Augustus F. Lindley

Ti-pingdom in 1861.—Its Armies.—The Foreign Policy of England.—Its Consequences.—Admiral Hope's Expedition.—Comments thereon.—Its Results.—Lord Elgin's Three Points.—Official Communications.—Secret Orders.—Evidence of such.—Their Object.—Official Communications.—Mr. Parkes' Despatch analyzed.—Newspaper Extracts.—Official Papers.—Mr. Parkes' Measures.—His Arrogant Behaviour.—Result of the Yang-tze Expedition.—Ngan-king Invested.—Modus Operandi.—The Ying-wang's Plans.—His Interview with Mr. Parkes.—Sacrifices his Interests.—Sketch of the Ying-Wang.—Hung-jin's Adventures.—The Chung-wang's Operations.—The Results.—Siege of Hang-chow.—Its Capture.—Manchoo Cruelties.—Position of the Ti-pings in 1861.

Far brighter dawned the spring of 1861 upon the Ti-ping cause than did the opening of the previous year. In nearly every direction the revolutionists were victorious: the principal forces of the Manchoo emperor were completely routed, and a considerable portion of the most valuable territory in China had fallen into their hands, and was fast becoming thoroughly consolidated as a part of their possessions. It seemed as though at last their heroic struggles were about to receive their well-merited reward. So great was the prestige of their late triumphs that, wherever they marched, whole armies of Imperialists vanished away without striking a blow, or, if unable to seek security in precipitate flight, defended themselves with the wild unorganized desperation of despair.

The extent of country entirely under the Ti-ping rule was very considerable. Along the line of the great Yang-tze river, from N.E. to S.W., their territory extended from its banks below Chin-kiang into the central part of the province of Kiang-si, south of the Poyang lake, a distance of more than 360 miles; while from the boundaries of their possessions N.W. of the river to the opposite limits in the S.E., an irregular breadth of 200 to 250 miles included the whole of their settled dominions, forming an area upwards of 90,000 square miles, and containing a population of some 45,000,000. Besides this, large portions of the provinces of Hoo-peh, Hoo-nan, Fu-keen, Che-kiang, and the distant Sze-chuan, were occupied by powerful Ti-ping armies. The lowest approximate strength of their forces at this time might be estimated at 350,000; but a large proportion consisted of mere boys. This force was divided into five principal armies, the remainder doing garrison duty at Nankin, Soo-chow, and many other of the most important cities within their jurisdiction. One of the five armies in the field was commanded by the Ying-wang in the province of Hoo-peh: the Chung-wang commanded a large force in the southern districts of Ngan-whui; the Shi-wang, with a very powerful army, was operating in the central part of Kiang-si; and the Kan-wang, having proceeded to the province of Hoo-nan, was joined by upwards of 40,000 insurgents from the old seats of rebellion against the Manchoo dynasty,—the provinces in the southern limit of the empire, Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, and Kwei-chow; and, besides this force, far away upon the western boundary of China, Shih-ta-kae (I-wang), the Ti-ping emperor's brother, in command of a large army, was successfully operating in Sze-chuan. In fact, north, south, east, and west, the star of the patriots shone brightly in the ascendant, while that of the Manchoos seemed setting in the gloom and darkness, through which, upwards of two hundred years ago, it had struggled into existence. The greatest empire in the world appeared at length about to be relieved from that incubus which for two centuries had paralyzed its hopes and energies; the enlightenment of China seemed approaching, step by step with the advent of Christianity, which, following rapidly on the expulsion of the Tartar, with its vast train of benefit and improvement, promised, not alone to place that empire upon the pedestal of greatness yet reserved for her, but to realize corresponding advantages for the whole civilized world. One dark cloud alone appeared to cast a shadow upon so bright an horizon—the policy of the British Government. Language can scarcely express how seriously the interests of the universe, and of England in particular, have been prejudiced by a persistence in the suicidal measures dictated by a policy so mistaken.

Forcibly as the moral effect of the general foreign policy of England has been denounced by statesmen, how few have been found to raise their voices in the British senate in protestation against the practical evils which that policy has engendered in the far East, a country abounding in tea and silk, and now paralyzed by opium instead of being enriched by the manufactures of Great Britain. The moral effect of bad statesmanship, however much it may weaken England's just influence and the future peace of Europe, cannot sensibly affect the present wealth and pursuits of the people. Trade, politics, civilization, and religion, are pretty well balanced and regulated throughout Europe; therefore, whatever evil might result from the foreign policy of the British Government, no particular improvement could be expected to take place in a state of affairs which we consider almost perfect. But very different are the results of our peculiar kind of foreign policy in the case of China. With that extensive empire present relations are unsatisfactory, and the mutual benefits to be derived from a free intercourse are yet hidden in the vale of futurity. Mutual benefit is hardly the correct expression, for from a country which may be regarded as the richest in the world in proportion to its extent and population, England would derive far greater commercial advantages than she could possibly bestow. Whenever a prospect of the most satisfactory relations offered, and whenever a free intercourse was not only offered, but actually established by any section or part of that innumerable people, it would be only natural for England to rejoice, if not for the sake of the Chinese, and the higher objects of humanity, at least for selfish motives. But this is exactly what the British Government has proved incapable of appreciating, by preferring temporary interests to those which were much greater and far more lasting.

