CHAPTER XX.

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Ti-ping Disasters.—The Vampyre Fleet.—Important Letters.—Mr. Roberts's Case.—Mr. Consul Harvey.—Letters continued.—Misrepresentations.—Anti-Ti-ping Meeting.—The Sherrard Osborne Theory.—The Fleet Afloat.—The "Lay" and "Osborne" Agreement.—The Fleet repudiated.—Pecuniary Loss to England.—A ResumÉ.—General Burgevine.—Lieutenant Ridge.—Act of Piracy.—A Tartar caught.—Exit of the Anglo-Chinese Flotilla.—General Ward's Proceedings.—Progress of the War.—Death of General Ward.—Captain Dew's Disgrace.—How caused.—His Mode of Proceeding.—Its Effect upon Trade.—Operations before Kah-ding.—"Wong-e-poo."—General Burgevine dismissed from his Command.—Major Gordon takes Command.—Sir F. Bruce's Despatches.—His Objections to Gordon's Appointment.—Also to General Brown's Interference.

During the absence of the Chung-wang on his campaign to the north, and while I was still confined by illness in Nankin, important events disastrous to the Ti-ping cause were occurring elsewhere. These events, which must be described before continuing my personal narrative, consisted of the organization of that extraordinary flotilla known in England as the Anglo-Chinese, but principally as the Vampyre fleet in China; the resumption of hostilities against the Ti-pings by General Staveley and his colleagues; and the conversion of Ward's old mercenaries into a British contingent, besides the formation of several other similar legions both at Shanghae and Ningpo.

The origin of the Vampyre scheme to regenerate China by exterminating the Ti-pings, is as yet uncertain, although Mr. Lay (late Inspector General of Chinese Customs) in his pamphlet intituled "Our Interests in China," thus describes its first practical adoption:—"Threatened by Sir F. Bruce, 'that Her Majesty's Government will not go on protecting Shanghae for ever,' ... [Blue Book, 1863, pp. 13 and 67], and alarmed by the news of the loss of Ningpo, and of the advance of the Ti-pings upon Shanghae ... they (the Manchoo Government) saw that they must comply,[29] or perish.... The Prince Regent (Kung) accordingly declared himself ready to adopt any measure that Sir F. Bruce might advise. What was his bidding? 'Get foreign ships and engage foreign officers.'[30] 'Procure us the ships and the officers,' was the rejoinder."

Accordingly some one whom Mr. Lay terms "my locum tenens, Mr. Hart," received from the Manchoo Government "a certain sum of money for transmission to England for the purchase of a steam fleet." Meanwhile arrangements were made between Mr. Lay and Captain Sherrard Osborne, R.N., by which that officer agreed to receive the elevation to a Manchoo Admiralship. The British Government suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act, ignored the pledges of neutrality, and "at the Court at Windsor, the 30th day of August, 1862," passed an "Order in Council authorising the enlistment of officers and men, and the equipment and fitting-out of vessels of war for the service of the Emperor of China."

Although fearing I may tire my readers, I cannot resist quoting from a small book of official letters under my hand in order to prove by most conclusive authoritative testimony the false pretences upon which the raising of the flotilla and the enlistment of British subjects in the service of the barbarous Manchoo despotism was permitted in England. The letters have been lent to me by a distinguished Member of Parliament, and are written by one of the first Shanghae merchants to his brother, a member of the present Government. These letters have, I am informed, been submitted to various ministers; therefore, it may be concluded that in addition to the despatches of Consul Meadows, &c., the Government had ample means of becoming acquainted with the favourable characteristics of the unfortunate Ti-pings they have devoted to destruction.

The letter I now propose quoting is written in reference to Earl Russell's speech in the debate upon China in the House of Lords on the 2nd of July, 1862, and commences by stating "Earl Grey's view is far sounder than that of the Government." Passing over Earl Russell's preamble the letter states:—

"II. Earl Russell next propounds two questions:—

"First.—Will the Ti-pings give us the same advantages which the Government of China is bound to give us?

"Second.—Can the Ti-pings form a Government with which foreign Powers can treat?

"He argues a negative answer to these questions, and I take issue with him on his argument as follows:—

"First.—He alludes to the agreement made with the Ti-pings at Nankin by Admiral Hope, restricting them to a limited distance of thirty miles from Shanghae. The arrangement was made about the end of 1860, and was generally understood at the time to be limited to the space of one year. The agreement was faithfully kept for that time. When Admiral Hope and Mr. Parkes went to Nankin at the close of 1861,[31] they found the Ti-pings stubborn, and, I believe, the latter would give no further pledge, while Shanghae, under our protection, was made the arsenal, mint, and storehouse of their opponents!... I believe that the Ti-pings acted in good faith, as far as they knew, and that the accusation is fallacious.

"Earl Russell, on the assumption of their want of faith, proceeds to say:—'They approached very near to Shanghae. Junks belonging to British owners were seized, the crews were imprisoned, one European was murdered, and every determination was shown to interfere with the British trade at that port.'

"This is a very sweeping sentence, and to a great extent fallacious.

"'A. The Ti-pings certainly, early this year, came in strong force close to Shanghae. Their leaders sent in a note immediately to the British and French authorities.... All negotiation was repudiated by our authorities.'

"Seeing that Shanghae was the centre, from which, under cover of our flags, safe from harm, the Imperialists organized all their plans, provided all the necessaries of war, and found a ready treasury in the customs' revenue, it is not to be wondered at that the Ti-pings were most anxious to get possession of a place so important to the success of their cause; and it is scarcely reasonable, in this view, to suppose that they ever intended to pledge themselves in perpetuity, to allow such a state of matters to continue.

"'B. Junks belonging to British owners were seized, and their crews imprisoned.'

"This is so vague, that it is difficult to know what instances are alluded to. Some boats, British owned, were, during last season, stopped at the passes from the silk districts, in possession of the rebels, from their attempting to run the pass without paying the usual toll. I have never heard of any boat being molested which stopped and paid the moderate duty exacted by the de facto power....

"'C. One European was murdered.'

"To what case does this allude? Several Europeans have been murdered. A Frenchman, named Salabelle, having imprudently gone up the Yang-tze in a China boat with a lot of dollars, was murdered by pirates in collusion with the boatmen. The Ti-pings had nothing to do with that.

"Another man, in charge of a silk-boat, was attacked on his way to Shanghae by a band of robbers. He was killed, but the robbers turned out to be Imperial soldiers—not Ti-pings. I have not heard of any European being so murdered by the Ti-pings. On the contrary, both last year and this season, numbers of Europeans have been engaged in the silk and green tea districts in pursuance of their business, and have been perfectly welcome, on paying the duty on their produce....

"'D. And every determination was shown to interfere with the British trade at that port.'

"This, to a person on the spot, is a most extraordinary statement. Both last year and this season the Ti-pings have had possession of the entire silk district, and a great part of the green tea district. Yet, for the year ending the 30th of June last, we exported 75,000 bales of silk, and fully 50,000 bales have come to market already of the new crop. What sterling money do these 125,000 bales of silk represent? Take them at £80 per bale, you have £10,000,000 sterling, or one-third of the £30,000,000, which Earl Russell correctly states as about the present annual value of the Shanghae trade. The Ti-pings might have cut off nearly all this, had they been so inclined, but they have allowed it all to come to market on payment of a moderate duty. I have not the figures of the green teas by me at this moment, but a very full supply was exported up to 30th June last, a great part of which came from districts in possession of the Ti-pings.

"Are these facts consistent with Earl Russell's assertions?

