Since Whig Ministers took it into their heads to become Manchoo Mandarins, the result may soon be told.

The wars have all been undertaken for the purpose either of forcing trade—principally, if not wholly, that in opium—upon the Chinese, or else to chastise that people for endeavouring to put their own laws against opium smuggling into force, from the time of the fracas with Commissioner Lin to the lorcha Arrow pretext for the last war.

The results of the late British policy in China are summed up generally in the following sectional review:—

1. As for the vaunted treaty of Tien-tsin, forced from unwilling Manchoos by the results of the "Arrow war," it has greatly restricted trade along the coast of China, closed ports (such as Wan-chew, Tai-chew, Lam-quan, Hoc-kau, Chin-chew, &c.), which were virtually open to foreign trade, and by confining commerce to a few Treaty Ports, played exactly into the hands of the anti-foreign Mandarins. Upon this subject a capital article appears, from an old resident of many years' standing in China, in the Overland Trade Report, September 11, 1865, which, as the editor says, "contains the most able exposition of the defects of the treaty of Tien-tsin, of the pernicious results of the foreign inspectorate, and of the crusade carried on against foreign shipping visiting non-treaty ports, that we ever read." The article is long, but some of its salient points are to the following effect: Until the signing of the treaty of Tien-tsin, the whole coast-line, from Canton to Woo-sung, with all its intermediate ports, was virtually open to foreign trade! Foreign vessels of all nations were allowed and even encouraged by the local authorities to enter any port they chose, and were permitted to trade in any article, either native or foreign, without hindrance or molestation, provided they paid the lawful duties.

The disadvantages to which British (and all foreign) trade is subjected by the treaty of Tien-tsin, and the establishment of the foreign inspectorate of Chinese Customs, are these:—

1st. To pay nearly double as much duty on both imports and exports as native vessels or junks are charged.

2nd. Heavy tonnage dues are enforced, consisting of 4 mace or 4·10 of a tael (6s. 8d.) per ton, every four months, instead of every six months as previous to the war; junks paying no tonnage dues!

3rd. Interdicted from carrying or trading in salt, one of the principal articles of trade in all parts of China and Formosa. Likewise saltpetre, sulphur, alum, and some other articles of general commerce, on pain of confiscation of vessel. Junks allowed to carry or trade in any article either native or foreign!

4th. Interdicted from entering any port on the coast of China, except those specified "open port" by the treaty, on pain of confiscation of vessels and cargo. Junks free to enter any port or harbour either in China or foreign countries. What a contrast of advantages and disadvantages! Whereas, before the concoction of the Tien-tsin treaty, foreign vessels enjoyed equal privileges with native craft, they have since been placed at a discount by the execution of the retrogressive measures of that treaty so inimical to British interests. No doubt the astute Manchoo statesmen who acted for China during the negotiations gained many advantages over the representatives of England. They succeeded in obtaining terms which restricted trade, and limited foreign intercourse to a few ports; their latest act has been to follow this up (now that the dread of the Ti-ping is over and the Ta-ku forts in their hands again) by interdicting the employment of foreign vessels to carry goods on Chinese account even between treaty ports!

2. The foreign inspectorate of Chinese Maritime Customs was a scheme effected by officials of Lord Elgin's embassy to China; its aim was to make sure of the indemnity by placing Englishmen in charge of the Imperial revenue, and to enable the squeezed Government to suppress rebellion by handing it over the remainder. Beautifully has the Pekin Cabinet responded by taking advantage of every opportunity to limit the rights of Englishmen, and resuming step by step its habits of repellance and exclusiveness!

A very significant event has lately taken place, being the elevation of Tseng-kwo-fan, leader of the anti-foreign party, and sometime besieger of Nankin, to a position of unprecedented magnitude. This Mandarin has been appointed to the absolute civil and military control of all the officials and troops, whether Tartar or Chinese, in the three provinces of Chili, Shangtung, and Honan. Speaking of this appointment, the China Overland Trade Report, 12th August, 1865, states:—

Tseng-kwo-fan's rank is that of Commander-in-Chief and General Viceroy of the empire.

