"On 27th November, after Major Gordon had all infantry (except 1st Regiment) and artillery assembled at Waiquedong, an order was issued that a night attack should be made on the Low-mun stockade, which formed the key to all other stockades on the east side of Soo-chow.

"White turbans were served out to all soldiers, so as to be able to distinguish them from the rebels, in case it should come to a hand-to-hand fight. About one o'clock Major Gordon himself, accompanied by Majors Howard and Williams, started with about two companies of men towards the stockade, leaving the remainder of the force behind already fallen in, so as to advance at a given signal. Everything seemed quiet, and in fact all thought the plan would succeed. After Gordon and his followers had been advancing close to the stockade, they found everything quiet, and no signs of the guards being aware of an attack. The remainder of the force, therefore, received orders to advance, while the advance guard had succeeded in climbing inside the breast-work. Scarcely were all troops up to the front and a portion of them crossing to reinforce Major Gordon, when the rebels began to direct a fire of grape, canister, and musketry on the force, which made every one shiver. The Quin-san artillery responded vigorously, and it was a fine spectacle to see fiery rockets and red-hot mortar shells going into the rebel works. But the rebels stood it gallantly, and did not retreat an inch. The whole line of stockade which the rebels held seemed one line of fire, and here Major Gordon perceived that Chinese are not fit to fight at night time, for all the begging and encouraging of the European officers could not make the troops try another attack; they seemed afraid of their own shadows. The only chance left therefore was to try and shell the rebels out of their position, and this was done till dawn of day, when Major Gordon, seeing the rebels still resisting desperately, and receiving thousands of reinforcements from the city, made good his retreat, leaving numbers of killed and wounded on the field. This was one of the most bloody fights the force encountered; and, judging by what the Quin-san force lost this night, the rebels must have lost tremendously. Still, the gallant fellows, encouraged by their brave chiefs, held their position manfully against a fire of about 20 guns, flying on them for about three hours. The loss of the Quin-san force was as follows:—Captains Wylie, 2nd Regt.; Christie, 4th Regt.; and Maule, 2nd Regt.; Lieut. King, 2nd Regt., killed. Major Kirkham severely wounded on the head; Lieut. Miok, 4th Regt., wounded in the shoulder; Major Tapp, wounded in the leg; and several more slightly, with about two hundred men killed and wounded. Major Gordon seeing this night attack frustrated, determined to pay the rebels off for it; and shortly after, on the 28th November, at night, all guns, about 46 in number, were brought in position within about 700 yards of this formidable stockade, and the infantry was to fall in near the guns at daylight on 29th of November, to make another attack. The rebels were quite prepared for it, for no sooner did they perceive all the artillery and infantry so near their works, than they hoisted their red flag as a sign that they meant to fight, and not give up this position so easy. Precisely at eight o'clock the signal rocket went up, and at once all guns sent forth their different missiles, some directing their fire on the Low-mun stockade, others directing their fire on the stockades lying to the right and left.

"The rebels seemed to preserve their ammunition, for but very little fire was encountered at first. The 8-inch mortars were playing havoc in the stockades, for every now and then houses, boats, etc., would be blown up in the air, under the cheers of the Imperialist soldiers, of whom thousands, under command of General Ching, were present, to support Gordon's force. Le Futai himself had taken up a place in rear, in one of the Imperial stockades, so as to witness the spectacle. About eleven o'clock the fire from both sides was furious, even the siege artillery had advanced within about one hundred yards of the rebel works, pouring forth grape at the rebels, who, however, inspirited by their noble leader, the Mo-wang, in person, stood it like European soldiers. The 5th Regiment, under Major Brennon, was now ordered up, to storm the stockade on the extreme right, near the Soo-chow creek, the most favourable point to cross the ditch; but although this brave regiment advanced with cheers, and some of the officers succeeded in crossing and trying to climb up the breast-works, the rebels defended this point desperately, and poured volley after volley of musketry into the ranks, so that after about ten minutes' struggle the 5th Regiment was obliged to retire, having lost several officers and men. This attack having failed, the bombardment was renewed with vigour, and orders given to the 3rd Regiment, under Major Morton, to go to the extreme left, to make feint of attack, so as to draw the attention of the rebels on that side. Gordon here succeeded beautifully, for scarcely had Morton and his regiment begun to engage the rebels on the left, when the Mo-wang, of course anticipating a real attack on that place, ordered his best men to defend it. Scarcely, however, had the Mo-wang's men moved on, than Major Williams, of the 2nd Regiment, made a dash at the place where Brennon had met with defeat, and not waiting for bridges, but swimming the moat, followed by several officers and men, succeeded in getting inside the breast-work, which no sooner had the rebels perceived than the whole fled in confusion into the Low-mun evacuating all the stockades along the east side of the city, and leaving a good number killed and wounded on the field. The stockades were soon occupied by Imperial troops, and thus Gordon's force was within one hundred yards of the city wall. The Quin-san force, however, paid dearly for this victory, their loss being Lieutenant Jones (Artillery), Lieutenant Williams, 5th Regiment; Captain Acgar, 4th Regiment, killed. Captain Shaml'sffel lost both eyes; and several more officers slightly wounded, with about 100 or 150 soldiers killed and wounded. The ground around the stockades was as if it had been ploughed by the shell, and no doubt the rebels deserve credit for having defended the place so long against such enormous artillery."