"I think they confute them altogether.... You are trying to patch up a rotten Government, which will only get weaker for all your efforts to mend it. Finally on this head, the Ti-pings have all along professed anxiety to keep on friendly terms with us, till our decided hostility, and harbouring of the Imperialists at Shanghae, has made their wish impracticable. They are not inimical to trade, as the facts above prove. They are not the savages who would murder every European who goes among them on peaceable pursuits, as many who have been among them could prove; and I believe that if we could only give up the unfortunate Imperialism we have espoused, we should find them quite ready to give every facility of trade we have now, and to restore this unlucky province to peace.

"Second. Earl Russell asks:—

"'Is there any chance, supposing the Ti-pings consented not to annoy us any longer, and we made peace with them, that they could form a regular government?—and upon this point we have most convincing testimony.'

"Convincing testimony, indeed! Mr. Roberts[32] is the first.... Some time back Mr. Roberts went to join his former pupil at Nankin. Whatever faults the chief might have, he was always most kind to his former teacher. The reverend gentleman, however, was alarmed one day, and left the place precipitately, and therefore wrote a recantation of his former belief in Ti-pingdom. He could not have been quite in his senses at the time, for the boy whom he said was murdered before his eyes, was seen alive and well afterwards....

"His opinion is not worth much.

"The next authority is Mr. Consul Harvey of Ningpo."

The writer of the letter deprecates the idea of using this gentleman's testimony in a grave debate, especially because it was permitted to overrule the opposite evidence adduced by the talented and trustworthy Mr. Consul Meadows. It is unnecessary to say more upon this subject than notice the fact that Mr. Meadows is a man of honour, of noble mind, and possesses a thorough knowledge of Ti-ping and Manchoo; Mr. Harvey is—Mr. Harvey!

The letter continues:—

"On the strength of these valuable witnesses, Earl Russell proceeds to say, 'It must therefore be clear to your lordships that it is quite impossible anything like civil relations can be established with the Ti-pings, or that they can govern the Chinese empire, or conduct relations with foreign countries upon the footing of amity upon which alone peace can be preserved.'

"Well, if their lordships are content to come to this conclusion on this valuable evidence, they are very likely to find out their mistake in doing so."

After citing proof of the "very great system in their military department," the writer of the letter goes on to state with regard to the Ti-pings:—

"If men can thus conduct the details of a military department, is it not probable that they have also the power of conducting the details of a civil department, when the military necessity is past? At Soo-chow, which the Ti-pings have now had for eighteen months, the country people round about are now living quietly enough, and carrying on their usual avocations....

"With regard to the attack at Ningpo, Earl Russell asserts that the Ti-pings first fired on Captain Dew. The fact was, I believe, that the pirate, 'Apak,' anchored his boats near the English ships, so that in firing at 'Apak,' the shot from the rebel batteries came close to, or over, the foreign ships. An excuse for attack was wanted, this was enough, and the place was taken.

"The Earl goes on to say, 'It appeared clear from this that there was no chance of our being able to maintain any relations of amity with the Ti-pings; and as they seemed determined to destroy us, all that we could do was to protect our trade and the lives of our merchants.'

"It is not to be expected that we can be on terms of amity while we make Shanghae the arsenal of the Imperialists, and carry out our intervention on the principle by which it has hitherto been characterized.

"A most disgraceful affair took place the other day. Nine young gentlemen, members of the Shanghae Mounted Volunteer Corps, went out one afternoon with Captain Borlase, of H.M. ship Pearl, and a party of men, to reconnoitre. They came on a number of Ti-pings, who on seeing the horses, immediately threw away their arms, and ran off half naked. Captain Borlase gave the order to pursue and to give no quarter.[33] These young gentlemen accordingly amused themselves that afternoon in cold-blooded murder, and their captain distinguished himself, it is said, by the chivalrous action of killing a man lying badly wounded on the ground. One of the number, a young friend of mine, I am glad to say, refused to obey the order he received. I say that if H.M.'s officers are to be permitted to give such brutal orders, the sooner we cease to talk of Ti-ping cruelties and the savageries of General Butler the better.... A cry has been got up about the cruelties of the Ti-pings, for want of a better war-cry, and our people are taught to illustrate Christianity by the perpetration of cruelties, considering our lights, infinitely more atrocious. The conduct of the Ti-pings, notwithstanding all the provocation they have received, towards foreigners who have had to enter their lines on business, contrasts in their favour with our conduct to them.

"From Captain Osborne's appointment, I infer that my friend Lay has been entirely Imperialist in the advice he has given the Government.

"I regret that Osborne should have taken such an appointment, and that Government should have sanctioned it.

"I regret still more that Palmerston should be making what I consider such a grave mistake on this question, and that is one of the main reasons why I write these letters. Another is that I am convinced our present policy will be detrimental alike to British interests, and to the interests of the Chinese people."

We have seen that Messrs. Jardine and Matheson pronounced the policy of their Government "suicidal." We have now noticed the important evidence of another of the principal merchants, in whose interest it was alleged to be necessary to slaughter the Ti-pings. The British Parliament was persuaded by fallacies, and the "Vampyre" fleet was made ready and sent to China, while the British people were led into the belief that it was organized merely to act against Chinese pirates, the Government organs representing the Ti-pings as "attempting to force a way to the sea coast, where they hope to take to the amphibious life a Chinaman always loves, and prowl at sea or penetrate the inner waters as necessity or opportunity may tempt or dictate." This, and innumerable similar fabrications, are perfectly astounding by the depth of their untruth and the total absence of any foundation. The above-quoted statement is only surpassed by another in the same article of the same newspaper:—"It is, however, the people of China who have broken the force of the Ti-pings, and it is under the dread of their terrible reprisals that the Ti-pings are now attempting to force a way to the sea-coast"!!!

This article, so horribly wicked in purpose and so thoroughly false in substance, was one of those written upon the grand meeting held at the rooms of the Royal Geological Society upon the subject of the "Anglo-Chinese flotilla." The leaders of the quasi-regenerating expedition here held forth to the scientific gentlemen of the Society, their friends, and sundry members of the Government. The speeches they made, their arguments, facts, and declared intentions, were equally reasonable and trustworthy as the statement in the newspaper article eulogising them, and which, by some most extraordinary perversity of knowledge, represented the bitter and ruthless warfare prosecuted by Admirals Hope and Protet, Generals Staveley and Brown, and others, against the Ti-pings, as "the people of China who have broken the force of the Ti-pings." Certes, had such been the case, it required an astonishing quantity of British shot, shell, artillery, and men, to enable the Manchoo Government to occupy any single village or foot of land held by the "broken force!" And one can hardly discover the object of the flotilla if the "people of China" had already done the only thing for which it was being organized; for which Prince Kung was paying, and Mr. Lay, Captain Sherrard Osborne, and his men, receiving a goodly share of that Manchoo mintage. Five months later, this "broken force" was found to be so well able to convert its opponents into a similarly unpleasant state, that upon the 9th day of January, 1863, another order in counsel was passed, making it "lawful for all military officers in Her Majesty's service to enter into the military service of the Emperor of China."

To resume the history of the "Vampyre" expedition. At the oratorical display of the civil leader and the naval chief, the Chancellor of the Exchequer (with a keen eye to the guarantee the flotilla might afford for the payment of the indemnities by China) was present to see, to hear, to judge, and to wind up in most affecting and impressive style by giving the well-paid, and doubtless well-deserving, adventurers his blessing.

