CHAPTER XXV.

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Operations Resumed.—Attack on Kin-tang.—The Battle of the Brickbats.—Ti-ping Success.—Active Operations.—Manoeuvring.—Hang-chow Invested.—Fall of Kar-sing-foo.—Gordon's Proceedings.—Chang-chow-foo.—Narrative of the Siege.—Fall of Chang-chow.—The Foo-wang.—Manchoo Cruelty.—Debate on the Chinese War.—Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Its Errors.—Mr. Cobden's Policy.—Mr. Layard.—His Inaccuracy.—Extracts from the Debate.—Result of Lord Palmerston's Policy.—Fall of Nankin.—"Imperialist" Account.—The Chung-wang's Capture.—Other Reports.—Digest of Events.—The Chung-wang.—His Position in Nankin.—Events in the City.—Newspaper Reports.—Doubts as to the Chung-wang's Fate.—The Retreat from Nankin.—Newspaper Extracts.—The Shi-wang's Proclamations.—Lee-Shai-Yin's Address.

Late in the month of February, 1864, the Futai's General, Gordon, resumed operations against the Ti-pings. Upon this occasion it appears that he acted entirely on his own responsibility, neither under the orders of his hitherto controller, General Brown (commanding H.B. Majesty's forces at Shanghae), nor the Futai. Consequently, the campaign to be noticed partook more strongly of filibustering than any of the preceding raids already described.

The first movement the Anglo-Manchoo force made was directed against the walled city of Yih-sing, on the western shore of the Ta-hoo Lake, and about forty miles south-west of Wu-see. After a short engagement, the usual result of such operations occurred. The garrison, unable to resist the overwhelming artillery employed by Gordon, an arm newly replenished from the British arsenal at Shanghae before taking the field, was driven from the city with much loss; those who managed to escape retreating to Li-yang, the nearest walled town. Soon, however, they were followed up to this place, but the commandant having received orders to retire to another city, it was evacuated upon the appearance of the disciplined troops and their irresistible guns.

The appearance of the country lately wrested from the Ti-pings is given as follows by one of Gordon's own officers (who was present during all operations) in his notes, "How the Taepings were driven out of the provinces of Kiang-nan and Che-kiang." Describing the march to Yih-sing, he states:—

"Some commissariat boats also went astray, causing the infantry a few days' hunger, as scarcely any food could be obtained, the country being all deserted and devastated. Seemingly it had not been cultivated easily after the Taepings lost possession. Hundreds of dead bodies were strewn along the roads, people who died from starvation; and even the few who were yet alive, watched one of their comrades dying, so as to obtain some food off his dead body."[75]

Sleep calmly and sweetly, ye China-rebel-subduing English politicians, and speak authoritatively as to the benefit of your intervention in the Chinese civil war, after reading this testimony from the hand of one of your mercenary tools! Is there a man so ill-"liberal" as to consider Lord Palmerston and colleagues are responsible for the results of their policy of interference towards the outlandish Chinamen? What do the starving Chinamen above mentioned say?

Their easy successes seem to have made the victorious enemy too confident in their own prowess, and less cautious than heretofore. Leaving a garrison at Li-yang, and also a considerable portion of his artillery, Gordon next advanced upon Kin-tang, a small city to the north-west. Elated by his former triumphs, and believing that his appearance alone would cause the submission of all Ti-ping cities in the district, and place their long-haired people under the barber's razor, Gordon expected no resistance at Kin-tang, and was induced to think that the place would open its gates to receive him as a sort of "conquering hero" whenever he might choose to enter. It will be seen that he became the victim of misplaced confidence.

Although, since my departure from China, and since the Ti-pings have been driven far inland, all information has been received from Chinese sources—false, exaggerated, and figurative—it seems pretty certain that the Chung-wang, after parting with me at Wu-see, placed the Shi and Foo Wangs in charge of the military position, while he proceeded to Nankin in order to confer with his king, the Tien-wang. Chang-chow-foo became the head-quarters of the Foo-wang, and it so happened that Kin-tang was similarly occupied by the Shi-wang (a general second only to the Commander-in-Chief in talent and capability), when Gordon arrived before its walls. Both cities were situated on the southern road from Nankin, and their retention was absolutely necessary to maintain either the communications of the capital, or insure the retreat of the garrison, should they be obliged to abandon their charge. In consequence of this the Chung-wang divided about 10,000 of the best Ti-ping troops between his two lieutenants for the express purpose of holding Kin-tang and Chang-chow, while another force was organized to co-operate in the field.

The two Wangs had concentrated all their strength at Chang-chow when intelligence of Gordon's advance upon Kin-tang reached them. The Shi-wang, with a division of several thousand men, by forced marches, managed to throw himself into the city just before the enemy appeared.

When the Anglo-Manchoo contingent arrived under the walls on the 20th of March, they summoned the place to surrender, but no reply was made, for the battlements were silent and deserted, neither soldier nor spear, nor sign of living occupation being visible. The gates were all fast closed, and although Gordon had been looking forward to enter peaceably, and when he had arrived could see neither trace of man nor prospect of opposition, something there must have been ominous and suspicious in the stillness reigning over the city, for he preferred battering the walls down to knocking at the gates and demanding admission. The heavy guns were moved up to within a few hundred yards; the boats, containing supplies, followed them by the creeks; and batteries were soon thrown up, still amidst the same profound and mysterious silence upon the part of the garrison. During the bombardment all the noise was on one side; nor flag, nor face, nor living thing could be observed about the encompassed battlements. After several hours' constant firing, a large and practicable breach was effected, and the 1st regiment of Anglo-Chinese ordered to storm the silent ramparts. The enemy came forward with a loud cheer, bearing with them bamboo bridges to throw across the moat, while the stormers were closely supported by portions of the 2nd and 5th regiments, who were allowed to enter the city ditch in their boats and cross unopposed. The short space between the moat and the foot of the breach was soon passed, and the storming column began to ascend. At this moment the hitherto invisible garrison appeared and broke their previous silence in a manner fatal to the assailants. Manning every available position, they threw such incessant showers of brickbats that the Imperialists, despite the gallant behaviour of their foreign officers, were unable to advance. The Ti-pings then rushed into the breach, and charging with their spears, drove them back in confusion. Three times the enemy turned to renew the struggle, but on each occasion were hurled back with loss, being quite unable to cope with the Ti-ping soldiers in a hand-to-hand combat. The breach was now played upon by the artillery, and the defenders driven back with great loss of life from the canister, grape, and shell. Gordon then ordered his Adjutant-General, Kirkham, to bring up fresh companies of the 2nd and 5th regiments, and himself to lead them forward to a second assault. Scarcely, however, had he given the order, when a jingall ball reached him at his almost secure distance and wounded him in the leg. Colonel Kirkham, with great bravery, led his men into the deadly breach, but when half-way up, fell severely wounded. Still, with courage worthy of a better cause, his men followed their officers only to be again charged by the valiant garrison and completely routed after a desperate conflict at close quarters. Again the murderous artillery swept away the defenders of the breach, and Major Brown, Gordon's aide-de-camp, leading forward fresh columns, made a last desperate attempt to storm the yawning chasm. Again the disciplined Chinese and their foreign officers rushed upon the blood-stained ruins; but with dauntless and undiminished courage the Ti-pings again met them—spear to bayonet and firelock, and man to man. After a terrible struggle the assailants were finally driven off, and retreated upon Li-yang, with Major Brown and all their commanding officers hors-de-combat. This action has been called "the Battle of the Brickbats," such missiles being the principal means of defence used by the garrison.

The attack upon Kin-tang was the most severely contested action that the Anglo-Manchoo troops had ever fought. Their defeat is to be attributed to the fact that they were not assisted by an overwhelming park of artillery, which usually did all the fighting. If the Imperialists had not been supplied with British guns, men, and munitions of war, ad libitum, the Ti-pings would have been quite able to manage the disciplined legions. Gordon, in this assault, lost fourteen European officers and nearly one-seventh of the men engaged. The destruction amongst the defenders of Kin-tang must have been equally severe, not less than 600 having fallen.

At this period the Ti-pings seem to have made a desperate effort to defeat the overwhelming numbers of the enemy encircling them on every quarter. At Nankin, Chang-chow-foo, and Kin-tang they managed to defeat the Imperialist forces almost on the same day at each place. The garrison of the capital having sallied forth in strength, defeated a portion of the great beleaguering army under Tseng-kwo-fan (Imperialist Commissioner and Governor-General of the two Kiang provinces) with much slaughter. Upon reaching Li-yang, after narrowly escaping being surrounded by the troops pursuing from Kin-tang, Gordon received intelligence the same evening that the garrison of Chang-chow had sallied out, completely routing the large investing force commanded by the Futai's brother, and following up the success by moving between Soo-chow and Shanghae, thereby threatening not only to recapture all the country lately wrested from Ti-ping rule, but isolate his division and more than counteract its operations by a powerful diversion upon Shanghae or Soo-chow.

Leaving a strong detachment to garrison Li-yang, Gordon at once proceeded with the remainder of his force, and all the artillery, to operate against the Ti-pings from Chang-chow. On the 29th of March he came upon them at Hwa-soo, in the neighbourhood of the city of Chang-zu, about 35 miles north-east of Soo-chow. On the morning of the 30th, finding that the Ti-pings did not number more than 3,000, he ordered about 1,500 infantry to attack them, while he followed in the boats with the artillery, to give assistance if required. Again, as at Kin-tang, the Royal Engineer was completely out-generalled. The Foo and Shi Wangs were both consummate strategists, and at irregular warfare, when artillery was not employed against them, would easily have foiled Major Gordon.