The inspectorate system has placed a set of cosmopolitan mercenaries in a position not only to govern but to prey upon the whole foreign trade with China. They are ever upon the qui vive to seize and confiscate the merchandise of their own countrymen, and have caused the effectual closing of every port on the coast of China, except those opened by treaty. Property that may be unprotected by every legal right, or may be placed (through the owner's ignorance of inspectorate forms) in such a position as to incur some of the vexatious penalties attaching to every infraction of rules almost daily issued by the European Commissioners of Customs, or their Mandarin colleagues, ad libitum, is eagerly pounced upon and appropriated. In fact, it may safely be said that, instead of benefiting foreigners and their trade, the scheme acts directly against their interests; that it places a number of European and American adventurers in a position to assist the Mandarins in taking every advantage of each flaw in the treaty, while at the same time constituting a capital shield behind which the still repulsive Manchoos can execute their anti-foreign plotting in safety.

3. The hostilities against the Ti-pings were caused through the unrighteous policy established by the treaty of Tien-tsin, the foreign inspectorate of Customs, the extortion of indemnity for the war, and the protection of the vile opium trade. This policy has been a great success, in so far as arresting and beating backward the only portion of the multitudinous Chinese whose progress afforded a prospect of change for the better. It has, with still greater iniquity, warred against and prevented the spread of Christianity; destroyed many thousands and tens of thousands of those who professed that faith, and has stopped the circulation and printing of the Bible in its full integrity by the Ti-ping Government, besides having caused the re-establishment of idolatry on the ashes of the destroyed Book, and the wholesale slaughter of those who only begged for our friendship and instruction. Through the wicked intervention of England, the former territory of the Ti-pings has been wrested from them, and the bleached bones of the victims mark the country thick and close for hundreds of miles. The starvation, the horrors, have been fully described; and now it is reported from China that many of the solitudes created where once happy villages of Ti-pings were found, have become infested with beasts of prey—wolves, panthers, and tigers.

As for having effected the slightest improvement in British relations with China, made the Manchoo authorities less unfriendly and illiberal, or rendered the least service to the general welfare of humanity, the past policy of the British Government has proved a lamentable failure.

By unjustifiable meddling, England has thrown China into a state of general anarchy. The cruelty and excessive corruption of the Manchoo officials throughout the country have always been sufficiently great to cause local insurrections and different regular systems of rebellion; but it was only to the great Ti-ping revolution (which proved its power so superior to that of the Imperial Government as to threaten the rapid extermination of the latter, and compel the assistance of England to save it) that people could look for success, and eventual pacification of the empire. Well, these urgently required results have been prevented by the policy in question.

Unable to depend upon the success of the Ti-ping movement, the disaffected Chinese have joined other rebellions, and at this day there are many desolating the country. In the north, a great amalgamation of the Yellow River rebels (an old organization, sometimes under allegiance to the Ti-ping king) or Nien-fie, with a force of Ti-pings, and a large body of Mohammedan rebels, has taken place. The army of this league is estimated at over 300,000 men; in the summer of 1865 they defeated the Tartar Generalissimo (of Pekin campaign memory) San-ko-lin-sin, who was afterwards killed by some country people with whom he sought a refuge—thus showing the state of feeling amongst the population. The northern rebels then seriously menaced Pekin itself, and at one time it was reported that they had captured the city; lately they seem to have moved more to the westward—probably to effect a junction with other revolutionists; but it is quite certain that the Imperialists are unable to subdue them.

Besides the league, there are two other formidable rebellions raging in the north of China—the Mohammedan rebels, who defy the power of the Government in Shen-si, Shan-se, Kan-su, and other parts of the empire. To the south of these come the "Honan filchers," a horde of more than 100,000 banditti, who maintain, as they have done for years, an independent existence in the Honan Province. Away to the west, the large Tartar province of E-li, four times as large as Great Britain, has been wrested from the Imperialists by a rising of Mahommedans.

Along the western boundary general anarchy prevails: it would almost seem that as Russia advances into central Asia, the Mohammedans were moving towards China.

In the great province of Sze-chuan, the Ti-pings under Shih-ta-kae, the I-wang, or his successor, are still in power. At Hankow (treaty port) in Hu-peh, and at Kew-kiang in Kiang-si, the Imperialist troops lately revolted and set up the standard of rebellion. In Ngan-whui serious disturbances have arisen. Farther south, in Kwei-chow, Yun-nan, and Kwang-si, the Miau-tze, or independent mountaineers, are steadily increasing in strength; in fact, every province of China is more or less the scene of formidable revolution or local revolt.