Mr. Lay, with a surprising theory for a questionable purpose, told the meeting that the great cause of the civil war in China was its crowded population, "which the productive power of the soil was not sufficient to maintain." Emigration of the Ti-pings (when he caught them) was his remedy. Now, how that clever, though it is just possible, mistaken gentleman, expected to forward the change of habitation with the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, and other deadly weapons of exceedingly killing power he was carefully providing, is by no means clear, unless, indeed, the emigration was to be eternal. Neither is it by any means easy to understand that if the production of the soil was not sufficient to maintain the natives, the distress could be alleviated by making it support, in addition, a large number of very expensive foreign officers and men, besides a costly fleet of steamers.

Captain Sherrard Osborne then succeeded the would-be Dictator General of China, and with no less extraordinary principles than his civilian superior, made the astounding declarations:—1. "That his first duty in China would be to bear in mind that he was a member of the Geographical Society." 2. "That he was going to China to spread peace, and not to shed blood" (with his Armstrongs and &c.s). 3. "That his object was to teach the Chinese rather the duty of sparing than the art of killing" (singular that such pains were taken to procure the most effective armament England could furnish). 4. "And that he hoped to report that Nankin was taken without the loss of one life after the assault was over."

1. As the Daily News wrote at the time, "Though this may be very advantageous for Burlington House, it affords an adequate explanation of the way China is to benefit by his vaunted advent. Perhaps, however, it may be accepted as a proof of his being a philanthropic adventurer; that his first care will be to look after, not the interests of the Chinese Government, which pays him 3,000l. a year, but those of a society to whose funds he is called on to contribute."

4. This naÏve announcement is a startling one for the "pirate" dodge of the gallant captain's friends, and proves that the only motive, which, in fact, is admitted by all save a few bigots, was suppression of the Ti-ping revolution.

Of Mr. Lay and his fighting-man, the Daily News well said, "As these gentlemen seem to have the power of carrying on their scheme for the present, they will doubtless do so, but it is a mistake for them to depart from the policy of reserve which they have hitherto followed."

In dire alarm and trouble, Prince Kung grasped at the offer of a fleet to save the Manchoo dynasty, as a drowning man will clutch at a straw. The British Government, wisely thinking that the fleet would guard the treaty ports against the Ti-pings, and thereby protect both the payment of the indemnity and the opium trade at the expense of the Chinese, quickly seized the opportunity it shadowed forth. The justice of their conduct is a very different matter, and it would be interesting indeed to know by what right the capture of Nankin was undertaken,—a city far in the interior of China, the owners of which only entreated the friendship of foreigners, while striving to throw off a foreign yoke and enjoy the blessing of the Christian faith and self-government.

The worst part of the tale has now to be related. Upon the individual authority of Mr. Lay, the flotilla (consisting principally of British men-of-war) having struck the English flag, hoisted a green and yellow rag, and without commission or any authority to constitute them national ships of war, proceeded to the high seas in true pirate fashion. The laws of England were unscrupulously violated, her navy indelibly disgraced, and all who took share in the expedition perfectly fooled, by the unofficial countenance of a Manchoo Prince, and the indecent haste of British ministers to comply with his ambiguous request for a fleet, in order to gratify their own ulterior motives.

Prince Kung simply authorized Mr. Lay to buy a number of vessels, but those ships were despatched from England fully manned and armed, as though they had been duly commissioned, which was not, and never became, the case. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne, between them, prepared an agreement (that being the authority and regulation upon which the crews were engaged, and merely a private understanding, strangely resembled the bond of a piratical organization), which, had it been carried into execution, would virtually have consigned the destinies and executive of China into their hands. These were the salient features of the agreement:—

"4. Osborne undertakes to act upon all orders of the Emperor which may be conveyed direct to Lay; and Osborne engages not to attend to any orders conveyed through any other channel.

"5. Lay, upon his part, engages to refuse to be the medium of any orders of the reasonableness of which he is not satisfied."

No wonder the Manchoo Government repudiated this pretty arrangement, fleet and all, when it arrived in China. There is, however, another reason to account for the ignominious failure of the "Vampyres,"—ignominious because they had neither right nor justification to be placed in the position of mercenaries, or to be subjected to dismissal by a barbarous court. The Imperialists were willing enough to receive a fleet upon any terms when the success of the Ti-ping revolution was certain unless foreigners interfered; but when the "Vampyres" did arrive, the dread of the avenging Ti-ping no longer existed. By English troops and English officers in command of Chinese disciplined legions, the revolutionists had been driven back from Shanghae and Ningpo, and were still retreating before the shock of foreign arms. Mr. Lay and Captain Osborne came too late. They could not become the slaves of the Manchoo, neither could they constitute themselves his tyrants, and consequently Prince Kung repudiated all his obligations with characteristic treachery.

When the flotilla reached China the Imperial Government endeavoured to place it under the command of the provincial authorities, and by this determination they effected its dissolution. Captain Osborne refused to lower himself into the position occupied by British officers in the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo—that of filibusters, subordinate to the local authorities—but the Tartars had the best of the argument, for the precedent existed in the terms upon which the military had taken service with them; they were therefore justified in applying the same reasoning to make the navy of England subservient to their inferior officials. Prince Kung and his colleagues were decided upon this point and the repudiation of other guarantees; Captain Osborne remained equally firm; consequently Mr. Lay lost his lucrative appointment as Inspector General of Chinese customs, Captain Osborne did not become a Manchoo Admiral, and the naval force of no nationality was sold, while the officers and men had to go back to where they came from.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer's magniloquent benediction, in which he prophesied of "the day when its leaders would come back rich in professional fame, and bringing also with them fresh glory to their country," vanished and disappeared in thin air, thanks to the failure of the attempt to "spread peace" with rifled artillery. Mr. Lay, since his tardy appreciation of the Manchoo, in "Our Interests in China," thus describes the state of affairs which led to the failure of his regenerating scheme:—

"When I left China, the Emperor's Government, under the pressure of necessity,[34] and with the beneficial terror established by the allied foray to Pekin in 1860 fresh in their recollection, was in the best of moods, willing to be guided," &c. "What did I find on my return? The face of things was entirely changed. There was the old insolent demeanour, the nonsensical language of exclusion, the open mockery of all treaties, the declared determination to yield nothing that could be evaded. In short, all the ground gained by the treaty of 1858 had been frittered away, and we were thrust back into the position we occupied before the war—one of helpless remonstrance and impotent menace."

A pretty state of affairs truly! Re-established, too, by British politicians, who, by supporting the Manchoos, have perpetuated a system which the Ti-pings would have altered for ever.

Time has already proved the truth of the above assertion by Mr. Lay; time will yet prove the bitter hatred the present dynasty of China entertains towards Great Britain, the nation which has frequently chastised them, forced them to break their own laws and receive the obnoxious opium, humbled them before their people and compelled them to eat the fruit of humility, and worse than all, originated the once irresistible Ti-ping revolution by the importation of Christianity. They would not be men did they forget the blows (not always justifiable) they have received; they would not be Manchoo did they forget to revenge themselves when able.

Financially considered, this Anglo-Manchoo expedition was rather a serious matter for the British Government. The only authentic estimate of the expenditure which is at present available shows that the portion consequent merely on the return of the flotilla when its services were rejected, amounted to 213,000 taels, or £71,000, which was advanced in the first instance from the Manchoo customs and subsequently refunded by England when receiving the quarterly payment of the Indemnity.