The Ti-pings continually gave way as the disciplined troops advanced; but they were manoeuvred so as to draw their pursuers into a position from which for a time they were themselves invisible, while a masked breast-work, ingeniously stretched across the end of the slight hollow, helped to conceal them. Barely had the retreating forces disappeared behind their slight intrenchment and the inequalities of the ground, when they were doubled back upon each flank so as to almost completely envelop the enemy. The Ti-pings were allowed to execute their manoeuvre thus easily through the incautious advance of their antagonists, for the latter halted in the very hollow to which they had been enticed, directly they lost sight of those whom they were pursuing. When next the Imperialists saw their opponents, it was in the form of a serried line, surrounding them upon every side except a small space in their rear, and charging them on front and both flanks. After a feeble resistance, during which they lost seven English officers and more than 200 men, the ranks of Gordon's force were broken, and the whole mercenary contingent fled from the field with precipitation.

According to the published accounts of this engagement, the Ti-pings were commanded by the Foo-wang, "numbered about 3,000," and were "badly armed." It will thus be seen that, without artillery being brought to bear against them, they were quite able to cope hand to hand with the disciplined troops, officered by foreigners and well armed with musket and bayonet as the latter were, although poorly equipped with a small supply of jingalls, a few bad European firearms, and a majority of bamboo spears.

During the spring of the year 1864, the Ti-pings struggled with desperate bravery against the odds opposed to them; and for some time it seemed very doubtful whether they would succeed or not. While Gordon and the Imperialist troops were being defeated in the northern districts of the Ti-ping territory, the Franco-Manchoo contingent and co-operating forces were meeting a similar fate in the south. Late in February the Imperialists besieging Hang-chow, the provincial capital of Che-kiang, were totally defeated by a sortie of the whole garrison. About the same time another large army was routed by a Ti-ping force in the neighbourhood of Fo-yang, a city not far from Hang-chow. Having recovered from their former repulse and obtained fresh supplies of British mercenaries and munitions of war, the Mandarins again proceeded to invest the provincial capital. On the 2nd of March the Franco-Chinese, commanded by Generals D'Aiguebelle and Schodelana, attacked the above city, and after several hours' hard fighting, succeeded in capturing three forts on the south side; only, however, to be driven out by a desperate charge the Ti-pings made during the afternoon, with a loss of fourteen Europeans and more than a hundred men. On the 29th of the same month, the besiegers recommenced active operations. Supported by a strong body of Imperialists, the Franco-Chinese attacked and carried the outworks of the city a second time, the garrisons retiring within the walls after some hard fighting. The next day fire was opened upon the city from numerous siege artillery, and a practicable breach was soon effected. Again the Franco-Chinese, or more correctly speaking, Manchoos, led the assault, but met with such gallant resistance that they were driven back to their supports in confusion. Twice they bravely rallied, and twice they endeavoured to storm the breach, rendered impregnable by the brave hearts and ready hands defending it, and each time they were repulsed with great slaughter. At the close of the day the assault was given up, after a heavy loss of life, and a vast expenditure of British shot and shell without other result.

Although Hang-chow could not be wrested from the Ti-pings by force of arms, a few days later it fell from external influences, having been rendered untenable through the capture of Kar-sing-foo by the enemy, whereby its supplies and lines of communication were cut off.

About the same time that Gordon commenced his raid upon Yih-sing, Li-yang, and Kin-tang, Manchoo General Ching proceeded with a large army and an auxiliary force composed of detachments from the English contingent, to beleaguer the city of Kar-sing-foo, situated about midway between Soo-chow and Hang-chow, on the Grand Canal. Ching was the bravest native general engaged against the Ti-pings; he was a renegade from their cause, and we all know that such people make the most bitter enemies. He had already been defeated before the city, shortly after I had left it on my last return to Shanghae. Gordon's subordinate, Colonel Bailey, had charge of the large siege train accompanying the army, and in a few hours after establishing his batteries, managed to effectively breach the walls of the doomed city. On rushed Ching's men and their allies, but their efforts were useless, for every assault failed; and Ching himself received a wound which, more than a month later, proved mortal. Some few days subsequent to this repulse, large reinforcements were received by the enemy, fresh breaches were made, and the small but devoted garrison was compelled to evacuate the place at night, having lost their gallant commander, Yoong-wang, and nearly two-thirds of their number. When the Imperialists at last entered, they put to the sword all the unfortunate non-combatants who had not fled the city,[76] sparing neither man, woman, nor child, during their cruel butchery of the unoffending inhabitants. Does Colonel Gordon, R.E., call this "observing the rules of warfare as practised among foreign nations," according to the proviso of Sir F. Bruce? Does Sir F. Bruce, after the massacres at Wu-see, Kar-sing, &c., still term Gordon's conduct "a service in favour of humanity"?

After the loss of Kar-sing, Hang-chow was also evacuated, and the two garrisons retreated to the large city of Hoo-chow-foo. The fortune of war now set strongly against the Christian patriots. With a few memorable exceptions, they were everywhere defeated, through the British influence so cruelly brought to bear against them, for which they were always unprepared, and equally unable to resist.

Having retired to Quin-san (the head-quarters of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent), after his defeat at Hwa-soo, Gordon was shortly joined by an Imperialist army of 15,000 men. A body of troops, commanded by officers of H.B. Majesty's 67th regiment, was also moved from Shanghae to support them. The Imperialists and the whole disciplined force, together with the latter's large park of artillery, now took the field again and moved upon the Foo-wang's position. The Ti-pings were still lightly intrenched at the village of Hwa-soo; they had been strongly reinforced by the Shi-wang, but were considerably hampered by a large number of country people who had fled from the enemy.

On the 11th of April the Imperialists commenced their attack, but, warned by former defeats, they entirely depended upon their artillery, to which the Ti-pings had not a single gun to reply with. The over-matched defenders were at last shelled out of their open breast-works with great slaughter, and being outflanked by the disciplined and undisciplined enemy, were much cut up during their retreat, while a great number were made prisoners and savagely put to death, as described in Chapter XXIII. by the letter of an officer present, under the eyes of General Gordon. The loss of the Ti-pings on this occasion was very heavy. Although the Shi and Foo Wangs succeeded in cutting their way through the enemy with their best troops, at least 8,000 unfortunates, principally country people, were killed.

Following up his success, Gordon pursued the retreating force to Chang-chow-foo. Meanwhile troops were being concentrated upon the same point from every quarter, so that within a few days the city was surrounded by an immense Imperialist army, which was estimated to exceed 100,000 men. The Shi-wang having proceeded to Kin-tang, the garrison commanded by the Foo-wang cannot have consisted of more than 7,000 to 8,000 effective soldiers, but at least 10,000 civilians, including all persons of any standing in the Chang-chow district, and who were Ti-ping subjects, or held civil office under the Tien-wang's Government, had sought refuge within the city walls, carrying with them their movable property and their families, whereby the number of non-combatants was more than doubled.

Three times already had the Imperialists been completely routed before the city, and the siege raised by the gallant resistance of the garrison, although on two occasions the enemy were assisted by detachments of foreign artillery and disciplined troops. After much hard fighting the defenders were driven from all their outworks and strictly confined to the city walls, when the besiegers at once proceeded to effect several breaches. The following account of the subsequent efforts of Gordon and the Futai to storm the place is partly transcribed from the narrative of an officer engaged, and which was published in the Shanghae Recorder of May 2, 1864.

The Ti-pings having been driven from all their stockades and intrenchments to the west of the city, and these being occupied by a strong force of Imperial troops, Gordon moved round opposite the south-east angle, and commenced forming his siege batteries, while the Imperialists placed their guns on his left, facing the south of the city. A combined attack was arranged for the 27th of April, but as the Imperialist batteries were ready on the 24th, and the troops who had so often been defeated were eager to storm, and averse to relinquish their hope of taking the city, the Futai gave orders to open fire, and by three o'clock in the afternoon a capital breach was effected. The advance was sounded and the stormers pushed on steadily to the city ditch, but were there thrown into confusion by some defect in the bridges. At last, however, they scrambled across, and advancing through the stakes got to the foot of the breach, where they maintained themselves for a considerable time; but the defenders, notwithstanding a most destructive covering fire from the Imperialist guns and from a battery of Gordon's enfilading the terre plein, manned the breach and wall with great courage, regardless of life, and compelled the assailants to fall back with heavy loss. This ended the first day's assault.

Gordon's guns having been put in position during the night, and a pontoon bridge laid down over the city ditch (the garrison was too weak to prevent the same by a sortie, and had not a single cannon to oppose its construction), at daybreak he opened fire, while the Imperialists' batteries did the same to knock away the barricades thrown up in their breach. Bang, bang, went the heavy guns, as quickly followed by the boom of bursting shell tearing up ponderous masses of the wall, and burying beneath them many of the defenders, while the smaller guns laid along the parapet right and left operated with deadly effect wherever the garrison appeared, or opened fire with their jingalls or musketry. By half-past twelve o'clock the new breach was rendered practicable, and the signal was given to the Imperialists to storm at the old one. On rushed the 4th Regiment of Anglo-Manchoo mercenaries, bravely led by Colonel Howard, and forward came the Ti-pings to the breach, determined and daring, to be mowed down in heaps by the terrible covering fire of the artillery; but no sooner down than their place was filled by their followers rushing with unabated courage to the defence. In the words of the officer whose narrative we are making contribute to this history:—The edge of the city ditch was gained, and over went the 4th Regiment's colours, accompanied by Colonel Howard, Captain Cane (R.A.), and Lieutenant Stackpole, and up the breach through a shower of missiles and fire-balls. Then came that deadly pause, the colours waving on the breach, defended by a few brave men. The defenders and assailants hesitated. They stood at bay for a moment. The "celestial" nature shrank from the dread conflict hand to hand. The officers attempted to break the spell: they pushed their men, they pulled them, they beat them with their swords, but in vain. The Ti-pings, fighting for life, sooner recovered their presence of mind, and every man discharged his missile on the heads of the assailants. The colours and their defenders were pushed off the wall down the breach, and had to retire over the bridge on their column. A murderous fire was poured from every loop-hole, men were falling fast, yet the attacking force stood its ground, but hesitated to advance to where it would have been comparatively safe, being too low for the aim of the besieged. The retire was now sounded, and the stormers fell back to cover.