"The morning after the failure of the attack by night on the Low-mun stockades, General Ching came to me, and informed me that Nar-wang, Ling-wang, Kong-wang, and Pe-wang, with thirty-five Tien-chwangs[61] and their followers, had opened negotiations with him for the coming over of their troops; that these men composed their quarter of the garrison, and had possession of four out of the six gates of Soo-chow, viz., She-mun, Tcha-mun, Tche-mun, and Low-mun; and that he had entertained their views, and had already seen Kong-wang. He said that they would have difficulty in disposing of Mo-wang, who was averse to a surrender; but that, if we resumed our attack on the Low-mun stockades, they would endeavour to shut him out of the city. I consented to the defection with a good deed of pleasure,[62] as I considered that, if the rebels fought, we should lose heavily.

"On the night of the 28th November, Chung-wang arrived in the city from Wusieh, and was present at the combat of the 29th. His arrival made a change in the state of affairs, and the disaffected were unable to carry out their intention of closing the gates on Mo-wang. They, however, sent over three Tien-chwangs on the night of the 30th November, and proposed to remain neutral if we attacked the city, and would trust us not to touch their men or horses; their men to be distinguished by white turbans. These Tien-chwangs told us that Chung-wang, on his return to the city after his defeat, had proposed to vacate Nankin and Soo-chow, and for the whole Taeping force to go down to Kwang-si; and, in fact, give up the cause.[63] The Mo-wang was averse to this, and proposed to remain and fight it out. I have since learned that he was most anxious to see me, and I think to see what could be done. This I learnt from two Frenchmen who came out after his death, of whom more hereafter. The other Wangs did not meet the Chung-wang's views, as they intended coming over. Chung-wang then left the city, and proceeded to Wusieh. General Ching came to me on the 1st December, and asked me if I would like to see Nar-wang. I said no, unless it was necessary, and told Ching at the same time that, if the Futai did not grant the Wangs sufficiently good terms as to induce them to come over, I thought our attack on the city might be foiled,[64] as we had lost heavily in officers and men on the attack of 27th and 29th November; and a little hitch with the bridge, which had to be seventy yards long, might cause a repulse. I told Ching on the same day that I could not see the necessity of my seeing Nar-wang. He, however, pressed it, and I consented to meet him at the north gate that evening. I accordingly went, and met Nar-wang in General Ching's boat. His first words were 'that he wanted to obtain help from me.' I answered that I was most happy to help him, and then I told him that this proposal to remain neutral would be of no avail, and that I could not accept it, as I should be only deceiving him and his chief if I did so, inasmuch as, if the city fell by assault, I could not, with an undisciplined force such as the one I command, restrain them from looting every one; and that, therefore, unless they could give a gate, it would be better for them to fight, or else vacate the city. I then told the Nar-wang what I thought of the Taeping prospects, and the little chance of success. I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and rebels good friends (?); that, since the rise of the rebellion, the Imperialists had much changed; and did not dare, from fear of foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as heretofore (?). He said he would see with General Ching what he could do about the city, and that he had no fear of Mo-wang knowing of his having seen me, or of Chung-wang either; that he had enough troops to keep both in check. I then left, and General Ching told me the next day that Nar-wang had decided to see the other Wangs, and to consult on the course of proceeding. The next day, the 3rd December, General Ching told me that Mo-wang had some idea of Nar-wang's negotiations, and wanted to decapitate him, but that Nar-wang was prepared. Nar-wang also sent out to tell General Ching that the other Wangs agreed to come over, that he personally wanted no command, but merely permission to retire to his home with his property; but that some of the other Wangs wanted to get commands of different sorts. He told me further that Nar-wang had some difficulty in seizing Mo-wang. On the morning of the 4th December, General Ching came to me, and told me that Nar-wang had determined and agreed with him to get Mo-wang on the wall of the city, and to throw him down and hand him over to us as a prisoner. I went to General Ching, and told him I must have Mo-wang given over to me; to which he