Here is what Captain Osborne says:—

"Dire necessity made Pekin accept our aid in a form likely to be beneficial to China and England. Reason or argument had nothing to do with it, so far as the mandarins were concerned. Most unexpectedly to them, our authorities repulsed the rebellion, without taking any guarantees from Pekin for future behaviour. The mandarins were at once rampant; they are not such fools as to spend their revenue in maintaining order, if we Englishmen will do it for nothing. The fear of rebellion is past. Lay, I, and the force may return to England."

With regard to the failure of the Osborne, Lay, and Gladstone theory, we can only say that it was deserved. Mr. Lay was dismissed from the service of the Manchoo, through the "Vampyre" embroglio. The many years that he had faithfully and energetically served them were lost sight of in the squabble arising from this unparalleled affair. He most likely was sincere in his efforts to regenerate Tartars; he has certainly been badly treated by them. Lay's motive in undertaking the notorious flotilla scheme seems to have been his philanthropical idea (brightened by the receipt of £5,000 a year), of regenerating China. Some people say he was a puppet in the hands of "taller men" behind, who worked the wires. Osborne's acceptance of the command without a commission may be ascribed to the erratic notions of that gallant officer, and his natural philanthropy.

The arrival of the "Vampyre" fleet was hailed with general disapprobation upon the part of the foreign community at Shanghae; its flight, without spreading peace, with no less satisfaction. During the short time the would-be mercenaries—the cream of the British navy, as they were loudly proclaimed to be, by ultra-philo-Imperialist papers and people—remained at that port, they managed to create no little ill feeling against themselves. Although they possessed neither warrant nor Imperial authority for their position and action, they nevertheless had the audacity to constitute themselves into a sort of police by land and water. No business could be transacted on shore, no vessel move upon the waters of the harbour, or work its cargo, unmolested by their inquisition. Vessels were seized, and their crews imprisoned in irons, upon the merest suspicion that they might be destined to assist the Ti-pings; houses were broken into and searched throughout the British and American settlements for supposed Ti-ping refugees, by parties armed to the teeth. They took, however, particular care not to venture upon the French settlement, as the Gallic authorities had given their own police orders to arrest them if they went there; and, if they resisted, to shoot them. The whole place was thrown into a regular ferment and uproar by their proceedings.

Just previous to the ignominious flight of the "cream of the British navy,"—which, by the way, possessed an extraordinary sympathy for another sort of cream peculiar to the Shanghae rum mills,—I happened to become personally acquainted with some of their piratical outrages, while visiting Shanghae for medical advice, and other reasons which will transpire by-and-by.

General Burgevine, successor to Ward in command of the disciplined Chinese contingent, having been badly treated and cashiered by his Manchoo masters, had joined the Ti-pings at Soo-chow. At the time of my visit to Shanghae, Burgevine was supposed to be there also; and, using this as their pretext, the "Vampyres" made a descent upon the house of my friend, Mr. Tarrantt (Editor of the Friend of China), where we were passing the evening with a social party. The dwelling was situated in a compound, also containing the house of the American Marshal; and, while walking round the grounds with my friend and another gentleman, we were suddenly pounced upon in the dark by a party of "the cream of the British navy," hitherto concealed in the shrubbery. At the same moment other detachments rushed into the adjoining houses with a zeal and alacrity tending to prove what capital burglars they were becoming, and, making prisoners of all the men they could find, marched them up to the position we had already been conducted to, in the broad colonnade extending along the front of the American Marshal's house. It was very fortunate neither myself nor any of our company were armed, otherwise, from the suspicious and sudden circumstances under which they had made their appearance, we might very naturally have mistaken the men who sprang upon us for the assassins, or robbers, whom they so strongly resembled. The "Vampyres" were commanded by a Lieutenant Ridge, the most ungentlemanly and discourteous British officer it has ever fallen to my lot to meet.

When our friends were all assembled under the guns of his men, he turned to the latter and distinctly gave them this order, at least in substance: "Now then, men, allow none of these gentlemen to leave this place; if they attempt to do so, shoot them down!" This spirited British officer then led off a party bristling with rifle, bayonet, cutlass, and revolver, himself with sword in hand and a huge "Deane and Adams" slung round his neck, and proceeded to tear up the flooring of Mr. Tarrantt's printing-office, in order to search for arms destined for the dreaded Ti-ping! Of course none were found. The man and his men then proceeded to the sanctum of the editor, and ransacked this and the adjoining rooms, emptying and breaking open boxes of letters, papers, and other editorial correspondence, leaving the whole scattered about the floor in a state of inextricable confusion, after their fruitless search for some trace of Burgevine or his doings.

When this gallant exploit had been brought to a termination by the fact that no private place under lock and key remained to be broken into, the leader of the outrage turned his attention to the neighbouring mansion. Having rummaged every nook and corner from top to bottom with a fruitless result, excepting indeed a spoil of two old muskets, a fowling-piece in good order, and another without any barrels, which they carried off in triumph, the "Vampyres" released us from the unpleasantness of their presence and took themselves off, visibly disappointed at their want of success.

Mrs. Pindar, the wife of the American Marshal, told us that Lieutenant Ridge had even penetrated into her bed-room and ransacked the drawers of her toilet table, &c. That Yankee lady accompanied him during his impertinent and unwarrantable intrusion, and assisted him by suggesting that he had better explore the chimney pots, have the carpets lifted to see whether Burgevine was hidden there, or perhaps he would like to search her pockets, &c. The "Vampyre" officer wore a uniform of unknown nationality, consisting of simple anchor buttons and a British naval badge with the crown cut off! When asked by Mr. Tarrantt for his authority, he produced an informal warrant from the British consul, which could only have been legally used by a consular constable. When this was explained to him, he agreed to the justice of the fact and pleaded orders from his commanding officer. He was thereupon asked for his commission, and he naÏvely admitted he had none. He was next asked upon what authority his commanding officer was acting, and his reply was, upon Captain Sherrard Osborne's commission from the Emperor of China (this in ludicrously pompous language and manner). He was then asked whether he was aware that Captain Osborne did not possess any such commission, and confessed that, although he believed the reverse, he thought the Commander-in-chief might have gone to Pekin to obtain it! The judicial proceedings that would have been instituted against the "Vampyres" but for their fortunate retreat from China, would almost certainly have found them guilty of unqualified piracy, not only in the case I have just described, but in several others equally outrageous.

About this time, and while it was fully expected that the flotilla would shortly proceed to attack Nankin, the following squib appeared as an advertisement in the Friend of China:—

"Wanted:

"Several first-class ships, to convey several thousand rebels from Nankin to Labuan.

"Apply to
"Lae, Horseborn, & Co."

Many foreign merchant vessels were in the habit of flying long pennants from the main truck, a practice indulged in by some of the shipping at Shanghae. This proved offensive to the "Vampyre" officers, who chose to consider that it was an infringement of their quasi right to the man-of-war emblem. They consequently amused themselves by boarding sundry easy-going Dutchmen, who, alarmed by their brass-bound appearance and peremptory orders to strike the obnoxious pennant, generally complied very quietly. Upon one occasion, however, while I was at Shanghae, the would-be Tartar martinets caught a Tartar of the implied characteristics, if not literal nationality.

An American vessel with a particularly extensive pennant, which it was afterwards rumoured had been rigged up on purpose, happened to attract the "fe fi fo fum" sense of a "Vampyre" commander. Instantly a cutter was despatched with a lieutenant to humble the offending parties. The officer proceeded on board and ordered the chief mate to haul down the pennant. Mr. Mate immediately sang out, "Cook, bring a bucket of hot water aft," but before this could be brought, the "Vampyre" was over the gangway "like a streak of greased lightning," as the Yankee mate afterwards related to an admiring audience on shore, and shouting with might and main to his boat's crew: "Give way, men!" in order to escape the warm reception preparing for him.

