Ti-ping Operations.—Chinese Apathy.—The Ti-ping Difficulty.—Popular Feeling.—Opposed to the Ti-pings.—England's Policy.—Her Motives.—Dr. Bridgman describes Ti-pingdom.—His Description of the Ti-pings.—X. Y. Z.—Ti-pingdom in 1857.—Its Internal Economy.—Lord Elgin at Nankin.—Gallant Exploit.—Its Interpretation.—Hung-jin arrives at Nankin.—Hung-jin's Adventures.—Mr. Hamberg's Narrative.—Hung-jin's Pamphlet.—Hung-jin Prime Minister.—Nankin Invested.—Resumption of Hostilities.—"Indemnity" demanded.—Conditions of Peace.—Cause of Wars with China.—England's Foreign Policy.—The Opium Wars. Towards the close of 1854, the detached armies of Ti-pings were gradually compelled to abandon their isolated positions, and retire closer upon their capital. During October, after forwarding all the supplies obtainable to the treasury and granaries of Nankin, the Western armies evacuated the important cities of Wu-chang, Han-yang, and Hankow, and collecting the garrisons of the many others between them and Nankin, retired quickly upon the latter, the siege of which the Imperialists were beginning to press with a vigour encouraged by the weakness of the garrison. This army falling rapidly upon the rear of the enemy's works, put them to flight with great slaughter, and completely raised the siege. After this, another force was marched to the relief of Chin-kiang, which was also invested by a considerable Imperialist army. At the close of the year, both Nankin and Chin-kiang were effectually relieved, and the besieging armies driven back upon the cities of Soo-chow and Shanghae in confusion. With the exception of the Northern army, in occupation of the north side of the Yang-tze from Ngan-king The principal operations were conducted towards the south, in the provinces of Kiang-su, Ngan-whui, and the borders of Che-kiang and Kiang-si, and towards the west, along the old route of the Yang-tze and beyond the Tung-ting lake. Early in 1855 the Western division, successful in all its operations, reached the city of Hankow, and Wu-chang, the provincial capital, was for the third time carried by storm, the Manchoo defenders suffering fearful loss. The Ti-pings now held the three cities for a longer period than before; but, although they obtained numerous recruits, they were unable to occupy the adjoining provinces permanently and rescue them from the Manchoo rule. The people at large, finding the revolution was to a certain extent stationary, naturally waited for some grand and combined movement likely to overthrow the Manchoo rule, and, however much they would have rejoiced at the change, were careful to avoid implicating themselves against the government until the prospect of success became more apparent. The fearful experience of former failures warned the nation to be cautious—in fact, the cautious alone remained in the land of the living, the indiscriminate massacres after the slightest attempt at rebellion having exterminated nearly every noble and patriotic spirit in China. Besides, many who might otherwise have hazarded the venture held back on account of the Ti-ping profession of Christianity (a change of the ancient national train of custom and ideas what they not only looked upon with suspicion, but with actual abhorrence). The hatred of the Manchoo must indeed have been intense—or rather, the hand of God powerful—to overcome the old and jealous The Southern army, breaking into several divisions during 1855, was mostly victorious; many cities were captured, and large supplies of every necessary and war material taken. Partisans were sent into all the southern provinces and many local insurrections stimulated, but all too feeble and desultory to be of any real assistance to the cause; though the prompt and savage punishments inflicted by the Manchoo authorities undoubtedly proved very damaging, the fear they inspired awing the people into submission, and terrifying them from rising in rebellion again. For more than a year the Southern and Western armies maintained their position; but early in 1856 they were again forced to retire upon Nankin, which had become reinvested by the Imperialists. It will thus be seen that, while the Ti-pings were detaching small armies just able to overcome the local Manchoo authorities, the Imperialists, after reinforcing the provincial troops so as to enable them to dispute the ground with varying success, invariably concentrated all their reserves and spare forces before Nankin. Considering that the Imperialists had vastly superior numbers, and, moreover, held the whole of the revenue, and completely surrounded the insurgents upon every side, the greatly superior organization and courage of the Ti-pings is sufficiently proved by the fact that they were able to compete with their more advantageously situated enemy so successfully. In the middle of the year, the Imperialists were attacked by the recalled Ti-ping forces, before the city of Chin-kiang, and were defeated with heavy loss; about the same time, their lines before Nankin were assaulted by another division and completely broken up. In this year an event took place, the consequences of which have proved almost fatal to the Ti-ping revolution. From a period long anterior to the commencement of the It was at such a crisis, the seizure of the opium-smuggling lorcha Arrow afforded a pretext for an appeal to arms; and this furnished all those favourable circumstances, hitherto expected from the Ti-ping movement, by a shorter and more direct road. It was sufficient for a portion of the body mercantile, that they would get their nefarious opium traffic legalized, and their general trade increased; it was sufficient for the body politic that they would be able to place their diplomatic affairs upon a satisfactory standing, and so humble the power of the Chinese government as to be able to do with it whatever they liked, compelling it to conform to their will in every way—and all for nothing, as the Manchoo government would be made pay the expenses England would incur by an aggressive war. The Ti-pings were at once thrown overboard. It mattered not that their cause was righteous and holy; it was no longer