acceded willingly, and in fact joyfully, as he had known him in former days. I then went to the Futai, who was out, but I saw a very high Civil Mandarin named Pow, who undertook to tell the Futai that Mo-wang must be my prisoner. I told him to tell the Futai that I would secure his not giving any more trouble to China. I had not come back five minutes before General Ching sent me over two Frenchmen, who had just come into the lines. They told me that that afternoon, at 2 p.m., all the chiefs had been assembled in Mo-wang's palace, and after a dinner, they had offered up prayers and adjourned to the great court, and having put on their robes, crowns, &c., Mo-wang mounted his throne and began an address, in which he stated their difficulties, and expatiated on the fidelity of the Kwang-si and Canton men. The other Wangs answered him; the discussion got higher and higher, till Kong-wang got up and took off his robe. Mo-wang asked him what he was doing, when Kong-wang drew a dagger and stabbed Mo-wang in the neck.[65] The Mo-wang fell over the table in front of the throne, and the other Wangs seized him, and decapitated him in the entrance. They then mounted their horses and rode off to their troops; Mo-wang's head being sent to General Ching. Mo-wang's men and the other troops looted the palace. There was no fighting in the city till the morning of the 5th, when the Nar-wang's men had some trouble with the Cantonese, and drove them out of the city, killing some 50 or 60 of them. General Ching's men advanced, and with a small body, took charge of the Low-mun, my men being kept fallen in, as they were under stricter discipline than the Imperialist soldiers are. On the night of the 4th December the rebels all shaved their heads. I went to the Futai, and telling him that it would not do to let my men remain idle, proposed to him to march on Wusieh, if he would give the men compensation of two months' pay, as they had received no reward since I had taken the command. He objected to it, and I told him if he could only promise, the matter could be settled well. He still objected, and I then told him I should leave his service,[66] and went myself to the city. The Imperialists had some men straying about, but not many. I went straight to Nar-wang's house, and saw him and all the Wangs. I asked him if all was right. He said that everything was satisfactory, and appeared quite secure. He had not seen Ching at the time. I went to Mo-wang's palace, and the body was where it had fallen. I then went out of the city, and arrived in time to see General Ching, who came to me on the part of the Futai to arrange matters. It was now 4 p.m. I told General Ching that I was helpless in the matter. The colonels of regiments and the officers had little authority over them unless they used the harshest means, which they would not do in this question. General Ching offered one month's pay, and the officers refused it. I told Ching that it was not my intention to accept anything; but that I felt that after the length of time the force had been fighting it was only right the men who wished to leave should have the means of doing so. Matters began to look bad, and I at last determined to make the men accept the one month's pay, which I did with difficulty, the men having made an attempt to march down on the Futai. I then, at the Futai's request,[67] gave orders for the march to Quin-san. Ching told me at this time that the Futai had written to Pekin, and said that he had extended mercy to the Wangs and the rebels. Next morning, after the troops had left, I started for the city, sending the two steamers to Wu-lung-chiao to meet me, as I expected to be able to retake the Fire Fly easily from information I had received from the letters in Mo-wang's house, and from some Europeans who were with Mo-wang, and who had escaped. I went to the Low-mun, and there learnt that Nar-wang and the other Wangs and chiefs were to come out and see the Futai at 12, noon, and that the city would then be given over. I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him aside and asked him if everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, 'Why not wait? I am coming to see you.' I said it was important business, and that unless he particularly wished it, or thought it necessary, I would not stay. He said very good, and I left. He passed me on his way to the Low-mun very soon after on horseback, with all the Wangs, going, as I supposed, to the Futai. I went then to Mo-wang's palace, and then to the east, or Low-mun, to while away the time, till the steamers could get round from Wai-quai-dung to Wu-lung-chow. From the top of the Low-mun I saw a large crowd of people near Ching's stockades, and thought it was the ceremony of submission going on. A few minutes