THE operations of the last few months had narrowed the area from which supplies for the troops could be obtained. The productive areas of Lupembe, Iringa, Kissaki and the lower Rufiji had been lost, and the newly-occupied districts included wide stretches of barren land. The productivity of the more fertile areas was for the most part unknown; for instance, it was not known until during the subsequent operations what yield could be expected south-west of Kilwa and south-west of Livale, for example. At that time I only had a general idea that the eastern part of the Lindi area was very fertile and known as the granary of the colony. But this fertile region, owing to its nearness to the coast, was in a very precarious position, and it was already necessary to consider what should be done if it were lost.

Our eyes naturally turned to the Portuguese territory across the Rovuma, but we had even less information about this than about parts of the German colony. Fortunately, however, a number of Portuguese chiefs had immigrated into German territory out of hatred for their oppressors, and, apart from this, we Germans enjoyed a very good reputation among the intelligent natives of Portuguese East Africa, many of whom worked on German plantations. Thus we were able to get at least an approximate picture of the district east of Lake Nyassa, and to take it as probable that south of the steppe-like zone of the Rovuma, in the neighbourhood of Mwembe, several days’ march, broad and thinly populated, lay a fertile region. An expeditionary force of a few hundred rifles under Major von Stuemer, crossed the Rovuma south of Tundura, and quickly took possession of Mwembe from where our patrols explored the banks of Lake Nyassa as far as the neighbourhood of Fort Jackson, and east half-way to Port Amelia.

In view of the difficulty of communication—messengers from the telegraph station at Livale took about three days to get to Tunduru and five from there to Mwembe—it was difficult to get a clear idea of the situation at Mwembe. We had no definite news until Lieutenant Brucher personally reported at Headquarters in January, 1917. The European potatoes he brought with him gave us good hopes that supplies could be expected there. He reported that the country was fertile, as was also the region round Tunduru, where the war had so far hardly been felt. There were still large numbers of eggs and fowls in the richly cultivated district. When Brucher slept on the ground in Tunduru, this was regarded as a piece of bravado by the inhabitants, so little did they know about war. In view of the difficulties of transport and the constant movement of the troops, it became increasingly necessary to make the force less and less dependent on their inadequate line of communication. With this object the forces of Captains Goering and von Lieberman were also moved to the region south of Kilwa, where, according to the stories of some Europeans in the Kiturika mountains, there was plenty of food. In order to relieve the transport of supplies from the rear the troops were marched off to Kilwa without waiting for further investigation, and it was fortunate that the reports as to the fertility of this district were realized. In order to take the enemy, who had already moved some small forces half-way to Livale, as far as possible from south of his point of debarkation, and at the same time to secure the fertile districts south of Kilwa to Mbemkuru, Goering’s and von Lieberman’s divisions made a dÉtour from Mpotora southwards and pressed forward, Goering’s force following the coast straight to Kilwa, and von Lieberman keeping further west and making for the Kilwa-Livale road. A weaker force followed this road to Kilwa and served as a reserve for the patrols, which several times surprised the enemy in his camps and threw him back. Our patrols were soon swarming in the neighbourhood of Kilwa. Several enemy dumps were surprised and part of the garrisons killed. On one of these occasions brave Sergeant-Major Struwe, who was afterwards killed, skilfully forced his way, with a large part of the 3rd Field Company, inside a dump, and, taking cover behind the sacks of flour, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, who appeared from outside in great force. It was difficult to get much away from the dump, so the patrol had to content itself with destroying the greater part of the stores. One patrol took a field gun with it—a strange weapon for a patrol. After careful reconnaissance this reached the coast at Kilwa—Kissiwami, and bombarded some of the transports lying there.