profitable to the British trader or his government, and with the usual error of mean selfishness, they took it for granted that the Manchoos would always remain powerless, or else forget to retaliate when they became able, for the gross treatment they had received; neither could they perceive that although delays might interpose before the final success of the Ti-pings, yet that, after a short probation, the willing and unrestricted commerce the latter would encourage, would be more profitable than the unwilling and forced trade the Manchoos were coerced into. Although meanness is generally the result of ignorance, it seems almost a fatality that so large a portion of Englishmen should have acted so wrongfully, and have been so forgetful of their national fair-play. The whole affair speaks too plainly of avarice and incompetent statesmanship. Commander Brine, R.N., in his valuable and fairly-expressed work, "The Taeping Rebellion," at pages 271-2, very truthfully observes:— "The principal reason for the decline of the popularity of the rebellion amongst Europeans may be found in the great change that has occurred in our political relations with the Manchoo government." Again, speaking of the treaty settled after the "lorcha Arrow war," he says:— "Two of its clauses, noted below, not only made the further progress of the Taepings unprofitable, but absolutely made their simple existence most objectionable to all Europeans who hoped to open trade with those provinces lying adjacent to the upper waters of the Yang-tze. When Lord Elgin proceeded to Han-kow, he evidently looked upon them as a mere body of rebels, sooner or later to be suppressed by government, and that they in the interval interfered with the due carrying into execution the terms of his treaty. Consequently he was not inclined to show them much favour." In this perfectly true conclusion is concealed the real motive of the conduct the British Government has pursued towards the Ti-pings. Not only in China, but over the whole world—from Denmark to America, from Abyssinia to Brazil, from New Zealand to Japan,—the policy of England has been derogatory to her dignity, and would be calculated to elicit merely feelings of contempt were it not so dangerous to her future welfare. It seems, however, that the majority of Englishmen are satisfied with a course of administration which advocates "peace at any price," except when war can be undertaken with impunity, and some aggression committed upon a weak neighbour, who is then compelled to pay all the expenses. I, for one, protest against such lowering of England's dignity and "just influence." I protest against the sacrifice of national honour to mercenary interest,—of principle to profit. Commander Brine's opinion has been amply verified—he wrote it early in 1862; since which period England, regardless of all pledges of neutrality, has deliberately It is no less singular than true, that the wars with the Manchoo government in reality weakened it but very little:—in the first place, the British troops were always met by the local forces, none being withdrawn from opposition to the internal danger, which was dreaded much more than any arising from the foreign expeditions;—in the second, the indemnity money being deducted from the increased duties levied upon the foreign trade, instead of impoverishing the Manchoo exchequer, was taken directly from the pockets of the foreign merchants; and although the exchequer was so much less in hand, it could hardly be looked upon as a loss, considering that only one-fifth of the gross customs revenue of the ports open to foreign trade was taken, and that the trade has enlarged amply enough to make the returns, minus the indemnity, more than equal to what they were before the war. Subsequent to the visit of H.M.S. Hermes, and the French steamer Cassini, the next communication between the Ti-pings and Europeans took place a little more than a year later, when the American minister visited Nankin in the U.S. frigate Susquehanna. The few extracts I give from the accounts of the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman, and another writer, X.Y.Z., each members of the expedition, coincide exactly with all opinions ever given of the Ti-pings by credible people who have held personal intercourse with them; and it is a singular, if not a sinister circumstance, that these accounts are all totally different from the dispatches of Sir F. Bruce (British minister at Pekin), and consuls of similar tendencies, who have either never seen the Ti-pings, or at all events know nothing of their government, life, and manners. The following are extracts from the Rev. Dr. Bridgeman:— "1. Their government is a theocracy, the development apparently of what is believed by them to be a new dispensation. As in the case of the Israelites under Moses, they regard themselves as directed by one who has been raised up by the Almighty to be the executor of his will on earth. "5. Their government is administered with remarkable energy. "Far in the distance, hovering over the hill-tops—southward from Chin-kiang-foo, the guardian city of the Great Canal, and northward from Nankin, we saw encamped small bands of the Imperialists, while all the armed multitudes in, and immediately around these two cities, wrought up almost to frenzy, seemed eager to rush forth and take vengeance on them as their deadly foes,—'fat victims,' said they, 'fit only for slaughter.' They exulted as they exhibited to us the scars and the wounds they had received in bloody conflicts with the Manchoo troops, always called by them, 'monster imps.' "6. Their order and discipline are no less remarkable than their energy. Under this new rÉgime, both tobacco and opium are prohibited. "Every kind of strong drink, too, would seem to come into the same category, and if any is used, it is only by special permission." At the city of Wuhu:— "The people had returned:—whole families,—men, women, and children,—were seen in their own houses, merchants in their shops, and market people going and coming with provisions; all most submissive to the officers and police, as they passed along