Augustus F. Lindley

Fall of Nankin.—Manchoo Cowardice.—Immense Booty.—Sir George Bonham's Arrival at Nankin.—"The Northern Prince."—The Ti-pings fraternize.—Sir George Bonham's Dispatch.—The Ti-ping Reply.—Further Communication.—Its Friendly Nature.—Ti-ping Literature.—Its Religious Character.—Bishop of Victoria and Dr. Medhurst's Opinions.—Ti-ping Publications.—The New Testament.—Monarchy Established.—Occupation of Nankin.—A Fatal Mistake.—Imperialist Advantages.—Advance of the Ti-pings.—Manchoo Operations.—The Tsing-hae Army.—The Retreat.—Tien-wang's Mistake.—His Opportunity Lost.—Manchoo Tactics.—Imperialist Outrages.—Ti-ping Moderation.—The Triad Rebels.—They Evacuate Amoy.—Captain Fishbourne's Description.—Triads Capture Shanghae.—Imperialist Aggressions.—Jesuits' Interference.—The French attack the Triads.—Shanghae Evacuated.—British Interference.—Its Consequences.

Upon the 19th of March, 1853, after a short siege of only eleven days, Nankin, the ancient capital of China, fell into the hands of the Ti-pings. Considering the importance of the city, and the strong garrison it contained, its capture was effected very easily. It was attacked from the river, upon the northern side, and while one division sprang a mine under the north-east angle of the wall, another blew down the I-Fung gate, both storming together and carrying the city with but little resistance. The Chinese troops in garrison are stated to have numbered about 15,000, though, considering the unusually large proportion of Tartar troops, it is probable their strength must have been greater. They made scarcely a show of opposition to the stormers, many taking to flight and escaping through the south and west gates, or surrendering and joining the Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops of the Eight Banners are estimated to have mustered at least 8,000, and including their families, not less than 20,000. Yet these men, who had already, in the wars with Great Britain, shown they could fight well and bravely, and who were now in a position to offer a stubborn defence, were killed with hardly an effort to defend themselves. It might naturally have been expected that, for the honour of their nation, for their emperor, for their wives' and their children's, and their own lives, in fact, for everything dear to them, they would at least have made a determined resistance. They well knew from the insurgents' proclamations, and their previous acts, that they would meet with little mercy, but seemed to have been completely paralyzed, and neither able to fight nor flee, throwing themselves on the ground before the victorious Ti-pings and crying "Oh Prince, Prince, spare us! spare us!"

Two days after the capture of Nankin, the Tien-wang announced by proclamation that he had established his court and seat of government there.

It is believed the Ti-pings were materially assisted in the capture of the city by confederates within the walls, who lighted signal fires and created confusion; while the fact of their finding confederates everywhere, even in the Imperialist camps, to post their proclamations with impunity, proves the wide-spread popularity of the movement at that time. With remarkable celerity, within twelve days after the capture of Nankin, the principal adjoining cities were taken and garrisoned. Chin-kiang, Yang-chow, and Kwa-chow fell into the hands of the Ti-pings without opposition, the garrisons having fled with precipitation on their approach.

The capture of these important cities was even of more moment than that of Nankin; for Chin-kiang being situated at the southern entrance of the Grand Canal into the Yang-tze, and Kwa-chow at the northern, gave them entire command of the canal itself, the great medium of communication between the southern provinces and the capital, and the route by which all the grain supplies were conveyed to the north. Immense booty was captured at these places, and conveyed to Nankin. At the latter city the military chest that fell into their hands alone contained about £120,000 sterling; while the stores of rice and provisions were enormous. At Kwa-chow they captured more than a thousand junks laden with tribute grain on its way to Pekin by the Grand Canal.

The singular panic of the Manchoos was probably caused by their fear of a retributive Providence having overtaken them for the indiscriminate slaughter of the Chinese by their ancestors; for in no other way is it easy to account for the helplessness with which they resigned themselves to their fate at Nankin.

The Chinese people at this time seemed to look upon the success of the rebellion as certain. Distant cities commenced to send tribute to the Tien-wang, and a deputation from Hang-chow was directed by the Ti-ping authorities to return, as they were not in want of money, and did not wish the people of Hang-chow to become compromised; thus displaying a praiseworthy consideration for their countrymen, whose fate they well knew would be sealed if they fell into the power of the Manchoos after offering allegiance to themselves.