In May, 1917, Captain von Lieberman, who, with the 11th and 17th Companies, was occupying an entrenched position at Ngaula, a day’s march south of Kilwa on the Kilwa-Livale road, was attacked by eight companies with two guns. Lieutenant Buechsel, with his 17th Company, made such a heavy flank attack that he completely routed, one after the other, several of the enemy’s Askari companies, who took to their heels, followed by the 40th Indian Pathan Regiment. The enemy left about seventy dead on the field, and, as the English related afterwards, it was only by chance that we did not find his guns, which had stuck fast in a river.

On the whole it seemed to us that the enemy’s forces were once more getting exhausted. Unless he brought over very considerable reinforcements it was obvious that the forces available would before long be worn out and his operations end in failure. It was already apparent that they were involving a great strain. It had been ascertained that a battery from the Indian interior had been brought to Kilwa and that a large number of new Askari companies were being raised.

More dangerous than the enemy seemed to me the material position of our men. The cargo of wheat from the relief ship was coming to an end, and I thought it questionable whether bread could be baked from Mtama flour alone, without the addition of wheat flour. At that time I still regarded bread as an indispensable necessity for the nourishment of Europeans, and therefore I made experiments personally in baking bread without wheat flour. Unfortunately the results were unsatisfactory. Afterwards, under the stress of necessity, we all produced excellent bread without wheat. The methods differed widely. Later we made bread not only with mtama, but also with muhogo, sweet potatoes, maize, in short, with nearly every kind of meal, and with mixtures of all sorts of combinations, and later still improved the quality by the addition of boiled rice.

The necessary kit also required attention. A shortage of boots was in sight. My experiments showed me that a European can go barefoot where there are tolerable paths, but never through the bush. Sandals, which anyone can make, given an odd bit of leather, proved helpful, but did not take the place of boots. To be ready for any emergency, I had some lessons in boot-making, and succeeded, with supervision, in producing an object that at a push could be taken for a left boot, though it was intended to be a right. It is very convenient for a European who knows the simplest rudiments of this craft to be able to kill an antelope and make a boot, or at any rate repair one, from his skin a few days later, without the help of any of the tools of civilization. A nail must serve as an awl, a tent-pole as a last, and the thread he can cut from the tough leather of a small antelope. As a matter of fact, however, we were never driven to these extremities, as we were always able to obtain the necessary kit and equipment from captured stores, and many captured saddles were cut up to make soles and heels for boots.

Every European was becoming more and more like a South-African “Trekker” and was his own workman. Naturally, not always in person, but within the small independent household, consisting of his black cook and his black servant, which followed him about. Many had even provided themselves with a few hens which they took about with them, and the noise of these betrayed the position of German camps even as far as the native settlements. An order issued in one force that the crowing of cocks before 9 a.m. was forbidden brought no relief.

The important question of salt was very simply solved by the troops at Kilwa, by the evaporation of sea-water. In order to secure the supply, which was beginning to run short, against the loss of the coast, salt-yielding plants were collected and the salt obtained from their ashes by lixiviation. We got this idea from the natives of the district, who supplied themselves with salt in this way. The salt thus obtained was not bad, but was never required to any extent, as we were always able to meet our requirements from the captured stores. The large numbers of elephants in this district furnished us with fat; sugar was replaced by the excellent wild honey which was found in large quantities. The troops had made an important step forward as regards supplies of grain. They found out how to ripen it artificially, and in this way provided against want.

It should be noted here particularly that the Medical Corps, in spite of the difficult and constantly changing circumstances of life in the field, had succeeded in satisfactorily solving the important questions of quinine and material for bandages. It has already been mentioned that in the north quinine tablets of better quality than the English had been added to the stock of Peruvian bark. After the evacuation of the northern area a large consignment of Peruvian bark had been sent to Kilossa. Through the efforts of the Deputy Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon Teute, a part of this was transported further south. It was of course impossible without the necessary apparatus to manufacture tablets, but liquid quinine was produced by boiling Peruvian bark. This had an infernal taste and was drunk unwillingly but with beneficial results by the patients, among whom it was known as “Lettow-Schnaps.”