The Ti-pings, in strong force, under the Shi-wang and other leaders, are making rapid progress on the borders of the provinces of Kwang-tung, Kiang-si, and Fu-keen, and the Imperialist troops seem totally unable to interfere with them.

Referring to the distracted state of China, the Overland China Mail, June 29, 1865, truly states that "there must be something in the conduct of the Imperial Government, and of the local Mandarins, which provokes a strong feeling of resentment against their authority in all parts of the empire." Singularly enough, the same journal has always opposed the revolutionists who tried to alter a Government the people hate.

The Times, in its Chinese intelligence of June 21, 1865, referring to the successes of the Nien-fie League, states:—

Those who have advocated interfering against such a movement as that of the Ti-pings, and supporting such a dynasty as that of the Manchoos, must have very curious reasons to plead for a justification—they have generally admitted the necessity for a change of government, and then amused themselves by resisting the change when offered.

The only policy which could have benefited China would have been, either an energetic protectorate established by England, and maintained with energy until the evil Government had been thoroughly and radically reformed in every branch; or, what would have been far better, the Chinese should have been left to themselves and allowed to choose their own rulers. If England had simply preserved her honour and remained neutral, China would have had a native, progressionist, and powerful Government at the present day. That huge empire has lasted more than 2,000 years, and the only deterioration its constitution has suffered has been caused by the Tartar conquest. The resources of China are as great, the capacities of her people as vigorous, and the elements of her ancient civilization as durable as ever: once let the incubus of Manchoo maladministration be removed, that vast and intelligent people will rapidly establish a native Government which will inaugurate an era of progression and improvement. For some time the usurping dynasty has been tottering towards its fall; England would have done well to have avoided supporting the decayed and hopelessly corrupt fabric. She has served a dying despotism, too far gone to feel even gratitude for her assistance, and has repelled a young successor who wished ardently to become of the same brotherhood as herself!

4. By her aggressive, meddling policy, England has alarmed the naturally suspicious and treacherous Manchoos. Making them feel towards the "outer barbarians" the passion of fear as well as hate, has, of course, only tended to make them more exclusive and repellant than ever. Every mail from China brings successive proof of the fact. Those who receive advices from the East cannot fail to notice such passages as the following:—

The Overland China Trade Report, in its issue September 11, 1865, states:—

The article then proceeds to notice the fact that the Mandarin policy of preventing the employment of foreign shipping, and encouraging that of native craft, simply tends to increase piracy by providing prey; and is further reprehensible because the Mandarins will not assist to suppress an evil which, were it not for the presence of British men-of-war, would destroy their entire maritime commerce. Mr. Hart, the Inspector General of Customs, endeavoured to induce the Imperial Government to allow Chinese to own vessels constructed after the foreign mode, but the hatred of foreign innovation, however beneficial, prevailed, and the authorities refused the much-desired boon.

Another instance of Manchoo repellance is the withdrawal of the concession formerly granted to foreign vessels to visit the ports of the Island of Formosa.

And again: the port of Wan-chew was open to foreign trade before the treaty of Tien-tsin, and became a place of much importance. Why it was not included in the list of open ports it is difficult to understand. The foreign representatives and merchants lately endeavoured to obtain the concession of having it opened to foreign trade, and for a time were encouraged by Prince Kung to believe that their request would be complied with. But since Tseng-kwo-fan has come to the front, the concession is rejected, and the idea abandoned.

The notification referred to as prohibiting the employment of foreign vessels was issued by Lin, Imperial Commissioner, and acting Viceroy of Kiang-su, in which province Shanghae is situated. It seems to have proved very effectual, and very injurious to British shipping interest.

The last mail from China brought the Overland Trade Report, dated "Hong-kong, October 15, 1865." It contains these lines:—"The repellance and anti-foreign tendencies of the Mandarins are becoming more broadly marked as each month advances."

The North China Market Report states "that the Chinese are rapidly learning to disregard the most important of the treaty stipulations." In fact, all sources of information are unanimous as to the hostile feelings of the Manchoo Government England has done so much to bolster up.