Exaggerated reports of the Ti-ping successes had reached Shanghae, and it was rumoured they were on the point of attacking that city. In consequence of this, and to undeceive the Ti-pings with regard to the Manchoo proclamations which were diligently circulated, stating the foreign "barbarians" were about to send their war ships against the insurgents at Nankin, Sir George Bonham, H.M.'s plenipotentiary in China, decided to pay a visit to Nankin, partly to explain the British intention of perfect neutrality, and partly to ascertain the extent, creed, and objects of the revolutionists.

Before leaving Shanghae a meeting was held at the British Consulate, to consider the course of policy to be adopted in the event of an attack by the insurgents. Captain Fishbourne, R.N., senior naval officer upon the station, reports:—

"The question was raised as to whether we should undertake the defence of the city. Sir George Bonham, however, decided that it was incompatible with the line of policy he had determined on."

It is only a pity that later British representatives have not been influenced by a similar sense of justice.

With these views Sir George Bonham embarked on board H.M.S. Hermes, and started for Nankin on the 22nd of April, 1853. The first appearance of the Ti-pings is thus described by the commander of the ship:—

Upon the arrival of the Hermes at Nankin, she anchored outside gun-shot from the batteries, in order to avoid misunderstandings, she having been fired upon at Chin-kiang by the Ti-ping forts, when she was followed closely by an Imperialist flotilla, which took advantage of her proximity to lead the Ti-pings to believe that she was one of the foreign vessels of war they had stated in many proclamations were engaged to assist them. Mr. Meadows, of the consular service, accompanied by Lieutenant Spratt, proceeded on shore for the purpose of negotiating a meeting between Sir George Bonham and the chief authorities at Nankin.

Mr. Meadows was received in the northern suburb of Nankin by the Northern Prince, and the Tien-wang's brother, the Assistant Prince. In his report of the communication with these two chiefs, he says:—

Captain Fishbourne, of the Hermes, says:—

A slight misunderstanding having occurred with regard to the unceremonious style in which the Ti-ping chiefs replied to the first letter sent to them immediately upon the arrival of the Hermes, Lae, a secretary of state, proceeded on board to arrange matters for Sir George Bonham's reception. This was settled to take place the next day; but he, apprehending difficulties in the way of ceremonial might perhaps interfere with the good feeling then existing, sent an excuse, accompanied by the following dispatch, which was delivered by Captain Fishbourne and Mr. Meadows:—

After stating the position of the British nation with regard to the Manchoo government, the existence of the treaty and trading regulations, &c., the dispatch goes on to say:—

Again the dispatch states:—

This guarantee of neutrality would have effected much good, and avoided much evil, had it been acted up to; but unfortunately such was not the case—it did not suit the policy of England to act on that occasion in the same manner as when the Confederate steam rams were seized in the Mersey.

Sir George Bonham's dispatch was carried ashore by Captain Fishbourne, who was received by several chiefs, whom he thus describes:[17]—

The following dispatch is the reply of the Ti-ping chiefs to Sir George Bonham's:—

With a faithfulness above all praise, the Ti-pings have never broken their promises, and although the British government have thought fit to repudiate theirs, still, with an integrity really wonderful, the Ti-pings, although they might fairly have done so, have never retaliated. Had ministers of enlightened mind, or even ministers of honour, taken advantage of that clause of the Ti-pings' line of conduct—and which in spite of the British hostilities has remained unaltered—to go "out or in, backwards or forwards," how great a result would have been attained for themselves, and how glorious a future of freedom and Christianity for the Chinese!

Sir George Bonham, it appears, took umbrage at some imaginative want of respect in the dispatch of the Ti-ping chiefs; still, the following extracts from a communication received from Lo-thai-kang, commander of Ti-ping forces at Chin-kiang, the Triad chief who joined the society of "God-worshippers" in Kwang-si, should have appeased his indignation:—

It is utterly impossible that anything could have been more satisfactory than this first communication with the Ti-pings. Not only were all their documents couched in the most friendly manner, affording a striking and total contrast to those of the Manchoo; but in practice as well as theory their conduct was excellent. They substituted for the old and insulting epithets, "barbarian" and "foreign devil," hitherto applied to all Europeans, the kindlier appellation of "foreign brethren;" while instead of assuming the repellant and exclusive manner of the Imperialists, they evinced the warmest friendliness and most candid demeanour. So pleasing was their conduct generally, that all persons having communication with them were unanimous in expressing their favourable impressions. Captain Fishbourne, describing his visit in the Hermes, says:—

The Hermes brought away from Nankin the following books, which were published and circulated amongst the Ti-pings, viz.:—