The other difficulty was the supply of bandages. To supplement the stock of linen, which was beginning to give out, not only was clothing of all kinds disinfected and used for this purpose, and then after being boiled used again, but quite a good bandage-material was made from bark. This idea, too, we got from the methods of the natives, who for a long time had made clothing and sacks from Myombo bark. The medical service had done everything humanly possible to keep the troops alive and well. The great resource of this service and the necessary husbanding of the primitive material available deserve special recognition, as this service had always been accustomed under the special conditions of a tropical climate, and rightly so, to be very free with their stocks. The Staff Medical Officer, Staff-Surgeon Stolowsky, and later his successor, Staff-Surgeon Teute, showed exemplary devotion, energy and foresight.

The surgery was on an equally high level. The hospitals which, during the early part of the campaign, had been accommodated for the most part in solid buildings, and had worked the whole year round without moving their quarters, had now to turn themselves into movable columns, which might at any moment be called upon to pack up, with patients and baggage, and keep up with the march in various directions of the troops. All not absolutely indispensable material had to be eliminated, so that the preparations for a surgical operation had always to be more or less improvised. The operating-theatre was as a rule a newly-erected grass hut. In spite of all this, Staff-Surgeon MÜller, Dr. Thierfelder, of the Imperial Medical Service, and others successfully performed even serious operations, including several for appendicitis.

As has already been mentioned, the confidence even of the enemy in the German medical service was fully justified. The successful and devoted activity of these men went far to strengthen the mutual confidence between white and black. In such ways as this the strong bond was formed which united the different elements of our force.

At Lindi the enemy had strengthened himself more and more, and it was reported that detachments were being transported by sea to Lindi, which hitherto had been posted west of Kilwa. General O’Grady, who had commanded a brigade at Kibata, also appeared at Lindi. The obvious idea that the enemy would advance from Lindi against our weak forces and our main supply area, as had been his intention earlier at Kilwa, appeared to be materializing. Several attacks had been beaten off by Captain Looff’s force west of Lindi. At the request of the Governor three of the companies which had arrived under Major Kraut were not, as had been the original intention, used to subjugate quickly and thoroughly the rebellious inhabitants of Makonde, in the south-east corner of our Protectorate, but were put under the command of Captain Looff. Two of them took part in an attack on Sudi, south of Lindi, where the enemy was strongly entrenched. The attack on the fortified position was bravely launched, but suffered heavy losses, and could not be brought to a successful conclusion.

Later, Captain Rothe was ordered to Lindi with reinforcements consisting of three companies from Mpotora. But the rains spoiled our plans. The crossing of the Matendu had already become difficult. All the rain that had fallen in Donde district collected ultimately in the valley of the Matendu, which in the dry season is simply a series of pools. It had become a strong, rushing torrent, like the Fulda in spate at Cassel, and tore up great trees in its course. By making use of some islands, tree-trunks were got into position under the direction of skilled engineers and a bridge to take transport was built; but a sudden rise in the stream repeatedly swept it away, several men being drowned. A footbridge further downstream met with the same fate; a narrow suspension-bridge of ropes made from twisted bark was only of slight service and was somewhat uncertain as, in view of the alternation of strong sunlight and wet, there was always a danger of the ropes rotting and giving way.

At Nahungu, on the Mbemkuru, similar conditions hindered Captain Rothe’s march. The stream was so strong that the first attempt to cross by the few ferry-boats available failed. Driven out of Nahungu by scarcity of supplies, Captain Rothe marched into the fertile region to the north-east, in this way seriously compromising the plans of Headquarters. It was necessary that this fertile country north-east of Nahungu should be spared to serve as a reserve for the forces south of Kilwa and to provide for a strong reinforcement of these troops should tactical reasons make this necessary. The time that was lost before a message could be got through to Captain Rothe was very vexatious, but finally his division was diverted towards Lindi again in time to take part in some of the fighting.

