As the steamer was expected to get under weigh about 1 a.m., I started with my men a little before midnight. Upon this occasion the very elements seemed to favour our design. The tide ran slack; the moon, after shrouding herself within a bank of silvery-edged clouds, retired below the horizon to rest; while even the never-setting stars were partially hidden by the volume of damp, misty vapour hanging over the surface of the river, and almost concealing our two small boats.

In little more than half an hour from the time we left the shore, we were right alongside our destined prize. With the exception of a sentry at each gangway, everything on board seemed silent and unprepared for an attack, although by the symptoms from the funnel and steam-pipe it was evident that the engines were in readiness. I decided to attempt cutting the vessel out immediately, as it seemed to me that her crew were probably turned in, and if so, not a moment should be lost in taking advantage of the opportunity, or they might be roused out to get under weigh, in which case we would hardly be able to effect the capture without loss of life.

Dividing my followers equally between the two boats, one being under my lieutenant's charge, and assigning to each man his duty in the attack, I gave the word to pull alongside, my own party to board on the starboard bow, the others on the port.

Another second and we were grappling at the sides of the steamer, and scrambling over her bulwarks, sword or pistol in hand. The Chinese sentinels on guard, and a Manilla-man who appeared on deck, were secured without either resistance or alarming those below. In fact, the Chinamen, directly they perceived the danger, seemed suddenly inspired with a strong determination to take no notice, but to be very diligent in marching up and down, and carefully employing themselves by intently gazing somewhere else. The calmness and attentive inattention with which they acted throughout the capture were really charming to behold. They betrayed neither surprise, fear, sympathy, esprit de corps, nor any other feeling. I then placed a guard over the hatches, set a party to slip the cable, and sent A-ling into the engine-room to get steam up; while, with four Europeans, I proceeded into the cabin and secured the officers. These comprised the intended captain, the mate, and the gunner, the others being still on shore. They submitted very quietly, gave up their arms, and were altogether too much confounded to attempt any resistance. Just as the vessel was entirely in our possession and I had given the order to go ahead full speed (the cable being slipped), the engineer came alongside in a san-pan, only to find himself a prisoner when he got on board. Directly the capture was accomplished, I produced the commission the Chung-wang had given for the purpose, and showed it to the senior officer of the steamer, informing him that we were Ti-ping partisans, and that we would endeavour to pass himself and brother captives from Soo-chow into Gordon's lines as prisoners of war.

Meanwhile, steam had been got up by A-ling, and we were carried along in the direction of the Ti-ping territory as fast as possible. During the capture, one of the Manilla quartermasters had jumped overboard and swam towards the shore. Fearing that this man would raise the alarm and bring a swarm of Impish Manchoos down upon us, I was compelled to lose no time in making good our escape, otherwise I might have managed to capture something more than the one steamer. A few days afterwards I was much vexed by ascertaining that I might have taken Macartney prisoner, and with him a large sum of sycee destined to pay Gordon's mercenaries. It appeared, from the information given by the former officers of the steamer, when too late to take advantage of it, that the redoubtable General was to come off in a boat with the dollars and be picked up abreast of the Fu-tai's camp. If I had known this on the same night, I could easily have taken measures to effect his capture. Aggravated by the infamous manner in which Macartney carried on hostilities against my friends, I would most assuredly have given him up to the Ti-pings, and he would have been justly punished for his cruelty to his unfortunate prisoners, if they had treated him by the strictest law of retaliation; but of this he would have been in little danger, the mad forbearance of the Ti-pings causing them to suicidally avoid the only means by which they might have saved themselves from slaughter by British means, viz., by proclaiming, and by executing the promise, that if any British help were given the Manchoo, either directly or indirectly, they would retaliate by destroying the silk and tea trade (totally in their power), and by generally making war upon British interests. As for the soundness of such policy upon the part of the revolutionists, it could not possibly have done them any injury, and it offered the only chance of arresting foreign hostility.

Some hours after the capture of the steamer, the Manilla-man, as I expected at the time, made his way to the Fu-tai's camp and reported the circumstance. The Manchoo official had no sooner received the information than he sent off couriers to his very good servants and allies, the British authorities. Those devoted personages immediately made ready one of their national gunboats, and, placing a number of English soldiers on board, despatched her to overhaul and bring back the missing vessel to Shanghae.

Naturally enough my readers may be inclined to wonder what business the British officials had to interfere with the capture of an Imperialist craft by the Ti-pings, they must therefore have an explanation.

All the English admirals, generals, consuls, and others, who were fighting upon the side of the Manchoo, chose, with an amazing amount of injustice and arrogance, to assume that they and their disreputable allies were alone entitled to belligerent rights and privileges. Every act of their enemy was very indignantly branded as either atrociously piratical or a form of bloodthirsty brigandage. They alone were virtuous; they alone had any right to kill, burn, and otherwise destroy! In consequence of this very comfortable state of self-conceit, and in order to succour the dearly beloved Manchoo, some experimental warrior or statesman among the British officials, according to their enlightened ex parte diplomacy, did me the honour to designate my humble exploit a piratical outrage. This of course justified their praiseworthy efforts to capture the scoundrel who dared to differ from their immaculate selves, by presuming to prefer and assist the rebels instead of the Imperialists. Besides, is not the vile pirate an enemy of all mankind? And who would be so oblivious of merit as not to do them reverence when they caught him? Unfortunately for their visionary laurels, though fortunately for the pirate, they did not succeed in catching him.

Now, as even at the period referred to, the Ti-ping revolution included a population and a territory, the former at least equal in number, and the latter in extent, to the people and soil of England; and as they were not only recognised as a belligerent power, but as constituting the Government de facto throughout the large tract of country under their control, I cannot understand how the military service of such a Power, with an army of several hundred thousand men in the field, and an organized administration ruling their possessions, was termed piracy and brigandage.

I was not only duly commissioned by the Chung-wang, the proper Ti-ping authority, but also acted upon a special commission issued against the vessels of the enemy. If, therefore, the capture of the steamer could be termed an act of piracy, what should be the language used to express the raids and seizure of Ti-ping craft by Admiral Hope, Generals Staveley, Brown, Michel, &c.? when it is remembered that they performed such acts entirely without authority from their own Government or any one else. Some pirates might feel flattered by finding themselves in the same boat with such worthy people; but the author of this work begs most respectfully to decline the doubtful honour. There is another point connected with this employment of defamatory epithets. If I, holding authority direct from the Ti-ping Commander-in-Chief (whose acts were authorized by his king), were a pirate, then what can have been the status of Major Gordon, R.E., the commander of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent, who held no commission whatever from Imperial authority, but was simply employed by a local Chinese mandarin?