Just six months have elapsed since the Colonial Government of Hong-kong perverted its powers by giving up an unfortunate refugee from Nankin to the sanguinary Imperialist Mandarins. After noticing the facts of the case, we will observe how the Manchoos responded to the officious and unwarrantable efforts of the Hong-kong rulers to execute the exterritoriality clause of the notorious treaty of Tien-tsin, the twenty-first article of which stipulates that, "if criminal subjects of China shall take refuge in Hong-kong, or on board of British ships there, they shall, upon due requisition by the Chinese authorities, be searched for; and, on proof of their guilt, be delivered up."

Acting upon the above clause, the Canton Mandarins, in the month of April, 1865, demanded from the Colonial Government the rendition of a certain Chinaman residing at the latter place, on the plea of his having been a pirate. The man demanded had been residing in Hong-kong since September, 1864, and the following facts transpired during the inquiry instituted. He had been a Ti-ping chief, known as the Mo-wang (probably a successor to the rank of the assassinated Commandant of Soo-chow); and, upon the evacuation of Nankin, had escaped and made his way to Hong-kong, with a considerable sum of money. As this became known to members of some secret societies established amongst the Chinese there, he was subjected to much extortion from people who threatened to denounce him to the Mandarins as a rebel unless he satisfied their demands. At last the persecution drove him to seek legal advice from some English lawyer, who told him that he was perfectly safe on British soil. Consequently, he defied his persecutors; and they, doubtless, to obtain reward from the Mandarins, fulfilled their threats. The principal Manchoo official at Canton, who was certain of promotion should he succeed in catching a rebel of such rank, forthwith demanded his rendition as a pirate.

The man was seized and tried before the magistrates' court, where the above evidence was obtained. The proof of his piracy (although consisting of the testimony of only one Chinese witness, sent down specially by the Mandarins) was considered sufficient; and, notwithstanding the protest of the counsel retained for the prisoner, the magistrate, under the direction of the law officers of the Crown, made out the requisite order for his rendition.

The valuable account from which the facts of this case are taken[83] states:—

Now, in this cruel case of rendition the Government of Hong-kong committed an act repugnant alike to humanity and the Christian principles of their countrymen, and which was not only entirely illegal, but grossly unjust.

The Mo-wang was demanded and given up as a pirate. The only evidence against him was given by one Chinaman, and tended to prove that the chief had once stopped a Chinese vessel, on board of which was the witness, endeavouring to run past the Ti-ping Custom House established at Nankin. The junk was confiscated by the Ti-ping authorities. Here we have the main point of the case. This was the only act charged against the Mo-wang. The only question is whether it was piracy. The Colonial authorities, true to the Mandarin-worshipping-and-Ti-ping-destroying policy, answered in the affirmative. Let us examine their decision.

First. The Ti-pings had been recognised as belligerents; and, moreover, as an established power, by repeated acts upon the part of representatives of Great Britain (and other countries); how then could the seizure of a vessel of the enemy by the Mo-wang—a regularly commissioned officer of the Ti-ping Government—be construed into an act of piracy? Why, the United States of America would have stronger (though none the less unreasonable) grounds to demand from England the rendition of every ex-Confederate officer, as a pirate, who might be found within her jurisdiction! The decision of the Hong-kong authorities is clearly against the rights of the case and the law by which it was tried. But what conclusively proves this is the fact that the Mandarins demanded the Mo-wang as a pirate, but executed him as a political offender, and nothing else.

Thus, it cannot fail to be seen that the unfortunate victim was not a pirate—the Hong-kong Solons gave him up as one.

Secondly. The extradition treaty with China specially declares "criminal" offenders as those who may be given up, upon "proof of guilt." The Mo-wang was not a criminal, therefore the Hong-kong authorities violated the law by giving him up as such.

Thirdly. The treaty of Tien-tsin was not the law of Hong-kong, therefore the authorities had no legal right to render up even a criminal subject of China—how much less the innocent Mo-wang! As the Hong-kong China Overland Trade Report, May 30, 1865, truly states, in reviewing this atrocious affair:—"It would appear that the local authorities have not only read the treaty erroneously, but that they have no power whatever to meddle in the matter, no ordinance ever having been passed to enable them to take cognizance of offences under the Tien-tsin treaty....