In view of the need for reinforcement of our troops at Lindi owing to increased tension of the military situation and the projected transference of fresh troops to that area, General Wahle had been withdrawn from Mahenge and had taken over the command of the Lindi front; Captain Tafel succeeded him at Mahenge. In the middle of June, 1917, General Wahle had, after several engagements which had brought to light a considerable increase in the enemy’s strength, retired so far up the Lukuledi river that the enemy seemed to be incautiously exposing his north flank.

I decided to make use of this advantage without, indeed, knowing exactly how it was to be done. So much was clear: that only a surprise attack promised success. I therefore advanced, with four companies and the mountain-battery consisting of two guns, through Nahungu, along the main road leading via Lutende to Lindi. At Lutende were encamped Captain von Chappuis’ company and Lieutenant Wunder’s company, and the rest were further back. I went on ahead to reconnoitre, with my able companion Nieuwenhuizen, who had played the chief part in the horse-drive on Erok mountain. From the height on which Chappuis’ company lay, there was an extensive view: one could see the different farmhouses round Lindi and the Lukuledi river with the steamer President, which had taken refuge there and been rendered useless. It was, perhaps, fortunate that no wild pigs or bush deer had come within range of our guns in this otherwise gameless district, for not far from Chappuis’ camp we crossed the trail of a strong enemy patrol which must only just have passed. The talk of the natives, too, led us to suppose that they had recently seen something interesting. When we questioned them they would tell us nothing. Making a wide dÉtour, we arrived in the evening, after dark, at the camp of Wunder’s company. We reported our observations to the company commander and the capable guide Inkermann, who died a hero’s death a few days later, warning them to keep a sharp look-out. Orders were also given that this camp, situated as it was in an open plain and exposed to fire from the surrounding bush, should be moved. After a cup of tea we returned to our main force about a quarter of an hour’s march to the rear.

On the morning of 30th June we heard increasing rifle-fire from the direction of Wunder’s company. Assuming that the enemy had taken advantage of the lie of the ground and was firing on the camp from the surrounding bush, I immediately advanced with the three companies to the right through the bush, so as to strike the road further south and so take the enemy in the rear. Soon, however, we met some Askari, who told us that a strong force of the enemy had forced its way into the camp, taking the company by surprise and driving it out. A young Askari complained to an old “Betschausch” (sergeant) of the third company that the enemy had taken everything from them. “Niemaza we, tutawafukuza” (shut your mouth, we’ll soon have ’em out), was the defiant answer which at once shamed the excited youth into silence. The sergeant’s answer indeed hit off the position. The enemy, consisting of the 5th Indian Regiment and a few natives, had thought to find only a weak German outpost. He had rashly penetrated into our badly-placed entrenchments and was now in his turn exposed on all sides to a concentrated fire from the bush.

The position was so clear that it called for the quickest possible independent action by the subordinate leaders, and Captain von Chappuis also attacked at once. Staff-Surgeon Mohn (afterwards killed), who had remained in Wunder’s camp and had temporarily fallen into the enemy’s hands, described the very harassing effect of our concentrated fire at short range and the panic it caused among the enemy. Nevertheless, the cover afforded by a few ravines and the undergrowth enabled some of the enemy to get away. These fled wildly. A number so entirely lost themselves that they were picked up in the bush days afterwards by our patrols in a half-starved condition. We inflicted about 120 casualties. In addition to recovering our own ammunition, which had fallen temporarily into the enemy’s hands, we captured the enemy’s ammunition which he had just brought into the camp, about a hundred rifles and some machine guns. Among the severely wounded whom we took to the English camp at Naitiwi, and there handed over, was the commanding officer of the English regiment. He afterwards died of his wound.

We stayed a few weeks longer in the fertile district of Lutende and tried with our patrols to inflict losses on the enemy, whose fortified camps at, and south of, Naitiwi offered no prospect of successful attack. Far to the south we often heard the explosion of air-bombs and of the heavy guns which were bombarding Wahle’s division. Von Chappuis’ company was marched to reinforce Wahle’s force. Apart from some skirmishing our success at Lindi was followed by a lull in the operations.