The British gunboat did not overtake my party, though, if she had been handled a little smarter, it would have been an easy matter, for we lost our way several times among the labyrinth of creeks in the interior. If it had not been prevented by the delay from taking wrong courses (thereby affording time for the seizure of the vessel to be made known to the enemy before Soo-chow), and from the fact that only one of the men I had engaged at Shanghae could be depended upon, I should have proceeded straight through the Imperialist lines and made an attempt to seize one of their two other steamers. However, I was obliged to be contented with my single prize. She mounted a capital pivot 32-pounder in the bow, a good 12-pounder howitzer in the stern, was well provided with the best description of ammunition, and she would probably prove very serviceable in the defence of Soo-chow.

In consequence of the impossibility of forcing a passage through the enemy's lines, it became necessary to follow some such route as that by which I had last reached Soo-chow, however difficult it might be to find a channel large enough to carry the steamer so great a distance.

After losing our course for the last time, and very nearly steaming into Gordon's head-quarters at Quin-san, we managed to reach the first Ti-ping position at San-le-jow. Directly we appeared, or rather, directly the funnel became visible above the dense growth of rush and bamboo lining the banks of the creek, the garrison of the fort rushed to arms and made ready to defend themselves against the supposed and dreaded enemy. The terror inspired by the appearance of the small steam-vessels acting with the Imperialist mercenaries was at all times excessive. From a distance the helpless Ti-pings were generally mowed down with perfect impunity, and heavy artillery carried destruction throughout their ranks, while the ships, white painted and low in the water, were almost invisible, and were able to maintain their advantage by retreating or advancing whenever it was desirable, at the same time retaining a position from which shrapnel, Moorsom, and other infernally destructive, though ingeniously contrived shell, could be thrown with deadly accuracy.

It was no wonder that as we suddenly hove in sight, with a volume of thick smoke puffing up from our high-pressure engines, the soldiers and civilians about San-le-jow were dreadfully alarmed. They were well aware that small mercy was ever shown by the "foreign brethren" in charge of the irresistible "hoo-lung paou-chwan," for, fighting or harmless, they were shot down whenever a gun could be brought to bear, and so long as the missiles could be made to reach them. The rowdy bravoes of the Imperialist flotilla being unacquainted with the principles of military honour, seemed to believe that their sole mission was to kill, burn, and destroy; as for extending mercy to those who were unable to resist their appliances of modern warfare, or treating the vanquished with magnanimity, they never entertained such ideas.

Fortunately for the people we came upon so suddenly, the steamer was under Ti-ping colours; therefore, their alarm presented only the most ludicrous character, unaccompanied by the tragic and heretofore inseparable consequences of such an event. From their isolated cottages the poor villagers rushed forth, carrying the most valued of their homely effects; men, women, and children ran frantically in the direction of the fort; some were laden with agricultural implements (for even these were often destroyed by the victorious Imperialists); others with household goods; while here and there a few noble labourers were observed trudging along with their aged fathers or mothers on their backs. Whenever the edge of a canal was reached, without a moment's hesitation, the fugitives would plunge right into the water, and give cause for merriment by the wild efforts they made to regain dry land, often rolling back, and floundering helplessly through the soft mud.

When I perceived the alarm our appearance had created, and that the soldiers were making ready to fire upon us with a few heavy gingalls mounted on their fort, I stopped our vessel's way and brought up alongside the bank, and then going ashore with A-ling, proceeded to the fort to satisfy the commandant as to our friendly character. When it was made known that we were in the Ti-ping service, the soldiers and people loudly professed their gratification. The chief was a bronzed and hardy veteran; and although his garrison did not muster nearly 100 men, he was quite determined to defend his post to the last, had we proved to be enemies. The answer he made when I asked him whether he would not have acted with discretion by retreating from the steamer if she had been still in Manchoo interest, closely resembled that given by a brave Ti-ping officer (who had charge of a most dangerous and exposed position near Ningpo) to a friend of mine, when the latter inquired why he did not abandon so precarious an outpost, which was nearly surrounded by the enemy; he replied, "Puh pa! laou Tien-ping tung shao" (No fear! an old Ti-ping soldier knows how to die).

Passing through San-le-jow, we soon reached the small town of Pimbong, barely twenty-five miles distant from Soo-chow, and also situated on the Grand Canal. At this place we were very kindly received by the chief, who, after seeing my commission, supplied me with provisions, coals, firewood, and other necessaries. Pimbong was almost the last Ti-ping position in the neighbourhood, as immediately beyond came the lines of the enemy besieging Soo-chow. Here our pilots ceased to be of service, and the chief sent on board a man well acquainted with the country, to guide us through the largest creeks. After trying every channel branching off from the Grand Canal, and finding them all too small for the passage of the steamer, we were compelled to proceed on to Kar-sing-foo, a city nearly twenty miles from Pimbong. Had the creeks we explored been available, we could have reached Soo-chow by a dÉtour of not more than forty miles, but by going to Kar-sing the distance would be doubled at least.

After a short run down the splendid Grand Canal, we came to off the city, and sent messengers to apprise the governor of our arrival. In a little while that functionary, who proved to be the Yoong-wang, visited the steamer in great state; he met me with much friendliness, and declared himself delighted with the acquisition of the vessel so well known and dreaded. Two Europeans were with the chief; they had formerly belonged to the Franco-Manchoo contingent; and as my lieutenant had known them to be of good character—one had been a captain in the force—I expressed my wish that they should join me, and the Yoong-wang very kindly consented.

As time was precious for the success of my plans, we only remained a few hours at Kar-sing-foo, and then started away with a new pilot on board, who was instructed to take us to the largest creeks leading to the Ta-hoo Lake, which it would be necessary to cross in order to reach Soo-chow.