The Ti-pings offered not only satisfactory relations and free intercourse, but every advantage that England could possibly wish for or be benefitted by. Christianity and civilization, as practised among ourselves, would have become morally and physically certain under their rule. The detestable opium trade would have been completely annihilated, and British produce would have taken its place, to the benefit of the Chinese, and the relief of the choked markets and distressed operatives of England. The fulfilment of the Ti-ping law, that European "brethren" should "go out or in, backwards or forwards, in full accordance with their own will or wish," whether for pleasure or "to carry on their commercial operations," did throw open the whole of their territory to free intercourse and trade, and would have done the same for the entire Chinese empire. The exclusiveness and hatred of the Manchoo Government to the "outer barbarians" and "foreign devils" was by the Ti-pings changed into friendship and kindness. Modern improvements would have been extensively introduced. The trade, at present restricted to a few treaty ports, would have become universal throughout the empire, and the vast stores of mineral riches, almost unknown to foreigners, would have yielded forth their mines of wealth, while a general and enormous commerce, perfectly free and unfettered (excepting opium), would have thrown open an empire richer in itself than all Europe. To England especially, as the greatest commercial power, an inexhaustible source of profit would certainly have been established, and would have produced, without aggression or usurpation of territory, a revenue far excelling any derived from India. All these and many other important advantages were partially established by the Ti-pings, and would undoubtedly have been completed upon the final overthrow of the Manchoos.

Strong as these inducements should have been to cause England to adopt a different policy towards China, and much as such a course would have tended to her own advantage, there was another and a higher consideration which she should have permitted to influence her. As a powerful and influential nation, a duty was cast upon her, if not to extend the hand of friendship to a people who were nobly struggling to follow her in the path of civilization and to learn the true religion, at least not to thwart such efforts, and, by untimely interference, render them hopelessly inoperative. Personal experience, the reports of men of intelligence and honour, all prove but too plainly how the friendly Ti-ping nation was crushed by British interference. It has been urged that the friendly professions of that people were not genuine, and that their undertaking would never have been performed. Had such a course, so opposed to their nature, been pursued, surely it would have been more grateful to the martial spirit of England to resort to arms for the purpose of enforcing an observance of good faith and honour, than for that of avenging the capture of a wretched opium smuggler.

Upon the 11th of February the expedition under command of Admiral Hope, started for the Yang-tze-kiang with the object of opening that river to foreign trade, in accordance with the treaty lately concluded at Pekin. In all respects this expedition was of the greatest importance, as well to the Chinese as the foreigners whom it most particularly interested. Its results were entirely prejudicial to the Ti-pings. The diplomatic and military authorities of the expedition mostly opposed the Ti-ping movement for its interference with the "carrying into due effect the terms of the treaty" just forced from the Manchoo at the cannon's mouth, and the almost certain prospects of its success, which would not only sadly affect the "China indemnity," but their own individual prospects of office and aggrandizement expected through their intercourse with the suddenly changed polite and obliging Manchoo mandarins. The deputation of the mercantile community attached to the expedition was utterly absorbed with its trading pursuits, and looked upon anything and everything likely to interfere with its immediate profits with no little amount of hostility: the future was completely ignored; its expectations were an uninterrupted trade for three years, and a return to England with a large fortune; therefore it is hardly to be wondered at that it looked with hatred upon the change progressing in the shape of the Ti-ping revolution. Besides the personal and spontaneous prejudice entertained by these two classes against the Ti-pings, it seems pretty certain that directly after all the efforts of the Manchoo Government to repel foreigners by force had failed, intrigues to deceive and induce them to act against the rebels they were unable to subdue, were successfully adopted. Even Mr. Bruce (who had stated in his despatches—"If there is one art of diplomacy understood by the Chinese it is that of separating interests which ought to be identical") seems to have been thoroughly imposed upon, while the false professions of the Manchoos, in order to obtain the assistance of the British against the Ti-pings, have had no small share in consummating that gross outrage. Again discussing the policy of assisting the Imperialists (which the latter had requested, making great protestations of "friendship," "mutual commercial interests," &c.), he says:—"It is evidently for the interest of the Chinese authorities to induce us to embark in a course of action which will embroil us with the insurgents."

Yet, eventually, Mr. Bruce chose to place implicit faith in their professions, and took one occasion out of many, in that disgraceful affair of the Anglo-Chinese fleet (depending upon the truth of the truthless Prince Kung, whose hands yet reeked with the blood of our murdered countrymen), to give his favourable opinion to the British Government; and the British people, depending upon their representatives, who depended upon the Government, who depended upon Mr. Lay, who depended upon Wan-siang, president of the Manchoo Foreign Office, who depended upon Prince Kung, who depended upon some one else, actually permitted the very laws of the land to be set aside, by allowing the ordinance of neutrality to be broken, and the Foreign Enlistment Act to be declared null and void. Fortunately the disgraceful affair terminated in the most ignominious manner, and the British sailors were saved the degradation (that had been thrust upon the soldiers) of becoming the mercenary braves of a corrupt and sanguinary despotism.

Upon the opening of the Yang-tze to trade, and the selection of the cities of Han-kow, Kiu-kiang, and Chin-kiang as the treaty ports, it became necessary to enter into some agreement with the Ti-pings, who commanded the river throughout its principal positions; in fact, by their possession of Nankin, Wu-hoo, Tae-ping-foo, the cities of Seaou-shan, Tung-shan, and several others, this trade was almost as completely in their power as the valuable silk trade had been since May, 1860. In consequence of this, Admiral Hope (ignoring, with all the arrogance of superior strength, the fact that the murderous repulse of the Ti-pings from Shanghae had given them a perfect right to make it a casus belli, and to retaliate upon British commerce, lives, or any other possession) communicated with the Ti-ping authorities at Nankin, and pledged the neutrality of the British nation once more.