That this was only the prelude to new efforts on the enemy’s part was borne out not only by the reports of the transport of strong forces to Kilwa, and also by the fact that at the end of May General Hoskins, who had taken over command from General Smuts, had been relieved by General van Deventer. Once more a Boer was in command, and the rumours that fresh European troops were being brought from South Africa seemed to be confirmed. South of Kilwa the enemy attacked our nine companies with three brigades, but Captain von Lieberman, who had taken over from Captain Goering, the latter being seriously ill, succeeded with extraordinary skill in beating off the superior forces of the enemy. On July 6th, at least a brigade made a frontal attack on Captain Lieberman at Unindi and was repulsed with heavy losses. The bold charge of our companies cost us heavily too; among the casualties was Lieutenant Bleeck, who received a mortal wound in the stomach while leading his company. This brave and upright personality had done excellent service both as a fearless patrol-leader and on the Headquarters Staff, and I knew him intimately. Von Lieberman’s right flank was covered against another enemy brigade by Captain Spangenberg with two of the nine companies. He carried out his task and attacked the enemy brigade so energetically with his two companies that, as we heard later, the English reports spoke of an attack by very strong enemy forces.

In spite of this success at Unindi, the great superiority of the enemy and the danger from enveloping movements to our supplies in the rear, induced Captain von Lieberman to withdraw gradually south, fighting all the time. I thought the moment had come to make a rapid counter-march with the available companies at Lutende, and the mountain-battery come unexpectedly to the aid of Captain von Lieberman and perhaps seize a favourable opportunity to inflict a decisive defeat upon the enemy. We moved due north from Lutende by forced marches and crossed the Mbemkuru, now once more an insignificant stream, without difficulty, two days’ march below Nahungu. The only opposition we encountered was from swarms of wild bees which forced us to make a slight dÉtour. North of Mbemkuru we continued our march north into the Ruawa hills.

I made use of the two days required to muster the force again to reconnoitre thoroughly the surrounding country, and on the 28th July, to my astonishment, I learned accidentally from some natives that a road through the mountains led almost in a straight line from our camp to Captain Lieberman’s camp at the Narungomba water-hole, about six hours’ march. A patrol of Europeans was sent at once to reconnoitre this road. In the morning of the 29th July I heard from my camp at Ruawa some explosions from the direction of Lieberman’s force. I did not think this could denote serious fighting, as the sounds ceased and, further, the patrol which I had sent to Lieberman’s force, and which had returned that morning, reported that everything was quiet there. I had, however, to change my mind when at noon van Rooyen, who was very reliable, returned from a hunting expedition and reported that he had certainly heard continuous machine-gun fire. The reader will, perhaps, wonder that I had not already begun the march to Lieberman’s camp, but it must be remembered that there was no water on the way, and my men were very exhausted, while some had only just reached Ruawa. By nightfall I was just three hours’ march nearer the scene of action, but it was not until the night was well advanced that my companies had all come up. A continuance of the march through the bush in pitch darkness was hopeless; it was bound to lead to a good deal of misunderstanding and would have meant a useless waste of the men’s strength, which had already been severely tried.

At 3 a.m. the march was continued and soon after a report came from the advance officer patrol that Captain von Lieberman had certainly defeated the enemy, but, owing to shortage of ammunition, had marched to Mihambia during the night. The rearguard had evacuated the springs and at the time of the report was following the rest. My order to hold the springs at all costs until my arrival at 6 a.m. to join in the battle had, therefore, been disregarded owing to pressure of circumstances. I now thought that the enemy, who was stronger than we, would have strongly entrenched the springs position, as was his habit, and that I should have to carry out any attack with thirsty troops. That seemed to offer little prospect of success. Later, when I learned the enemy’s real position, I inclined to the opposite view. In spite of his superiority the enemy had suffered a severe defeat. His 7th South African and 8th European regiments were almost broken up. Again and again his infantry had hurled themselves in deep waves against the front of our Askari regiments, and each time they had been driven back by counter-attacks. A forest fire had broken out and spread among his ranks. Finally the main body of his troops had broken away and fled in wild disorder through the bush. Machine guns, masses of rifles and hundreds of cases of ammunition had been left on the field. In this condition, my attack, even after the withdrawal of Lieberman’s force, would perhaps have sealed the doom of the enemy’s main body. It is much to be regretted that at that time large numbers of the troops did not show sufficient initiative to make good the shortage of German ammunition during the battle itself, by using the enemy rifles and cartridges which were lying about in quantities. We had been within reach of a most important success which was snatched from our grasp by accident. We must, however, be grateful for the feat of arms which the 7th Askari Company performed under the doubtless brilliant leadership of Captain von Lieberman, against overwhelming odds.

