and soldiers; and they would never allow such an arrangement to continue in force. In putting forward this proposal, your country shows that you seek only your own profit, regardless of the welfare of others; and you are acting in a manner that is calculated neither to promote friendly relations, nor to induce reliance on your own promises.[54]

"The third point states that the promise made in the second month of the present year, that the Taeping troops should not approach within 100 li of Shanghae and Woo-sung has not been faithfully observed, &c.

"It is true that in the spring of this year we did make an agreement of this nature, but if we discuss it by strict principles it will be seen that there is no spot under the wide canopy of heaven that was not created by Shangte, that upon us rests the obligation of recovering by our arms the whole of China for Shangte, and that it is difficult for us to make any exception in the matter of territory, even to the extent of a foot of soil. It was only in consideration of your nation being of the same origin as ourselves that we acted as we did.

"Though commerce may be to you the means of livelihood, to us the possession of territory is all-important. It was only as a mark of our benevolent and just regard for our fellow-men that we consented for the space of the present year to avoid making any attack on Shanghae and Woo-sung, and when we entered into that agreement we issued our commands requiring it to be observed at all places in our possession, and have received reports from our various commanders, assuring us that our orders have been most scrupulously observed. But as it is obligatory on our Divine armies to kill the imps wherever they are to be found, how can our heavenly troops be forbidden to fulfil this duty? If there were no impish forces at Shanghae and Woo-sung, the Chung-wang and She-wang would certainly not think of sending their troops to take those places; and should you be willing to undertake the expulsion of the impish soldiers, then our Divine dynasty will send officers to tranquillize those places, and to protect not only the people but your trade also.

"Why, then, should the advance of our Divine soldiers within 100 li occasion you any apprehension? The present year is now drawing to a close, and with it the time named in our agreement, and we can never consent that our Divine troops shall not prepare to attack those places, simply out of consideration for your trade. It occasions us, therefore, great surprise to suddenly receive from you such a proposal, at the very time when the Chung-wang and She-wang, at the head of several millions of the Divine soldiers, are engaged in recovering from the enemy Soo-chow, Hang-chow, and the whole province.

"Your fourth point is to the effect that, as a large and valuable British trade has sprung up at Kiu-kiang and Hankow, you wish us to promise not to approach these places within 100 li, and also not to molest Silver Island, the residence of the British Consul at Chin-kiang.

"We have well considered this proposal, and consider that in putting it forward your country has committed a grave error. The case stands thus:—It is now long since our vast and illustrious Empire of China became the prey of these Tartars, who know no respect for Shangte, nor any other worship than that of devils. All sons and daughters of Heaven should be moved with the deepest enmity against them, with a hatred too deep to allow of their living together with them in the same world, and, therefore, wherever they are to be found, death should await them at our hands. Strange that just at the very time when we are about to despatch troops to take Hankow, Kiu-kiang, Chin-kiang, and Silver Island, your country should seek, under the guise of maintaining friendly relations with ourselves, to render secret assistance to the Tartar imps, by occupying several of their most important positions, and thus completely fettering our movements.

"How can we possibly consent to such a proposal?

"When we have taken Hankow, Kiu-kiang, Chin-kiang, and Silver Island, and tranquillized those places, if your country should then wish to conduct trade there as before, what is there to prevent your entering into further negotiations with our nation on these points? That being the case, what object can you have in requiring us not to take those places? If you entertain fears as to the conduct of our soldiers, and think that they may commit wanton slaughter or destruction, you should know that Heaven guides all our actions, and that while we kill all those who pay Heaven no respect, we save, on the other hand, all those who prove themselves, by worshipping Heaven, to be Heaven's children.

"All our power is derived from Shangte, and from Christ comes our support; all our acts are done in their sight and receive their entire approval.

"If you make the anticipated dispersion of the merchants and people of those ports an argument in favour of your proposal, we meet it by observing that when your officers conferred with us in the spring, this very point came under discussion. At first it was proposed on your side that we should not attack Kiu-kiang and Hankow, but afterwards, when we made it clear (to your officers) in the orders we gave them that it was necessary that we should attack and take the whole of China, as being the territory of Shangte, they replied, If your troops do not kill or injure British subjects, or do not burn or plunder British houses or property, then we shall remain neutral and assist neither party. To which we replied that you should not only remain neutral, but should also take no offence at our troops, if the people in their alarm were to disperse, and thus cause your trade to be interfered with. Your officers replied, We shall take no offence, but we shall require you to give us notice of your intention to attack these places. To this we answered, We will not refuse to give you notice before we make our attack, but we are afraid that our communications with you may be obstructed by the impish camps, and that when we shall have succeeded in sweeping these away, the time then left will not be sufficient for the purpose, and the omission may prove a cause of trouble. We added, however, that your country must not again act as you did at Shanghae, where you received the letters of our nation, and yet assisted the Tartar forces to defend that city. Thus it will be seen that the point has been already fully considered, and that it is useless to enter into any further discussion.