The Ti-pings suffered terribly from the superior arms of their assailants, and now that they had succeeded in repulsing them a second time, they were swept from the shattered walls by the artillery, which still continued to fire on them. At half-past two o'clock in the afternoon the enemy were ready at both points of attack for a simultaneous movement. Up went their signal rockets, a yell burst from the ranks of Gordon's force, which was taken up and carried along the Imperialist lines, and on came both storming parties at a rapid pace. The 3rd Regiment of the English contingent now made the assault, and their colours were borne up the breach by Captain Winstanley (H.M.'s 67th Regiment), and other officers rallying around them and fighting hand to hand with the defenders. The Imperialists crossed their bridges, crowded at the foot of the other breach, and waved their flags about, but hesitated to mount it. With their bamboo spears, and undiminished courage, the brave garrison rushed to meet their well-armed enemy, while all who possessed firearms plied them diligently from the walls, and others kept up an incessant volley of brickbats from the heaps piled ready for use around the rampart, and which formed a principal means of defence. Still Gordon's troops maintained their position on the walls, and, if possible, began to increase the extent of their lodgment, whilst the Ti-pings were falling fast from the musketry of the enemy, which they had but small means to answer. At this critical moment the Foo-wang headed a last desperate charge in person. Leading forward all his unwounded men, this gallant chief inspired them with fresh ardour, while the efforts of the assailants began to flag. As one present stated: The contest every moment became more close, and was prolonged for at least twenty minutes. At length the stormers were driven from the ground they had gained, and hurled to the bottom of the breach. Several times they struggled to mount again, but every attempt was futile. The rear ranks of the enemy being under the fire from the wall, lost heavily in killed and wounded, while the front ranks, so desperately opposed, could not advance. The order to retire was now given, and the assaulting forces were withdrawn to cover, while their artillery again swept the breach with canister, shell, and grape, inflicting fearful havoc among the dauntless garrison of Chang-chow. During all this time the Imperialists had hurried on column after column to assault by their own breach, but none were able to effect a lodgment within the well-defended walls of the city. Every attack was repulsed with great slaughter upon both sides, and at last the bravest of the late General Ching's—he had died from the effects of a wound in the head received at Kar-sing—Mandarins advanced with his men, but though he passed the sticking point and got his colours partly into the breach, yet he too was brought to a stand and obliged to retire. The assault was now abandoned, and the besiegers carried off their killed and wounded, including 27 European officers, 400 of the English contingent, and about 1,500 Imperialists.

Although the Ti-pings were victorious, and had succeeded in defeating every attack upon the city, their triumph was only purchased by an awful sacrifice of life. When the stormers mounted the wall a fearful sight was before them. "Far as the eye could see, heaps upon heaps lay dead and mangled." During the different assaults at least one half the garrison were placed hors-de-combat, principally by the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery, which they were totally unable to countervail, having none to reply with. Chang-chow being completely surrounded by the vast Imperialist army, its fall, either by famine or the sword, was certain.

Having established fresh batteries at a different part of the city, on the 11th of May the enemy succeeded in capturing it. Upon this occasion two immense breaches were made, while the incessant artillery fire, and the overwhelming rush of the enormously superior assailing force over the wide-spread ruins of the wall, quickly overpowered the last gallant resistance offered by the remnant of the garrison. A comparison of the casualties of the English contingent at each attack affords the best proof that the terrible results of the first had almost exterminated the defenders. At the first attack the contingent lost 27 officers and 400 men; at the second, only 2 killed and 5 wounded! When the Imperialists poured through the two fresh breaches, the best and bravest of the remaining Ti-ping soldiers sacrificed themselves in the futile effort to repulse them, while their comrades, although fighting desperately to the last, were driven from the walls, and then through the streets of the city, still disputing the ground step by step. At last the few survivors were brought to bay in the commandant's palace. Throughout all the fighting the brave Foo-wang had been foremost in leading and encouraging his troops, and now, still unwounded, with several officers and a score or two of men, he made a last desperate stand in his own house. One by one his few followers—unable to conquer, but determined to die with their faces to the foe and their hands raised to the last in defence of their noble cause—fell around him, and then for a moment he fought alone against a host of assailants. Still he was not killed, for a price was fixed upon his capture alive. At length this dauntless chief, whose acquaintance I have valued, and whose elegist I am proud though grieved to have become, was overpowered by numbers and beaten to the ground, though not until many an enemy had fallen under his heavy sword. Even when disarmed and helpless in the grasp of the foe, he still struggled against a fate that would never have befallen him but for the unexpected, irresistible, and unrighteous military interference of England. One report of the capture of Chang-chow (China Mail, May 30) states:—"The chief (Foo-wang) of those who were in command of the city, fought in his palace to the last, and required ten men to bind his hands and secure him; and, when brought into the presence of the Futai, refused submission or to pay any respect to him, saying, 'Ah! were it not for the aid of the disciplined troops (under Gordon) he defied all the Futai's hosts to take the city from him.'" If the British army, arsenals, and navy had been thrown open to supply the young and vigorous revolution, instead of wasting their help upon the corrupt and hopeless Manchoo, how great would the success and future results have been! With all the British assistance the Imperialists have barely been able to drive the Ti-pings from their cities and possessions in the provinces of Che-kiang and Kiang-nan, much less to suppress the great Christian and patriotic movement, or insure its final extinguishment.

The Foo-wang was cruelly put to death by his merciless captors. "The two breaches were carried in a rush, and quarter was given to only a few hundred men;" so says the report above quoted from. How many days the triumphant Mandarins were engaged butchering the unfortunate inhabitants does not transpire; but, with the exception of the small number mentioned, the whole 12,000, besides the garrison, with their families, were massacred. Two years' provisions were found in the city, and this being stored in the Ti-ping granaries, was the entire produce of the district, and was the sole means destined to support the people during the ensuing season. The whole supply was seized by the Imperialists; and though previous to their success much misery had been caused by the general effect of the war, after their capture of the departmental city the entire department was starved; such being the usual result of Manchoo re-establishment in any locality, and particularly so at Chang-chow-foo, as proved by the letter of the first English-contingent officer in Chapter XXIII.

We have now noticed four authenticated instances (the captures of Wu-see, Kar-sing-foo, Hwa-soo, and Chang-chow-foo), subsequent to Gordon's return to service, when the conditions upon which Sir F. Bruce gave his approval to that officer's action were violated by the wholesale massacre of the vanquished and prisoners. We may, therefore, while expressing boundless disgust at Colonel Gordon's persistent continuance in the Futai's service after each and every one of these atrocities, fairly presume that the astounding assertion as to his influence in favour of humanity—in spite of the eulogy by Mr. Montgomery Martin at a late "China dinner" in London, wherein he stated that the officer in question had done more for the "civil cause" in China than all the bishops, merchants, and military put together—is not only negatived, but quite reversed.

Soon after the capture of Chang-chow-foo, Colonel Gordon was compelled to withdraw from active military operations by the Order in Council, prohibiting further aid to the Manchoo. He managed, however, to continue acting contrary to the ordinance, by organizing camps of instruction and proceeding to Nankin in person, there to advise the besieging forces commanded by Tseng-kwo-fan.

About the time the events noticed in this chapter were taking place in China, in England the energetic opposition of such men as Lord Naas, Colonel Sykes, Hon. Mr. Liddell, Mr. White, Messrs. Bright, Cobden, &c., from their places in the House of Commons, drew attention to the subject, and will ever stand as a memorable protest against the criminal policy of the Government.

During the second debate of the session on "British relations with China" (May 20, 1864), Mr. Baxter, M.P., very happily termed the policy of the Government "not a comedy of errors, but a tragedy of errors." Lord Palmerston, in this case, defended his policy by a very extraordinary argument, which it is singular that his opponents did not use to his confusion. Coming out as the advocate of intervention in foreign affairs, he stated, as a justification of his war against the Ti-pings:—

"We have interfered in other countries, and with great benefit to those countries.... We interfered in the case of Greece, and established the independence of the Greek state. We interfered in the affairs of Belgium, and established it as an independent state. We interfered in the case of Portugal, and enabled the people of that country to obtain a free and parliamentary constitution. (Hear, hear.) We interfered in the affairs of Spain with equal success, and a similar result.... We interfered in a great measure in those events which led to the Crimean war.... We interfered in the affairs of China; and why? Because our treaty rights were endangered, and our national interests were at stake."