I did not get a clear report of this action, however, until later. For the moment I thought it right to march to Mihambia in order, by joining with Lieberman’s detachment, to secure unity of command, to supply it with sufficient ammunition to carry on and, if necessary, to raise its moral after the severe battle by a visible reinforcement. This last turned out to be unnecessary; when I arrived I found Lieberman’s detachment in excellent spirits, all the companies being proud to have dealt such a heavy blow to the superior enemy. For me the operation at Narungombe was a further proof how difficult it is in the unknown African bush and in face of the uncertainty of communication, even if other circumstances are favourable, to carry through an operation in which several columns are taking part, so as to secure the necessary unity of action on the battlefield. At Narungombe, where all the conditions were as favourable as could have been hoped, the decision was finally thwarted by slight mischances, and my belief was strengthened that if I wanted to use different bodies of troops in one operation it was necessary to secure the closest connection first.

The engagement at Narungombe brought the enemy at Kilwa to a standstill for a considerable time, and the fighting was confined to patrols, who inflicted losses on the enemy’s lines of communication, firing out of the bush on his detachments and motor transport and attacked at close quarters when a favourable opportunity offered. In order, for one thing, to put this patrol work on a broader basis, but also to counter the moving of enemy troops westward, and finally for reasons of supply, I deployed the force laterally on the line Mihambia-Ndessa. A large number of aircraft appeared over the fertile Ndessa district against whose bombs we were defenceless, and some severe wounds resulted; from this air-reconnaissance we could infer the enemy’s keen interest in the district and soon it was reported that he was moving still further west. Our patrols did such good work that from time to time whole companies of the enemy were put to flight with heavy losses. But the enemy continued his efforts to obtain information. He hardly took the trouble to hide his intention when sending flags of truce. I remember one occasion when the party bearing the white flag arrived at our camp out of the bush; they had, therefore, not only avoided the roads leading to it but had deliberately crossed them. The closer proximity of the enemy made it more difficult for us to get up our supplies, which were gradually running out. It was unavoidable that the position of our requisitioning and hunting-parties should become known to the enemy and that they should be surprised. The influence of the enemy on the natives was shown by the fact that south of Mihambia several villages had been suddenly deserted. I had long regarded this phenomenon as a sign of the enemy’s intention to advance in that direction. The state of our supplies made it impossible for us to maintain so strong a force in the Mihambia-Ndessa area. As in any case the evacuation of this area could not long be delayed, and as the enemy west of Lindi was at the same time developing increased activity in strong force on General Wahle’s front, I decided to join General Wahle with some of the companies from Ndessa and perhaps bring off the operation that had failed at Narungombe; a decisive success by an unexpected reinforcement. On the 3rd August General O’Grady’s forces had certainly suffered a serious defeat. An Indian regiment, which had advanced through the gap between two strongly fortified German outposts, was attacked by our reserves, held ready for such a contingency, and almost annihilated. In the pursuit much valuable material fell into our hands. The enemy, however, had renewed the attack a few days later, and in face of the enveloping movement of his strong detachments, General Wahle had fallen back on Narunyu and a mountain of equal height south of the Lukuledi river.