From Pimbong everywhere we traversed a most beautiful country; and although, from the rumours of approaching war, the influx of fugitives, and the scarcity of provisions, no little distress was prevalent, the people were far more happy, prosperous, and improved than Imperialists ever have been, or seem likely to be.

Directly we steamed away from Kar-sing our troubles began. Every creek we attempted to navigate proved either too small, or the bridges were too narrow and low for the steamer to pass them. After getting, perhaps, fifteen miles up a creek, and destroying several bridges by the way, the water would suddenly shallow to less than our draught, or the channel would narrow to less than our beam; of course, in such cases our only plan was to get back stern foremost and try some other canal. Fortunately the vessel was built of iron, so that her progress overland—for often we were obliged to pass a place not more than four feet deep, while the steamer drew five—did no further injury than bending or indenting her pliant sides.

At last, after spending a week exploring the principal water communication of what seemed in every respect a free and Christian country, we approached the sea, and it was only when within fourteen miles of Hang-chow that we managed to find an available creek. Even to take advantage of it we were compelled to destroy many bridges; and, upon several occasions, clear the bottom of the channel, while the work of removing stakes and barriers was incessant. Had it not been for the willing assistance we received from the Ti-pings, we should never have been able to get through.

Eventually, after a passage no one would ever have believed the steamer could have effected against so many obstacles, we arrived at the great city of Hoo-chow-foo, situated just at the southern end of the Ta-hoo. At this place the commandant, Tow-wang, and the Luk-wang—whose nephew, the Mo-wang, was commandant of Soo-chow—came out and received us in state. Upon leaving them, after having dined with the chiefs in the city, I managed to reach the Ta-hoo after knocking down an obstructive bridge with a few Moorsom shells. Before proceeding to cross the lake, I obtained a dozen good men from the chiefs, and put the paddle-wheels (which had become much dilapidated during the passage of the creeks) in good repair; for I knew that if General Gordon, of the Manchoo mercenary service, had sufficient sense, he could easily intercept me with two, or even three, of the steamers attached to his force. However, fortunately for me, Gordon did not send his ships until too late; for had they overhauled their former consort, she would have fallen an easy prize, as I had not more than two or three Europeans and half a dozen Chinese on whom I could depend.

As I understood there were only two channels by which Soo-chow could be reached from the lake by a vessel drawing so much water as the steamer, and as one of these—vi the Tung-shan hills and city of Wo-kong—was already in Impish hands, I adopted the only remaining course—a creek leading from the northern end of the Ta-hoo to the city of Wu-see; from whence, to Soo-chow, the Grand Canal afforded an easy passage.

While stopping at a small Ti-ping position on the west side of the lake, I was much pleased by witnessing the kind behaviour of the soldiers to a number of destitute country people, who had fled from the advance of the Imperialists down the Yang-tze-kiang towards Nankin. There were not more than 150 soldiers at the station, and from their own rations, which consisted solely of rice and dried fish, they charitably relieved more than 500 starving people. This is no idle assertion, for the whole of my confederates were present, and saw the distribution of rice. I went over the five gunboats belonging to the troops, and found that their stores of food were nearly exhausted. The chief told me that, when all was used, he would be obliged to abandon the place, and leave the unfortunate people to starve. I supplied him with a couple of bags of rice, and then bade him farewell; although I have never seen him since, I have not forgotten his praiseworthy conduct. Who has ever seen an Imperialist official do the like?

At length we found the creek leading to Wu-see, and on the same afternoon arrived at the city, greatly to the delight of the garrison, who were much harassed by a formidable flotilla operating against their lines of communication. Soon after our arrival, the commandant, Saou-wang, returned to the city with his army, having beaten the enemy after a sharp fight in the morning. The troops had marched upwards of forty miles to and from the battle-field, and directly they came to the creek encircling Wu-see, they threw down their arms on the bank, and plunged into the cooling water in dense masses, clothes and all; so that in a few minutes the surface was literally covered with them.

The Saou-wang having informed me that the Commander-in-Chief was encamped at a place named Ma-tang-chiao—on the shore of the Ta-hoo, and a place of strategic importance—equidistant from Wu-see and Soo-chow, I at once requested him to despatch messengers to inform his superior of my arrival. While awaiting their return, the commandant set a number of men to work pulling down a very heavy stone bridge, which it was necessary to remove before the steamer could be taken into the Grand Canal. At this city I saw upwards of 6,000 poor people, who were supported by the garrison. They had been driven from their homes by the progress of the Anglo-Manchoos in the neighbourhood, and were perfectly destitute. Every day one of the principal officers of the city came to superintend the distribution of rice, and the ravenous manner in which the people struggled for their food was something fearful to contemplate, especially when it was considered that such great misery was caused entirely by the unjustifiable intervention of my countrymen.

Upon this occasion I had not much time to notice the distress caused by the approach of the allied English and Manchoo devastators, messengers from the Chung-wang on the following morning bringing orders for me to proceed back into the Ta-hoo Lake, and take the steamer to Ma-tang-chiao. When I reached this place, the Chung-wang, attended by the Sz, Le, and several other Wangs, came on board, and appeared to be overjoyed with my successful enterprise and the appearance of the steamer. A-ling, the two Ti-ping officers, and the two Cantonese were instantly promoted; and the chiefs took off their own pearl ornaments to decorate them. The Chung-wang then took me ashore with him, and, upon reaching his head-quarters, confirmed my lieutenant's appointment, and declared that he would give 20,000 dollars prize-money for the capture of the steamer. This I considered amply sufficient for so small a service, and I determined to divide it equally among all who had assisted at the seizure—including the five rowdies who only came for money—besides giving a portion to some of the former crew, who had kept to their work and assisted me since the capture.

The encampment was formed around a large straggling village; and the people, like those of the neighbouring hamlets, appeared more happy, better fed, and less depressed than those of more distant parts of Ti-pingdom. This was always the result of the Chung-wang's presence in any locality, for he was not only the most able general, but also the most talented organizer and pacificator among the chiefs.