Now, the noble Premier here cites a number of precedent cases; unfortunately, however, for his argument and acumen, on each occasion referred to, England, as worthily became her, interfered in the cause of an oppressed people; whereas, in the present case, he had been the active originator of an intervention diametrically the very opposite—a military interference against the oppressed natives of China, who were striving to liberate and Christianize their unfortunate country. If Lord Palmerston had interfered in the spirit of the cases which came so glibly to his voluble tongue, he would have interfered to support the Ti-pings—not to slaughter them.

After striving to justify his policy by precedents which should have entirely reversed it, Lord Palmerston was equally unhappy in his faulty explanation of the reasons "why" he interfered in China. As the Hon. Mr. Liddell, M.P., well said in his speech after the Premier, "The noble Viscount said that the Government interfered because the treaty rights were in danger. He wanted to know in what single instance had our treaty rights or our trade been in danger? He had asked that question before, and he now repeated it. (Hear, hear.) He wished to know any instance in which either the property or the life of a British subject had been placed in danger?"

Every member of the British Parliament, who questioned the China policy of the Government, has asked the same question. It has never been answered, because there is really not a single fact on which to base an answer. Colonel Sykes, M.P., has frequently defied and challenged the Government to cite one act ever committed by the Ti-pings prejudicial to British interests, and they have been quite unable to do so; for none are upon record.

Those who have been interested enough to wade through the compiled portion of this work will, no doubt, at once perceive the truthlessness of Lord Palmerston's charge against the Ti-pings, viz., that they endangered the treaty rights and national interests of England. No particle of truth mingles with the unfounded charge; no tittle of proof has ever been produced to justify the undeclared hostilities perpetrated against a friendly people which were consequent on it.

Besides this, the venerable Premier was no less unfortunate with each proposition he chose to base his arguments upon. To prove the cruelty of the Ti-pings, he stated:—

"A steamer, called the Firefly, was carried off, and four or five men, who were upon the vessel, were roasted to death.

"Colonel Sykes.—'By whom?'

"Lord Palmerston.—'The Taepings.'

"Colonel Sykes.-'No, no!'"

Now, by the above extract from the Standard's report of the debate, we find that the Prime Minister's vivid imagination positively roasted the men whose fate has never yet been ascertained even in China. They are referred to in Chapter XXIV. of this work, but whether they are living or dead, and, if dead, how they were killed, are questions which have never yet been satisfactorily answered; and, from the mystery in which the fate of the unfortunate men is involved, probably never will be.

Again, in a feeble effort to vaunt the duration and existence of the Manchoo dynasty, and, consequently, to make it appear that the Ti-pings were not striving to expel a foreign rule of comparatively modern establishment (which has never been entirely acknowledged nor submitted to, which has always been rebelled against, and which is still foreign to and hated by the Chinese), but, on the contrary, were simply rebels against an ancient and legitimate throne, Lord Palmerston made another very singular and important mistake. He tried to be satirical in commenting upon the excellent speech made by Mr. Baxter, M.P., who brought on the debate, by stating:—

"My hon. friend says he has studied the Blue Books, but I apprehend that he has not equally studied the history of China. He talks of the Imperial dynasty as having been recently established over a conquered country; and, if I am not misinformed, I think it has existed for nearly 500 years."

Well, the noble Premier was misinformed, and very much so, too. The Manchoo Tartars invaded China A.D. 1644; they had not established themselves as its masters before the year 1683. It was, doubtless, very funny and gratifying to chaff a troublesome member out of countenance, but still there must be some people who expect the Chief Minister of the British Government to be pretty accurate in the statements he makes from his place in the House of Parliament.

We will now notice a few incidents of the next, and last, debate on China; when the late Mr. Cobden, on the evening of May 31, 1864, rose to move in the House of Commons:—

"That, in the opinion of this House, the policy of non-intervention, by force of arms, in the internal political affairs of foreign countries, which we profess to observe in our relations with the states of Europe and America, should be observed in our intercourse with the Empire of China."

Mr. Cobden, after making a truly magnificent and exhaustive speech, was replied to by Mr. Layard, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Out of the many distinguished Members who followed, only one, Mr. Gregson, supported the policy of the Government; and he, by faintest praise and three minutes' unmeaning talk, proved but a poor champion, if he did not make a worse case for his superiors.

At the termination of the debate, Mr. Cobden withdrew his motion because Lord Palmerston distinctly avowed the failure and abandonment of his policy of intervention in China, and declared his intention to preserve an entirely neutral, defensive attitude in future.

The faithlessness and falsehood induced by the evil course adopted by the British Government in persistently endeavouring to carry out Lord Palmerston's pertinacious, crotchety, unrighteous policy to force British trade upon China (which involved the necessity of crushing the Imperial power, and then that of the Ti-ping revolution which would have succeeded it, so that, in fact, the British Government could dictate its whims without fear of refusal or opposition) were singularly exemplified during the debate referred to.

We have seen that in the preceding debate Lord Palmerston plainly and frankly declared:—

"We interfered in the affairs of China; and why?"

Now, Mr. Layard, when replying to Mr. Cobden's speech, stated:—

"Her Majesty's Government had been accused of supporting the Chinese" (Manchoo) "government against the Taipings. [Cries of hear, hear!] He had pointed out that such was not the case."—He then qualified this sentence by saying,—"Beyond our preventing the Taepings entering the treaty ports FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM, a course which we were compelled to take."

First, Mr. Layard denies the interference declared by Lord Palmerston, and then he admits it, attempting to justify the policy by the sweeping assertion in capitals. Now, if the ministers were "compelled" to prevent the Ti-pings entering the treaty ports, how is it that they were allowed to capture and occupy the treaty port of Ningpo? And now, to impugn Mr. Layard's veracity, if the Ti-pings endeavoured to enter the treaty ports "FOR THE PURPOSE OF DESTROYING THEM," how is it that they held the city of Ningpo for many months and did not destroy the least particle of property within its walls?

Mr. Layard's fault is a common one, only in an uncommon position. He knew that the policy of the Government was wrong, he knew that he was wrong himself, and besides occupying the pugnacious position of buffer or breakwater to the Foreign Office, he did not like to admit it. Poor Mr. Layard's situation must be an unpleasant one sometimes. He has unpleasant work to do. Undoubtedly he has an irritable temper and a sharp tongue, but it is rather unfortunate that he has a bad memory. After stating that her Majesty's Government had not been interfering, "such was not the case," beyond preventing the destruction of the treaty ports, and affirming, "the hon. gentleman the member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter), the other evening, after condemning the policy of the Government, concluded by expressing a wish, that the Government would continue to defend the treaty ports and protect British interests in China. That was what the Government had been doing all along." After thus expressing himself, Mr. Layard declared, "His hon. friend had really condemned a state of things in China which no longer existed." That is to say, Mr. Layard firstly stated that the hostilities waged against the Ti-pings were only to protect British interests; in fact, simply a defensive policy; and, secondly, he stated that such policy "no longer existed." Therefore, the natural deduction is that the British Government ceased to protect British interests at the treaty ports; such, however, was not and is not the case. The change that took place was the abandonment of the policy "of supporting the Chinese (Manchoo) Government against the Taepings," and the cessation of further aggressive military and naval operations against them. This was satisfactorily proved by the Premier's speech, who sadly contradicted his subordinate's defensive theory, as the following extracts from it will show:—

"Now, it is almost unnecessary, I think, for them" (the members who had spoken against his policy) "to have expressed their opinion with regard to the expedition of Captain Osborn, and the employment of Major Gordon and others, because we have stated on former occasions that those Orders in Council under which those officers were employed" (by the Manchoo Government; how about Mr. Layard's "such was not the case"?) "have been revoked.... Therefore that policy is at an end." (Now the following is a plain avowal of what Mr. Cobden brought his motion against.) "I think that we were perfectly justified in the steps we took, because it is evident that the more we can contribute to the internal classification of China, the more the trade, which everybody agrees is the main and principal object of our going to China, the more that trade would flourish....

"If, by allowing a British subject to enter into the service of the Emperor of China,[77] we have been the means of strengthening the hands of the Chinese Government, and enabling them to put down in any degree or diminish the scope of that rebellion, I say we should have been rendering not only a service to China, but promoting those objects to which alone our intercourse with China ought to be confined.[78] Those measures have failed, and I am sorry for it."

After this expression of opinion it is by no means surprising to find the Premier declaring a little further on, in the same speech: "I say it is the duty of this country to endeavour by all the means in her power to extend her commerce." Under these circumstances it is not difficult to account for the intervention in China, and while Englishmen, who have any respect for the principles of right and justice, may regret their late lamented statesman did not say, "by all the" righteous or legitimate "means in her power," they cannot fail to feel gratified that "those measures have failed," even though the originator of the measures, their late popular and jaunty minister, was "sorry for it."

Those measures have failed! it is true. They have failed miserably; they have failed to work good, but not to do harm. England has derived no benefit from them, China has received much evil. The schemes to Anglicise the Chinese army, navy, and civil service have failed; the efforts to extinguish rebellion against the Manchoo allies of the British Government (after the last war had rendered them quite powerless and docile for the time being) have likewise signally failed, for rebellion is more rife than ever: but "those measures" have been famously successful in causing an enormous sacrifice of life, in injuring the cause of Christianity and civilization, and obstructing its progress in China for the present.