By such acts the "cream of the British navy" made few friends and many enemies, and the lament of few indeed accompanied their ignominious departure. During their stay some of the gallant tars deserted and went over to the enemy, and I cannot forget a very characteristic fact related by a friend of mine who was present. While passing a certain rum shop in the "model settlement" of Shanghae, my friend, with several companions, became mixed with a crowd of the tars, who were on leave, and had just issued from the shop. Willing to see a little of the sort of men represented as the Élite of the finest navy in the world, my friend got into conversation with a warrant officer, although the man and his companions had evidently been indulging their creamy propensities. The result was that when questioned as to their feelings for the service they had engaged in, the leader of the party made this exposition of principle: "D'ye see, my hearty, so long as we gets the dollars and can make a haul, d—— my toplights if we cares who we fights for, the himperor of Chiny or his hinemies the t'other longshore Chinymen."

Organized upon principles of wrong and injustice, the Anglo-Chinese flotilla came to an unregretted, disreputable, and premature end. In the words of the same friend who communicated the above incident we will dismiss the subject: "Captain Sherrard Osborne, like CÆsar, may exclaim, 'I came, I saw;' unlike CÆsar, 'I did not conquer.' The fleet was equipped, set sail, arrived, and—was not wanted."

We must now turn to survey events far more disastrous to the Ti-ping cause than the advent of the foreign vessels of war we have just finished with, although the fact of their arrival, connected with what we are about to notice, helped to produce the misfortunes.

Soon after the Chung-wang had recaptured all the places formerly taken by the allies, and had returned to Nankin with the greater proportion of his troops, General Staveley, having received the desirable reinforcements of British troops from Tien-tsin and Hong-kong, resumed hostilities.

Although Admiral Hope had respect enough for the usages of civilized nations to invent a casus belli for the raids he first initiated, General Staveley proved himself to be above such petty considerations when they could be ignored with impunity, and therefore, upon commencing a fresh war against the Ti-pings, did not trouble himself to pretend that they might, could, would, or should do anything inimical to British interests. However much scrupulous people may think that an English general should have paid some regard to the rules of civilized warfare, the gallant officer in question cannot at all events be charged with hypocrisy.

During the month of August, 1862, the filibuster, General Ward, assisted by detachments of British and French troops, succeeded in taking several fortified villages from the Ti-pings and recapturing the city of Tsing-poo; the success of the operations being attributable to the large park of artillery always employed. After the fall of Tsing-poo, Ward moved off with the principal portion of his force into the Ningpo district, and joined a column already operating there. Since the atrocious expulsion of the Ti-pings from Ningpo by Captain R. Dew, R.N., and his pirate ally, Apak, the advance of filibustering and piracy had made wonderful progress. Several contingents of disciplined Chinese were raised, the most important being an officially-authorized British legion and a similar French one, both entirely officered by foreigners, including English, American, French, and representatives of other nations. At first, these organizations consisted of about 1,500 men each, besides artillery-men to work the numerous heavy guns they were supplied with. In addition to these, and other bodies of foreign disciplined and officered mercenaries, Captain Dew devoted the entire service of the squadron under his command to their assistance and support, perfectly oblivious of the fact that he was a British officer, and that the ships prostituted by him to an infamous alliance with pirates and freebooters were the property of British tax-payers, who maintained them solely for the protection of their own interests.

The British men-of-war, the Manchoo gunboats, the French vessels, the American, English, and French drilled filibusters, the Cantonese pirates, and Imperialist troops, all leagued themselves together in the war to exterminate the unfortunate Ti-pings, and loot their cities. In spite of their numbers, their boundless supplies of every munition of war, their irresistible shell and artillery, and the co-operation of the friendly legions swarming from the grand depÔt, Shanghae, these heterogeneous marauders found the "broken force" able to give them many hard knocks and many a severe repulse, although the Times happened to think that "the people of China" had somehow converted the Ti-ping revolution into a crowd of fugitives running away from their mythical "terrible reprisals." This statement might do very well to excite the horror of pious people in England ready to believe anything dreadful; but the mercenaries banded together against the would-be freemen and Christians found that to break the force of the latter many a deadly encounter, and many a cunningly contrived Moorsom or shrapnel shell, was required. During a period of nearly twelve months, extending from August, 1862, to the middle of the summer, 1863, the horrors of Chinese warfare fluctuated backwards and forwards over what would otherwise have been one of the fairest parts of God's earth. The Ningpo and neighbouring districts possess a beauty and variety of scenery, added to a surpassing richness of production (tea, silk, cotton, &c.), second to none in the world. Yet a few experimental warriors and politicians have been permitted to create misery and ruin throughout this smiling land, and strew its plains with mouldering skeletons.

The war conducted by Captain Dew and his colleagues raged furiously for many months. The cities of Tse-kie, Yu-yaou, Fung-wha, Shou-shing, &c., were each taken, retaken, lost, and won, several times over, by the Allies and by their Ti-ping enemies, and were at last finally held by the former.

To give any detailed account of the numerous actions fought within the Ningpo province would be impossible. With one exception they resembled those in the first campaign of Admiral Hope and General Staveley. The same great slaughter of the Ti-pings with the deadly artillery, to which they could make no reply; the same gallant efforts to repel the stormers, who rushed forward after the defenders had been thoroughly shelled for many hours; the exception being that few of the cities were carried by assault. It is, I believe, due to the fact that a great proportion of the Ti-ping soldiery about the Ningpo districts were Cantonese, or Kwang-si men, that nearly every attempt to storm the cities they held was repulsed. They were ultimately driven out of the province, and the cities were, almost without exception, evacuated, although the besiegers had been severely repulsed, being rendered untenable by the severance of their lines of supply and communication.

There are two important episodes of Captain Dew's war which, from their influence upon future events, it is necessary to notice. The first is the death of General Ward; the second, the attack upon Shou-shing, in consequence of which Captain Dew was reprimanded by his superior officer and the British Government, and was thereby compelled to desist from actually participating in the further hostilities.

General Ward, whatever his failings might have been, was a brave and determined man. He served his Manchoo employers only too well, and at the last, by closing a career of peril and fidelity with the sacrifice of his life, he sealed all faults with his death, and left those who cherished his memory to regret that he had not fallen in a worthier cause. While directing the second attack upon the small town of Tse-kie, some ten miles inland from Ningpo, on the 21st of September, 1862, Ward, the American filibuster, and the first foreigner to take military service under the Manchoo, was mortally wounded by a Ti-ping musket ball. This adventurer originated the force that finally was the principal instrument in driving the Ti-pings from the dominions they had established as "Ti-ping tien kwoh." By such apparently insignificant means does the Great Ruler of the Universe overthrow the efforts and establish the destinies of man! The death of Ward placed Colonel Burgevine, his immediate subordinate, in command of the force. Burgevine could not agree with the mandarins, was badly treated by them, resented their treatment, was dismissed from the command, and the old Ward force became transformed from a rowdy, filibustering, hired legion, into a regular contingent of British mercenaries.

The disgrace of Dew, the Ti-ping slayer, came about in this wise:—The city of Shou-shing, distant more than one hundred miles from Ningpo, was attacked by an Imperialist army, to which the Anglo-Chinese and Franco-Chinese contingents were attached. These forces were defeated with severe loss, including their French general, Le Brethon, who was killed before the city. A French captain of artillery, by name Tardife, succeeded to the command; Captain Dew joined forces with him, and together they proceeded to besiege the place, and to avenge the disgrace of their former defeat.