At Ma-tang-chiao the Chung-wang was concentrating an army of relief for Soo-chow; and, with the object of enabling the steamer to participate in the same movement, men were employed to remove several bridges and other obstructions on a creek by which she could reach the Grand Canal. This work was hardly commenced, when two or three fugitives, shortly followed by many others, from the suburbs of Soo-chow, arrived with the disastrous intelligence that the city was in the hands of the enemy. How it had fallen they could not say, further than by stating that it had not been captured by fighting, but by some treachery. The Chung-wang seemed much affected by the report, for Soo-chow was not only the most important and best fortified city, the most abundantly supplied and strongest garrisoned, but the commandant, Mo-wang, was his oldest and bravest brother in arms.

Orders were at once given to break camp and march upon Wu-see; and while the troops were so engaged, I returned with the steamer to the same city. On the following day the bad news became confirmed by the arrival of some hundreds of the garrison of Soo-chow. These men stated that the second in command, Nar-wang, with several other principal chiefs, had assassinated the commandant and then surrendered the city to the enemy. A great number of the Mo-wang's men were massacred by the followers of the other leaders, who commanded about 20,000 troops, while the Cantonese portion of the garrison —some 5,000 strong, and unconnected with the treachery—were compelled to fight their way out of the city. These latter, having placed their wives and children in the centre, proceeded to force the west gate. Unable, however, to effect the narrow passage with their helpless families against the incessant attack by overwhelming numbers of Imperialist and renegade soldiery, they were driven to the horrible extreme of killing their own women and children to save them from the worse fate of degradation and torture, if captured by the enemy. Scarcely a third of the men succeeded in cutting their way through, and of these many were wounded, many were covered with the blood of their wives and little ones, while others had become raving maniacs.

The Chinese nature, although apparently so apathetic, is yet capable of the wildest frenzy of passion; in fact, no people have a more paradoxical and anomalous character. It is a well-known fact that Chinese non-combatants will commit wholesale suicide upon the approach of enemies; but few Europeans would credit the fearful acts which the Soo-chow fugitives were driven in desperation to commit, or the frantic excitement leading to such deeds, and to the insanity of many of the perpetrators. I shall never forget the terrible appearance of the madmen stained with the blood of their own dearest relatives, whom they had themselves killed. They rushed into Wu-see at an immense speed, passed the city, and came to the encampment outside, and then, yelling, shouting, and crying, threw themselves, in paroxysms of grief and frenzy, on the ground before the Chung-wang. Several attempted to drown themselves in a neighbouring creek; and one, a young chief, stabbed himself to death before he could be prevented. The unfortunate men were at last secured and taken into the city.

With the remnant of the Soo-chow garrison came seven Europeans. These men had been sent from the city to join my legion, by order of the Chung-wang, and having proceeded to Ma-tang-chiao, when they changed their route for Wu-see, they were overtaken by the fugitives, and came on with them. These seven men were not a portion of those whom I had sent from Shanghae; all the latter (with the exception of the brave Labourais, who was killed during a night attack on some stockades by the enemy only a few days previously) being within Soo-chow when that city was betrayed, and many of them there perishing. Three of the Europeans had straggled, and did not arrive for some days. Among the four who joined me were Captain Smith, and an engineer (for the steamer) who had hitherto been employed casting shell, guns, and executing other important work at Soo-chow.

As it was absolutely necessary for the increase and establishment of my legion that I should return to Shanghae, I wished to leave as soon as the Chung-wang reached Wu-see, particularly as both I and my lieutenant were in a very bad state of health, and urgently required medical assistance; but the Chung-wang having requested that I would join him in an attack upon the Imperialist force threatening Wu-see and Chang-chow-foo, I was obliged to defer leaving until after the battle. The enemy were intrenched in great strength within fifteen miles of Wu-see, and were assisted by a powerful flotilla of gunboats, which gave them entire command of the water communications of the city. It was to drive away or destroy this fleet that an attack was decided upon.

At last all obstructions in the way of enabling the steamer—now named the Ti-ping, and flying the Chung-wang's standard—to participate in the engagement were removed; and I joined the Commander-in-Chief's consultation held before commencing operations on the following morning. One thousand men, composing the Élite of the Chung-wang's guards, and the first division of the Loyal and Faithful Auxiliary Legion, were placed under my orders, together with fifteen gunboats, which were to co-operate with the steamer. With this force I was ordered to attack the hostile flotilla, the Chung-wang himself disposing of his troops so as to prevent a junction between the enemy and their vessels. About midnight the army marched to take up its position, and at daylight I advanced with the steamer and gunboats, the men of my legion accompanying me in two divisions, one on each bank of the canal.

The morning was thick and foggy, so that we were enabled to take up a position within cannon-range of the enemy without either attracting their attention or discerning them ourselves. The place I chose for a halt until the fog cleared away was at a large stone bridge, parallel to the Grand Canal, up which we were proceeding, and over a creek leading direct into a small lake, about a mile and a half distant, on which the enemy's flotilla was stationed.

My plan of action was soon formed. I sent the gunboats in advance beyond the bridge, with orders to attack the enemy at the entrance of the lake, and then to retreat in confusion. By this manoeuvre I hoped to draw the hostile gunboats into the creek, when I should be able to attack them with the steamer to an advantage. On the creek not more than a dozen boats could form abreast and work their guns, but on the lake the whole number, estimated at 60 to 70, would be able to open a concentrated fire on our advance; and one well-aimed shot could sink the lightly-built Ti-ping, or pierce her boilers.

Taking on board fifty picked men from the Cantonese musketeers of my legion, and making everything ready for action, I had the steamer moved close to the side of the bridge, where she lay perfectly concealed.

Towards noon the weather began to clear, and our small squadron immediately pulled forward and opened fire on their opponents. The Imperialists, encouraged by their great superiority of numbers, soon advanced into the creek and gave chase as our gunboats retreated. By the time that they had reached half-way to the bridge, however, the day became quite clear, and observing our troops spread out in line of battle, they gave up any further pursuit.

This was the moment for which I had been waiting. Sending forward my men on the shore at a run, I moved the steamer from her hidden position, passed under the bridge, and advanced upon the enemy at full speed, firing upon them with our 32-pounder, and warmly answered by their stern guns as they turned and pulled back to reach the lake, which they managed to do before we could close with them. As we approached the termination of the creek, we were saluted with a tremendous cannonade. The gunboats had formed in three divisions, one directly fronting the mouth of the creek, the others upon either flank, so that they were enabled to maintain a most powerful cross fire. I counted twenty-two vessels in the centre squadron, and twenty in each of the others. They were all fully manned with about 30 men in every boat, and each carried a bow-gun, from 6 to 18-pounder; a large swivel on either side, and a stern gun, a little smaller than that in the fore-part.