The failure of Lord Palmerston's policy came all too late for rectifying the evil already perpetrated. Within two months of his public announcement that the measures of his administration had failed, Nankin, the capital and the political strength of the Ti-pings, fell into the hands of the Imperialists. Assisted, as we have described, by the powerful, though underhanded, British alliance, the Manchoo forces were enabled to capture or isolate every city beyond the capital. When Chang-chow-foo was taken by the Englishman Gordon, the neighbouring cities of Tan-yang, Kin-tang, &c., became untenable, and were consequently evacuated by their garrisons. Under command of Le-shih-seen, the Shi-wang (the Chung-wang's cousin, sometimes figuratively referred to as his "brother"), were also the troops from Hang-chow (capital of Che-kiang), Kar-sing-foo, Yih-shing, Li-yang, and many smaller places. Between these forces and Nankin the vast army commanded by the Imperialist Le-Futai now intervened, but their communication with the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, at the south of the Ta-hoo lake, and strongly garrisoned by several wangs, was still intact.

Unable to advance against the superior forces of the enemy, much less to reach Nankin and endeavour to rescue it from the besieging army of Imperialists under Tseng-kwo-fan, at least 80,000 to 100,000 strong, the Shi-wang commenced what seems to have been a preconcerted retreat to the south. This occurred during the month of June.

Shortly afterwards, on the 19th of July, 1864, Nankin reverted to Manchoo authority. Thus the city which had been the capital of the great Ti-ping revolution and the head-quarters of its Government during more than eleven years, and which throughout that period had defied the strongest efforts of the rulers of the greatest and most populous empire in the world, succumbed at last through the unjustifiable hostilities and crotchety, bullying, meddlesomeness of the British Government or some of its members.

Again, soon after this overwhelming disaster, the Ti-ping forces at Hoo-chow-foo, after soundly beating their immediate adversaries, evacuated that city, and followed in the rear of the Shi-wang's army, if they did not join it during the nearly simultaneous retrograde movement. During the months of May, June, July, and August, 1864, the remnants of Ti-pingdom continued retreating to the southern provinces.

We must now consider for a moment the loss of Nankin. Of the two other events—the retreat of the Shi-wang's army and the retreat from Hoo-chow—it is needless to say much, as these fugitives are well known to be safe, and at present advantageously disputing the enemy in the south of China.

The only records of the fall of the Ti-ping capital are those of Imperialist origin, and the lying proclivities of the whole body of Manchoo officials are too well known to need comment.

The following particulars are condensed from the Mandarin reports; they cannot be depended upon except to a very limited extent, and are, therefore, succeeded by a version I have deduced from almost every source of European information in China, comprising the Shanghae and Hong-kong press, and intelligence gathered for me by friends on the spot. Besides this, I have carefully traced the progress of events since the fall of Nankin till the present moment, and have found my former experience of much value in disentangling contradictory and confused statements.

The Imperialist accounts of the capture of Nankin are to the following effect:—

On the 17th of August news reached the besieging army that the Tien-wang had committed suicide by swallowing gold-leaf. The Imperialists now pushed on their works more rapidly than before, and on the 19th of the same month, having run an enormous mine under the north-east gate, they fired it, and completely destroyed a portion of the wall, about one hundred and twenty feet in length. It is also reported that 68,000 pounds of powder were used in the explosion.

The Imperialists stated that they lost 5,000 killed and wounded in the breach, but, as the North China Market Report observed, "for this assertion there is not the slightest foundation, as on the day following the assault there remained no trace of a struggle." In similar style they declared that their losses while storming the Tien-wang's palace were immense, but, as the European journals say, "This assertion is in like manner utterly false. The gate must have been forced with little or no difficulty, or quietly given up, and the very citadel of Taepingdom was in the hands of the enemy."

Now, after having poisoned the Ti-ping king with gold-leaf, the enemy very curiously burned him to death.

Immediately after the capture of Nankin, Mr. Adkins, H.M. Consul at Chin-kiang, proceeded to the city on board M.M.S. Slaney, in order, as he expresses himself in his despatch to Earl Russell on the subject, "to congratulate the Chinese (Manchoo) Commander-in-Chief on the auspicious termination of his two years' siege." Well, the commander, or some of his followers, told the officious Mr. Adkins that when they made good their entrance into the city, "they found that the palace of the Tien-wang had been burnt to the ground."

What about the "immense loss" of the other version, in which they do such heroic deeds to capture the palace?

Mr. Adkins goes on to say "that the impostor (?) and his immediate attendants lie buried in its ruins."

The victors also reported that they captured the Chung-wang a few days later, and also the Kan-wang when they entered the city, finding him in the Tien-wang's palace. Chung-wang, they say, managed to leave the city with a number of followers, but was captured three days later by a body of cavalry sent in pursuit: this was the account given to Mr. Adkins. Another Imperialist version states that the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief was captured by some villagers a few miles from the city, through having given up his own white horse (celebrated for great strength and fleetness) to his young prince, the Tien-wang's son, and having compelled him to mount it and escape when he saw that at least a portion of his party must be captured. Certainly this seems very characteristic of the Chung-wang's brave, loyal, and generous nature, but then it is the only incident in the whole narrative which bears the appearance of truth and probability. Besides the above two stories of his capture, when the enemy obtained possession of Hoo-chow-foo, they reported that they had caught the Chung-wang there, and from that place a head, stated to be the great rebel general's, was sent over the country as a warning to the people.

As for the story of the Kan-wang's capture, there are several contradictory and apparently authentic statements: one by a certain Patrick Nellis, who personally saw the chief and talked with him at Hoo-chow (subsequent to the fall of Nankin), where it seems that he proceeded with an escort to communicate the loss or abandonment of the capital, and concert measures for the evacuation of Hoo-chow-foo as well.[79]

Besides the above reports, others were promulgated by the Mandarins, in which they defeated different Ti-ping armies en route for the south, killing thousands and tens of thousands of rebels and capturing many chiefs, among them the Shi-wang, who, singularly enough, still managed to be in command of the Ti-pings near Amoy, until within the last few months, when he retired to join other leaders farther inland. Confessions were produced which professed to be written by the penitent rebel leaders in their dungeons, while awaiting their turn to be disembowelled, or "cut into a thousand pieces"—a pleasing prospect, of course likely to make the destined victims suddenly feel inspired with love and respect for the benevolent Manchoos, whom they had so vigorously opposed all their lives! Among these seemingly fabricated confessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is a lengthy composition, entitled, "The autographic deposition of Chung-wang, the faithful king, at his trial after the capture of Nankin." Were it not for the known mendacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the prestige of the revolution by representing its principal leaders as in their merciless power, there would be little doubt but that the one in question was genuine. In 1852, previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the "Confession of Tien-teh," pretending that it was the deposition of the leader of the rebellion, whom they falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite probable that the "Chung-wang's deposition" is of similar truthlessness, and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have been pardoned in consequence), and the cunning writers attached to the Governor-General of the two Kiang, Tseng-kwo-fan. Still it must be admitted that many portions of the alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth (in so far as historical events, data, &c., are concerned), but expressions closely resembling the well known sentiments of the great Ti-ping general; so that if, as we trust, he was not the author, some one pretty intimately acquainted with him must have been. However, some facts tending to support the theory (for there is no direct proof in any case except the Shi-wang's movements subsequent to the fall of Nankin) of the Chung-wang's escape, will be given in the course of our narrative.

Having noticed the Imperialist reports, it is now necessary to give the following digest of the events referred to, and which may be depended upon as the only possible version to be derived from the existing and attainable sources of information:—

It is known that when the Chung-wang became convinced England was determined to persist in prosecuting hostilities against his people, and likewise felt their inability to cope with the foreign power, he at once decided upon the best military movement under the circumstances—namely, an entire abandonment of all accessible possessions, and a retreat into the interior, where British hostility could not reach them, and where no Manchoo forces could either prevent their operations, restrain their consequent reinforcement, or impede their future progress.

Before parting with the Chung-wang, I was myself present at several councils when the above plan was discussed, and unanimously agreed to by every chief present. But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief from acting with his usual brilliancy of conception and wonderfully successful rapidity of execution; it was the Tien-wang, who refused even to listen to any proposal to abandon his capital.

Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the Ti-ping king in various ways. Some will look upon it as sheer, downright folly; others, as the useless, fanatical sacrifice of a bigot; while some may consider that that great, heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the capital of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death rather than turning backwards on the grand path. If we ascribe to the Tien-wang motives partaking equally of the three traits—nobleness, fanaticism, and rashness—we shall probably be pretty near the truth.

At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to entertain the only plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping power, and the perpetuation of his dynasty, seemed possible. All the court officers, cabinet ministers, and other high authorities of Nankin, were blindly subservient to the will of their king, and equally infatuated with his religious and temporal command. Besides, many of those about him were of the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, not only followed implicitly his wishes, but jealously formed themselves into a clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other more capable and independent officers. All the fighting Wangs were outside the capital, and incessantly engaged with the enemy; few troops were in garrison, while many thousands of helpless non-combatants daily diminished the stores of the failing granaries; and if the multitudinous besieging army, encamped and fortified all round the devoted city, had been animated with the slightest particle of courage or military spirit, they might easily have captured it many months before it eventually fell through starvation, or was evacuated by the troops.

The Chung-wang, after his separation from myself at Wu-see, proceeded direct to Nankin vi Chang-chow-foo. His only object was to save the king and his own family (living with his aged mother, whom he loved with excessive filial tenderness), by inducing them to leave the untenable city. He, alone, proposed the unpalatable manoeuvre to the Tien-wang, whose severe displeasure he had already incurred, being punished in various ways—by deprivation of titles, refusal of audience, accusation of disloyalty, &c. How the time (December, 1863, to 19th July, 1864) was passed, from the arrival of the Chung-wang to the fall of the capital, unless the professed "autographic deposition" be true, or the garrison really abandoned the city and escaped, will probably never be known to history. Either, as the "deposition" states, the whole city petitioned against the departure of the renowned commander, or he personally elected to remain, rather than desert his king in the hour of death and darkness, even though such calamity might have been avoided but for the fatal perverseness of the monarch; perhaps both causes operated to confine him to useless inactivity within the walls of the doomed city—inevitably doomed, and encircled by the numberless siege works of the enemy as with a band of impenetrable steel.