Besides several field-pieces landed from the British men-of-war at Ningpo and a large park of howitzers and mortars belonging to the disciplined forces, Captain Dew provided them with a large 68-pounder lent to him for the occasion by General Staveley. Lieutenant Tinling, of the Encounter, with a party of seamen, had charge of this gun. On their march, the allies entered a large town, which the men thoroughly pillaged during two days; the consequence being, as it is written by one who was present, "that it was only after much trouble they could be got to move forward against Shou-shing. When they did so, at least 500 boats followed, each soldier having his own private san-pan, containing, and ready for more, loot. Many of the officers were almost as bad as the men, drinking and smoking, and taking hardly any care to maintain discipline." Here is a pretty description of the doings of those who were supposed to be protecting the country people from the "ruthless marauders!" The town referred to was not in Ti-ping possession, and all the looting was from the unfortunate inhabitants. Facts, that can be multiplied ad infinitum, exist to prove that the foreign intervention, and the manner and details thereof, seriously increased the anarchy, desolation, and loss of life, caused by the civil war previous to that event. The unavoidable devastations had passed away, peace had become established by the supremacy of the Ti-ping, when, alas! mercenary-minded Europeans wickedly deluged the peaceful districts with the blood of fresh victims, and causelessly maintained and prolonged the unmitigated ravages of war.

Upon reaching the devoted city of Shou-shing,—which, in expectation, General Tardife had promised his freebooter following the pleasure of "forty-eight hours" to loot,—Captain Dew placed his big gun in position, and proceeded to make a hole in the wall, by which the respectable allies might get at the prizes within. Now it so happened that the Ti-pings were determined neither to part with their city, nor their private valuables. A great breach was made, a battalion of European ruffians, and the nondescript disciplined and Imperialist troops, rushed forward to take possession; but the defenders—who, to use the language of an eye-witness, "fought with admirable pluck in the breach, and exposed themselves freely"—drove them back with a loss of half the European brigade of Shanghae rowdies, half the officers of the disciplined contingents, and many men hors de combat. Almost at the same moment General Tardife was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling mortally wounded.

The death of the last-mentioned gallant young officer, by drawing the attention of Admiral Kuper (on the station), and that of Parliament at home, to the subject, led to the disapproval of Captain Dew's disgraceful proceedings, and his removal from a part of China that he had contaminated by his presence. When brought to task for his participation in hostilities more than 100 miles from a treaty port, his shuffling excuse was "that I had gone to watch the proceedings, and prevent, if possible, any false step being taken by the Chinese disciplined force, which would at once have imperilled Ningpo." Well, it is an old saying that, if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the ditch; and this was undoubtedly realized by Captain Dew. The untrue statement about "any false step" being certain to imperil Ningpo, distant 100 miles, and protected by several strong cities directly on the way, is perfectly absurd; the crafty device was to avoid the censure he dreaded and deserved by frightening his superiors about the safety of Ningpo, which he pretended rested upon his exploits at Shou-shing. Admiral Kuper, however, states in a despatch to the Admiralty, "I have informed Captain Dew that ... I consider he exceeded his instructions," and the Admiralty declares "that my Lords have desired the Rear-Admiral to inform Captain Dew that he exceeded his instructions." No wonder that the Chinese papers stated:—

"How Captain Dew, and all his crew, are allowed to do just what they have a mind to, is more than we can tell. Clearly all the people he slays he murders. He is violating every law, human and divine, to an extent which cannot be overlooked."[35]

It is a well-known fact that vast quantities of loot, and a money bonus from the Imperial authorities, almost invariably attended the capture of every Ti-ping city; and I have under my hand many apparently authentic statements in the press, accusing Captain Dew particularly, and others generally, of having been induced to carry on hostilities against the Ti-pings for "private aggrandisement," and from "far less disinterested motives than 'the love of glory.'" As for the effect the Dew war had upon trade, the following extract from a communication dated "Ningpo, March 28, 1863," and forwarded to H.B.M. Consul by a number of influential firms, will show:—"So great a panic exists among the natives on account of the lawless proceedings, that our trade is in a worse condition than when the rebels were in the neighbourhood!"

Captain Dew attempted to shirk the responsibility of Lieutenant Tinling's death at a place where duty did not call him, although his commanding officer's orders did, by declaring that he (the Captain) was there as an "amateur!" Killing one's fellow man, even when conscience-bound by the plea of duty, is bad enough; but roving about, seeking whom to destroy, and slaughtering innocent men for pleasure, is somewhat different. We have seen that even the Government, which has approved every other proceeding, completely repudiated the unpardonable conduct of Captain Dew; we therefore say adieu to that officer, trusting there are few like him in the British service.

It is now necessary to notice the last of the events referred to at the beginning of this chapter. Since the death of the lamented filibuster, various members of General Staveley's staff and command had been in a perfect state of ferment, intriguing for the command of the Ward force, which it was determined should be converted into a British contingent. A battalion of Chinese, wearing shoulder-straps with the badge "67," drilled and officered by members of the British regiment of that number, and popularly known as Captain "Kingsley's force," was organized and raised to a strength of 1,000 men. Other corps, and some of Chinese artillery, were formed, while British officers were induced to accept various commands pertaining to the Ward force and its head quarters at the city of Soong-kong.

After a series of preliminary operations, General Staveley effected the recapture of Kah-ding on the 24th of October, 1862. After a desperate defence, the Ti-pings were driven from the city with heavy loss. According to the safe modus operandi acquired by experience, General Staveley shelled the defenders for some hours from 40 pieces of heavy artillery and mortars. The besieging army consisted of 5,500 disciplined troops, including about 3,000 British and French, and a large co-operating force of Imperialist braves and soldiers. The Ti-pings, out of a garrison less than 5,000 strong, lost upwards of 1,500 men; while the allied loss amounted to 4 killed and 20 wounded. Soon after the capture of this city, the Ting-wang from Hang-chow, the Mo-wang from Soo-chow, and the Tow-wang from Hoo-chow, each commanding about 5,000 men, were ordered by the Shi-wang (chief in authority over their districts) to attempt its recovery, and also that of Tsing-poo. This army was attacked by General Burgevine's force, a column of 500 British troops, some 10,000 Imperialists, and an artillery detachment with 20 guns. The Ti-pings had just intrenched themselves by the light field works usual among the Chinese, when they were engaged by the enemy. Unable to reply to the murderous artillery of the British and disciplined troops, they still held the position, although the shot and shell committed fearful havoc in their close ranks. At last, when the enemy had become tired of their shell practice, and imagined the Ti-pings were sufficiently decimated, a general assault was given. An episode in this transaction is worthy of notice.

A division of the attacking army was led by one "Wong-e-poo," a young Chinese officer who had been promoted to a captaincy at the request of Admiral Hope, who had also presented him with a sword for conspicuous bravery during the raids he had lately conducted against the Ti-pings, and in which the officer had served as a sergeant of Ward's force. This gallant young Chinaman was the first to cross the line of intrenchments, and almost instantly fell mortally wounded; he then gave the sword to General Burgevine, whom he begged to keep it, and to give his young wife a few dollars to keep her from want—this was his last request. The Ti-pings, when driven from their slight defences, made a stand at a village just in the rear, and were three times brought back to the charge by a fine-spirited young chief, who was the Mo-wang's brother, and whose gallant bearing and handsome trappings attracted universal attention. At the last charge, Vincente, the late General Ward's aide-de-camp, spurred his horse into the Ti-ping ranks. Misled by the fact that he had separated himself from the enemy, and believing he came over as a friend, the chief unsuspiciously advanced towards him and held out his hand; the Manilla-man replied to his friendly gesture by shooting him dead, and then, singular to relate, managed to gallop back to the enemy in safety.