These furnished abundant proofs of the Christianity of the whole movement. Errors, and some very grave, undoubtedly existed; but although these have been sometimes animadverted upon in unmeasured terms, the grand truth that the Ti-pings admitted and recognized the principal points of the Christian faith, remained. Yet some persons seemed to imagine the insurrection totally unworthy of Christian sympathy and consideration, because their tenets of belief were not perfect; forgetting that everything must have a commencement, and forgetting the universally imperfect commencement of Christianity, even from the time of the Apostles. Those who have made the religious error of the Ti-pings an argument against them are not worthy of the smallest attention; for, although they have been forward enough to declaim against the struggling Christians, they have been altogether backward in the slightest attempt to teach them better. Their own Christianity is scarcely so faultless that they can afford to consign tens of thousands of professing, though ignorant, Christians, to destruction; and were they ever so correct themselves, still less should they be guilty of so unchristian an act.

The earnestness with which the Ti-ping government endeavoured to promulgate the saving Word of God, is illustrated by the fact, that then, and ever since, they circulated the Scriptures and all religious publications entirely free of charge, a circumstance unparalleled in the history of the world. Captain Fishbourne reports:—

This singular mode of proceeding seems to imply that even at that early period they recognized the truth of the Divine promise, "My word shall not return unto me void," and with a holy simplicity were acting in full confidence as to the results.

The Bishop of Victoria, in his estimate of the books of the Ti-pings, has used the following language:—

The following are the Rev. Dr. Medhurst's opinions of the same publications. Of one hymn in particular, from "The Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty," he says:—

Of "The Book of Religious Precepts of the Ti-ping Dynasty," he further says:—

Although the above reports are very favourable as to the Ti-pings' religion, still, upon many vital points they were undoubtedly defective; but to qualify their shortcomings they subsequently published the Bible in its full integrity, Old and New Testaments inclusive, copies of which, with the Tien-wang's Imperial seal, are in possession of several gentlemen in England.[22] Therefore, to denounce the Ti-ping movement as evil and anti-Christian, because there exist some errors of belief, is not only most unjustifiable, but even implies that a person using such an argument doubts the promised efficacy and result of God's Word.

The information gathered up to this time upon the religion of the Ti-pings is particularly interesting and satisfactory; and if all Christian men did not feel disposed to help them, they at least ought not to have interfered against them; yet such was not the case, for even at that early period many misnamed Christians, without in the least personally knowing anything of the movement, very loudly decried it. Wrongful as this may seem, it only forms a part of the great psychological problem—why it is that the minds of men will always, by a vast majority, follow wrong instead of right?

The opposition the Ti-ping rebellion has met with from those whose profession of Christianity should have made them its friends, can excite no wonder; for, throughout the history of the world, has truth, freedom, or Christianity, ever become manifest otherwise than through a dismal vista of disbelief and bloodshed? It is a sad reflection, and a proof of our frail, if not vile, mortality!

Some few months after the visit of the Hermes, the French war steamer Cassini proceeded to Nankin; she brought to Shanghae a reprint of the remainder of Genesis, of Exodus, and a portion of the New Testament, consisting of St. Matthew's Gospel, printed from the version of the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff.

This is the first account we have of the New Testament being seen amongst the Ti-pings, although in some of their previous proclamations it had been referred to: it proves the progress they were making; for many of their errors were to be attributed to the fact that their belief was grounded almost entirely upon the Old Testament. The Ti-pings have been sadly abused for polygamy, &c., although I do not remember that such facts have been made a casus belli against the Imperialists; but it must be remembered that as their laws were framed and already constituted when the New Testament first came into their hands, everything required to be altered; therefore people should recall the maxim of Bacon, "that nature should be imitated by politicians, in the gradual character of her changes," and have the justice to admit, that Hung-sui-tshuen, having made his laws as to marriage, &c., could not possibly either overturn them at once, or see any reason to do so until the truth either gradually dawned upon him, or was inculcated by some of the many missionaries who overspread China. It seems very remarkable that none of them ever entertained this idea, excepting the American, Mr. Roberts, who turned it to no advantage.

In the meanwhile, the possession of Nankin entirely altered the tactics of the Tien-wang. Instead of continuing his rapid and triumphant march, overcoming the Manchoos almost by the terror caused by the advance of his forces, he settled down at what he had decided should become the capital of his new empire; gathering together his followers in and about Nankin and the neighbouring cities. For a month or two the whole Ti-ping forces were busily engaged drilling, and fortifying the cities they retained. During the same period, the Tien-wang and his chiefs were employed constituting a regular government, with its attendant courts and tribunals.