after, perhaps 12.30 p.m., a large body of Imperial soldiers came up, and passing the gate, rushed cheering into the city, as they generally do into vacated stockades. I thought little of it, more than expressing my disapprobation to some of them. They, however, went on pouring in and firing off their muskets in the air and yelling. Ching then came up, and looked rather pale. I asked him if the interview was over, and if it had been satisfactory. He said that Nar-wang had not been to the Futai at all. I said I had seen him going with the others. He said no; that he could not say for certain; but that he thought he had run away. I said I could not make out what for, as I had just seen Nar-wang, and he said everything was all right. I asked Ching if there was any trouble. He said that Nar-wang had demanded the command of 2,000 men, and of half the city of Soo-chow, the division to be a wall, and that the Futai had refused it, and also that he had let some of Chung-wang's men in. The latter part I knew to be false, but, strange to say, I believed the former portion. I asked him where Nar-wang could go to. He said that he would not go back to the rebels, but that he would go to some village and settle there I thought the thing so strange that I asked Dr. Macartney, who was by me, to go to Nar-wang's house, and to see him, and tell him not to fear anything.[68] Ching then told me that his men alone would be allowed in, and that there would be no looting; and as I knew before that he had his men in good discipline, I had no fear, and therefore rode round the wall with him. He kept on firing vollies in the air, which I remonstrated at, and could not make out the object. He said it was merely to prevent Kwang-si men from doing anything to his men while they were taking possession of the city. I became uneasy about Nar-wang; and at the south, or Pou-mun, I left General Ching and rode off to Nar-wang's palace. I got there at dark, and found it had been gutted. I was then met by Nar-wang's uncle, who asked me to come to his house. Being only with my interpreter, I had no one to send for General Ching, or for my troops; but the entreaties of this Tien-chwang being so great I agreed to do so, and therefore went with Nar-wang's family to his house. When I got there his men were all fallen in, and the streets barricaded. I wanted to send my interpreter for assistance, but they would not let him go. I therefore remained till 2 a.m., keeping away the Imperial looting parties. At 2 a.m. I sent my interpreter and an Imperial soldier, who was with my horse, to get the steamers round to Wai-quai-dung to make the Futai answerable, and also sent for my body guard. After he had started, the man who went with him came back and said he had been beheaded by the Imperialists. I remained till 4 a.m., and then went out to send orders to the steamers myself. I was taken by the Imperialists and detained an hour. At last I got to the Low-mun, and sent the body guard to the Nar-wang's house, but it was too late, the Imperialists had entered and gutted it. I then went to the Low-mun, and met there General Ching, to whom I gave my opinion. He was most anxious to excuse himself, but I did not listen to him. At this time I did not know that the Wangs had been beheaded. I then went down to Ching's stockades, and met Major Baily, commanding Ching's artillery there. He said that General Ching was very much put out; that the Futai had ordered him to execute the Wangs, and had given orders to the troops to enter the city, that he had lost face, &c. Baily then told me that he had Nar-wang's son, and brought him to me. I refused any communication with General Ching, Nar-wang's son came to my boat, and, pointing to the other side, said it was there that the Wangs had been executed. I went over, and recognised Kong-wang's, Nar-wang's, Sieh-wang's, and Sung-wang's heads, but the body of Nar-wang was not to be seen, having been buried. I took, at the son's request, Nar-wang's head. The bodies had been cut down the chest, and the wounds on the head were most horrible, showing the brutality of the executioners. I then was waiting for the steamers, as I had heard that there were some high persons still in custody, and I thought that I could frighten the Futai into giving them up. He, however, heard of my arrival, and went off to the city. I left him a note telling him my opinion, and then moved off with the steamers to Quin-san.[69] I received, just before leaving, a letter from Futzu-quai, telling me that a chief had come over with 3,000 men to my officer in command; and that he, the officer in command, had received them. I sent orders to him to inform the chief of the treachery, and to let him go with his men and arms, if he liked, or else to bring his troops to Quin-san.