"The case of the St. Alban's raiders has elicited the fact that a treaty is not a statute, and cannot be adopted by a court of law without a statutory enactment. The Ashburton treaty was not the law of Canada, because the Government had neglected to legalize it by statute. So the Tien-tsin treaty is not the law in Hong-kong, because no ordinance has been passed to legalize it."

The above three objections to the rendition of the Mo-wang pretty strongly prove that his death was a judicial murder by those who unlawfully gave him up to so frightful a doom. Another example of British malversation in China, and a further instance of persecution of the Ti-pings!

It might at least have been expected when British officials exceeded their authority and so misapplied the exterritoriality clause of the treaty in order to oblige the Mandarins, that the latter would have responded. We will observe how they did so.

Within one month of the rendition of the Mo-wang, the Imperialists in the neighbourhood of Amoy captured the mercenary soldier, Burgevine (already noticed in these pages), an Englishman named Green, and a British East Indian subject, whilst endeavouring to join the Ti-pings at Chang-chew. These men had committed no crime, and were caught before having committed any political offence (any previous episode of Burgevine's life constituting another case, which did not concern the Englishman, Green). Even if they had succeeded in joining the revolutionists, and had afterwards been caught levying war against the Imperialists, their only offence would have been a political one, viz., breach of neutrality, punishable by deportation from China or three months' imprisonment.

The American Consul at Amoy, hearing of the seizure, demanded, as in this case he had a perfect right to do, the rendition of Burgevine, according to the terms of the exterritoriality clause of the treaty. The Mandarins refused to fulfil their obligations and give up the men. They carried them into the interior and murdered them by heavily ironing, and then drowning them, afterwards pretending that the three unfortunate prisoners had met their death by the capsize of a boat in which they were being conveyed across a river!

Thus we see that immediately after a Chinese political offender was illegally given up to the Manchoo Government by the authorities of Hong-kong, the Mandarins deliberately violated the exterritoriality stipulations of the treaty, by refusing to give up the three men whom they had seized before offence, on suspicion only, and by cruelly putting them to death.

The last mail from China brings intelligence of the murder of three Europeans at the treaty port of Chin-kiang. Two (Messrs. Filleul and Pickernel) were Englishmen, and old friends of mine; the third, a Mr. Lewis, was an American. These men were set upon by Imperialist soldiers in the dead of the night, while sleeping, and cruelly murdered, without having given any offence, although another European had struck a Chinaman on the previous day. The murderers belonged to a disciplined contingent, commanded by a Mandarin named Kwo, a force which had been raised, officered, and equipped by British means!

Besides the continual violation of the exterritoriality clause of the treaty, the Manchoos have lately displayed their growing disregard for their obligations and their increasing repugnance to foreigners in a variety of illiberal measures. To those which we have already noticed may be added the late blunt refusal of the Pekin Cabinet to allow the construction of a proposed Russian line of telegraph from Siberia to that city.

Another very serious blow to British and Chinese interests has been the fruitless mission of Sir M. Stephenson. The Manchoo Government has pointedly refused to grant permission for the introduction or construction of railways, and the local authorities have obstructively prevented the formation of proposed experimental lines at Canton, and between Shanghae and Woo-sung, a distance of about fourteen miles.

There is another case in point, which effectually proves the thorough impracticability of the Manchoos. A few months ago an enterprising Shanghae merchant, Mr. E. A. Reynolds, was public-spirited enough to erect a line of telegraph from Shanghae to the sea-coast. He made all arrangements, compensated various native landowners, and erected his posts, only to find them all chopped down again one fine morning. The Mandarins, when appealed to, insulted the British Consul, and refused to allow the erection of the telegraph, the alleged reason being that it interfered with Fung-shui—the spirit of geomancy, the air, or something else.

Shortly before the above outrage, the Mandarins showed their gratitude for the assistance England had given them, by closing the whole of the silk districts and interior to steam communication or transit by foreigners, the same having been free and open under the rule of the Ti-pings, who encouraged the employment of steamers.

Many other instances of Manchoo repugnance and hostility could be mentioned, but those noticed are sufficient for all purposes, and so we will close our review of some of the results of British policy in China.

After having examined the conduct of England, it may not be out of place to follow with a short sketch of Russian policy, which is daily becoming so closely connected with China, whilst the frontier of the great Muscovite Power is rapidly extending towards the Chinese and Indian empires in one direction, is peacefully established against Chinese territory in another, and is gradually annexing to herself vast portions of Chinese territory in the north.