Of course, my land force could be of no assistance on the lake, all their use being to accompany the steamer on either side of a creek, and prevent the enemy's troops closing upon her in such an indefensible position. Our fifteen gunboats were armed with such inferior artillery that they were altogether unable to cope with the hostile vessels, every one of which carried good English guns supplied by the British at Shanghae. I therefore ordered them to remain in the creek, but to advance and take charge of any boats we might capture.

Directly we emerged from the creek, the enemy gallantly pulled towards us, decorated with innumerable flags, maintaining a very heavy fire, yelling terrifically, and deafening us with a tremendous beating of gongs and blowing of war-horns. Seeing that their only way of retreat was by a creek in the rear of their starboard squadron, I immediately attacked the centre, because, if successful, we should not only succeed in capturing two-thirds of the flotilla, but would render them unable to fire upon the steamer through danger of injuring themselves. While steaming up to obtain this position—necessarily at slow speed, because the lake was very shallow—showers of grape, roundshot, and every species of Chinese rocket and missile, came rushing all around and about our heads. Fortunately the mitraille was fired too loosely, and the solid shot too badly aimed, to cause us much damage, while every discharge from our heavy gun, worked by Captain Smith, proved very effective among the mass of boats, men, and flags. In a short time the central squadron gave way, and the crews, pulling close to the shore, began to desert their vessels. The port squadron, in danger of being cut off, took to flight and became mingled with the centre. Meanwhile, the starboard division pulled up the creek in its rear, and took up a position, from which it maintained a sharp fire over the low land, nearly every shot passing close to the steamer or striking her. Several times I turned away from the discomfited vessels to follow their consorts up the creek, but on each occasion, with obstinate courage, the enemy rallied, remanned their guns, and stuck to them until our return to the attack drove them ashore again.

Thrice did the crews of the gunboats resume the conflict. On their last attempt to turn the fortune of the day, they actually advanced upon us, loading and firing as fast as they could, keeping up a fearful yelling and beating of gongs, and evincing every determination to board. Had they only possessed sufficient confidence to persist in this attempt, they might easily have succeeded in overpowering us by numbers and capturing the steamer. Fortunately, however, directly the heavy discharges from our pivot gun—double-shotted with grape and canister—and the incessant musketry fire from the small-arm men stationed on our upper deck began to take effect upon them, they gave way and retreated to the shore. After the last repulse, my squadron of gunboats having arrived on the scene of conflict, their crews took charge of the deserted vessels of the enemy and began to tow them away.

From their position on the creek, the starboard division of the Imperialist flotilla still maintained the action; so, abandoning the two others to our allies, we steamed after the still defiant squadron. In a few minutes a well-aimed shot from our 32-pounder sunk two of the gunboats, and eight others were captured. The remaining ten, after a short chase, were abandoned by their men, who escaped ashore, carrying with them, however, their small arms. At this moment I perceived that the creek was lined on either side by a cunningly-contrived breast-work, from behind which the gunboat braves began to fire heavily upon us. At the same time large columns of Imperialist troops became visible, as, by sheer force of numbers, they pressed back the Chung-wang's divisions, and threatened to occupy the bank of the creek by which I had advanced the steamer, and which formed the only line of retreat to Wu-see.

Before we could secure the last abandoned gunboats, a large number of musket-armed skirmishers were thrown into the intrenchments in our immediate vicinity. So heavy and effective became their volleys—every bullet striking some part of the steamer, riddling her light upper works through and through, and wounding many men, while we could neither reply with our heavy guns nor bring a rifle to bear upon the hidden foe—that we were compelled to save ourselves by precipitate flight, leaving the last captured vessels behind, and hurrying to the other creek at full speed, in order to avoid being intercepted by the advancing troops. Owing to the gallantry with which my land division held the enemy in check, we were able to effect our retreat, carrying off fifty-one gunboats as the substantial trophy of our victory, and capturing more than fifty of the Sung-wang's[54] flags.

Upon reaching the bridge we were warmly congratulated by the Chung-wang, who at once declared he would give 200 dols. prize-money for each gunboat, which promise he scrupulously fulfilled. As the enemy continued to advance in line of battle, orders were given for a general attack, and I was despatched with the steamer to the city of Chang-chow-foo, to join in the co-operating movements being executed therefrom. We were too late to participate in them, for, upon reaching some outworks, about twelve miles from the city, our orders were countermanded, the Imperialists being defeated at every point, and the stockades from which they had menaced the two cities being in the hands of the Ti-pings.

Our escape from the ambush into which we had fallen while pursuing the remnant of the Imperialist flotilla was something miraculous, for, although our casualties were only two Chinese killed, three Europeans slightly, my interpreter A-ling dangerously, and a dozen Chinese wounded, the steamer was pierced about her upper-works with countless bullets; so much so, indeed, that it was difficult to understand how every person on board had not been killed.

Some days after our victory, a large Imperial force advanced from Soo-chow and proceeded to invest Wu-see. Upon one occasion they advanced close up to the walls, but were driven back by the shell we threw among them from the steamer. As the city was rendered untenable by the loss of Soo-chow and other places, the Chung-wang decided to evacuate it and retire upon Chang-chow-foo. Before executing this arrangement the Commander-in-Chief, in his capacity of Vicegerent to the Ti-ping king, Tien-wang, commissioned me to promulgate among foreigners the objects of the revolution; the wishes and opinions of its leaders; the treatment they had received from England; and all subjects relative thereto upon which I might be able to write. This event has been the sole origin, besides my own feelings in the cause, of the present work—"Tai Ping Tien Kwoh."

My arrangements to return to Shanghae were soon made. Captain Smith, together with the Ke-wang (one of the Commander-in Chief's high officers), I left in command of my legion so far as it was organized, including the steamer and captured gunboats. My lieutenant, who was too ill to remain on duty, the five rowdies, A-ling and his two Cantonese friends, were to accompany me. Those who remained were given their prize-money, but I refused to receive the share for the others until we should reach the city of Kar-sing-foo, because this place was on the limit of the Ti-ping territory in the direction of Shanghae, and I felt confident that, if they had time, the rowdies would quarrel over their money, and, probably, injure one another. It will be seen that my anticipations were not groundless.