the streets. "It was at their 'holy city,' however, as they frequently called their new capital, that their order and discipline were observed in the greatest perfection. Parts of the city were appropriated exclusively for the uses of the wives and daughters of those men who were abroad, as their armies, or elsewhere employed in the public service. "Everywhere else, as well as in the 'holy city,' extreme watchfulness was observed in the maintenance of order; and all irregularities, and infractions of the laws, were rebuked or punished with a promptitude seldom seen among the Chinese. All persons, without exception, had their appointed places and their appropriate duties assigned, and all moved like clockwork." Their unity of purpose Dr. Bridgeman speaks of as follows:— "There is no community separate from their one body politic; at least none appears, and no traces of any could we find." Of their religion he reported:— "Christians they may be in name; and they are, in very deed, iconoclasts of the strictest order. They have in their possession probably the entire Bible, both the Old and New Testaments; and are publishing what is usually known as 'Gutzlaff's Version' of the same. "Their ideas of the Deity are exceedingly imperfect. Though they declare plainly that there is 'only One True God,' yet the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, Dr. Bridgeman continues:— "Our Saturday we found observed by them as a Sabbath-day; but they appeared not to have any houses for public worship, nor any Christian teachers, ministers of the Gospel so called. Forms of domestic worship, forms of prayer, of thanksgiving, &c. &c., they have; and all their people, even such as cannot read, are required to learn and use these. We saw them repeatedly at their devotions; some of them were exceedingly reverent and devout, while others were quite the reverse. Most, who were asked to do it, promptly recited that form of the Decalogue which is given in their tracts. "A form of baptism was spoken of by them; but no allusion was made by them to the ordinance of the Lord's Supper. "We found them, according to their reformed calendar, discarding the old notions of lucky places, times, &c." Speaking of the public notices seen on the walls, he says:— "The distribution of food, of clothes, and of medicines; the payment of taxes, the preservation of property, the observance of etiquette and decorum; and injunctions to repair to certain quarters for vaccination,—these were among the topics discussed in them. One document announced the names of sundry candidates who had been successful in winning honours at a recent literary examination in the Heavenly capital." Thus, it appears, the "ignorant coolies" were literary coolies. It was late in 1854 when Dr. Bridgeman visited "Their numerical strength, and the extent of territory under their control, are by no means inconsiderable. They said they had undisputed control from Chin-kiang-foo, four hundred miles up the Great River; and that besides the large numbers of troops garrisoned and intrenched about Chin-kiang, Kwa-chow, and the 'Heavenly capital,' they had four armies in the field, carrying on active aggressive operations; two of these had gone northward, one along the Grand Canal, and one farther westward; they were designed to co-operate, and after storming and destroying Pekin, to turn westward and march through Shansi, Shensi, Kians-oo, into Sze-chuen, where they are expected to meet their other two armies, which from Kiang-si and the Lake provinces, are to move up the Great River, and along through the regions on its southern bank. "The personal appearance of their men in arms, and of their women on horseback, was novel. They formed a very heterogeneous mass, having been brought together from several different provinces, principally from Gnang-wui, Keang-si, Hoopeh, Kwang-si, and Kwang-tung. The finest men we saw were from the hills of Kiang-si, and those from Hoonan were the meanest and least warlike. Their arms and accoutrements were quite after the old fashion of the Chinese; but their red and yellow turbans, their long hair, and their silk and satin robes, so unlike the ordinary costume of the 'black-haired' troops, made the insurgents appear like a new race of warriors. All the people we saw were very well clad, well fed, and well provided for in every way. They all seemed content, and in high spirits, as if sure of success." It will be seen that Dr. Bridgeman thought—as every one else did until the arbitrary interference of the British Government—that the "progress, and ultimate success," of the Ti-pings was certain, "under the inscrutable providence of God." The following are extracts from the communication written by X.Y.Z., and published in the North China Herald at that time. "There is no change of policy or of feeling towards foreigners since the visit of the Hermes. On the part of the people the same friendly feeling was manifested that was observed a year ago. "The visit of the Susquehanna has put us in possession of facts which prove that the insurgents have undisturbed control of a large extent of country, so large as to furnish a guarantee to their ultimate success. "The city itself (Nankin) is under strict martial law, and indeed is at present a mere military camp. The most rigid discipline and perfect order are maintained. "In passing through the city, little was seen to distinguish it from other Chinese cities, except that some of the streets are very wide, and appear to be kept in a state of cleanliness not often seen in China. "Whatever Hung-sui-tshuen may mean by calling himself the brother of Jesus, it is but justice to say that no evidence was found of its being insisted on as an essential article of faith among the mass of his followers. And several officers who subsequently visited the steamer, when asked what was meant by it, professed themselves unable to give any information upon the subject. They were so evidently puzzled, that it was plain their attention had never been called to the matter before." Speaking of the composition of the Ti-pings, X.Y.Z. says:— "A few were from Kwang-se. These latter