The Earl of Elgin's instructions to Admiral Hope contain the following:[35]—

"It is obvious, however, that before British vessels can navigate the river in safety, some understanding must be arrived at with the rebels, who are believed to be in possession of certain points upon it. It is with the view of obtaining your assistance towards the accomplishment of this object that I now address myself to your Excellency.

"Nothing, I am confident, would so surely tend to the establishment of such an understanding on a satisfactory basis as your Excellency's own presence and authority, if your other engagements should permit of your proceeding up the river in person. At any rate, I would venture to suggest that a naval force, sufficiently large to inspire respect, should present itself before Nankin, and that the rebel authorities should be informed that we do not appear as enemies, or with the intention of taking part in the civil war now raging in China, but that we require from them some sufficient assurance that British vessels proceeding up or down the river for trading purposes shall not be interfered with, or subjected to molestation by persons acting under their orders."

In his letter of instruction to Mr. Parkes, who accompanied the admiral as diplomatic secretary or agent, Lord Elgin gave three points to be observed:—

The following passage appears in the letter of instructions addressed by the Earl of Elgin to Mr. Parkes, viz.:—

Reading these instructions together with the third of the three articles above cited, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that a policy of neutrality was intended to be acted upon: how far such intentions were sincere may be gathered from the following "orders" addressed to Commander Aplin.

With regard to this document, in the first place, the statement that the English Government had "ordered" Shanghae and Woo-sung to be defended vi et armis, is simply untrue. The Foreign Secretary's first "orders" with regard to the defence of Shanghae, or any other treaty port, bear date, "Foreign Office, July 24th, 1861," and are given to Mr. Bruce:—

If then orders had been issued to Admiral Hope or any one else, they must have been secret orders, for none are upon record to such effect as stated in the communication to the Ti-ping authorities. Moreover, the condition upon which the neutrality of the treaty ports was proposed in the Foreign Secretary's despatch was not observed. The Pekin Government was never asked to abstain from using Shanghae as a base of operations against the Ti-pings; on the contrary, they were not only assisted to make it one by the moral and indirect support of the British authorities, but by the actual assistance of British soldiers and sailors in the field, chiefly headed by Admiral Hope, who almost before the ink of his guarantee was dry openly violated it. What renders this flagrant disregard of all truth and honour still more to be deplored is the fact that the Ti-pings, in their wonderfully earnest endeavours to cultivate the friendship of Europeans, complied with every requisition of even Admiral Hope and his colleagues. They agreed not to attack Shanghae for the space of one year, upon the special understanding that the British upon their part would prevent the Imperialists from using that city for any aggressive or belligerent purposes; and although not even the shadow of an attempt was made by Admiral Hope, or any other British authority, to fulfil the pledges given upon the part of England, with an almost incredible forbearance and good faith, the Ti-pings to the very day, nay, nearly to the very hour, faithfully, but entirely to their own prejudice, refrained from any attack upon Shanghae. As for the orders with regard to Woo-sung, they can only be attributed to the exuberant imagination of the diplomatic Admiral, such place having never upon any occasion been referred to by the "orders" from the Foreign Secretary.

It is difficult indeed to consider Admiral Hope's communication, either in accordance with the public instructions of Lord Elgin and Earl Russell, or other than in direct opposition to them. Of course it would be idle to suppose that either Mr. Bruce, the minister to Pekin, Admiral Hope, Mr. Parkes, the diplomatic agent, or any of the consuls, would have dared to systematically violate the orders of their Government; it can therefore only be concluded that secret orders were given.

To those who cannot reconcile Admiral Hope's and Mr. Parkes's communications with the Ti-pings, with the explicit instructions they had each received, and can neither approve of their idea of "strict neutrality," it must appear that the Admiral's communication at Nankin was simply a very unsailor-like trap to catch the Ti-pings. The plot was doubtless very creditable to the ingenuity and diplomatic finesse of those who planned it; but those admirable politicians, though remarkably indifferent moralists, cannot easily reconcile it with honour and justice. Had the drama been enacted nearer to home, it would from its very clumsiness have attracted attention; but as it occurred so far away, scarcely a soul but those personally interested either knew or cared anything about it.

The intention evidently was to induce the Ti-pings to promise not to attack Shanghae, and then, by converting that city into a base and nucleus for the Manchoos, to compel them to do so for their self-preservation. The theory was a bold one, and would have been realized were it not for the extraordinary forbearance of the Ti-pings, which forced Admiral Hope, and the others, to commence hostilities themselves. The conditions upon which the insurgents had agreed not to attack Shanghae, the violation of the British pledges, and the true position of affairs, of course, formed no part of the programme to be made public; and it was correctly considered that China was too far away, and the British people not sufficiently interested to scrutinize matters very closely. Thus it is that a few unprincipled officials have been able to attempt the justification of their conduct, upon the pleas, that the Ti-pings broke faith and attacked Shanghae, and that the leaders of this great Christian and patriotic movement were a horde of banditti who desolated everything, and meditated the destruction of Shanghae, &c. &c. &c.

The reply of the Ti-ping authorities to Admiral Hope's "strict neutrality" despatch, as translated by government interpreters, is thus:—

This decree sufficiently evinces the anxiety of the Ti-ping Government to act in accordance with the wishes of that of England.

Commander Aplin thus reported the result of his mission to Admiral Hope:—

Mr. Parkes, in his report of the means by which the agreement of the Ti-pings to Admiral Hope's communication was obtained, states:[36]—

Mr. Parkes continues:—

Mr. Parkes had ample room to dilate on this subject, for it is difficult to imagine in what light, save that of an usurpation of territory, the Ti-pings could behold the seizure of Shanghae, Woo-sung, Ningpo, &c.