Thinking that the horrible Soo-chow treachery and massacre (the chiefs and their men who surrendered upon General Gordon's guarantee of conditions were put to death by the Manchoo colleague of the British officer) would surely occasion the British Government to withdraw its help from those whose sanguinary atrocities were not only dishonouring them by their participation as allies, but actually making them morally, if not materially, responsible; I set out for Shanghae under the impression that the Anglo-Manchoo alliance would cease, and the time prove favourable for advocating the Ti-ping cause and its claims upon all foreign, but especially British, sympathy.

Having taken leave of the noble Chung-wang and his son Maou-lin, I left Wu-see with an escort of fifteen gunboats; at the same time the city was evacuated, and the Commander-in-Chief started with his troops for Chang-chow-foo, carrying with him the four Europeans captured on board the steamer, whom he promised to retain as prisoners of mine until the return of myself or my lieutenant. It has since been reported that the bodies of these four men were found some time afterwards near Wu-see, and Major Gordon of the R. E., in his notorious capacity of uncommissioned general to Manchoo Governor Le, took upon himself to report that the Chung-wang had roasted them to death, his only authority being the testimony of a demented "old woman," who declared that "Cantonese rebels" had killed them! If the Ti-pings did kill the four prisoners, the act was not only the first instance in which they have retaliated upon foreigners,[55] but was also the result of Major Gordon's treacherous capture of Soo-chow, for I should have sent the men over to his lines as exchanged prisoners of war if I had reached that city. It is, however, believed by all in China who are acquainted with the facts of the case, that the men fell into the hands of the Imperialists, and were put to death by them; and this seems to me a very likely affair (if they have been killed, for it is by no means certain), because the rear of the forces that retreated from Wu-see were closely pursued by the troops of Le, Futai. But my strongest reason for believing that the Ti-pings had no hand in killing them, if murdered they were, is the fact that the Chung-wang was personally pledged (to me) to keep them unharmed and properly cared for; and even Major Gordon cannot state that this celebrated chief ever broke his word, or sanctioned a violation of his guarantees by associates. Moreover, I particularly gave the Chung-wang to understand that my future services would depend very much upon finding my prisoners safe and sound at my return; besides, he could not possibly have had any motive to injure them, and thereby lose what he expected might prove valuable aid; and certainly, to judge by the kind treatment they received within Wu-see, he had no intention of doing so.

At my last interview with the Chung-wang I shall never forget the speaking expression of his fine eyes, as I shook his hand for the last time and stepped back to take my final departure. His look seemed to express friendship and gratitude for what I had already done, doubt for the future, and a mutely pathetic request, imploring that I, too, would not desert him in his hour of need. This well-remembered glance created another bond between us which only death can obliterate, and which would alone have bound me to help the Chung-wang to the utmost of my ability. No wonder he seemed doubtful as to my future course, for the Ti-pings had never trusted a foreigner without being deceived, and they never experienced anything but insult or unprovoked injury from European officials!

From Wu-see to Kar-sing-foo, vi the Ta-hoo Lake and Hoo-chow-foo, I was accompanied by the Shi-wang, a cousin of the Chung-wang, who had received instructions to facilitate my movements and make arrangements for my return, besides being commissioned to divert to the city of Hoo-chow the reinforcements on their way to Ma-tang-chiao. A few days after commencing our journey we fell in with a body of troops belonging to the Ting-wang's command at the provincial capital Hang-chow, who were proceeding to the appointed rendezvous; but the Shi-wang ordered them to Hoo-chow, where they afterwards proved very useful in maintaining communications with Nankin along the west shore of the Ta-hoo, vi Chang-chow, Kin-tang, Li-yang, &c.

After the evacuation of Wu-see by the Ti-ping troops, the city, of course, fell into Imperialist hands; when the wretches, in their usual style, commenced a general massacre of the unfortunate inhabitants, it being estimated that 6,000, at least, were put to death, their crime being the fact that they were found in a city which had been held by rebels! The poor people who had been daily supplied with food from the Ti-ping granaries were now starved to death, for charity is a virtue unknown to Manchoo mandarins. I was at Wu-see for several weeks, and during that period I went over the country for miles in every direction, finding everywhere the same frightful results of British intervention—in the devastation of the country by the allies, and the starvation of the unfortunate Ti-ping country people. During my return to Shanghae, every place I saw exhibited more or less misery; a painful contrast to the prosperity universally prevailing only a few months before, when the power and rule of the Tien-wang was unshaken. Upon leaving the Ti-ping territory, or rather upon passing the few strong cities they still occupied in proximity to the frontier, the desolation of the country was perfectly appalling. Even throughout those portions of the silk districts still untouched by the enemy, everything was in a state of turmoil, inactivity, and distress. The mulberry-trees and the silkworms, which require constant care, were but partially tended; in many parts they were neglected altogether; so that these facts, coupled to the wholesale massacre of the people by the Imperialists, fully account for the great decrease of silk since the Ti-pings have been driven from the producing districts.

My readers have already been shown the prosperous condition of the country entirely under Ti-ping control during the years 1860-1-2-3. We will now notice for the last time the effect of British support of the barbarous Manchoo.

The change for the worse may be considered to have fairly commenced directly after the capture of the city of Quin-san by the Anglo-Manchoo forces. Since that event, entirely caused by British means, death and destruction have swept throughout the once free, Christian, and smiling land. I have wandered over mile after mile of the once happy Ti-ping districts (during the latter part of 1863 and beginning of 1864); I have passed through twenty and thirty villages in a day, and, horrible to relate, in almost every room of each house have found the unfortunate people starved, starving, or barely maintaining the embers of life by a fearful state of cannibalism, feeding on the dead bodies lying thick around them! I have seen this sight of unparalleled horror in large unwalled towns containing many hundred houses, and I frequently found as many as fifteen to twenty bodies in one dwelling, the great number being occasioned by refugees from places already occupied or threatened by Anglo-Imperialists. I have had the fearful consolation of resuscitating many of the miserable people for a short time by giving them all the rice I could obtain, though I was convinced it would only give them strength to undergo the pangs of starvation a second time. Some insensate patriots may accuse me of un-English feeling for my expressions against the policy of the present British ministry; but would not any Englishman feel and write strongly upon witnessing such scenes as those I am describing, and which have been solely caused by the wicked use of England's strength? I denounce the policy pursued against the Ti-pings as being not only egregiously stupid and suicidal in theory and practice, but absolutely iniquitous in every result. Nothing could work greater harm on living mankind.