were all young men of unusually fine appearance and more than ordinary intelligence, and they were distinguished by some peculiarities of dress." Of the civil administration he says:— "The expedition reached the city of Wuhu on Thursday morning. Here the most cordial feeling was manifested by the authorities and people. The visit to this place was of great interest, as it afforded an opportunity of learning from personal observation the character of the insurgent rule over the people in districts which are no longer the seat of war. The state of things is entirely different from that at Nankin. The people are engaged in their ordinary avocations, shops are opened and trade carried on, as under the old rÉgime, though the former prosperity of the place is by no means restored." Upon perusing such statements, the British public will doubtless wonder at the nature of the reports which emanated from their government, that "the Ti-pings destroyed everything and restored nothing,"—were "ruthless desolaters," "bloodthirsty marauders," "hordes of banditti," &c. It must, however, be remembered, that the authors of these statements knew nothing about the Ti-pings; in some cases had never seen one, and in all The year 1857 passed over without any important military movement, and the Ti-ping Government was engaged in consolidating its power in the districts and cities it held. The extent of territory and amount of population entirely under their control was very considerable. They held possession of about three-fourths of the large province of Ngan-whui, one-third of Kiang-su, one-third of Kiang-si, and parts of Hoonan and Hoopeh. In Kwang-si, Kwang-tung, Fo-keen, and Yun-nan, Ti-ping agents were actively at work inciting the people to rise. In the meanwhile, the administration of their territory was being perfected;—the title "Wang" was reduced into a sort of feudal rank, into which all governors of cities, lieutenant-governors, and governors of provinces, and generalissimos, were admitted. The whole of their land was divided into departments, or circles, each department into four districts, and each district into twenty-five parishes. After the governors of departments, or provinces, came the district chiefs, or magistrates; then the parish magistrates; and then the five village magistrates, or authorities, appointed over each circle of twenty-five families. The Ti-ping territory included at this period not less than 70,000 square miles, with a population of about 25,000,000. At parts where the Manchoo troops had been driven out of the country, a regular system of monthly taxation was established, considerably more moderate than the old. A tariff for the whole empire was published; while throughout all their cities, the machinery of a regular government was constituted, and the whole conducted with considerable energy and success. The "Land Regulations of Political Economy of the Ti-ping Dynasty" were put into force, and a large "As soon as harvest arrives, every vexillary must see to it, that the five-and-twenty parishes under his charge have a sufficient supply of food; and what is over and above of the new grain he must deposit in the public granary. This must be done with respect to wheat, pulse, flax, hemp, silk cloth, fowls, and money; for the whole empire is the universal property of our Heavenly Father, and when all the people of the empire avoid selfishness, and consecrate everything to the Supreme Lord, then the sovereign will have sufficient to use, and all the families in the empire, in every place, will be equally provided for, while every individual will be well fed and clothed." From this system, and the vice-royalty of the governors, or wangs, the Ti-ping government assumed a patriarchal feudal constitution. The following regular conscription was levied:— "If any man throughout the empire has a family, including wife and children, amounting to three, four, five, six, seven, eight, or nine individuals, he must give up one to be a soldier. With regard to the rest, the widowers, widows, orphans, and childless, together with the sick and feeble, shall be excused from service, and shall all be fed from the public granary." Religious observances were thus enjoined, in a manner which evinces a spirit far different from that which the world was led to suppose actuated the Ti-pings:— "In every circle of five-and-twenty families, the youths must every day go to the church, where the vexillary is to teach them to read the holy books of the Old and New Testaments, as well as the proclamations of the During 1858 the Ti-pings continued their work of organization, and undertook no military movement of importance. In consequence of so large a concentration of their forces, supplies began to run short, and the city of Chin-kiang was promptly abandoned, and a considerable force detached into the province of Kiang-si. They still retained possession of both banks of the Yang-tze for a distance of about 400 miles, and large reinforcements were sent from Nankin to all their possessions upon the northern side of that river. In the meanwhile, Canton had been taken by the English and French forces, the Taku forts had been captured on the 20th of May, and on the 3rd of July the Elgin treaty was concluded; a treaty that in all respects proved nearly the death-warrant of the patriots. On the 8th of November, Lord Elgin started from Shanghae upon the expedition up the Yang-tze-kiang as far as Hankow. On approaching Nankin, the squadron came into collision with the Ti-pings in a similar, though more serious manner, than on the occasion of the visit of the Hermes. Lord Elgin, with the characteristic arrogance of Englishmen in foreign lands, disregarded the frequently repeated and urgent request of the Ti-ping authorities; namely, that to avoid misunderstandings as to men-of-war approaching their fortifications during a time of battle and The Church Missionary Intelligencer of December, 1860, gives the following account of the transaction:— "In the latter end of 1858, a British squadron, with Lord Elgin, passed up the river as far as Hankow, not without exchanging shots, on more