The government instituted was monarchical, Hung-sui-tshuen (the Tien-wang) being the monarch; the other chiefs, titled Wang, bearing the same relation to him as royal princes, that E-ching-wang, the Prince of Kung, and the Soong-wang (one of the late Manchoo emperor's uncles) do to the Manchoo dynasty.

The five principal leaders, besides their rank of Prince, constituted both the Privy Council and Ministry. Six boards were formed, similar to those of Pekin, with an additional one for Foreign Affairs. Yang, the Eastern Prince, was appointed Prime Minister; Wei, the Northern Prince, President of the Board of War; Fung, the Southern Prince, of the Boards of Justice and Finance; Siau, the Western Prince, of the Civil Office Board and Ecclesiastic Court; and Shih, the Assistant-Prince, of the Board of Public Affairs and the Foreign Office.

The above arrangement was, however, subsequently altered, in consequence of the increasing extent of the revolution. The five princes then resigned their inferior appointments to others, continuing their duties as Privy Council to the Tien-wang, and Supreme Generalissimos of the five military divisions, into which their whole rule and territory were divided. Other chiefs were elected to the dignity of Wang, with a rank secondary to that of the Princes, and the whole formed a sort of parliament. All the important affairs of state, such as the military expeditions to be undertaken, plans of defence, &c., had first to receive the sanction of this parliament, and were then submitted to the Tien-wang for his approval. To a certain extent, the Tien-wang was despotic in his government, for nothing could be undertaken without his special sanction. This rule, although supreme, was still far from constituting a despotism; and the ultimate decisions vested in him, have, singularly enough, never created dissension in council. This is to be accounted for not only by the fact that his subjects regarded him as endowed with theocratical attributes, but also to the wisdom of his mandates.

As it was impossible, during their belligerent state, to give full effect to their Civil Boards or officials, the whole system of government resolved itself into a military one, pending such time as peace should be obtained, when they would be at leisure to cultivate the arts and sciences, and form a legislature upon an entirely civil basis.

The occupation of Nankin has proved fatal to the success of the Ti-pings hitherto. Insurrection, of whatever kind, to be successful, must never relinquish the aggressive movement; directly it acts upon the defensive, unless possessing some wonderful organization, its power is broken. The principal element of revolutionary success is rapidity of action, and when once this is forsaken, the consolidated strength of an established constitution is advantageously brought to bear against rebellion.

The Tien-wang, by settling down at Nankin and commencing to defend his position, committed a vital error, and one that lost him the empire. If, instead of so doing, and affording his enemies time to rally and recover from their wild panic, and concentrate their forces, he had aimed at the one terminal point, Pekin, beyond all doubt, the very Éclat of his victorious march would have carried him with an almost resistless triumph into possession of the capital, and the consequent destruction of the Manchoo dynasty would have given him the empire. The very fact that for years afterwards, in spite of this unfavourable re-action, the Ti-pings have been enabled, not only to hold their own against the Imperialists, but to have utterly crushed them—had it not been for the intervention of England—proves how easily they might have followed up their first advantages.

Two courses were open to the Ti-pings, either of which, judging by their career, would have led to the extinction of the oppressive Manchoo rule. The first was, without a pause, to have continued their march upon Pekin, abandoning each city as they seized it, and while enriching themselves from the captured stores and treasuries, and strengthening their forces by the crowds of discontented wherever they might pass, not to have permitted the slightest reduction of their numbers by detaching isolated garrisons.

The second would have been to have abandoned Nankin, and concentrated all their forces in the southern provinces,—Kwang-tung, Kwang-se, Kwei-chow, and Fo-keen,—a part of China, more than any other, bitterly opposed to the Manchoos, and more important still, the native provinces of the principal Ti-ping leaders. In this case, the whole of the country south of the Yang-tze river could in a short time have been completely wrested from the Manchoos, and then, if unable to obtain the whole empire, they would at least have established a southern kingdom in perfect integrity—and how superior this course of action would have been to the irregular one they pursued!

It was not only a great mistake, but a great absurdity for the Tien-wang to establish a capital, and set up a new dynasty before accomplishing either of the foregoing courses.