This very singular extract is much open to objection. 1. If "experience had proved" that the Imperialists were unable to withstand the Ti-pings, how is it that Mr. Parkes states, with regard to the defence of Shanghae, &c., "we should be glad when it was no longer rendered necessary by the restoration of the country to order," particularly when the policy that was pursued naturally prolonged the struggle and delayed that result? 2. The inaccuracy of the statement that, "to secure the safety of our people and their property, it was necessary we should protect them ourselves," is thoroughly proved by the capture of Ningpo by the Ti-pings on the 9th December, 1861, when not the slightest particle of British property was touched, and all foreigners were treated as "brothers" by the Ti-pings; and, moreover, by the fact that not a single case is upon record in which the Ti-pings have ever retaliated upon European life or property when they might have done so with every justification. 3. Then, with regard to the "any other place that the English Government might see fit to protect," when the whole of the province, with the exception of Shanghae, was in the possession of the Ti-pings, and when the entire silk and a great proportion of the tea trades were also in their undisturbed possession, why was not Shanghae surrendered to the rising and triumphant power, as Ningpo had been; particularly when we are told that "it was rendered no longer necessary, by the restoration of the country to order," to pursue the policy of defending the treaty ports, or any other place, "that the English Government might see fit to protect"?

Mr. Parkes continues his report thus:—

This savours rather highly of hypocrisy when it emanates from one of those fully acquainted with what was to be. "Of course," their destruction being predetermined, the Ti-pings "could not be" assisted; can Mr. Parkes and his superiors explain the conduct described in the following extract by the same "rights and duties of neutrality"?

For some months this disgraceful work proceeded, till at last the following official sanction appeared:—

This arrangement, in accordance, we are bound to believe, with the "duties of neutrality," was executed by the house of Mackenzie, Richardson, & Co., of Shanghae, in consideration of the sum of 180,000 taels (£60,000) paid by the Manchoo Government.

While the British steamers have passed the walls of Nankin, crowded with Imperialist troops, hastening to the destruction of the Ti-pings in the neighbourhood of Shanghae, I have sat on the silent batteries and sympathized with the too credulous people who, faithful to their promises of neutrality, foolishly allowed the Tartar troops to pass scathless right under the muzzles of their guns, simply because they were safely sheltered by the British ensign flying over them. The ruse of shipping the soldiers as coolies, and so smuggling them past the Ti-ping positions, was abandoned upon the legalization of the trade by the same admiral and authorities who, but a few months previously, had explained the "duties of neutrality" to the Ti-pings, and had given them to understand it was impossible their stores could be conveyed to Ngan-king, as any such act would constitute a breach of neutrality! After the legalization, the Imperialist braves were carried down to Shanghae by thousands, and many a time I have longed to put a shot through the hulls of their conveyances; but the Ti-pings would not allow me, because, as they said, it might hurt the "foreign brethren"! Meanwhile, directly the cowardly rabble had passed out of range of the batteries, their yells of bravado could be plainly heard, and British oak and British seamen became hidden and disgraced by a cloud of Manchoo flags waved in defiance, whenever it could be done in safety.

As Mr. Parkes and his co-adjutors did not obtain an instant compliance with their grossly unjust demands upon the Ti-pings, viz., not to attack Shanghae, a city belonging to them by every known right as natives of the soil, if they were able to capture it from the Manchoos; not to levy duty upon the British vessels passing through their territory, and to avoid all the principal ports, the great sources of revenue to their enemies, simply because their capture of such places might interfere with the British trade—they took more active measures, viz.:—

Let Englishmen apply this arrogant document to themselves. The Tien-wang was crowned sovereign over a vast territory; his large armies were in victorious possession; and he, being invested with all the mystery and divine attributes common to eastern monarchs, became a much more unapproachable object than western rulers, even to his own people. What would Englishmen do if some foreign official, dissatisfied with waiting "five days" in negotiation with their proper authorities "to arrange certain important business," were to force themselves into Her Majesty's palace, and "request" her to personally treat with them, or "appoint an officer to meet them," and so infringe official etiquette?

Not satisfied with issuing this presumptuous summons, Mr. Parkes proceeds:—

If Mr. Parkes had met with the fate of Mr. Richardson and others in Japan, or experienced indignities similar to those suffered by Mr. Edan, political agent at the Bhootanese court, during his superlatively arrogant dictation to the Ti-ping chiefs, can it be denied that it would have been his own fault?

In his explanation of thrusting himself into the Tien-wang's palace, and outraging all the Ti-ping rules and ceremonies, Mr. Parkes has evidently forgotten himself, and represented his own conduct as that of the Ti-pings. He says:—

This little conceit of the diplomatic agent is really amusing, by reason of its being perfectly unique. I cannot remember another instance in which the Ti-ping has been compared with the Manchoo in behaviour to foreigners or anything else. When people set themselves to work deliberately to injure others, it generally happens that they strive to vilify them in order to justify themselves. To this motive, I suppose, we must ascribe the "clearly necessary stand" of Mr. Parkes.

The result of the Yang-tze expedition, in so far as the Ti-pings were concerned, amounted to a treaty of neutrality between them and England; a promise on their part not to attack Shanghae, and to remain 100 li (about 30 miles) away from it during the "present year" (1861), upon condition that the British authorities prevented the Imperialists from attacking them from that place, or using it for belligerent purposes; and a pledge from Admiral Hope, that if the Ti-ping forces were to attack the other treaty ports, all British subjects being "unmolested both in their persons and property, the commanders of the vessels of war stationed there will receive directions in no way whatever to interfere in the hostilities which may be going on, except for the purpose of protecting their countrymen, should it be necessary to do so." It also resulted in their being compelled to break their engagements, and thus expose themselves to British hostility and encourage the violation of solemn pledges of neutrality. Grave as are the accusations which may be brought forward against a number of British officials, it must be admitted that their conduct fully justified the most severe animadversions.