than one occasion, with the Tai-pings, and a consequent loss of life was caused, which, by due precautions, might have been avoided. On approaching The first act of the wolf and lamb drama was thus performed, and "those outlaws," the Ti-pings, who might possibly "interfere with the carrying into due effect the terms of his treaty," were reported to head-quarters, as not only having insulted and fired upon the British ensign, but having actually violated a flag of truce—but it was not reported that said flag of truce was unknown to the Ti-pings, and therefore could not be recognized. The affair is thus reported by Secretary Wade:— "My orders were to inform the rebels that we took no part (?) in the civil war, and interfered with no one who did not molest us. (?) That a gun-boat had been detached from the squadron before it passed Nankin, for the express purpose of explaining the object of our expedition had the rebels desired to ask it; that they had fired eight shots at the little vessel so detached without a single shot being returned by her; that the forts which had so fired had been made an example of, and that the fact, together with the lesson they had themselves received, might satisfy them of the absurdity of provoking our men-of-war to hostility." At the time the expedition passed Nankin it was The earlier half of 1859 was unmarked by any important military movement upon the part of the Ti-pings. The most interesting event of this period was the arrival of the Tien-wang's relative, Hung-jin, at Nankin, after many fruitless attempts to reach that place. It will be remembered that upon the capture of the first city in Kwang-si, Hung-sui-tshuen had sent messengers into Kwang-tung calling all his and Fung-yun-san's remaining friends and relatives to join his standard. Before this could be effected he was compelled to abandon the position. Hung-jin, in the meanwhile, had started upon the journey with some fifty friends of the two chiefs. Upon approaching the neighbourhood of the place appointed to effect a junction, they ascertained that the "God Worshippers" had raised their camp and marched away, and that the Manchoo authorities were seizing and cruelly murdering every one connected with them. Hung-jin now sent back into Kwang-tung all his friends, excepting three, who, with him, made their way deeper into the country, and endeavoured to join the army of "God-worshippers." The Mandarins were, however, so strictly upon the watch for all travellers or suspected persons, that he found himself under the necessity of abandoning his attempt and returning home. Upon reaching the Hwa-hien district, Hung-jin found that from henceforth home to him was but a name. The Manchoo butchers were already in his Hung-jin with about a dozen friends arrived at Paddy-hill just after the defeat, being totally ignorant of the disaster. He and his companions were seized by the people of the neighbourhood and imprisoned in a house, previously to being delivered up to the Mandarins. As the Rev. Mr. Hamberg's narrative states:— "Hung-jin, lively and enthusiastic, desirous to lead his friends to honour and to glory, now sat down in the midst of them in deep sorrow and despair, and would gladly have given his own life to save those whom he "Hung-jin, whose liveliest hopes had been so suddenly frustrated, who had drawn upon himself the hatred and revenge of so many involved in the present disaster, and who had no place of refuge left to himself, now felt his own guilt and despair too hard to bear. He therefore unloosed his girdle and was going to strangle himself, when one of the fugitives came up to him. Hung said, 'Try to escape and save your life, I will put an end to my existence in this place.' The other then seized his hand and drew him forward, exhorting him to continue his flight in company with him, which he did. The next day, when Hung awoke from a short rest in the bush, he missed his companion. He now prayed to God, the Heavenly Father, to spare his life and protect him amidst so many dangers. During the daytime he lay concealed in the bush, and during the night-time he went on. Once the people in search of fugitives passed very close to him without observing him. Finally, after having passed four days and four nights in the mountains without any food, he arrived at the house of some near relatives in a very exhausted state. Here he was concealed six days in a mountain cavern, and afterwards his relatives gave him some money, with which he went on board a passage-boat to go to another district, and seek refuge with more distant relatives of the Hung clan. But even among these, new trials awaited him; for also from their place a few of the Hung clan had gone to Paddy-hill, whose further fate was unknown. Some of the relatives of those missing were now inclined to revenge the supposed death of their brethren, and deliver Hung-jin to the Mandarins, but an old venerable headman took him under his protection, and gave one of his grandsons to Hung-jin as a guide, and this young man, being a Christian convert, conducted him to Hong-kong in the end of April, 1852, and introduced him to me. I was astonished to hear a person from the interior of China speak with such interest of, and display so much acquaintance with, the Christian religion. I liked to listen to his animated narratives about Hung-sui-tshuen, Fung-yun-san, and their followers, though at the time I could form no clear conception of the whole matter, which then was little known and still less believed. He wrote a few sheets of paper, containing a short account of himself and Hung-sui-tshuen, which I put into my desk, until I should have further evidence as to their contents. I expected that Hung-jin, who wished to study the Christian doctrine and be baptized, would remain for some time at Hong-kong; but upon my return from a tour on the mainland he had departed, as he had no means of support in that place. In November, 1853, Hung-jin, who up Early in 1854, with the funds from the sale of his little work, which Mr. Hamberg kindly gave him, Hung-jin embarked for Shanghae, en route for Nankin; he also carried with him a