"To resume. As friendly relations exist between us, let us regard each other as people of the same family. Those whom we are thus hotly engaged in slaughtering are no other than the Tartar imps and robbers, and the whole empire of China is the conquest we intend to effect. As the Tartar imps have not yet been exterminated, and the great work of conquest is still incomplete, we cannot give our consent to such proposals as those which your country now makes to us.

"Your only course, therefore, is to wait until the Tartar imps shall have been annihilated, when we shall be ready to give our attention to any advantageous measures that your country may have to propose.

"We trust you will listen to this advice and raise no further questions; also that you will firmly maintain the present peaceful relations, and give no occasion for distrust or ill-will. These are the hopes that should be earnestly entertained on both sides.

"P. S. We observe that the translation of the letter before us, and the paper communicating the points under discussion (the English original?) are written on white paper and bear no seal. It is very difficult for us to know whether documents thus prepared are spurious or authentic, and we fear that they could easily be imitated by the Tartar imps, and that the fraud might be attended with serious consequences.

"We trust, therefore, that in order to establish the authenticity of your documents your country will in future observe the practice of affixing your seal to them.

"Dated the 22nd day of the 11th month of the 11th or Sin-yew year of the Divine Kingdom of Universal Peace, being the Kingdom of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly Elder Brother, and Heavenly King (January 1, 1862)."

"COMMANDER BINGHAM TO THE TAEPING AUTHORITIES AT NANKING.
"Reward, Nanking, January 1, 1862.

"I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Queen of England in the Chinese Seas to acknowledge the receipt of your reply to the communication made by me four days ago, and to acquaint you—

"1. That in bringing the demands for compensation for the robberies committed on British subjects to the notice of the authorities at Nanking, instead of exacting redress for them on the spot where they were committed, he has given you the strongest proof of his desire to treat you in a friendly manner.

"Your refusal to do justice gives him the right to take his own measures for procuring adequate redress for these injuries.

"2. That he will take effectual measures to prevent any vessel carrying the English flag which has not the right to do so, but that he will not permit vessels, whether of European or Chinese construction, which are owned by British subjects, to be interfered with in any way or under any pretext, in their undoubted right of navigating the Yang-tze-kiang River free from all molestation, and you will do so at your peril.

"3. The towns of Shanghae and Woo-sung, as you well know, are occupied by the military forces of England and France, and if you repeat the absurdity of attacking them, you will incur, not merely a repulse as on a former occasion, but such further consequences as your folly will deserve.

"4. Your refusal to enter into an engagement to leave Silver Island, Kiu-kiang, and Hankow free from molestation, all places which you have not the slightest chance of attacking with success, proves to the Commander-in-Chief that your expressions of friendly feeling are mere words, and the necessity of dealing with you accordingly.

(Signed) "Henry M. Bingham."

[43] See page 46, Blue Book.

[44] See page 50, Blue Book.

[45] See page 64, Blue Book.

[46] See page 50, Blue Book.

[47] See page 51, Blue Book.

[48] See Appendix B.

[49]

William Breck, Esq., United States Consul.
M. Leon Obry, His Imperial Majesty's Navy, commanding steamer Confucius.
Lieutenant Henry Huxham, R.N., commanding H.M.'s gunboat Kestrel.
Frederick Harvey, Esq., Her Majesty's Consul.

[50] "E" corresponds to the Chinese title "Kung," or Duke.

[51] i.e., She-wang (the Assistant Prince).

[52] A quotation from the "Sze Shoo Mencius," tom. i. chap. 2. The King of Tse is inquiring of Mencius whether he ought to take possession of the kingdom of Yeu, lately conquered by him. Mencius, instancing the practice of the ancient kings Wan and Woo under similar circumstances, replies that, unless the voice of the people invites the invader to take possession, he is not justified in so doing. Hence the rebels would have it believed that they have enlisted in their cause the sympathies of the nation, without which, according to received notions, it will be impossible for them to obtain the "Teen-ming" (the Divine Commission), and, by consequence, the Empire.

[53] i.e., those of the nation who do not submit.