In the meanwhile, during the negotiations at Nankin, the Ti-ping forces mentioned in the first pages of this chapter were severally engaged prosecuting, upon the whole, a very successful series of operations.

The city of Ngan-king (capital of Ngan-whui province) having become closely invested by an Imperialist army of some 20,000 men, and a flotilla of several hundred gun-boats, the Ying-wang was charged with the relief of that city during his march up the course of the Yang-tze to his destined operations in the province of Hupeh.

Although Ngan-king had been threatened by Imperialist forces during some eighteen months, until the spring of 1861 it had never been seriously menaced, the Manchoo braves having contented themselves with the ordinary phase of Chinese warfare—watching, flag-waving, and yelling at a safe distance from any probable vicious attempt of the dangerous Chang-maous.[38] Ngan-king, however, was a place of great strength for Chinese warfare; it formed the point d'appui of all Ti-ping movements either to the northern or north-western provinces, and previous to any attack upon their capital, Nankin, or its fortified outposts, its reduction was an absolute necessity. The city being built right on the brink of the great river, was absolute mistress of that important highway, without which, and its invaluable water communication, any extensive movement of the Manchoo armies in an easterly direction became impracticable. At last, therefore, the Manchoo warriors girded up their loins, that is to say, tucked up the bottoms of their petticoat inexpressibles, fiercely wound their tails around their cleanly-shaven caputs, made a terrible display of huge flags, roaring gongs, horridly painted bamboo shields, and a most extravagant waste of gunpowder, and moving forward with terrific cloud-rending yells, established themselves safely out of cannon-range of the walls, and proceeded to complete the investment of the doomed city by building themselves in with a formidable series of earth-works and stockades, from which they could neither climb out nor enemies climb in. As a rule, the Chinese never fight unless they are obliged to. Not that they are so cowardly as some Europeans have mistakenly seemed to believe, but rather from those singularly refined traits of reasoning which, with these peculiar people, border closely upon the absurd. For instance, having myself often spoken with Chinamen regarding their ineffective and almost childish, but for the merciless treatment of the vanquished, military tactics, I have always been answered to the following effect:—

"Hi-ya, how can? Two piecee man no can stop one place aller same time, spose nother piecee man must wantchee come, mi must wantchee go; spose mi must wantchee stop, nother piecee man no can come."

Singularly enough this principle is generally applied. If a determined resistance is certain, those who should attack content themselves by safely fortifying themselves at a distance, as in the case at Ngan-king; but should the determination of the defensive party be doubtful, then an attack, with no little impetuosity and daring, will almost surely take place.

Now, the Ti-pings have never been known as remarkable for the logic, cowardice, or whatever it may be termed, generally peculiar to the race of Chinese: upon the contrary, their reputation has ever been that of fighting men. In consequence of this certain prospect of hard knocks in the event of their being irrational enough to try and climb over the walls of Ngan-king when the Ti-pings were determined to try and prevent them, the Imperialists very wisely made themselves masters of the situation by establishing a complete cordon of stockades around the city, extending from the river above to a point just below its walls, calculating, with a perfect philosophy, that when the rice within the city became finished, those without might make a good breakfast, then scale the walls free from any "hard knocks," and, better than all, gather the heads of the helpless and famished garrison, ad libitum; thus capturing the city, obtaining the emoluments of a long and easy campaign, and winding up with the head-money, all without the danger of fighting.

Meantime, although the city was fast becoming straitened for provisions, the Ying-wang confined his efforts for its relief to distant operations, probably considering its garrison amply sufficient not only to maintain the place, but to prevent any complete blockade by sallying forth upon the Manchoos, as their strength, although less than half that of the besiegers, was considered such as would not be likely to diminish their possible chance of victory. In this case, however, too much was expected from a mostly newly-levied force, exposed to the attack of Honan braves and Tartar troops, the best forces in the service of the Manchoo emperor.

The Ying-wang, his plans, and the success attending his hitherto operations, became known to the Yang-tze expedition, under Admiral Hope, in March. Upon the 22nd of that month Mr. Parkes visited the Ying-wang at the city of Hwang-chow, situated upon the northern bank of the river, 50 miles from the treaty port Han-kow. In his report of the interview he states:—

This statement, to those who know anything about the Ti-pings, appears perfectly true; how does Mr. Parkes reconcile it with his report that "plunder and violence marked the progress of the Ti-pings"?

Now this exaggerated "caution" and absurd regard for "our commerce" made the Ying-wang sacrifice his own interests.

His expedition was planned for the express purpose of capturing Han-kow (preparatory to that of Wu-chang, the capital of the Hupeh province, situated directly opposite, on the other side of the Yang-tze); the relief of Ngan-king was to be effected en route, either by the direct attack of his army or by the effect of its success elsewhere. At the time of his interview with Mr. Parkes, either operation was simply a matter of choice, for Han-kow was almost undefended and offered an easy capture; while having completely outmanoeuvred the besiegers of Ngan-king, he might have fallen upon their rear, and, with a sortie of the garrison, probably exterminated them. Of course, to effect either plan a continuation of his hitherto prompt and decisive action was imperative; this, however, became arrested by the unfortunate and prejudicial presence of the English, who, in the midst of his successes, established themselves at the city the capture of which formed the terminal point of his campaign. Of course, Mr. Parkes does not report the threats of hostility thrust upon the Ying-wang to deter him from advancing upon, and occupying the Eldorado on which foreigners of every degree were greedily intent, trusting to the terms of the Elgin treaty with the Manchoo Government for the fulfilment of their golden visions. But it were idle, indeed, to suppose so energetic a commander as the Ying-wang would allow all the fruits of his past operations and the favourable prospects of a rapid prosecution of his movement, to be lost either by "hesitation in marching upon Han-kow," or by the advice of Mr. Parkes. The Ying-wang undoubtedly received a threat of "strict neutrality" in event of his appearing at Han-kow—that sort of "neutrality" with which Mr. Parkes was "fully acquainted," and which has invariably been assumed towards the Ti-pings, but which some might interpret by the words, "gratuitous hostility."