"This is a brief summary of the late events, which will prove to the Imperial Government a most fatal blow. I imagine that the Futai and General Ching arranged this matter, and know that it is viewed by the mass of Mandarins with disgust.

"Nar-wang's son tells me that Chung-wang was willing to come over; and that all the people in the silk districts are the same; but how to come they know not. Is not this a time for foreign governments to come forward and arrange the terms? The power is in this force, if the authority from Pekin is given to it to act under some honest Chinaman. What is now to be feared is that foreigners will join the rebels, and will thus cause the war to linger on to the extermination of the unfortunate people on whom the burden falls, and to the detriment of trade of every sort. That the rebels really do not possess the qualities of government cannot be doubted. They merely hold cities, and let the villages govern themselves. The head chief may know something of the Christian religion, but I will answer for it that nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the subject. It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government will interfere at this time.[70]

"P.S. Prince F. de Wittgenstein was present at most of the above occurrences, and can vouch for the correctness of the same."

"We publish to-day a document which we consider one of the most remarkable that it has been our good or evil fortune to peruse for many a day. Emanating as it does from a man of Gordon's ability and position, we have been much more than disappointed. How we have been so, let our readers judge.

"The exact position of the major is, it would appear, that of Adjutant of Quin-san, though possessing less power than General Ching, whose faculty of lying seems to have the wonderful power (by attraction we suppose) of giving credence; though the major tells us that he knew the rogue was lying. We give the major's own words, 'the latter part I knew to be false; but, strange to say, I believed the former portion.'

"This General Ching, this cowardly liar, it was who voted as the right-hand man on all occasions concerning the conduct of negotiating with the rebels. The major tells us that the Taeping Wangs had opened negotiations with Ching for the surrender of at least four gates of the city. We suppose this was before the 29th of November. On the 4th of December we learn of Ching's being joyful at the prospect of the Mo-wang falling into the hands of Major Gordon, and on the same day we hear of his reception of the unhappy Wang's head.

"Ching next appears as Envoy of the Futai 'to arrange matters,' we suppose, for the surrender of the city. Here the major slips out of the 'matter' by declaring himself 'helpless,' and this, after he had assured the Nar-wang that he wanted to make the Imperialists and Taepings friends, and only wanted possession of 'a gate' to prevent looting everybody.

"Major Gordon does not tell us why, at the 'supreme' moment of the taking of Soo-chow, he was so anxious to get possession of the Fire Fly. We beg to call our readers' attention to the following statement:—'I thought I had better see Nar-wang before I went out, so I called at his palace, and took him aside, and asked him if everything was all right, and if he wanted me to do anything. He said no; that everything was proper. I told him I was going to the Tai-hu; and he said, "Why not wait? I am coming to see you at the meeting of the Wangs," as he supposed, at the Futai's.' Why was Major Gordon absent? Why did he not make it his business to see that the assurances which he had given to the Nar-wang were carried out?

"The major tells us that he got 'uneasy' when he found that Nar-wang's palace had been gutted; however, his remaining till 4 o'clock next morning where he was (though why he did not go himself for his body-guard instead of sending his servant he has not told us) hardly seems to prove this assertion; but the affair of his steamers being of so great a consequence, he sends an assistant 'to send orders to them,' when he is taken and detained by the Imperialists for an hour. (General Ching was, of course, busy just at that moment, and Major Gordon's detention was most opportune.) The screaming farce of General Ching's losing face, and Major Gordon's refusal to have anything to do with him, here opportunely follows the tragedy—(one likes to laugh after the heavy business!). The idea of frightening the Futai is nicely got over. The latter gentleman——goes into the city, where, of course, he couldn't be frightened! The major takes a steamer and goes off to Quin-san.

"Leaving a note for the Futai.

"Our readers have the major's letter before them, and they can judge for themselves whether our analysis be correct or not. Our own opinion is that the major—owing to his recent losses, fearing a repulse if the city of Soo-chow had then been attacked, and finding occasion of taking it himself by treachery, and yet desiring to shield himself from the infamy of such a transaction—would have acted precisely as he declares he has done.