How the poor people, fated by the passive stubbornness of their rulers, must have gathered together round their great warrior, as men will rally about a tower of strength; how the unnumbered thousands of helpless non-combatants must have rejoiced at the presence of him whose very name was an army, a bulwark to his people, and a terror to the enemy; how bitterly must the brave, energetic soldier have grieved and chafed at the unnecessarily-incurred annihilation, and growing horrors of the siege, which should have been avoided; but, alas! how could one great man, without means, save a people, a sacred cause, and a city invested by 100,000 savage foemen?

Loyalty and filial duty brought the "faithful prince" to Nankin; the same motives bound him there to await destruction, when his presence in the field—at the head of his own army, left under command of his cousin, the Shi-wang—would have proved invaluable, and would surely have placed the Ti-pings in a much better position than they occupied at the close of the year 1865.

Nankin fell at last. All that is positively known by Europeans—apart from false, garbled, and exaggerated Mandarin sources—may be summed up in few words:—Frightful privations were endured before the enemy took possession; and when the city was entered by Mr. Consul Adkins, and other gentlemen, the streets and houses were literally blocked up with the bodies of the dead, by far the greater portion having the appearance of death from starvation; and many being very far advanced in decomposition, proved that, long before the Imperialists found courage enough to blow an opening through the undefended walls, the unfortunate people had succumbed to famine faster than the living could bury the dead—in fact, it was evident that no such effort could have been successful from the numbers who had daily perished.

Mr. Adkins, in his despatch to Earl Russell, places the number of people slaughtered by the Imperialists on their entry at 10,000; but other visitors state as many as 30,000, which is probably nearer the truth.

It is also certain that many chiefs with their followers left Nankin in safety. A successor to the Mo-wang, assassinated at Soo-chow, having afterwards appeared at Hong-kong; the Yu and Hsieh Wangs (the latter being one of the Tien-wang's brothers, and always attached to the court) being heard of in Kiang-si at the head of an army; while the following extract from the narrative of one Patrick Nellis, already referred to, and which was made on affidavit before the British Consul at Shanghae, seems to prove that the Ti-ping prime minister escaped from Nankin, and such being the case, undoubtedly there are strong grounds to believe the military leaders did likewise. In the evidence sworn to, Nellis, after describing an engagement with the Imperialists, states:—

"On our return to Hoo-chow-foo, Kang-wang arrived from Nankin with an escort. Great ceremonies were shown at his reception; he did not look as if he had suffered any hardship...."

In speaking of the evacuation of the city, Nellis makes the following statement:—

"Kan-wang spoke to me in English very slowly. He asked me what I was. I said, 'an Englishman.' He said he had never met a good foreigner, and asked me if I would go with him to Kiang-si. I said I should be very glad if Tow-wang (Commandant of Hoo-chow) would let me."

This conversation took place more than a month after the fall of Nankin, and a few days before the abandonment of Hoo-chow-foo on the 28th August, 1864. Upon the strength of such facts the Friend of China has steadily maintained that Nankin was abandoned by all but the poorest civilians when the Imperialists made their breach and marched through without opposition.

Another circumstance damaging to the veracity of the Imperialist reports, is a statement (contained in one of the Mandarin's inspired "confessions,") purporting to be that of the Tien-wang's son (the heir to the throne). The young prince is made to state that his father "succumbed to sickness on the 24th of May, 1864;" but of this all-important event the "Chung-wang's deposition" makes no mention. Here is an inconsistency which at once proves either one or both the "confessions" false; because, if the Tien-wang had really died, the Chung-wang would have been at liberty to carry out his own views and abandon Nankin; whereas his professed "deposition" states that, to the day the city fell, he was unable to do so in consequence of the Tien-wang's opposition.

The Friend of China also states that a Mr. Butler, of Shanghae, actually witnessed the withdrawal of the garrison. Moreover, adding together the few spared by the enemy, those slain and those destroyed by famine, we should even then scarcely have the number of destitute people—labourers, coolies, and friendless non-combatants—who were relieved by the Chung-wang alone during the early part of the year 1864, when he kept a list of about 80,000 dependent upon his resources and charity. In 1863 rations were daily issued to upwards of 400,000 people. At the period now referred to, when the Chung-wang shut himself up in the beleaguered city, the population, inclusive, was certainly not less than a fifth of a million, and, probably, far exceeded that number; therefore, even supposing that one-half (which is a large estimate) perished, were slain, or made prisoners, during and at the termination of the siege, how can we account for the 100,000 remaining, unless we believe that they had previously managed to effect their retreat from the city?

In the Friend of China, August 16, 1864, appears the following:

"We are still assured by parties who have means of knowing, that our first story of the evacuation of Nankin by its soldiery, before the Imperialists sprung their mine and rushed in, was the correct story; all those 30,000 massacred individuals told of by the Recorder (but not mentioned at the Asiatic Society with the "flushing of a pheasant") being inoffensive men, women, and children.

"The Chung-wang, it is said, is not dead. He is at Hoo-chow-foo, while the Tien-wang is still in the body."

The strongest support of the Imperialist statement of the death of the Tien-wang, and the capture and subsequent execution of the Chung-wang, is the fact that, since the fall of Nankin, nothing whatever has been heard of them elsewhere. On the other hand, however, it was supposed that one or the other was commanding the forces in the interior, acting in Fu-keen in concert with the Shi-wang when he occupied the city of Chang-chow, near Amoy, from October, 1864, to May, 1865: and what seems to lend force to this supposition is that he appeared to be acting under the orders of some superior farther inland; the only chiefs of higher rank being the King and his son, the Chung, Kan, I (several years absent in Sz-chuen), and Si Wangs—the latter being a young man (son of the original Western King) attached to the court at Nankin, and totally without authority in military affairs. Upon the whole, it is quite possible that the Ti-ping King, his son and heir, Prime Minister, and General-in-Chief, may have met with the fate ascribed to them by the enemy; still there is no positive proof, and there are good grounds for supposing that some, if not all, are yet living and directing the Ti-ping movements.

The siege of Hoo-chow-foo by the Imperialists was merely nominal, for, up to the abandonment of that city by the Ti-pings, they were never allowed within range of its walls, and were compelled to act almost entirely on the defensive, so repeated and vigorous were the attacks by the garrison and a corps of observation they had encamped outside the place on a neighbouring range of hills. Only a few days before the evacuation took place, the garrison succeeded in capturing a number of Imperialist stockades, several hundred gunboats, and three or four thousand men, besides inflicting heavy loss in killed and wounded; the Franco-Manchoo disciplined auxiliaries alone losing 6 officers and 800 men. Very soon after this victory, the evacuation was effected with consummate skill, the enemy not discovering that the Ti-pings had flown until the day after. The number of troops forming the garrison and encampment was very considerable, 50,000 being the lowest estimate;[80] their line of retreat was either through the province of Fu-keen or Kiang-si, and their destination is even yet unknown, none of the chiefs from Hoo-chow having been recognised anywhere since. It is, however, pretty certain that they acted in concert with the forces led by the Shi-wang, though keeping an inland position, while the latter advanced to the sea-board at Amoy.

The Friend of China, Sept. 8, 1864, under the heading,—"Another of the parties despatched by us a short time ago, to learn the real state of affairs about Hoo-chow-foo, has just returned,"—reports as follows:—

"The Chung-wang was in command up to the last.... Hoo-chow was evacuated.... Three days afterwards—we repeat—three days afterwards, Le Futai gallantly marched into the city with a thundering noise; and then what did he? The gates were closed, and then commenced a general sack, and the usual massacre of innocent individuals.... A laughable story is told of the second capture of the Chung-wang here, at Hoo-chow; his head—the veritable caput—with loud clamour of gongs, being sent round to all the villages, that people might behold the head of the arch traitor! Our reporter, wicked sceptic! loudly declares that the head said to be the Chung-wang's, truly sat on the shoulders, a week ago, of a man whose highest grade in life was that of a coolie!"

In the month of October, 1864, the residents of Amoy were suddenly surprised to hear that a body of Ti-pings, about 10,000 strong, had surprised and captured the city of Chang-chow, barely twenty miles inland, and situated on a river emptying itself into the sea at the Treaty Port.

From this reappearance of the Ti-pings close to a Treaty Port, we are enabled again to obtain some authentic records—many Europeans, including the British Consul, having visited them at Chang-chow. One English gentleman wrote the following account (which may be relied on as authentic) of his experiences to the Daily Press, and the same was reproduced in The Overland China Trade Report, 1st January, 1865:—

"A VISIT TO CHANG-CHOW.
"To the Editor of the 'Daily Press,' Hong-kong.

"Sir,—As you appear desirous to obtain information regarding the insurgents in this neighbourhood, I take leave to furnish you with the following result of my personal observations, which were derived in the course of a visit amongst them.

"The city and suburbs of Chang-chow are still occupied by the Taeping insurgents. About three-fifths of the whole city is burnt, and in the ruins may be seen the dead bodies of the late inhabitants, uninjured except by fire; not a wound could I see on any, which plainly shows, and as the rebels themselves affirm, that the inhabitants set fire to their dwellings themselves, and perished in them; having previously drugged themselves with opium rather than fall into the hands of the insurgents.