From the few poor wretches I found able to speak, in most cases I gathered their expression of opinion "that it was through foreign soldiers coming to fight the Tien-ping (Ti-ping troops) that their distress had been occasioned." Some said that "they had come from places taken by the Kwan-ping (Imperialist troops), and reaching where I found them, could get nothing to eat, were unable to travel farther, and so had lain them down to die." Whenever I came to villages where the people were not yet reduced to the last stage of famine, mothers were offering their daughters to any one who would take them; but even this was unavailing! Although in other parts of China the young women would have been taken for evil purposes, in Ti-pingdom the laws strictly prohibited everything that was condemned as immoral, so they were left to starve if provisions were not supplied from better motives. These fearful scenes are so vividly impressed upon my memory that I am sorry I ever had the misfortune to witness them.

The desolating sword of Asiatic warfare has been ruthlessly carried into provinces for years in the most flourishing condition under Ti-ping rule. Hundreds of once happy villages have been obliterated from the face of the earth they once adorned, while the decaying skeletons of their industrious and inoffensive people are thickly scattered throughout the surrounding country, changing into a vast Golgotha and desert what would otherwise have remained an earthly paradise.

As many people would probably feel inclined to deny that the Anglo-Manchoo forces created the desolation I have described, because it has frequently been misrepresented by interested persons that the Ti-pings were the devastators, I have selected two or three statements which entirely corroborate my own.

The following narrative was given by a gentleman who has comparatively lately traversed the silk districts in search of mulberry-trees and silkworms, in order to estimate the probable extent of the next silk crop, and the causes of the present great fall-off. It appeared in the Friend of China, Shanghae paper, of January 13, 1865, from which I quote:—

Here we have the testimony of an impartial mercantile gentleman. Comment is needless. We will now turn to the evidence given by two of Gordon's own officers, men who were present during the operations against the Ti-pings, but who were ultimately honest enough to admit the truth. The following extracts are from a letter which appeared in the Friend of China, April 28, 1864:—

Besides the above letter, the following appears in the issue of the same paper on the 31st of January, 1865:—

As the Liberal Government has such a penchant for interfering in the internal affairs of other nations, why has it not devoted its meddlesome talents to killing some one either in Denmark, America, Italy, Poland, or Mexico? Cynical people may well say that the Premier and his colleagues dared not more than bluster in these cases; that in the centre of China, in Japan, Ashantee, New Zealand, &c., they became very brave and officious because they could be so with impunity, and that such disgraceful, unprofitable, and inconsistent, if not imbecile policy, is either the expiring flashes of their administration or the greatness of England.

Although it may be perfectly true that the Chancellor of the Exchequer and his confrÈres in office have saved the opium trade and the China indemnity (probably also their places in office, by covering the expenses of the last China war, which would otherwise have made a serious cause of opposition), at the immaterial responsibility of the destruction of a few millions of Chinese and the devastation of some districts of China three or four times the size of England, of what benefit has the meddling policy proved to general commercial or mercenary interests? The silk trade, the most valuable with China, has fallen off exactly one half at the present date,[58] since the due effect of driving the Ti-pings from their dominions has transpired. The interior, free and open under the revolutionists, who earnestly desired the friendship of Europeans, has now been closed to freedom of trade or travel by the very Mandarins who have been reinstated to tyrannize over regions their oppression had otherwise lost to them for ever; while the old hatred of foreigners, persistent determination to evade treaty obligations, and the haughty, exclusive policy of the Manchoo has been resumed, since the hypocritical pretence of adopting a more friendly line of conduct, in order to obtain foreign assistance, has become no longer necessary, by the recoil of the Ti-ping revolt before British arms. Besides this, having broken the political power of the only movement in China which afforded a prospect of improving, pacifying, or Christianizing that vast empire, England has been the means of creating a general state of anarchy. The Ti-pings have simply retreated to the interior and the sea-coast province of Fu-keen, while in every other part of the empire the people, no longer able to look upon the great revolution as likely to overthrow the Manchoo, and being more than ever oppressed by their foreign rulers, are not only driven to discontent but open rebellion. Besides the Ti-ping revolution, there are at the present time three or four powerfully organized rebellions. The "Nien-fei," in the north; the "Honan Filchers," towards the west; and the so-called "Mohammedan rebels," in the central provinces. Elsewhere, the innumerable local insurrections have settled into a regular system of brigandism, because the discontented have no longer the opportunity or confidence to join the diminished forces of Ti-pingdom. These circumstances, added to the fact that the Imperialist Mandarins are now systematically enforcing at least five times the treaty-legalized transit duties upon merchandise, are not only greatly enhancing the price of foreign goods to the natives, but, of course, considerably limiting their consumption. The only staple article of trade which has not at present decreased in quantity is tea. Still the price has become higher in China, and the non-diminution of export is due to the fact that the Ti-pings evacuated their former tea districts and captured the famous Vu-e, or Bohea districts, which they held for some time, without much fighting. It would be impossible to say that, since the result of British hostilities against the revolutionists has transpired, our commerce with China was ever in a more stagnant, unprofitable, and generally unsatisfactory condition. So much for the mercenary interests, to aid which England has been unscrupulously dragged into a clandestine and grossly criminal war!