"Though a considerable reader of history, our recollection does not supply a parallel to the infamous treachery practised upon the unsuspecting Taeping chiefs. The conduct of Pizarro, in Peru, was nothing in comparison. One Inca, and a room full of treasure, is a small affair when compared with the confiding Princes of Soo-chow. Now, we ask all right-minded men to take Major Gordon's statement to Nar-wang, which we quote literally:—'I said that I wanted to make the Imperialists and rebels good friends. That since the rise of the rebellion the Imperialists had been much changed; and did not dare, from fear of the foreign Governments, to perpetrate cruelties as heretofore.' And compare his account of the atrocities committed upon the Princes of Kong, Nar, Seih, and Sung.

"Our review of these facts is based upon Major Gordon's own statements; and if he does not find means of extrication, we have placed him upon a pinnacle of infamy whence he shall not readily descend. From the moment Major Gordon first became particeps in the affair of the surrender with General Ching (the very ideal of a Manchoo liar), he should have stood between the Manchoo butcher of a Futai and his confiding victims, and, as a true soldier (the soul of honour), yielding his life rather than have exposed himself to the execration of all society as a traitor of the deepest dye.

"Major Gordon will, no doubt, think us severe upon himself; but we assure him that what we have said is by no means meant as a personal attack. We are simply commenting upon his own statement of what has lately occurred at Soo-chow. It may possibly be true that he has been victimized by the liar, Ching, and the Futai. We are half inclined to think such to be the case, considering his simplicity in telling us, on the authority of the Nar-wang's son, that 'Chung-wang was willing to come over, and that all the people in the silk districts are the same.' He also tells us that the 'rebels do not possess the qualities of government.' That they actually allow 'villages to govern themselves;' and that while the 'head chief may know something of the Christian religion, nine-tenths of the rebels have no real ideas on the subject.'

"We are rather astonished at Major Gordon's information as to this point. We have been for many years in China. We have seen the way in which the cherished temples and idols of the Manchoos have been treated by the Taepings; and it is rather late in the day to tell us what rebel 'ideas' are on the subject of the Christian religion.

"In conclusion, Major Gordon hopes for the interference of the 'Government.' He means, of course, the English Government. If there were anything wanting to make Major Gordon contemptible in the eyes of all Europe and America, it was this last phrase. What! the English Government interfere to prop up the Manchoos after the statement of what Major Gordon says has occurred at Soo-chow! Major Gordon! We thought you not only an English officer in Chinese employ, but we considered you an honourable subject of our Sovereign, yet it seems you penned this sentence after the atrocious perfidy of Soo-chow—'It is sincerely to be hoped that the Government [English] will interfere at this time.'

"If he had not added this last sentence we could have pardoned Major Gordon everything. What! the Government of Englishmen to sustain a Government which, by Major Gordon's own showing, is so perfidious that we can make no possible comparison! There is no Englishman in this or any other part of the world who will not blush for Gordon, or the era in which it was found that an Englishman advocated assistance for a Government which has violated every treaty, and even the most sacred obligations recognised among men.

"As for ourselves, we are not military adventurers, and, perhaps, cannot understand how any stratagem may be fair 'in war as in love,' but we do hereby protest against a violation of a solemn word of honour given. Major Gordon must clear himself, or he will go down to posterity not only 'unhonoured and unsung,' but as a wretch who sold blood to General Ching and the present Futai of Kiang-nan.

"Major Gordon, in telling us that, or, in fact, asking the question, viz., 'Is this not the time for foreign Governments to come forward and arrange terms?' looks as though he fancied foreign Governments could entertain the idea of an honest Chinaman under authority from Pekin. But in spite of the testimony of the Prince Wittgenstein, or any other potentate, we are inclined to believe that unfortunate Taepingdom has little to learn from Manchoo morality, and still less from mercenary soldiers, whose honour is bought and sold!"

"After leaving Shanghae, our route (or creek) lay through a low, flat country, intersected by canals innumerable in all directions; the richest land in China, stretching away to the very horizon, unbroken to view, except by countless graves, commemorative arches, and heaps of ruins. The weather, though superb, seemed oppressive, from the utter abandonment of the country; not a soul was to be seen as far as the eye could reach, and the endless fields of neglected and fallow ground (once the garden of China) deepened that air of sadness which winter always seems to wear in the country. Though ashore the desolation is complete, not so on the water; Mandarin squeeze stations have sprung up in all directions.