[54] "On the occasion when they recently stopped some British junks at Woo-hoo, eventually retaining two (subsequently released by the Bouncer), in pledge for payment of duty, on the whole their demand amounted to 2,000 taels. Their right to levy moderate duties on all vessels trading in the territories they hold was allowed in the original arrangement entered into with them, but they were, at the same time, distinctly acquainted that I had stationed a vessel of war at Nanking for the express purpose of securing to British vessels entire freedom in the exercise of their right of navigating the Yang-tze. The necessity of preventing any interference whatever with the passing trade by the rebels, arises from the impracticability of recovering any duties they might extort without a serious collision. In the case of Imperialists, redress could always ultimately be obtained by reference through the Minister to the Government at Peking.—J. Hope."

This is the excuse given for depriving the Ti-pings of their revenue.


Transcriber's Notes

Obvious punctuation errors repaired.

The embedded color images are low-resolution; click on an image to load a high-resolution version.

The frontpiece and title page contain Chinese characters which may not be rendered correctly unless the correct fonts are installed.

Hyphen added: co[-]adjutors (p. 342), E[-]CHING (caption of image facing p. 304), E-ching (p. 379), Kwang[-]si (p. 144), Pei[-]ho (pp. 229, 230), sand[-]bank(s) (pp. 107, 202), semi[-]civilized (p. 228), Shang[-]te (p. 418), Soo[-]chow (pp. 272, 273), Tai[-]ping (p. 306), Tien[-]Kwoh (caption of map facing p. 359), Ti[-]mung (twice on p. 132), water[-]fowl (p. 20), Woo[-]sung (p. 199).

Hyphen removed: banner-men (p. 322), blood[-]thirsty (p. 415), fire[-]arms (pp. 79, 408), good[-]will (pp. 88, 102), main[-]land (p. 21), Ning[-]po (p. 356), Po[-]yang (p. 88), Shen[-]si (p. 157), under[-]mentioned (p. 342), Vice[-]roy (p. 71), Wu[-]hu (p. 267), Ye[-]su (p. 175).

The following words appear in multiple forms and have not been changed: "benefited" / "benefitted", "Budhist" / "Buddhist", "gunboat" / "gun-boat", "Han-kow" / "Hankow", "Honan" / "Hoonan" / "Hoo-nan", "Hoopeh" / "Hoo-peh", "Nan-kin" / "Nan-king" / "Nankin" / "Nanking", "Shang-te" / "Shangte", "Tae-ping" / "Taiping" / "Tai-ping" / "Ti-ping", "Woo-san-kwei" / "Wu-san-kwei".

p. 61: "jingall" changed to "gingall" (a gingall battery).

p. 70: "Atalanta" changed to "Atlanta" (the occupation of Atlanta).

p. 86: "sovereignity" changed to "sovereignty" (his divine commission to earthly sovereignty).

p. 86: "sufficent" changed to "sufficient" (with guns or sufficient powder).

p. 88: "Imperalist" changed to "Imperialist" (Imperialist troops in Hoo-nan).

p. 111: "1838" changed to "1858" (Elgin treaty (June 1858)).

p. 125: duplicate "that" removed (that something was most likely dangerous).

p. 197: "exclaming" changed to "exclaiming" (exclaiming, "hish.").

p. 212: "inconoclasts" changed to "iconoclasts" (iconoclasts of the strictest order).

p. 237: "skook" changed to "shook" (shook hands).

p. 241: "acomplished" changed to "accomplised" (accomplished prince).

Caption of image facing p. 261: "HU-KAN" changed to "HU-KAU".

p. 271: "superintendant" changed to "superintendent" (in his capacity as superintendent).

p. 295: "dissertion" changed to "dissertation" (a lengthy dissertation by one Rev. J. L. Holmes).

p. 329: "ursurpation" changed to "usurpation" (without aggression or usurpation).

p. 331: "gave" changed to "give" (to give his favourable opinion).

p. 331: "bravos" changed to "braves" (becoming the mercenary braves).

p. 342: "Imperialst" changed to "Imperialist" (the Imperialist braves).

p. 344: "forgottten" changed to "forgotten" (has evidently forgotten himself).

p. 348: "Impearialist" changed to "Imperialist" (all the Imperialist posts).

p. 349: "prejudical" changed to "prejudicial" (prejudicial presence).

p. 350: "chieftian" changed to "chieftain" (gallant chieftain).

p. 354: "politicans" changed to "politicians" (politicians of the Yang-tze).

p. 356: "compartively" changed to "comparatively" (were comparatively useless).

p. 368: "parient" changed to "parent" (the injured "parent,").

p. 371: "Sze-wang" changed to "Sz-wang" (to call in the Sz-wang).

p. 388: "detoriated" changed to "deteriorated" (has seriously deteriorated).






                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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