number of religious books. After remaining at Shanghae several months, during which he was neither able to reach Nankin nor communicate with his friends, he returned to Hong-kong. In the mean time Mr. Hamberg had died, and Hung-jin was received by members of the London Mission Society, and by them employed as a catechist and preacher during the years 1855 to 1858. In the Missionary Magazine he was soon after spoken of thus:— "He soon established himself in the confidence and esteem of the members of the mission, and the Chinese Christians connected with it. His literary attainments were respectable; his temper amiable and genial; his mind was characterized by a versatility unusual in a Chinese. His knowledge of Christian doctrine was largely increased, and of the sincerity of his attachment to it there could be no doubt." Similar opinions were entertained by many devout and earnest missionaries who were intimately acquainted with Hung-jin for a period extending over six years; but Mr. Frederick Bruce, the British minister at Pekin (who never saw Hung-jin, or, I believe, any other Ti-ping in his life), true to the policy of his employers, thus writes from amidst his Manchoo friends at Shanghae:— Dispatch to Lord Russell. "Shanghae, September 4th, 1860. "Hung-jin has sent to the missionaries in manuscript a pamphlet which has made a considerable impression upon them. I see no guarantee It may naturally be asked, What has this to do with England's policy towards China, and why should it affect the honourable neutrality she was pledged to maintain? The answer simply is—a misrepresentation of the acts and intentions of the Ti-pings might afford some colour of justification for a line of policy which could not be defended. The Bruce dispatch further states:— "But as the chief (Hung-sui-tshuen) is an ignorant fanatic, if not an impostor," &c. We thus find this representative of the British Government not only volunteering his unsupported opinion against a weighty mass of evidence as to the religion, education, and acquirements of the chief, but actually constituting the same tribunal as the sole judge of a solemn question which must rest alone between Hung-sui-tshuen and his Creator. About the middle of 1858, Hung-jin once more determined to try and join his relative, the Tien-wang, and with this intent started in disguise, and gradually made his way (by land) into the province of Hoopeh. In December of the same year, while Lord Elgin's expedition was at Hankow, he was heard from at a small town in the neighbourhood; in fact, he managed to put on board one of the vessels a letter for Mr. Chalmers, his teacher at Hong-kong. In the spring of 1859, he at last reached Nankin, and soon after was appointed to the high rank of Kan-wang (i.e., Shield Prince), in which position, and his subsequent one of Prime Minister, he became familiar to Europeans. A letter which he wrote to the Rev. Mr. Edkins, nearly a year later, contained the following passage relating to the Tien-wang: "On meeting with his relative, the Celestial king, and having daily conversations with him, he was struck by the wisdom and depth of his teaching, far transcending that of common men." Hung-jin—or rather the Kan-wang, as we must call him in future—joined his friends at a troublous time, more than usually so even to a man who, like him, had lived the prime of his life in difficulties and danger. Within a few months after his arrival at Nankin, that city was closely invested by a large and overpowering Imperialist army. Although since 1853, Nankin had frequently been in a state of siege, upon no previous occasion had it been so hardly pressed. Towards the close of 1859, the besieging forces were increased from 50,000 to upwards of 100,000 fighting men, all supplies were cut off from the city, and the Imperialists flattered themselves that a short time would see the garrison starved out. Darkly, though, closed that year around the Ti-ping capital—surrounded as it was by savage foemen, thirsting for the blood of its starving inhabitants—a danger, still more deadly, and more bitter, was looming in the distance, although at the time impalpable and scarcely conceived. It was a danger menacing the patriots from civilized and Christian men, men who, in other lands, have given their blood and treasure to causes far less deserving of their sympathy; in short, it was the creation of the "China indemnity" extortion. Evil as the effect of the Elgin treaty concluded in 1858 must have been to the Ti-pings, it is yet possible that the successes they shortly attained might have counteracted the prejudices so unjustly excited against them; but when to this was added the question of indemnity, the Ti-pings were doomed. It is probable that had they remained quiescent until such time as the love of gold was satisfied, they might then have been uninterfered with; unfortunately it was otherwise, a rapid series of victories threatened destruction to the Manchoo dynasty, and with it, of course, to the "China indemnity;" consequently, if the expenses of this "little war" were to In June, 1859, the British plenipotentiary, not satisfied with the route vi Peh-tang, as proposed and decided upon by the Chinese authorities for his passage to Pekin, had the coolness to choose his own path, and when the mandarins naturally resisted such arrogance, to endeavour to force it at the cannon's mouth. What would Englishmen think, and do, if a Chinese fleet carrying an ambassador were to arrive in England, and, refusing to land their ambassador according to our customs, advance their fleet past all our fortifications without paying them the slightest respect? This would be a very similar case to the Taku fort disaster; and, moreover, it must be borne in mind that the affair took place just after peace had been concluded, which must have given it the complexion of a resumption of hostilities rather than that of a peaceful embassy. The excuse generally made for this sort of thing is, that it is impossible to deal with semi-civilized nations as you would with civilized ones, that is to say, the civilized nation is to descend to the level of the