After two hours' fighting, during which the artillery mowed them down by hundreds, the Ti-pings were driven out of the village, and, being then hemmed in against a wide creek, which they had only one small pontoon bridge to cross by, suffered terribly from the deadly fire of grape and canister shot during their retreat. Their loss in this disastrous action was 2,300 killed (600 bodies were counted in one portion of the intrenchments) and 700 prisoners, the latter being barbarously put to death by their captors.

The frightful atrocities perpetrated upon the unfortunate Ti-pings by those into whose power they had fallen, even excelled the cruelties of the cruel Chinese and still more cruel Tartars. "How the Ti-pings were driven out of the Provinces of Kiangnan and Chekiang," from notes kept by an officer under Ward, Burgevine, Holland, and Gordon, is a lengthy narrative published in the Friend of China. The portion contained in the columns of that journal of April 25, 1865, describing the engagement just noticed, states:—"General Burgevine darkened the victory with a foul deed. The poor rebels who had been captured were cruelly blown away from the guns, to the delight of a few we will not mention, but to the disgust of the greater part of the officers." Who, after this, shall talk of Ti-ping cruelties? The revolutionists had neither made war upon, injured, nor even insulted foreigners; yet the foreign officers, supported by the help of British troops, actually massacred their unoffending and helpless prisoners of war in cold blood! Perhaps General Burgevine thought he was paying a graceful compliment to his British allies by imitating their deeds in India. No doubt some war-Christians think these latter proceedings exceedingly worthy and proper; however, the Ti-pings have never yet reached such a state of Christian civilization as to copy them.

The allied loss was 5 killed and 15 wounded, including three Europeans! And this may be taken as a fair sample of all the succeeding battles with the British, French, and other disciplined and artillery-supplied forces. The Ti-pings have always done all that men of flesh and blood were capable of doing, but, without artillery to resist or reply to that overwhelming arm of the enemy (supplied freely from the British arsenals), their bravest and best fell to the iron storm, and the rest fled before it.

Very shortly after the above action, General Burgevine became the victim of the scheming carried on between the mandarins and those British officials who desired to establish the Ward force as an English contingent. Having taken a large amount of specie from the house of Ta-kee (the banker to the force, and in the service of the Imperial Government), which he had been compelled to seize, nolens volens, in order to satisfy his men, who were in an open state of mutiny for their arrears of pay—pay, too, that seems to have been purposely kept lying idle at Ta-kee's house, probably with the cunning idea it would act (as in reality it did) upon the force, and produce some outbreak that could be taken advantage of to disgrace Burgevine and replace him by a British officer—he was dismissed from his command and a reward offered for his head by the Manchoo governor, or Fu-tai, of the province. The excuse given by the Mandarins for this transaction was that Burgevine had disobeyed orders, resisted lawful authority, and seized the money. Some measure of this is very probably true; but whatever offence had been committed by him, the mandarins had themselves been the cause of it by their peculation, withholding the wages of the troops, and underhand intriguing. Probably the fact that Captain Holland, R.M., was installed as Burgevine's successor, may account for the events leading to the latter's dismissal.

The Imperialist Mandarins were only too eager to fall into the views of those who assisted them; the command of the once despised filibustiers' force by Englishmen meant taking all the danger and responsibility of repelling the Ti-pings out of their own hands; consequently, availing themselves of the subserviency of British officers and authorities, they accepted Captain Holland as the commander of their disciplined troops, and the services of any others who were willing, and did not feel dishonoured by hiring themselves out to support such a cruel and corrupt cause. From this moment the active operations by British troops ceased, but Ward's old legion became a British contingent, and has continued one ever since. Backed up in all their operations against the Ti-pings by the presence of British troops to support them in case of reverse, and supplied with every munition of war, artillery, ships, &c. they required, the various mercenary legions infesting the neighbourhood of Shanghae and Ningpo have managed (with the assistance of the ordinary Chinese and Manchoo soldiers, who alone outnumbered those of Ti-ping tien kwoh) to terminate the allied operations by driving the revolutionists from their once happy territory.

Soon after the command of the force had been assumed by Captain Holland, it met with the most severe defeat the Ti-pings have ever given it, and he resigned the appointment in disgust. The Order in Council permitting British officers to take military service with the Emperor of China having just reached Shanghae, Major Gordon, R.E., took command of the disciplined Chinese, and many other officers joined in the questionable service. From this time forth the British Government became committed to the success and responsibilities of the force; and for every atrocity perpetrated by the Imperialists, and for every life destroyed, are equally as much accountable as they were for the previous conduct of their own troops. Under such auspices, and with boundless supplies of all the material of war, similar necessaries being successfully prevented from reaching their antagonists, it is easy to appreciate the consequent course of events—continued triumph of the Anglo-Franco-Manchoo mercenaries, and repeated defeat of the Ti-pings, already much weakened by the loss of many of their best troops, and diminished in their prestige from the result of the raids headed by Admiral Hope and General Staveley.

The worst feature attending the conversion of the mercenary legions into British auxiliaries, is the fact that Sir F. Bruce, the English Minister at Pekin, distinctly repudiated any such action; and yet his Government saw fit to sanction the arrangement when it was reported to them by Generals Staveley and Brown, who seem to have been foremost among the Shanghae local advocates of the system. General Burgevine having proceeded to the Manchoo court at Pekin, stated his case, and was by them reinstated in his former command; receiving, also, the full approval of Sir F. Bruce. Upon his return to Shanghae, with an Imperial Commissioner to place him in position, the British generals and their colleagues in collusion with the Imperial authorities, disregarding the direct instructions of Sir F. Bruce, successfully opposed his reappointment, and managed to retain Major Gordon in command; by what means being best known to themselves.

We will conclude our notice of the establishment of the Anglo-Manchoo contingent with a few facts proving the singular, if not sinister, circumstance, that Sir F. Bruce, although a virulent enemy of the Ti-pings, has always carefully avoided authorizing the employment of British officers against the insurgents; and, in fact, has invariably disapproved such measures, as well as the movement of British troops to support and succour the contingents when in difficulty.

In a despatch to General Staveley, dated "Pekin, March 12, 1863,"[36] Sir F. Bruce, referring to the liberty granted to officers to enter the Chinese Imperial service, states:—"I should prefer that the military men employed by the Chinese Government should not belong to the great treaty Powers;" and, with regard to British officers choosing to enter what the Press in China has termed "the disgusting service," he expresses the opinion that "they will then bear a Chinese, and not a British character." How literally this belief has been fulfilled, the torture of Ti-ping prisoners captured by the Imperialists, the treacherous massacre of the prisoners at Soo-chow, and the great loss of life which occurred, after cities were captured, sufficiently prove.

In a despatch dated "April 10,"[37] Sir F. Bruce expresses his wish to the same officer that Burgevine should be reinstated to the command of the Ward force, and, speaking "of the charges brought against him," states: "I took occasion to examine them at length, and I am perfectly satisfied that General Burgevine acted from a regard to the interests confided to him, that he was sacrificed to an intrigue of some Chinese subordinate officers, and to the jealousy entertained by the Governor towards the Chinese drilled force." If the Minister had added the names of a few foreigners as being privy to the "intrigue," he would have hit upon the whole truth. The Governor was jealous of the force as a Chinese one managed by foreigners, and successfully plotted, with no little ingenuity and shrewdness, to make it a foreign force officered by Englishmen, and countenanced by British authorities, who accepted all the responsibility entailed.