"At Wong-doo we were actually stopped, and 400 cash demanded from our Louda. Our indignation getting the better of us, we did then and there write our protest against thievery upon the rogue's ribs; and in round, legible characters, too, we did all we could to teach this Manchoo robber that the higher the squeeze, the less commerce, and the less commerce will certainly produce less revenue. When will all Manchoos, Morrill tariff men, &c., learn this lesson?

"There were, besides, a few wretches fishing by means of cormorants (so often described that I will say nothing about it), making up the sum total of population. At last, Quin-san pagoda became visible; and after a short run over the country (our boat following), we reached the city.

"Of course, we went to see the 'lion' of the place. He seemed to be in a consumedly bad humour; but, nevertheless, granted us passes for Soo-chow. Dropping metaphor, Major Gordon impressed us as a very young man (say thirty) without an 'old head on his shoulders.' We suppose coolness is a quality which he constantly displays on the field; he certainly displayed it in his own house when we called upon him.

"On the 18th December, after a run of fifteen miles from Quin-san, we reached the stockades outside the city of Soo-chow. They had evidently been the scene of a fierce encounter. Innumerable shot (solid) in their interiors told the tale of carnage; and numerous unburied corpses were lying about in all directions, in spite of the number which had been disposed of in the creeks. As we drank our tea that evening, we studiously avoided any remark on this subject. Four or five miles more brought us to the lofty walls of Soo-chow. Inside the gate (Lo-mun) an immense stone wall and water-gate (as protecting the outer bastion) will ever stand a monument of Taeping energy. Of course, our first move was to see the 'lion' of Soo-chow, the in-famous Futai. The palace of this magnate (the former Ya-mun of the Chung-wang) really 'impressed' us as something worthy of the 'Mings,' in which style it is erected.

"We have visited hundreds of such structures, but the Soo-chow pagoda is certainly the finest we have ever seen. In ascending we counted 220 steps, and judged the height to be from 150 to 170 feet from base to summit. It is nine stories high (as usual, an odd number); but when we reached the top, the view there presented well repaid our trouble. The vast city lay at our feet—the Venice of China—intersected with hundreds of canals, pagodas, and temples (in the tent-like style of the Chinese), relieving the otherwise monotonous view of infinite tiled roofs.

"In many places the city was obscured by the burning of houses, set on fire by the Imperialist soldiers.

"On the 19th December, having sent our cards before us, we called upon General Ching. While waiting for his appearance, we had time to examine a magnificent English clock (looted from Mo-wang's palace), which formed the main ornament of the 'reception-hall.'

"Over the dial was a fountain of water (in glass), and under it a pastoral scene, with moving figures of impossible shepherds and shepherdesses, worthy of Arcadia—all moved by the mechanical contrivances provided in the clock itself. At last Ching entered, and at first took us for a second edition of General Brown, for he immediately entered upon a defence of Le Futai. After telling him who we really were, he suddenly became so reserved that we beat a polite retreat (for the fate of the Taeping-wangs had by no means faded from our memory).

"As it was still noon, we determined on a visit to the residence of Chung-wang's secretary in the neighbourhood.

"On our arrival we found that the house had not only been looted, but that the valuable furniture it contained had been literally smashed to atoms by the Imperialist soldiery.

"In the rear we discovered a large hall, over the entrance of which a rebel tablet still remained—'Teen-foo-dong'—'Hall of the Heavenly Father.' But what really astonished us was to find on the walls a complete set of elegant lithograph engravings, which Roman Catholics are accustomed to call the 'stations,' a series of pictures representing the sad journey of Jesus from the house of Pilate to His place of execution.

"One of the pictures we became possessed of, and we shall ever keep it as the most precious souvenir of our trip to Soo-chow; for we think that the affecting story of Jesus' passion and death was appreciated by these Missionary-forsaken patriots.

"It certainly shows that a high Taeping official loved to contemplate the various scenes of that awful tragedy (for principle's sake) over which the world, till the end of time, shall weep the bitter tears of violated right and triumphant wrong.