semi-civilized one. This reasoning, illogical and dishonourable at all times, is in this case totally inadmissible, for it is at the least doubtful whether any cause for an appeal to arms existed. It appears, however, that elasticity of principle and inconsistency in action may be regarded as the important elements in the policy of England—can it be better illustrated than by her conduct to Germany and Denmark, to America and Brazil, to Russia and China? Admiral Hope, a useful man to such a ministry, to use a nautical simile, "went stem on like a Nor'-west buffalo" to the Taku forts, and sacrificed a number of brave men needlessly. This led to the resumption of hostilities, and we find Lord John Russell writing upon November 18th, 1859, to Mr. Bruce:— "Unless, therefore, the most ample apology should be promptly made By altering a few words, how like the ultimatum of a highwayman this would read. Lord John Russell evidently did all he could to justify the anecdote of Alexander the Great and the robber. The Chinese indemnity plot thickened rapidly. Lord Russell's next dispatch to Mr. Bruce, dated January 3rd, 1860, contained the following:— "We go to seek redress for these wrongs" (the resistance offered by the Manchoo troops to the destruction of their barriers, defences, &c., at the Taku forts, by Admiral Hope), "and to require that the word of the emperor should be observed, and that an indemnity should be paid for the loss of men" (killed trying to kill the Chinese troops who very correctly opposed their unjustifiable attempt to force the fortified entrance of the Pei-ho river), "and the heavy expense of obtaining redress" (for their own fault). Lord John Russell arrived at the superlative degree of the "China indemnity" upon February 8th, 1860, when he penned the following to Mr. Bruce:— "It has been decided between her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French that the amount of indemnity-money to be demanded of the Chinese Government shall be in each case a sum of 60,000,000 francs," "towards the expense of the joint expedition now on its way to the China seas." Here was decisive action following promptly upon threats and intimidation; who can say but that the finale to the Danish question might have been different had the Foreign Secretary possessed equal facilities for arranging the indemnity to be paid by Germany? Upon the part of the British representatives it is denied that the Chinese Government proposed Peh-tang as the route our plenipotentiary should proceed by to Pekin; it is, however, admitted in the blue book upon affairs in "They" (the Imperial Chinese commissioners) "would wish that on his arrival at the mouth of the river he would anchor his vessels of war outside the bar." As this was disregarded by Mr. Bruce, it may naturally be inferred that the request so constantly reiterated throughout the Chinese dispatches, "that he (Mr. Bruce) must go by way of Peh-tang," was really made, but was treated by the British plenipotentiary with the same contempt and want of courtesy. The instructions given to Lord Elgin upon his second embassy to China were issued from the Foreign Office, April 17th, 1860; the conditions of peace to be offered to China were:— "First. An apology for the attack on the allied forces at the Pei-ho" (i.e. the Chinese Government must apologize for defending itself). "Secondly. The ratification and execution of the treaty of Tien-tsin" (a treaty extorted from the Chinese when under compulsion, the terms of which would probably not have been really evaded). "Thirdly. The payment of an indemnity to the allies for the expense of naval and military preparations." (No wonder the Chinese ministers wrote "then the demand for indemnity is yet more against propriety. Were China to demand repayment of England, England would find that her expenses did not amount to one half of those of China.") Most undoubtedly previous to the Arrow war the position of Europeans in China was very unsatisfactory; but it is quite as certain that this resulted as much from our aggressive and lawless proceedings, as from the natural aversion of the Manchoo government for our intercourse. From beginning to end, the whole history of the British connection with China is discreditable. However just may have been the cause of complaint, it is beyond all doubt that mean and disgraceful subterfuges have been adopted as the casus belli for each campaign undertaken "In agreement with a treaty signed by British merchants, Captain Elliott, her Majesty's superintendent of trade, caused 20,283 chests of opium to be delivered to Commissioner Lin. The opium was destroyed by order of the emperor. The conditions for terminating the war were, that China should pay £1,200,000 for the opium; £3,000,000, which amounts to £1,000 per head, for the destruction of 30,000 of her unoffending subjects, and bear the expense of her own defence!" The last war, which commenced in 1856, and was ultimately concluded by the ratification of the treaty of 1858, by Lord Elgin in 1860, was equally iniquitous with the first, and in the same manner was originated by the detestable opium smuggling, the seizure of the opium smuggler Arrow being made the pretext for hostilities. Whatever may hereafter be alleged, at the present time but few can be found to deny the fact, that the wars with China have always been waged to force the opium trade, and that by the last one the legalization of that vile traffic was compelled. Not without reason did the Manchoo great council of state use the following passages in their dispatch to Commissioner Ho, who was at Shanghae endeavouring to settle pacifically the Taku affair, and the ratification of the treaty of Tien-tsin, previous to the resumption of hostilities:— "To come to the British minister's request to be properly (or courteously) received when he comes north to exchange treaties, if his intention be indeed peace (or friendly), he will (or let him) leave it to the commissioner to think over all details whatsoever of treaty arrangements in which management (adjustment, compromise) may with propriety be effected; and negotiations being set