"Those portions of the city unburnt are occupied by the rebels, but there are many streets of Hongs, the doors of which are sealed up, uninhabited, and apparently full of merchandise. The rebels appear to be very numerous; I should estimate them at about 12,000; but they affirm themselves that they number 15,000. There are a great number of boys and youths among them, but I saw no women. They are much sunburnt, thin, and haggard in their appearance, and evidently have undergone much hardship before they took this city. I was told by many of them that they underwent extreme privations during their retreat from the north; that food of any kind, at many places, could not be obtained, on account of the country people being extremely hostile, and destroying everything as soon as they heard that the rebels were nearing them. That at several small towns on the borders of the Provinces of Che-kiang and Fokien human flesh was used for food; and that a peasant's body was retailed out at 80 cash per catty by the fortunate rebel who had killed him!

"The chief in command at Chau-chow is Tszle-wang,[81] brother to Chung-wang. He was at Ningpo during its occupation by the insurgents in 1862, and he commanded in the defence of that city when he was attacked and driven out by the British naval force, under Captain Dew. But he says he bears no animosity towards the British on account of it, as he is aware that Captain Dew was subsidized by the Chinese Government to retake Ningpo from the rebels. He professes the profoundest respect for the British nation for their bravery and power; and what he most ardently wishes is to be on friendly terms with her; and all that he requests is for her to act fairly up to her professed neutrality to both contending parties. He says that, should they not succeed in conquering the Imperialists, he would be most happy to see the country under British rule. He promised he would not venture nearer to Amoy than Chang-chow (which is about twenty miles distant), provided the Mandarins at Chau-bay, a town situated on the river, about half way between Amoy and Chau-chow, did not blockade the river, and cut off all native trade and communication with them. That, in case they did, he should be compelled to take Chau-bay. That he should on no account attack Amoy, as he did not wish to have any rupture with foreigners. That he was very sorry the trade of Amoy suffered on account of their occupation of Chau-chow. That he would be only too happy to open trade reciprocally with foreigners; and that he would grant them every privilege and protection. That he was willing to trade with them for any description of European goods and native produce in return. Opium was not interdicted. He has made a law to protect all native farmers and tradespeople, and this has been already felt by the country people who have opened a day market in one of the main streets of the south suburb; and, from daylight to dark, until the gates are shut, every description of native 'Chow-chow' is to be obtained. Tszle-wang told me that the establishing of this market, though doing a great deal of good to both parties, had led to many executions of both rebels and country people—the former on account of taking goods and not paying for them, and natives found in the city setting fire to houses and plundering; who, when caught, are taken before a rebel Mandarin, and, if found guilty, executed; as no rebel, under penalty of death, can take the life of any person, except in action. The rebels appear to be well armed with rifles, revolvers, and muskets. The Imperial soldiers in this respect are not to be compared to them, as their arms consist entirely of native matchlocks, gingalls, and spears, and not one in ten has even a matchlock; and they are a wretched lot of ragged rabble. On the other side, the rebels are very neatly dressed, more cleanly, and are drilled after European tactics. There are some Europeans amongst them, but I had no communication with them. They have entirely routed the Imperialists in every engagement they have had with them; and on the 2nd instant they came down on the Imperial lines 2,500 strong, the Imperial troops numbering 11,000; who have advanced to within about five miles of the city, to endeavour to protect the farmers, to gather in the standing crops of rice, which are in great abundance for many miles around the city, and which the rebels have gathered in and secured. The Imperials were encamped on both sides of the Rim, but their greatest force was on the right bank, behind a rugged hill, the inner extremity of which was crossed at right angles by a valley, which could have been easily protected by throwing up a few earthworks and mounting a few guns in them. Their weak point they could not see; and the rebels, taking advantage of the hilly ground in the neighbourhood to advance under cover during daylight, and, coming down the valley at dark, entered the Imperial camp about eleven p.m., without any warning being given. The Imperials were completely panic-struck; and having no retreat but by river, rushed to their boats in such numbers that many of them were swamped, and hundreds of soldiers drowned. Many of them ran and hid themselves wherever they could, and among the latter was the chief Mandarin in command. They offered little or no resistance; and the rebels, after killing 1,000 and taking 450 prisoners, destroying the camp equipage, returned to the city at daylight. Tszle-wang told me that his plan of campaign would be next to take the large and populous town of Tong-wah, and from thence march upon the district city of Chin-chew in the spring. That the amount of the whole rebel force in the province of Fokien under his command fell little short of 50,000 men; and hoping to increase it to 80,000 after the capture of Chin-chew, he should then endeavour to open communication with the British authorities, and arrange to take Foo-chow-foo.

"Tszle-wang appears to be a man of considerable calibre. He appears, for a Chinaman, to be well up in foreign politics, and conversant on many subjects that you generally find the Chinese most ignorant on. He is affable and engaging in his manner, and appears to treat those about him with kindness. He is thirty-one years of age; short, stout, and well-made; his face is much sunburnt, and complexion, say dark; any person might think he was of Malay origin, as he has both the features and colour of a Malay. That he is some strategist and has considerable military tact must be acknowledged by the manner he took the city of Chang-chow, before a rumour was even circulated of the rebels being anywhere near the place, or intending to capture it; and from the defeats the Imperial force has sustained in every engagement they have had with him, although in numerical strength the Imperial force has always been 3 or 4 to 1. I should like to pay another visit to the insurgents, but all foreigners are interdicted from visiting them, both by the Consuls and Mandarin authorities; in fact, we are now not even allowed to enter the river, which is only a mile and a half, and nearly twenty miles from Chang-chow, on the usual shooting excursions, wild fowl being very plentiful in the river, and which is our only amusement at this season of the year. The whole foreign community feel this to be very hard indeed, and consider it to be very arbitrary on the part of the Consul, as this place is extremely dull—no amusements whatever, our only recreation being in a picnic or shooting excursion up the river—but Mr. Pedder tries to make himself as unpopular as he possibly can, and he has told the Mandarins that they can arrest any foreigner they can find on the river under any circumstances whatever, and the Mandarins have threatened to decapitate any boatmen who may hire their boats to or take foreigners up the river. I also hear that the British Consul some few days ago issued a warrant to search the private dwelling of an English resident here for arms and munitions of war; and, if any were found, to bring him prisoner to the Consulate; but, happily, his suspicions were wrongly placed, as they found nothing of the kind in the gentleman's house whatever. Has a British Consul authority to search a gentleman's private dwelling whenever he may please, and set spies to watch the movements of a person to please the Chinese Mandarins? Really this is cringing or holding the candle to the Celestials, and taking away the liberty of the subject entirely; and if it goes any further, I cannot say how it may end.

"Your obedient servant,
"Veritas.

"Amoy, 14th December, 1864."

In a subsequent letter, describing another visit to Chang-chew, the same writer states:—

"The rebel campaign is about to be carried on with vigour in this quarter; of the 30,000 men collected in Chang-chow, not one-fifth are required to garrison the city. I heard from Tszle-wang myself that he should immediately detach 7,000, under Tsi-wang, to assist in the capture of Tong-san, and another force would be despatched simultaneously to attack Tong-wak and Chin-chew. The rebels (Ti-pings) are in possession of six cities in this part of the province of Fu-keen, and within a few days' march. The rebels told me that Tien-wang's son was at one of the cities."

The violation of the Queen's Order in Council (commanding neutrality to be observed after the Soo-chow massacre) by the British Consuls in China, is well shown by the previous letter of "Veritas." Besides the partisan acts therein complained of, six or seven English steamers were hired to the Mandarins at Shanghae to carry Imperialist troops to Amoy. They did so, and were well paid for the affair; but is this neutrality? Moreover, every kind of war material was freely supplied to them, and British officers were allowed to command some of the Imperialist troops (Colonel Kirkham, formerly with Gordon, and one Captain Macdonald being particularly noticed), while all supplies for, or communication with, the Ti-pings were forbidden and attempted to be cut off; but, notwithstanding, munitions of war, and some Europeans (including Colonel Rhode, Gordon's late Adjutant-General, and Colonel Williams, who had commanded one of the Anglo-Manchoo regiments) managed to reach the revolutionists.

Shortly after the capture of Chang-chew, the Shi-wang issued the following proclamations:—

"NOTIFICATION FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW.

"Notification from His Royal Highness Lee, Shee-king and Protector General, ordering the people to submit willingly and to continue their occupations.

"Whereas agriculture is the chief of the occupations of mankind, upon which people necessarily subsist, and whereas, since I rule this city I have always informed the people everywhere that they may continue their duties and occupations as usual—be it therefore known that those who submit to this government are called good people. Strict orders have been given to my officers and soldiers not to make any disturbance among the inhabitants, which orders you must have heard.

"But how is it that at present the fields are left uncultivated and all agricultural business seems to be entirely neglected? The plantations of sugar-cane are nearly ready for harvest, but will spoil if not cut, and the grains and paddy are nearly rotten, the reason of which we cannot comprehend. Probably the raising of arms is the cause of it, of which the people stand in awe, consequently they moved to their countries; or is the cause that at the time of fighting they are afraid that they may be implicated, that on this account they fled to other places? But the benevolent and just army will not destroy the good people; while they exterminate the wicked, they will not punish the innocent.

"Now two villages on the south and north have already submitted, they are settled as usual. You people should be diligent at all times in trade and agriculture.