The Ti-ping cause suffered from British contact in this, as in every other instance, as the Ying-wang delayed his march upon Han-kow, and sent to Nankin for orders. His army, although mustering nearly 50,000 men, did not possess a fighting strength of more than half that number, the rest being simply the coolies in usual attendance upon all Chinese armies; therefore delay in the enemy's country simply meant defeat. The critical and favourable moment to strike a successful blow was lost, and while the great cause of Christianity and freedom was once more paralyzed by the incubus of British interests, the opponents to both received such ample time to concentrate their out-generalled forces, that when, after a delay of several months, the Ying-wang received orders to advance upon Han-kow, and open communication with the British authorities, he encountered their vastly superior army close to the city of Ma-ching, and after a most desperately contested battle, was defeated with heavy loss, and then gradually driven beyond the city of Ngan-king without having been able to succour that position, or obtain the slightest advantage from his previous brilliant exploits.

The Ying-wang, although only twenty-four years of age, had already, by his extraordinary courage, obtained one of the highest positions among the Ti-pings, ranking at this time as a generalissimo of the army, and a noble of the first degree, with the honourable title of Ying-wang (Heroic Prince). By the Imperialists he had received the cognomen of "Sze-ngan-kow" (Four-eyed dog), in consequence of his remarkably rapid and successful strategy; and next to the Chung-wang his presence inspired more fear in Manchoo bosoms than the vicinity and operations of any other Ti-ping leader. Singularly romantic were the antecedents of this young and gallant chieftain. A youthful Cantonese student, while immersed in studying the wise proverbs of the Chinese classics, he chanced to meet a fellow-scholar related to some of the Hung family, who had originated and still formed so important a part of the Ti-ping rebellion. Shortly afterwards, having been unfairly treated in his examination by the corrupt government officials, he turned towards the new doctrines of the Ti-pings, and, with the assistance of his friend, paid a visit to Hung-jin, the future Kan-wang, who at this time, 1857, was fulfilling the duties of Christian teacher and catechist to the London Missionary Society at Hong-kong. Of an impulsive and enthusiastic disposition, he soon became a convert to Christianity, which Hung-jin preached with an eloquence that obtained the future Prime Minister of Ti-ping-wang the confidence and entire approval of all missionaries and Christians for many years, though, singularly enough, when the time of Hung-jin's elevation to the second place among the Ti-pings arrived—that is to say, the moment when by his power and influence it might naturally have been known that his exertions to Christianize China would have become immense, and would have been accompanied by proportionately gigantic results—his English pretended friends for the most part abandoned him.

The Ying-wang added one more to the large number of proselytes obtained by the earnestness and devotion of the warm-hearted and noble-minded Hung-jin. He had been for some months under the tuition of the latter, and had become greatly attached to him, when, deeply impressed by the information of the imprisonment of Hung-jin's mother, wife, and several other relatives, by the Canton mandarins, because of their connection, though very distant, with the principal members of the Ti-ping rebellion, and that they were only saved from execution by the efforts of some missionaries, he formed the determination to rescue them from imprisonment and ill-treatment.

Proceeding with his fellow-student to the city of Canton, they managed, through bribing some of the prison warders, to obtain a moment's admission to the aged mother of Hung-jin. To their surprise they found with her, besides other relatives, a granddaughter of surpassing beauty, who was the orphan of Hung-jin's brother—a brother who, with nearly the whole of his family, perished during the ruthless massacres of the innocent kindred of the Ti-ping rebels. Although their first meeting lasted but a few minutes, it seems the future Ying-wang and the beautiful captive maid became mutually attached. In their case, however, the romance admits of explanation. I have myself seen both the Ying-wang and the lady, and I consider that of each sex they were by far the most handsome I ever beheld in China. I can, therefore, easily believe that when in the wretchedness of her captivity, the young and noble-looking student appeared before her surrounded by all the extra attractions of his position as her deliverer, the lonely and miserable girl turned towards him with her whole heart. Not less natural seems the passion of the student, whose newly-aroused religious enthusiasm predisposed him to entertain the warmest feelings towards those he came to rescue and whose cause he had already espoused. During the short moments of his first interview, he told the prisoners to be prepared for an attempt to escape upon a certain night. The appointed time arrived, but no rescue, for the would-be deliverer, betrayed by one of the gaolers whom he had bribed and trusted, was seized while making his way into the prison by means of false keys, and thrust, helpless as themselves, among those anxiously awaiting his assistance. Brought before the cruel Manchoo mandarins, he was sentenced to the barbarous death by "cutting into a thousand pieces," while Hung-jin's mother, wife, niece, and several other relatives, were condemned to torture and decapitation.

Time flew onwards, and at length the evening before the fatal day arrived. What dread and overpowering feelings those poor doomed creatures felt upon that last day of life, while anticipating the horrid tortures coming with the morrow's sun, I do not know; but what I can tell is, that suddenly, about midnight, the doors of their prison were burst asunder, and the whole of the captives liberated by an insurrection of famine-maddened Chinamen.