Although the Manchoos have always been hostile to British intercourse, "there is a system of European policy which they can and do appreciate," as the Standard, August 28, 1865, well said. The substance of the article referred to so thoroughly expresses what I would say, that I cannot refrain from using it:—

The Manchoos comprehend the spirit of Russia, and dwell at peace with that empire on her borders. Instead of a great wall, they are divided from their powerful neighbour by a wooden paling, and there has not been a shot fired between Russia and China, contiguous though they are, during the last fifty years. But what has been the course pursued by Russia with regard to that which is loosely and inaccurately termed the Ti-ping revolt? One of complete neutrality. We, however, from the coast, hoisted our flag in the war. We have taken an active and open part, declared against a tremendous national movement, and been virtually beaten off the Chinese soil and waters. Looking for results, it is impossible to find any, except that our name is hated by millions of people who desired to live and trade upon friendly terms with us. Our representative diplomacy at Pekin is a nullity, and there is every chance that, a change of dynasties intervening, we shall have to undo our Manchoo statesmanship, and comply with a very different set of political necessities in the East. Your Chinese are very intelligent fatalists; they rarely quarrel with facts; they are convinced, it may be, of the English fighting quality; but they can feel little respect for our wisdom when they see us standing in a baffled attitude between both their great parties, blundering and bewildered, with an enormous trade to foster, with prodigious future interests to foresee, and yet with a diplomacy which means neither peace nor war, which binds us to no intelligible line of conduct, and which has brought us to a condition wherein, through any accident, whether of Imperial or insurrectionary success, we may be called upon to defend our rights by force of arms.

It is a fact no less singular than true, that the Russians, in contradistinction to all other Europeans, show a strong tendency to amalgamate with the higher races of Asia. In consequence of this, her rapid progress on the continent referred to partakes of the nature of absorption and not of conquest. The policy of Russia seems inseparable from continual increase of her already vast dominions. In every direction her frontier is determinately advanced, while thousands of strange people are submitting to her sway. In Europe she uses force to obtain any desirable locality; and although it is true that occasionally some obstinate or patriotic chief of Central Asia may dispute her advance, such obstructions would seem to form the exception to the general progress she is enabled to make rather by conciliation and clever seizure than by force of arms.

If people have the audacity to use their eyes, and the unparalleled hardihood to discover the extraordinary increase of the Russian empire, there is a clique of venerable wiseacres who always think to annihilate them by the crushing denunciation, Russophobia! Now, these old gentlemen—it is presumed that they are rather decrepit—may call the knowledge of modern geography and the continual increase of Russia whatever gives them a little innocent amusement; but all the calling in the world cannot alter the fact.

There are two questions which particularly concern England: is she content to halt on the forward path of nations, while Russia, by reclaiming the people of Asia, bids fair to rival her in every duty assumed by great civilized Powers? Is the meeting of the frontier lines of Russia and India, which, according to the regular increase of the Russian possessions in Central Asia, might be calculated almost to the day, likely to prove disastrous to British empire in the latter country?

Other European Powers can afford to look on without being interested, for only England has so precious a jewel as Hindoostan. The first question may be passed over as merely bearing upon the advancement of abstract principles, or the propagation of Christian doctrine, philanthropy, and civilization; but the second is very different, relating as it does exclusively to the material and commercial interests of Great Britain. Before explaining how these may be affected by the future movements of Russia, or describing the present position of that Power in Central Asia, it will not be out of place to give a short sketch of Russian progress.

At page 410, vol. ii., "MacGregor's Commercial Statistics," the following interesting calculations are given:—

"Russia contained—

"Her acquisitions from Sweden are greater than what remains of that kingdom.

"Her acquisitions from Poland are nearly equal to the Austrian empire.

"Her acquisitions from Turkey in Europe are of greater extent than the Prussian dominions, exclusive of the Rhenish provinces.

"Her acquisitions from Turkey in Asia are nearly equal in dimensions to the whole of the smaller states of Germany.

"Her acquisitions from Persia are equal in extent to England.

"Her acquisitions in Tartary have an area not inferior to that of Turkey in Europe, Greece, Italy, and Spain."