Upon the subject of Major Gordon's appointment to the coveted generalship of mercenaries, Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch to General Brown, dated "June 11," states:[38] "It is not expedient that British officers should command Chinese troops in the field against the insurgents, beyond the limits of the radius deemed necessary for the security of the ports where they are stationed.... I am further of opinion that, unless the force be properly constituted, and relieved from the necessity of obeying the orders of the local Government, it will do no real and permanent good; and that the officer who commands it will speedily find himself in a position which is neither compatible with his professional reputation, nor what is due to the character of a British officer. Under these circumstances, I must decline accepting the responsibility of authorizing the employment of British officers beyond Shanghae.... I have informed the Chinese Government of my objections to the employment of British officers in the field." Singularly enough, every word prophesied by Sir F. Bruce came to pass; the force became an instrument of evil in the hands of local Mandarins, to be used for their individual purposes, and then got rid of; the officers found their honour tarnished by complicity in deeds of blood and treachery; some were disgusted, but the Commander retained his position until he was compelled to break up the force by orders from his Government. In a despatch to Earl Russell, dated "October 13," Sir F. Bruce declares:[39] "It was reluctantly, and in deference to the naval and military authorities, that I consented to our assuming the responsibility of defending the thirty-mile radius round Shanghae, and I spared no effort to bring about an arrangement of Burgevine's dispute, so as to avoid the necessity of having to place an English officer at the head of the force destined to operate beyond the radius." Yet members of Lord Palmerston's Government have had the hardihood to declare that the operations against the Ti-pings were approved by Sir F. Bruce.

When Major Gordon's force was in danger, General Brown moved detachments of British troops to support him, and to garrison the captured towns and hold them against the Ti-pings. Sir F. Bruce, in a despatch upon the subject, dated "October 6,"[40] clearly condemns his conduct in these words:—"If officers go into the Chinese service, we are not entitled to facilitate their operations by moving men, or placing garrisons in towns beyond the radius for their support, further than we should be if the corps assisted were commanded by a Chinese general. We are not entitled to lend them artillery, or men to work their guns on any pretext!" In the very teeth of these distinct instructions, General Brown persisted in every measure they condemn. It was the favourite modus operandi over again—the military or naval authorities acting in direct violation of orders, the disobedience being ultimately endorsed by the Government, and the apparently disobedient receiving praise and C.B.'s by way of punishment.

FOOTNOTES:

[29] With the schemes of the Bruce, Wade, Lay, &c., politicians.

[30] This is a startling contrast to what Mr. Bruce declared would be the "worst" course to pursue.

[31] To completely prove the error of Lord Russell's assumption, and the slightness of its foundation, we will read the following extract from "A Memorandum, dated October 15, 1862, addressed to Rear-Admiral Kuper, by Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope, on resigning the Command of the Station." [Blue Book, June, 1862, to February, 1863, p. 111.]

"The only question of real importance on which we are at variance with the rebels, arose from their desire to possess themselves of Shanghae, and their capture of Ningpo, since retaken.

"On my first visit to Nanking, ... I effected an agreement with them, but limited to the year, that they should not approach it within 100 li (thirty miles), on the whole tolerably WELL KEPT during that time, but which they refused to renew on the occasion of my last visit."

[32] Mr. Roberts, an American Baptist missionary already referred to in this work, joined the Ti-pings at Nankin about the end of October, 1860. Of all missionaries in China he was the least qualified for such a position. Intolerant and bigoted to the Baptist dogmas, irritable, peevish, inconsistent, and vacillating—a man singularly illiterate, without stability of character or pleasantness of manner—his presence at Nankin did far more harm than good. His objections to every other Church, and to every other denomination of dissent except his own, went far to give the Ti-pings a dread of that diversity of doctrine among the British and Americans which they had always looked upon with surprise, thinking, as they did, that God could not be well served by those who were always quarrelling about it. The circumstances attending the advent and career of Mr. Roberts among the Ti-pings I have avoided as a worthless episode, but, as the facts of his indecorous flight from Nankin have been misrepresented, I think it necessary to notice the subject. Mr. Roberts accepted temporal rank under the Ti-pings, and by his unwise dogmatical obstinacy frequently provoked unpleasant discussion. During a dispute with the Kan-wang, who had entertained him since his arrival, that chief had particular occasion to chastise a boy of the household. Mr. Roberts was so blinded by passion, the idea that Europeans would never know the reverse of his statement, or some other reason, that, in a paroxysm of rage, he fled from the city, and sought refuge on board H.M. gunboat Renard, which happened to be lying in the port. By some obliquity of vision best known to himself, Mr. Roberts mistook the stick used by the Kan-wang for a sword, and declared that his boy had been brutally murdered. Not satisfied with this, although on the previous night he had retired to rest fully believing the surrounding people saints, the very next day, after his quarrel with the Kan-wang, he awoke to find them howling sinners. The many years that he had praised the Ti-pings as holy men were, by a moment of passion, forgotten, and within one day Mr. Roberts not only declared himself to have been deceived so long, but, for the act of one man, gave up the hundreds of thousands in the Ti-ping cause to fire and sword. We will just contrast the different statements of Mr. Roberts, one with the other, and then dismiss the subject.

This is an extract from the first, made on board the Renard:—

"Kan-wang, moved by his coolie elder brother—literally a coolie at Hong-kong—and the devil, without fear of God before his eyes, did on Monday, the 13th instant (January, 1862), come into the house in which I was living, and with malice aforethought murder one of my servants with a large sword in his own hand, in my presence, without a moment's warning or any just cause. And after having slain my poor, harmless, helpless boy, he jumped on his head most fiend-like, and stamped it with his foot."

Now, at Canton, on the 3rd of April, 1862, when it was generally known that the above charge of murder was incorrect, Mr. Roberts retracted these words [Blue Book, 1862, p. 5], having reference to the Kan-wang's form of baptism:—

"A miserable apostate, (?) polygamist, and murderer, too, to wish to administer an ordinance held sacred by those who practise it. What a sacrilege! But as to that boy, I have since been told that he evinced indications of life after he was dragged out, by one who saw him. But I think it would have been less cruel in Kan-wang to have smoothly cut off his head than to send him out even half killed, destitute, and naked, to freeze and starve to death. Whether the boy was killed directly or not, I cannot esteem Kan-wang, and his elder brother, who prompted him to the wicked deed, less than murderers; and hence, in my judgment, they ought both to be treated as such."

In the pamphlet, "A Letter to the Bishop of Victoria, regarding the Religion of the Ti-ping Rebels," the author states, "Of course you now know that the story of that person's boy being murdered by the Kan-wang is a fabrication. 'The Kan-wang called on me,' said Mr. Roberts, when I asked him about the matter, 'and desired me to punish the boy. I told him I would first remonstrate with him; and then he, the Kan-wang's brother, dissatisfied with my answer, beat him, as I thought, to death.'"

[33] This affair happened on the 25th of August, was reported to the Shanghae Daily Shipping and Commercial News of the next day, and was widely known in China. A certain Mr. Chaloner Alabaster, of the British consular service, is mentioned in connection with it.

[34] From the success of the Ti-pings.

[35] China Overland Trade Report, February 20, 1863.

[36] Blue Book, China, No. 3, 1864, p. 68.

[37] Id., p. 80.

[38] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 96.

[39] Id., p. 162.

[40] Blue Book, No. 3, 1864, p. 163.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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