These tumults, created for want of rice, are of very frequent occurrence in China, and are often attended with great loss of life; in nearly all such cases the rioters break open the prisons and augment their strength with the released captives. To such an event were the Ti-pings indebted for their brave Ying-wang, for many a future victory, and for the Manchoos' oft-repeated defeat.

Making his way down to the European settlement, Hung-jin's pupil, with his teacher's mother, wife, and niece, and several male relatives of the Hung family, found safety under the kind protection of some European missionaries. In the morning they all embarked and took passage to Hong-kong on board an American river steamer plying between the two places, and within four or five hours anchored in safety under the folds of the flag of freedom.

Hung-jin's happiness in the release and society of his wife and mother may easily be imagined; but soon rumours of other Manchoo persecution reached him, and, dreading the sudden death of his dearest relatives, if captured, he determined to make his way to Nankin, and then return for them, if such a plan proved practicable. His travel through the country and ultimate arrival at Nankin has been noticed in another chapter; suffice it, therefore, to say, he was accompanied by him who afterwards became the Ying-wang, himself disguised as an itinerant surgeon, and the latter as his attendant. Upon their arrival at Nankin, Hung-jin was detained and created Kan-wang by his relative the Ti-ping-wang, while his companion, receiving a commission in the Ti-ping army, was given letters to a number of Ti-ping partisans in the provinces of Kwang-tung, Fo-keen, and Kiang-si, and also received instructions to bring the Kan-wang's relatives from Hong-kong, and having delivered his despatches, to return to Nankin in company with those who would join his party (several Ti-ping officers accompanying him) by the way. Reaching Hong-kong safely, disguised as wandering mendicants, the whole of the refugees succeeded in arriving at the first rendezvous in small parties of two or three, under his guidance. At this place several hundred men mustered in arms, and recruited at other parts of their route. After many encounters with the Manchoo troops and many perilous adventures, the Ying-wang having principally contributed to the successful efforts of his comrades by his distinguished gallantry, re-entered Nankin with the Kan-wang's family. Soon after the successful issue of his mission, the Ying-wang was promoted, and received the beautiful niece of his patron and friend in marriage.

The Ying-wang having studied for a military life and possessing undaunted bravery, soon rose in the Ti-ping army, and during the famous victories obtained over the besiegers of Nankin in May, 1860, while in command of a small division, defeated the Tartar body-guard of Chang-kwoh-liang, second in command of the Imperialist army, and killed that general, falling himself desperately wounded in the moment of victory. Upon his recovery he received the title and position of Ying-wang.

While in the west, successes that would undoubtedly have led to the capture of Han-kow and other important positions were rendered nugatory through the presence of the English; in fact wherever the Ti-pings carried on their operations apart from that baneful influence, good fortune crowned their efforts.

The Shi-wang in Kiang-si, the I-wang in Sze-chuan, the Kan-wang in Hoo-nan, and the Chung-wang in Che-kiang, were successful in each province.

Although the movements of the three former Wangs were very extensive, and although the Shi-wang had captured the capital and many other large cities in Kiang-si, and in June had occupied the city of Wu-chang-hien (situated a few miles below the Ying-wang's position at Hwang-chow, but on the opposite side of the river, and from which two points the armies of the Shi and Ying Wangs would have co-operated in the reduction of Han-kow, but for the stoppage of their movements caused by the presence of British authorities and merchants at that city, and the menaces they had been treated to by the politicians of the Yang-tze expedition), all these operations paled before those of the Chung-wang in Che-kiang. Pressing rapidly forward with a small army of observation, the Commander-in-Chief made a false attack upon the important city of Hang-chow, the provincial capital, strongly garrisoned by Tartar troops of the Eight Banners, and after satisfying himself as to the strength of the enemy, by a rapid and brilliantly executed series of manoeuvres, succeeded in capturing the important cities of Chapoo, Hayen, Kashen, Hoo-chow, Hi-ning, &c., and, in fact, obtaining complete possession of all that most valuable territory extending from the south of the Ta-hoo lake to the walls of Hang-chow, and from the banks of the river Yang-tze to the sea at Shanghae, with the exception of that small portion adjacent to the latter city that was guaranteed by the agreement with Admiral Hope to remain a neutral ground during the "present year."

In consequence of the tactics pursued by the Commander-in-Chief as the result of his short campaign of observation, the main body of the two armies respectively commanded by the Shi and Kan Wangs were recalled from their distant successes and concentrated at the important cities of Hwuy-chow (capital and centre of the green tea districts in Ngan-whui, upon the south of the Yang-tze, at the time completely under the jurisdiction of the Ti-pings) and Soo-chow, with a large force already under the personal command of the Chung-wang himself. These two columns were marched, the one from Soo-chow in a south-westerly, and that from Hwuy-chow in an easterly direction, co-operating with each other upon the city of Hang-chow.

The Manchoo force concentrated at Hang-chow for its defence, and for the general defence of the Che-kiang province, numbered 125,000 men, of whom 35,000 were Tartars of the Eight Banners, the whole commanded by the Imperial commissioner and Tartar general, Luy-chang, assisted by the noted Chinese commander Chang Yuh-leang.

At the commencement of the Chung-wang's campaign, a movement took place which was attended by a success that put in action the hostile operations of the British Government, and thus brought disaster to the Ti-pings, whose available forces amounted to about 295,000 men, as opposed to 420,000 Manchoo Imperialists. Although to a casual and uninformed observer these figures may appear greatly advantageous to the Imperial cause, such was very far from being the case. With the exception of their Tartar troops and certain portions of the Chinese regulars, the Manchoo Government could not depend upon its defenders. Those who might fairly be trusted did not exceed two-thirds of the total number; the rest, comprising the militia (braves), were comparatively useless in the field, and many of the veteran Ti-pings confidently advanced against a greater odds than ten to one.