Bad as the preceding effects of the foreign policy of the Palmerston Government undoubtedly are, there is yet another and a far worse consequence to be noticed. Before adverting to the most serious fact it is as well to epitomize the political action which has created it. It has been fondly imagined and fatally supposed by the Liberal ministers themselves, that they, par excellence, are the enlightened men of England, the only framers of philanthropical and progressive measures; and, in fact, that their glorious and never-to-be-forgotten place-holding is a Government of "peace, retrenchment, and reform." The doctrine of non-intervention having even been especially professed, and having been carried so far as to make a certain noble lord sacrifice his publicly and officially declared determination that "Denmark should not stand alone" in the event of certain contingencies, by leaving her to stand alone when those contingencies did come to pass, and then framing another set of probabilities, about the chivalrous deeds he would initiate if the King of Denmark were to be made a prisoner. Doubtless the admirers of that noble lord—who once made the astounding and statesmanlike discovery that "all children are born innocent," especially those of his constituents, whose chubby "olive branches" were also discovered to be the best and most beautiful in England—considered their representative a marvellously proper man, and his bragging to fight and then retracting a very creditable proceeding, quite in accordance with the useful policy of non-intervention: yet, on the other hand, there are people who have the obstinacy to review this and similar affairs, and deduct therefrom, and observe the fact that in other parts of the world a very different policy has been enacted where it could be done with impunity, all of which affords sufficient evidence that the pretended adoption of a non-interfering policy is neither more nor less than an unprincipled truckling to strong powers, and an aggressive bullying of the weak.

It is quite certain that, whether the rulers of China be Manchoo or Ti-ping, the vast industrial population would still produce tea, silk, and other commodities. Now, the professed motive for British intercourse with China is commercial—that is to say, to buy the above-mentioned articles, and sell the manufactures of the English markets—but not political; for meddlesome interference with the internal affairs of China would prove disadvantageous to both nations, and would certainly be well calculated to bring the Imperial authority into contempt, injure the Chinese organizations in an abortive attempt to substitute those for which they are not yet qualified, and simply foment the troubles already existing, by the natural consequences of injudicious and unnecessary meddling.

But the British ministers, who would justify their broken pledges in Europe by an appeal to the doctrine of non-intervention, act upon a very different system towards China and Japan. They seem to make it their business, not only to advance trade in the Celestial Empire, but to concern themselves with its private and political disturbances, to judge between the Ti-ping and Manchoo, and then to settle the affair by destroying the one and bullying the other.

In Japan they have attacked feudal chieftains as though no central Government existed in that country; and then, after degrading the Imperial authority in the eyes of the people, force has been used to compel the opening of ports to trade. Thus have British statesmen pursued the best course to increase the animosities already existing, to produce general anarchy, and to establish the violation of all principles of international law, which they are compelled to observe in Europe. The most convincing fact with regard to the folly of interfering in China, is, that until such idiotic, or rather wicked policy was commenced, the exports were largely on the increase, having risen from £9,014,310 in 1859, to £14,186,310 in 1863; while the consumption of British imports has decreased up to the same period—about which time the operations against the Ti-pings were exercising due effect—by more than half a million—£567,646. In 1863, the total value of British exports to China was £3,889,927—a sum less than the value of the exports to Brazil; yet for this comparatively paltry amount an enormous military expenditure has been maintained, whilst it is palpable, by the falling off of trade, that the policy has signally failed, and the number of persons who have perished through the mistake would make at least one life destroyed for every pound sterling.

We now come to the most serious point with regard to the war against the Ti-pings. It is well known, and has never been denied, that throughout the country, under their control, the Bible was circulated not only with freedom, but gratuitously, by the Government established at Nankin. Besides this unparalleled practice, the fact that they accepted the Word of God in its full integrity is also incontrovertible; and He has declared, "My Word shall not return unto me void." Furthermore, it is well known by all who have visited the Ti-pings in their cities and camps, that (so strict an interpretation have they placed upon the Commandments, &c.) they effectually prohibit not only the inveterate vices of the Chinese, and their heathen practices, but the evil indulgences which find full sway even in the most moral State of Europe. Their abolition of opium smoking; prostitution; the hitherto universal Chinese slave trade; the degraded Asiatic status of the women; the use of torture and bribery in courts of justice; the deformed small feet; the tail-wearing slave-badge of the men—these, and other facts proving their complete superiority to the hopelessly corrupt state of public and private life under the foreign rule of the Manchoo dynasty, we have already noticed. Let us ask, whence these great and glorious changes? Are they, as Lords Palmerston and Russell, and their correspondents upon anti-Ti-ping Chinese affairs, have repeatedly declared (when obliged to defend their un-English policy) the conduct of the Ti-pings to be, the natural acts of "bloodthirsty marauders," "locusts," "merciless brigands," "revolting impostors," "ferocious hordes of banditti," &c.? Or are they not rather the blessings bestowed by God upon people who, to the utmost of their power, and the sacrifice of their lives, have striven to follow His Word and Law? Man may change the public and outward forms of existence necessary for the body, but only God can alter the private and moral character necessary for the soul. There is a doctrine of original and natural sin; therefore it does appear presumptuous, if not profane, when people combine together against any vast movement in which the hand of God is visible—either in the supernatural or the presence of the Bible; especially as they believe that Divine interposition is necessary to convert and save the souls of all men, and as they have neither political nor national interest in the movement to even justify the worldly motives of their interference.

Present ministers[59] and their followers may possibly ridicule the idea, in order to justify their policy towards China, that whatever the Ti-pings might or might not have been—even setting apart the fact of their Christianity—if they have been killed for the sake of British commerce (especially the vile opium trade, which they prohibited), every bale of silk and chest of tea brought into this land bears with it an endless curse; and that these, together with every article of British manufacture forced upon China, are defiled with the blood of the victims who have been slaughtered to prosper, forsooth! "our commercial institutions!" Man cannot serve both God and Mammon. The efforts of the British Government to worship the latter have failed most signally; but even had they succeeded in creating the most stupendous trade the world ever contained, do they believe that a righteous and eternal God has not witnessed the means, and that He who notes the fall of a small sparrow hath not recorded the murder of every human being, during their unholy crusade against the unfortunate Ti-pings?

Throughout a vast extent of China the Bible became established; but now, through the assistance given by the British Government to the Manchoo, the people—even including the little lisping children—have been slaughtered, while the idols of Budha are re-erected, dominating for a season over the desecrated ashes of our Bible.

Nankin, the Ti-ping capital, has fallen, through British intervention, since my arrival in this country; the printing and circulation of the Holy Scriptures have therefore ceased, and the Ti-pings have become wanderers over the face of the earth they would otherwise have adorned. It is idle and unworthy to cavil at this dogma or that article of the Ti-ping creed: the revolutionists did their utmost to enter into the pale and brotherhood of Christendom. Truly and candidly speaking, the nation solely responsible for preventing so glorious a consummation, is—England.