"Further, in the four villages of that place, the sugar-canes may be converted into sugar and the grains be collected: if you do not immediately return and resume your occupations, then how will the people get their subsistence? Furthermore, the people who fled away have not paid their taxes due, being thus ignorant of the plan of seeking peace.

"I treat others with great liberality, and therefore again and again issue these notifications, intimating to you that all those who have fled away may quietly return to cut the sugar-canes and collect the grains, and those who have not paid their taxes must, with submissive mind, come and pay their taxes. You must not cherish any doubt or hesitation, nor have a different heart, otherwise you will too late repent what you have done. I protect the people as children, and look upon them as wounded; therefore, for more than a month since I have taken possession of the place, I have never allowed a single soldier or officer to go to any village to give trouble. Now all the regulations have been arranged and the laws rectified, and strict orders have also repeatedly been given to the army thus treating you people bountifully and kindly. When the superior is so affectionate, you inferiors should readily come and pay tributes.

"After this notification has been issued, if those who have not paid their taxes and still insist on their obstinacy by disregarding it, troops will be raised to punish them in order to warn those who are perverse and stubborn, without lenity. Every one of you must obey this command and not disappoint me of my affection to you.

"Lee-Shai-Yin,
Shee-king, and Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty.

"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 19th moon, 30th day."
Daily Press.

"ADDRESS FROM THE TAIPING CHIEF AT CHANG-CHOW TO THE TREATY POWERS.

"His Royal Highness Lee-Shai-yin, Shee-king and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty, to their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of England, France, United States, and the people of their respective countries.

"Since creation our Chinese Empire was first governed by Shinnung, then by the Emperors Yaw and Shun, who afterwards resigned their throne. Again the Emperors Tang and Mo attained to their throne by force of arms; then Dynasties Chun, Han, Ngai, and Tsiun transmitted their thrones to their respective posterity, and were succeeded by the Dynasties Tang, Sung, Yune, and Ming. It would be a matter of considerable difficulty, when referring to the distant generations, to repeat them all, but as a nation it had hitherto been in amity with all your various nations, no distinct border having been marked out. I was born late, and have not had the fortune to view these good prospects, and to enjoy the administration of the benevolent Government, but I have examined maps of the world, and studied the histories, and I am happy to possess a thorough knowledge of them, and the contents of which are as before me. For a man to guard a place, the watchword is to remember the fact that when the lips are cut off, the teeth will be endangered. To be in amity with adjacent countries, and for one to keep intercourse with neighbouring countries, it is essential not to forget the maxim of one large nation serving another small one. Of the history of China in counting back from the Dynasties of Ming and Yune, there have been innumerable successive revolutions of kingdoms who invariably paid tributes and presented precious stones to each other when due, and who never encroached upon other's territory. But the Tartars were of a different species, remarkable for their ravenous disposition, and for this reason, the central kingdom with the eastern provinces, in order to prevent their invasion, built the great wall. Unfortunately, during the latter part of the Ming Dynasty they were allowed to invade the interior, we became their victim, and have since been disgraced by them for these two centuries or more. Who then with common sense and natural patriotism would not strike his breast and weep? Even your various nations, in a practical point of view, are countries and in relation as lip to teeth, would not fail, I think, to hate them.

"Long had it been designed to raise the just standard, but in consequence of their being few in China who would support the movement, the design had for a time to be abandoned. Happily our Heavenly Father the Almighty God did not desert the descendants of Han (China), and hated the Tartars, and sent down my Lord who settled at Kinling[82] as a basis of operations for more than ten years, and during that period exterminated thousands and ten thousands of Tartars. My Lord had always been in friendship with the heroes and enterprising men of your various nations who carried on their respective trades as usual. Further, the provinces of Kwang, Cheh, Yu, and others have been opened, and the ministers and people of various nations have travelled and rambled, and trade has been carried on uninterruptedly as usual. Is this not excellent? In obedience to my Lord's command I have been ordered to extirpate and root out the Tartars. Recently I attacked and took Chang-chow, where I encamped my soldiers. Whilst there I was glad to hear that you were close by, and I would ere this have sent a despatch to you, but various difficulties were thrown in the way. I now write this and tell the people of Tai-po-tsz of Cha-chow to present it for your perusal, earnestly hoping that after reading, you will consider the importance of lip-lost-and-teeth-endangered phrase, and perceive the advantage of a large nation serving a small one; that you will support our just movement by combining together to put an end to the Tsing Dynasty, in order that the people may live in happiness, and your various natives enjoy peace. The doctrine of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and of Jesus Christ, teaches us that He is merciful, saving us, answering to prayers and unselfish—all mankind should look to future and believe in Christianity.

"Therefore, more than ten years before my Lord's accession to the throne, he believed in Christianity, as his conduct would show.

"He also received the Rev. Mr. Roberts, who preached the Gospel to the Chinese who believed and praised with him to God. We have welcomed your doctors, who cured many Chinese, and healed their diseases. We all feel grateful for their merciful kindness, and are under obligation for their favours. From this you will see that your nations and our Chinese in a universal point of view are as one. But the Tartars believe in Buddism, despise Christianity, and turn a dead ear to its doctrine. It may be argued that belief or disbelief rests with them, and they will afterwards reap the fruit of their conduct. Well, why then do they persecute Christian converts so that their lives are in jeopardy? Therefore my Lord reluctantly took up arms, raised an army, and coped with them. This has been going on for these more than ten years, and through the mercy of our Heavenly Father, the Almighty God, and Jesus Christ, and through the assistance of your various nations, my Lord has taken many cities and provinces, and killed many Tsing devils. Still to conquer and subdue an empire of eighteen provinces, combined with a strong army of Mongols and Chinese, who have ample munitions of war and provisions, must be extremely difficult.

"Let us learn from the ancients as well as the moderns that to lead an army to battle it is indispensable to have reinforcements; and to establish a kingdom it is essential to get assistance from the neighbouring countries. Your various nations and China are at present like lip to teeth, and similar to a large country serving a small one. Let me ask you that before my Lord settled at Kiang-nan, could you get admittance into the interior? Now you can ride from east to west and from north to south, and the provinces of Hupeh and Ngan-hoin have been opened to trade. If your various nations do not ally with me to exterminate the Tsing Dynasty, and in case our force being unable to cope with the Tartars, as we are deficient in naval power, we shall be conquered, then the result of lip-lost and teeth-endangered will soon follow. Therefore it is desirable that your various nations should embrace this opportunity as presented.

"If, on the other hand, your various nations, relying on the omnipotence of our Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ, and acting upon the doctrine of Christianity, will come to terms with us for destroying the Tsing Dynasty, if you command your naval armies and attack those places near the water, and whatever cities, districts, ports, and passes you will have taken and conquered by your force, you will be at liberty without the least hinderance on my part to keep them, and whatever treasures and food found therein, you will be at liberty to appropriate them. And so I will attack on land, and whatever cities, districts, and passes I conquer, and whatever treasures and food I find, I will divide, giving one half to you, and all the distant cities, ports, and marts will be surrendered to you.

"Thus having your naval armies, we can cross the ocean and bestride the rivers without obstacle or hinderance. Our army, I must confess, in its beginning is weak, and food is not plentiful; and unless your various nations lend a hand to assist me, the Tartars will be more ravenous and their ferociousness will be greater, and if once our army is subdued, they will as a matter of course come upon your various nations, when, it is clear, you will be precluded from trading and travelling in the provinces of Kiang, Kwang, Cheh, and Yu. I earnestly pray that you will despatch your soldiers and co-operate with me to exterminate the evil posterities, and that we all may obtain advantages. Hoping you will comply with my views is my earnest prayer.

"The statements I have made, though they are vulgar, I undertake to swear before heaven that I will keep them. Let us write in benevolence to accomplish our undertakings, then we shall make peace with each other, trade with each other from generation to generation, and enjoy together universal peace. Is this not the best plan? The city of Chang has been and is a rich place, at present both the soldiers and inhabitants are happy, trade is flourishing, and treasures are plentiful. I also earnestly request that you will convey merchandise and vessels containing all kinds of foreign cargo, and the caps, powder, &c., which will be sold immediately here. You have no occasion to fear that some of my men will take them without paying for them. I will make up the damages should they do so, and surely I will not break my promise!

"On the day of this epistle reaching you, you will favour me with a reply.

"With my best compliments to your gentlemen of your various nations,

"I am your obedient servant,
Lee-Shai-Yin,

"Shee-king, and Imperial Protector General of the Celestial Dynasty
"Taiping Celestial Kingdom, 14th year, 10th moon, 1st day."
Daily Press.

FOOTNOTES:

[75] See Friend of China, July 11, 1865.

[76] See the account from Shanghae Recorder, at the end of the preceding chapter.

[77] Referring to Colonel Gordon, Captain Osborn, R.N., and their subordinates.

[78] Meaning the noble occupation of buying and selling; and that, too, at the point of the bayonet.

[79] Times, January 12, 1865. China Overland Trade Report, 30th November, 1864.

[80] The Times, October 26, 1864, in its China intelligence (under date, "Shanghae, September 4"), describing the evacuation of Hoo-chow, makes the following statement, which is a further proof of the total or partial escape of the Nankin garrison:—"The rebel force had been so greatly swollen by fugitives from Nankin and other places, that it constituted quite a formidable army."

[81] The writer of the letter has evidently made a confusion of the name, Le, and title, Shi, of the chief, for the following proclamations prove him to be the Shi or Shee Wang.

[82] This must mean Nankin.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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