The two divisions of the Chung-wang's army uniting under the walls of Hang-chow, commenced the siege of that city with much vigour. The Tartar garrison being of great strength, and aided by an army in the field, for nearly a month the progress of the besiegers was not very material. Numerous actions occurred, and a severe struggle was maintained, without any decided success upon either side. At last, unable to carry the city by direct attack, after severely repulsing a sortie of the garrison, combined with an attack of the army of co-operation, the Chung-wang determined to reduce the city by cutting off its communications, and with this intent organized operations that, judging by their results, proved of the very gravest importance to Manchoo, foreigner, and Ti-ping alike.

Establishing the main body of his army in lines of circumvallation around Hang-chow, a strong division of nearly 50,000 men was detached under the command of the generals Hwang and Fang, with orders to capture all the important cities to the south-east of Hang-chow, and terminate the expedition with the full possession of the seaport Ningpo, one of the treaty ports open to foreign trade.

Dividing into two columns, respectively commanded by the above-mentioned generals, the division pushed rapidly forward, acting under the direct orders of the Shi-wang, who superintended the movement against the enemy's communications, while the Chung-wang himself conducted the siege operations. The columns of Hwang and his colleague Fang, during the month of November, successively captured all the cities to the south and south-east of Hang-chow, while other expeditionary columns detached by the Shi-wang obtained possession of all situate between the possessions of the Ti-pings in the north and north-east, round to the westward, and to the positions occupied by the two subordinate generals; thus completely cutting off every communication of the besieged city. After reducing the departmental and district cities, Shaou-shing, Fung-wha, YÜ-yaou, Yen-chow, Tsze-ke, and many others, and after receiving a deputation from the European residents of Ningpo, who left them highly satisfied, the leaders of the two columns effected a junction of their forces, and, moving upon Ningpo, carried that city by a sudden assault on the 9th of December, 1861. Meanwhile, other divisions, detached from the Chung-wang's army, captured and garrisoned all the southern, western, and eastern departments of the province, so that when, upon the 29th of December, the garrison of Hang-chow succumbed to famine and the determined assault given by the besiegers on that day, the whole of Che-kiang became subject to the Ti-ping Government.

In consequence of these successful operations, the end of the year found the Ti-pings in almost entire possession of the two richest and most densely populated provinces of China, Che-kiang and Kiang-su, while the small portion of Kiang-su yet held by Manchoo authorities was comprised within a radius of thirty miles around Shanghae. Faithfully observing their part of the agreement made with Admiral Hope and his coadjutors, the Ti-pings refrained from any advance upon Shanghae, even although the non-fulfilment by the British authorities of the conditions upon which the said agreement was made fairly released them from its obligations; but directly the "present year" had expired, every other position in the province being already in their hands, troops were moved forward to drive the Manchoos from this their last stronghold in the province.

As has been already observed, the position of the Ti-pings was one which but for the interference of the British Government must undoubtedly have caused the overthrow of the Manchoo Tartar dynasty. They possessed the valuable silk districts, the tea districts of Ngan-whui and Che-kiang, the cotton districts of Kiang-su, and the potteries and porcelain manufacturing districts of Kiang-si, which together constitute the principal sources of revenue in the empire. The repulse of the Ying-wang, and consequent fall of Ngan-king upon the 5th of September, afforded the Imperialists but little compensation for their defeats everywhere else. Ngan-king, completely invested by land and water, and unrelieved by the Ying-wang, after its garrison had endured the most terrible privations, fell into the hands of the besiegers. Three regiments of the garrison, unable to endure the horrors of the famine raging within the doomed city, which had reduced them to cannibalism of the most frightful description, human flesh being eagerly sought at the price of eighty cash per catty[39] and devoured with avidity, surrendered to the Imperialists upon condition of a free pardon, but were massacred to a man, and their headless bodies cast into the Yang-tze. After this the remaining portion of the fighting men came to the usual Chinese arrangement with the besiegers, and leaving the city unmolested, reached the Ti-ping position at Loo-chow. Then came the triumph of the Manchoos, who, entering the city, ruthlessly slaughtered the non-combatant inhabitants: men, women, and children, whose mutilated bodies were borne down towards the sea by the swiftly rushing waters of the great river. I beheld them mangled with every atrocity that fiends could perpetrate, floating down the stream in hundreds, huddled together, while the river steamers, Governor-General and Carthage, surrounded by the ghastly remnants of mortality, became impeded in their movements.

The capture of Hang-chow and the entire of the Che-kiang province concluded the operations of the Ti-pings in 1861. They had now attained a magnificent position; the richest provinces and most important cities of China had become subservient to them, the most valuable sea-coast in the world was partly theirs, their base of operations against the Manchoos could not be surpassed, and it only now remained to capture the commercial city of Shanghae. The whole of the trade of the interior, valuable beyond calculation, was justly theirs,—it had been so since 1860; but yet that city was maintained by British forces as the citadel of the Manchoos, whereby the Ti-pings were defrauded of the export and import duties which belonged to them, but which, in the hands of the Manchoos, not only answered for the "indemnity," but served to obtain for them all munitions of war needed to carry on the struggle. Under these circumstances, the possession of Shanghae became imperatively necessary, and yet such was the chivalrous observance of good faith on their part that they refrained from hostilities until the expiration of the "present year," although long since released from all moral obligations, and prompted by all considerations of self-interest and aggrandisement to subjugate Shanghae without a moment's notice or delay.