Although for several years numbers continued flocking to the Tien-wang's standard, still, they were not of the best material; the wealthier classes, directly they found the revolution paused, paused too, and time showed them that the obnoxious element was the Christian religion. So long as the movement, in the earlier stages of patriotic excitement, was looked upon as a means of overthrowing the foreign dynasty, it was a national and a popular one; but as the foreign derived religious character transpired, the bigoted and proud Chinese naturally began to eye with suspicion a movement so vast, aiming not only at the subversion of the reigning dynasty, but of the time-honoured superstitions, ceremonies, and faith of the nation. The stationary phase, prejudicial to any revolution, was doubly so to the Ti-ping, as it fully displayed that the Christian, or foreign innovation, was as much their profession as the popular anti-Manchoo feeling; but for this, the whole population of China would have risen en masse to throw off the foreign yoke.

Through our Faith the Ti-pings have heroically, and, until the British Government added their weight to the adverse scale, successfully maintained an unequal struggle for years. Should we not then rather have assisted than opposed them? Why should we, who pride ourselves upon our superior freedom, oppose the advance of Christianity, and perpetuate a most corrupt and barbarous government in Asia—a government more foreign to the people whom it crushes than the Russian is to the Poles? Can the British nation sympathize with the rebels to one and not with those to the other, particularly when the latter are endeavouring to propagate the Christian faith? Can the English nation, one of the most Christian and enlightened in the world, deny all sympathy to those carrying on the greatest patriotic struggle on record, a struggle that would, by the admission of many high-minded missionaries, have Christianized more than one-third of the human race?

The Imperialists gained many advantages through the stationary position of the Ti-pings. Whereas, before, they contented themselves with following an advancing and triumphant army, and occupying the towns and districts as they were evacuated, they were now enabled to recover from the demoralizing effects of their numerous defeats, and to concentrate their efforts upon one or two points. The prestige of success, a great element with Chinese troops, was for a time lost to the revolutionists, and the Tartar forces despatched from the north combining with those lately following at a respectful distance in the rear of the Ti-pings, soon invested Nankin and Chin-kiang with apparently overwhelming numbers.

The blockade of Nankin, notwithstanding the strength of the investing forces, was neither close nor effectual. Several expeditionary armies were formed and despatched by the Tien-wang to raise the country in different directions. He seems to have reckoned too much upon the patriotic spirit of his countrymen, besides committing the error of settling down and attempting to consolidate his own power before overthrowing that of the enemy. It is even very probable, if all these expeditionary armies had been combined into one and marched upon Pekin, that that city would have fallen.

In May, 1853, a small army of about seven thousand men crossed to the northern bank of the Yang-tze-kiang, and after defeating a body of Tartar troops who disputed their passage, proceeded rapidly in a north-west direction, through the provinces of Ngan-whui and Ho-nan. Kai-fung, the capital of Ho-nan, the city containing the only tribe of Jews found in China, was unsuccessfully attacked.

Passing rapidly on, the Ti-pings effected the passage of the Yellow River, and attacked the city of Hwae-king. Here they were likewise unsuccessful, and a large army of Imperialists having collected, some from the north, some from the neighbouring garrisons, and united with a considerable force that had been detached in pursuit from the army of observation before Nankin, the siege was raised, and the Ti-ping line of march to the northward checked. Diverging to the westward for nearly 200 miles, they entered the province of Shensi, and on the 4th of September captured the city of Yuen-keuh. This was the first city of magnitude taken since leaving Nankin, and the treasure and supplies found at this place proved very acceptable to the worn and destitute army. They once more turned northwards, and marched steadily forward in the direction of Pekin, capturing many important cities on the way. Late in the same month they entered Chih-le, the most northern province of the empire, and that in which Pekin is situated. Advancing with rapidity, and capturing city after city, towards the end of October they reached the Grand Canal, and proceeding by this, in a few days arrived at and captured the town of Tsing-hae, distant some twenty miles from the port of Tien-tsin. Tsing-hae now became the head-quarters of the Ti-ping army; while the main body occupied the place, a column was detached against Tien-tsin, before which city it appeared on the 30th October; but being repulsed with considerable loss, the whole army went into winter quarters at Tsing-hae.

In the meanwhile, the Manchoo court at Pekin was seriously alarmed at the progress the Ti-pings were making, they being now distant but a few days' march. Every exertion was made to stop their further progress; not only was the Manchoo garrison of Pekin despatched against them, but large bodies of Mongols were engaged and sent before Tsing-hae early in November; and these forces combining with the Imperialist troops that had followed the Ti-pings from the first day they crossed the Yang-tze, and continually receiving reinforcements from every garrison town they passed, now closely blockaded the Ti-ping position.