on foot at Shanghae, when both parties are perfectly agreed, let him come north without a fleet, and with a small retinue, and wait at Peh-tang, for the exchange of the treaties; in which case China will certainly not take him to task for what is past." Referring to his former attempt to force his passage past the Taku forts, when Admiral Hope was repulsed, "But if he be determined to bring up a number of vessels of war, and if he persist in proceeding by way of Takoo, this will show that his real purpose is not the exchange of treaties, and it must be left to the high officer in charge of the coast (or port) defences to take such steps as shall be essential" (lit. as shall accord with right). This proposition, of course, was not entertained by Mr. Bruce or Lord Elgin, who proceeded to act upon Lord Russell's instructions—"for the joint occupation of Chusan, or some other portion of the Chinese territory, in addition to the city of Canton, by the British and French forces till the indemnity is paid." So to obtain "material guarantees" for this indemnity, the civilized nations proceeded to batter the semi-civilized one into compliance, and the allied forces started upon the Pekin campaign. However wrong the Manchoos may have been, it cannot be denied that the British modus operandi in China has been equally bad; and whatever right there may be on the civilized side, it would be difficult to read the correspondence between the two governments and not admit that the semi-civilized one has the best of the argument. Commerce is a great and important element in the prosperity and civilization of every nation, and especially so to England; but there is something greater and more noble than commerce—that is, honour. The advantages of trade, to be permanent and beneficial, must be conducted honourably, and that is exactly what the Government of Great Britain has been unable to do. All over the world its foreign policy, and its attempts to force trade where it can be done with impunity, have not only lowered the "just influence" of England and brought her into contempt, but, in many cases, have created a burning resentment in the breasts of those who have been FOOTNOTES:"While the imperial titles are raised by only one space, it is interesting to observe that in their list of authorized books (published as a preface to each volume), with the imprimatur of Tae-ping-wang, the words 'Old' and 'New Testament' each receive an elevation of three spaces in the enumeration, whereas Tae-ping-wang's name, even when forming a portion of the title of books of their own original composition, is only raised by one space. This seems to be a plain recognition of the paramount divine authority of the Holy Scriptures as God's Book, above books of human authorship, and suggests the hope that where so vital an element of essential truth is present, errors will be rectified and defects expurgated, by the general circulation and perusal of the Word of God, as the best and surest corrective of imperfect views on the more mysterious doctrines of the Gospel. The portions of the Holy Scriptures which they have already published, exceed in quantity of contents all the other books which are of their own composition added together. In the books recently brought from Nankin, there is an impression in red ink, from a large moveable die or stamp, with the two characters, Che Chun—'the Imperial Will permits'—surrounded by the usual imperial symbols. This imprimatur is stamped upon the first page of the text in every book. With such a fact as this before us, every unprejudiced mind will perceive that there is a new era of hope for the Chinese empire." "It has been customary in native compositions, whenever the Chinese names or titles of the Emperor occur, to commence a new column, as a mark of honour, and to place the imperial name higher in the page by the space of two Chinese words. The name of the Supreme Being is similarly honoured, but has the distinction of being raised three spaces in the page. An interesting modification of this usage is perceptible in the imperial proclamations and manifestoes of Tae-ping-wang. The name of Almighty God the Father is elevated three spaces; that of Jesus Christ is raised two spaces; and the imperial name and titles of Tae-ping-wang himself are lowered one degree from the customary position, and receive the elevation of only one space. As minds are differently biassed, this fact will be differently judged. To us, however, it appears an indication that the insurgent leaders, although viewing Jesus Christ as inferior to the Father as touching his humanity, recognize his superiority to the most exalted of earthly potentates as touching his divinity." The unmistakable interpretation to place upon this, is,—no Chinese mind could possibly place the Son upon a perfect equality with the Father,—their entire system of thought and education debars this from their comprehension; but with a reverence beyond all praise, the Tien-wang actually lowered his own position to avoid trespassing upon the divine attributes of his Saviour: which he has thus expressed in the verse of the "Ode for Youth":— "REVERENCE TO JESUS Jesus, His first-born son, Was in former times sent by God; He willingly gave His life to redeem us from sin. Of a truth His merits are pre-eminent. His cross was hard to bear, The sorrowing clouds obscured the sun; The adorable Son, the honoured of Heaven, Died for you, children of men. After His resurrection He ascended to heaven, Resplendent in glory, He wields authority supreme. In Him we know that we may trust, To secure salvation and ascend to heaven." Such are the sentiments of a man, who, besides his voluminous religious compositions, has written the history of China; corrected her classics: written innumerable works upon civil administration and foreign arts and sciences, and who has nevertheless been designated in England as an "ignorant impostor and coolie." The British public must indeed have been "green and greasy" (as Sir James Brooke once observed) to take in all the secretary and under-secretary's reports, and swallow the bullock, horns and all. |