"20th Dec.—The day being fine, we determined to have a look at the steamers Feillong and Sycee. A smart walk to the Padi-cho gate brought us to the 'fifty-two arched bridge,' where we saw the heavy artillery just outside.

"We looked with regret upon those splendid 'peace-makers,' that they should have been loaned to the butcher of Soo-chow—that they should be the property of the British Government—were thoughts upon which we need make no comment.

"Captain Baily in charge, and very creditably too! His hospitality is the last pleasant impression we had of Soo-chow, if we omit the feeling of relief we experienced when once outside of its walls on our way to Shanghae.

"21st Dec.—On learning (to our surprise) that the locale of the 'execution ground' was neither more nor less than the court-yard of the 'Shing-s-tah,' 'twin pagodas,' where the unhappy rebels had paid with the forfeit of their lives for trusting in the word of honour of their unprincipled assailants, we determined on a trip thither. On our arrival, we examined several most ancient tablets of stone, whence we gathered that these pagodas were erected long anterior to the Ming dynasty (i.e. reign of Tai Ching, dynasty of Sung); but we will not detain our readers with antiquarian trifles. On entering the court-yard (about half an acre) we found the ground soaked with HUMAN BLOOD! the creek forming its drain was still (after twenty days of slaughter) reddish with blood, as the officers of Dr. Macartney's force can testify. The ground for three feet deep stunk with blood (and the best blood of China); though the weather, except at noonday, did not favour the corruption of animal particles, Soo-chow being situated in lat. 31° 23' 25" N., and long. 120° 25' E.; consequently of rather a warm climate even in winter.

"Our Chinese informants told us that 30,000 rebels had been led to these shambles, and executed. We had proofs enough to know that the number was enormous; we have it on authority of an European eye-witness that this creek was so full of decapitated rebels that the Mandarins employed boatmen to clean it, by pushing the bodies with boat-hooks outside of the city into the principal stream.

"We quitted the 'execution ground' (travellers will know it by the 'twin towers'), faint at these horrible proofs of human butchery which had met our view, and overcome with emotion. Was it for this that Englishmen fought? Was it for this that English guns had been loaned by the representatives of the British people? Was it for this that the 'first nation of the world' and the two Scotchmen, Gordon and Dr. Macartney, had fought?

"Let the spirit of Robert Bruce forbid it! Let the noble sons of Scotia contemn it; and all Christendom, in the name of ... liberty, protest against the unspeakable perfidy, the horrible treachery, and brutal butchery of Soo-chow!

"22nd Dec.—Though the experiences of yesterday made us long to leave Soo-chow, we determined to visit the ruins of Mo-wang's palace; though completely burned, it had evidently covered an immense area of several acres; huge bronzes half melted obstructed the passage, and only a solitary drum stood sentinel at the entrance.

"It was with a melancholy satisfaction that we gazed at the wreck of his palace.

"Among so many traitors (his brother Wangs) he had been true to his flag. He knew what Manchoo honour meant, and his death by the hands of Taeping traitors is his eulogium. If his spirit can visit this world of ours, we must rejoice that the Manchoos have not profited (even in money) by his destruction.

"If the infamous barbarity of the Futai can be excused; if his atrocious violation of justice and right can be pardoned; if there is any possible Jesuitical ground of justification for his immeasurable atrocities, it is this—he betrayed the betrayers of their own cause: he was a traitor to traitors, and has broken faith with the recreant Wangs.

"Depressed in spirit, we hurried from the ruins of Mo-wang's palace to our boat, and instantly gave orders to our crew to get under weigh for Shanghae.

"Hardly had we quitted the gate, when a letter was placed in our hands by a trusty agent from Chung-wang, dated Kia-ching-foo; what were our feelings in perusing it and finding these words:—'You foreigners are like the Manchoos; you have no honour! you have deceived us!' We, as a foreigner, felt all the bitterness herein contained. We, a personal friend of his, blushed for our nationality in being compared to perfidious Manchoos!

"We candidly avow it, if we thought that the sword was really stronger than the pen, we would have girded it on, and be one more 'witness' to the glorious cause of liberty! We should like to prove to the Taepings that European nations are not all unprincipled liars, devoid of every virtue recognised by men, and that sacred volume which teaches a morality of which one would think they were ignorant. So much for our trip to Soo-choo and back.