Soon after the departure of the first northern army, in May, a large force was marched back upon the old route taken by the Ti-pings in their advance upon Nankin. Proceeding up the Yang-tze-kiang, Ngan-king, the capital of the province of Ngan-whui, was captured and made a base for further operations. Many cities were captured, and their stores and treasuries convoyed down to Nankin. Two strong columns were now detached from Ngan-king, one in a westerly direction, penetrating through the provinces of Kiang-si and Hoo-nan, while the other started due north to the reinforcement of the army blockaded at Tsing-hae. Early in 1854, the western army having passed the Tung-ting lake, retraced a part of their old line of march, capturing the numerous cities on the bank of the Yang-tze river. About May this army arrived before the three cities of Han-kow, Han-yang, and Wu-chang, the capital of Hoo-peh, conveying the immense supplies they had already captured; after a short siege, these important places fell, thus placing the Ti-pings in possession of all the principal cities from thence to Chin-kiang, a distance of more than 450 miles, and comprising the richest and most fertile portion of the Yang-tze provinces.

In the meanwhile the northern column (which left Ngan-king some time in November, 1853), making forced marches through Ngan-whui, struck the Grand Canal in the province of Kiang-su, and rapidly following its course through Shang-tung, city after city falling before its victorious march, crossed the Yellow River in March, 1854, and captured by storm, on the 12th April, the strongly-fortified city of Lin-tsing, on the border of the northern province, Chih-le.

During this time the army at Tsing-hae remained closely blockaded. While, entirely cut off from all supplies or reinforcements, it became fast reduced by sickness, famine, and the sword; the enemy, upon the contrary (but a few days' march from Tien-tsin, the great northern commercial city and grain depÔt; in the immediate vicinity of Tartary, and, moreover, hardy and inured to the keen wintry storms, so trying to the lightly-clad southerners, comprising the Ti-ping forces) had everything in their favour. Large bodies of Mongolian troops were hired and despatched by the Manchoo government against the blockaded rebels—the Manchoo reserves, and even a large contingent of volunteer Chinese, were sent to swell the imperialist ranks; and while time fast reduced the number and efficiency of the Ti-pings, their foe day by day became more numerous and formidable. The small Ti-ping army at the first scarcely mustered seven thousand strong. Owing to the rapidity of their march, the numbers who joined them by the way were inconsiderable, compared with the resources of the enemy; the only addition they received of any importance was in the province of Ho-nan, where a detachment of local insurrectionists, nearly five thousand strong, joined them; but this reinforcement was more than cancelled by their losses in battle and from disease. The courage and discipline of this small army must have been something wonderful. The steadfast perseverance of their onward march, in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties; their steady resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the fur-clad hardy Tartar cavalry—an arm in which they were totally deficient, and could not effectually oppose; their firm endurance of the rigours of the northern winter, close to the icy steppes of Tartary, to which they were unaccustomed, and for which they were unprepared; their isolated march of more than fourteen hundred miles; the heroism with which they supported attack, and finally their successful escape,—all constitute one of the most remarkable campaigns of modern times.

During the months of November and December the besieged made several desperate but unavailing sorties, the enemy in each case repulsing them with heavy loss. At last, early in February, 1854, after an occupation of more than three months, hopeless of success, with famine in their camp, and no prospect of succour from their friends, the whole garrison sallied out and succeeded in cutting their way through the besiegers. With gallantry hitherto unknown to the Chinese, this small but heroic band commenced the most arduous operation of any army,—a retreat in the presence of a vastly superior enemy. Inch by inch they retired, continually facing about to repel the pursuing host. Masses of Tartar cavalry whirled around them, now charging impetuously on front, rear, and flanks, now hurrying in advance to dispute some difficult passage; heavy columns of infantry, surrounding them on every side, rushed incessantly to the attack, confident in their overwhelming numbers, and encouraged by the hope of reward; yet never for a moment did they succeed in breaking the unfaltering and orderly retreat of the Ti-ping army, which slowly retired with its face to the foe, until, after three months' endurance, a junction was effected with the forces which garrisoned the city of Lin-tsing.

It is a singular fact that the Manchoo government dreaded the approach of the small Ti-ping army more than the advance of the allied English and French upon Pekin in 1860. An extract from a memorial of the Board of Censors to the Emperor, found in the Summer Palace, runs thus:—

"In 1853, when the Cantonese rebels overran the country, advancing impetuously towards the north, the alarm excited in the capital was many times more serious than that now manifested."