Captain Koehl, with six companies and a battery, remained behind at Ndessa; I crossed the river Mbemkuru below Nahungu with four companies and two mountain-guns, and then marched diagonally across the Muera plateau to the mission-station at Namupa. The prefect in charge entertained us, among other things, with muhogo (a species of corn with edible roots), prepared like fried potatoes, and supplemented the scanty provisions of our Europeans with bananas and other fruit out of his extensive gardens.

In the camp at Njangao the receipt of part of a German wireless message directed to me, expressing his Majesty’s acknowledgments on the occasion of the third anniversary of the outbreak of war, delighted us all.

We pitched our camp with the first company at Njengedi, on the main road between Njangao and Lindi, in the rear of Wahle’s division, in unpleasant, rainy weather. I immediately set out for Narunyu to inform General Wahle of our arrival. Here, in an almost impenetrable country broken by numerous ravines, at the bottom of which lay deep swamps, friend and foe faced one another in close proximity. Our men were working at dug-outs covered by branches cut from the trees. Only five of General Wahle’s seven companies were at Narunyu, the two others being on Ruho Mountain on the south bank of the Lukuledi river. In view of the danger of a surprise attack on our weak forces at Narunyu I ordered them to be reinforced by the companies on Ruho Mountain and marched two of those that had come with me to take their place. The enemy attack on Narunyu occurred the following day. Captain Lieberman’s Company from Ruho Mountain and the two companies I had brought with me all took part in the engagement. The third company had literally started their forced march to Karungu immediately after their arrival at Njengedi. I can still see the Askari coming up just before dawn and hear their shouts of delight at the thought of once more routing the enemy.

Our attempt to envelop the enemy’s right wing, however, only served to press it back; the bush was too thick for an offensive movement which had to be developed at short range under a continuous machine-gun and rifle fire. The darkness made it still more difficult to direct the operations, and there is no doubt that in the confusion of the two fronts in this broken country our detachments often fired on one another: it was almost impossible to recognize friend or foe. For instance, hearing loud sounds of shouting in front of me, in the complete darkness of the bush, I thought this came from our enveloping attack driving back the enemy. It was not discovered till some time afterwards that this was the enemy and soon we heard him working at his trenches. The exact location of his trenches gave us the advantage of being able to get the range for the 10·5 cm. gun of the KÖnigsberg, which was with Wahle’s force. This was done with good results; at any rate the enemy evacuated his trenches on the following day and retired.

The complete victory desired had not been attained and, in view of the difficulties of the ground, could not be expected, as we had discovered our strength to the enemy in the fighting of the 18th, and lost the advantage of a surprise. Once more I had to content myself with delay. In this fertile country there was no difficulty about holding our ground from the point of view of supplies. The force has rarely been so well fed as in the Lindi area. Great fields of sweet-potatoes and muhogo stretched as far as the eye could see, and there was an abundant supply of sugar-cane. The numerous Arab plantations indicated the fertility and the ancient civilization of the country. We made ourselves at home, and though rifle bullets often whistled through our camp and aircraft dropped bombs on us, not much harm was done. On one occasion the dentist, who had set up his surgery in a European house and was giving us the attention we had long needed, was attending to a patient when a bomb fell into the room. It was discovered later, when the place was examined, that the planter kept his store of dynamite in this very room. Fortunately the bomb did not touch this or both patients and dentist would have been permanently freed from toothache.

It was no easy matter to decide what to do with the German women and children, some of whom had fled from Lindi and did not know what to do. A number of them had taken refuge in the planters’ houses, which were within range of the enemy’s guns. In view of the restriction of supplies and the difficulties of transport and accommodation, it was desirable that these women and children should be sent back to Lindi. Some were intelligent enough to see this. By means of a parley their transference behind the British lines was duly arranged, and they were able to leave for Lindi. For reasons unknown to me the English then refused to keep to the arrangement, and the women and children, as well as male non-combatants, gradually collected in the Catholic mission at Ndanda. A military convalescent home had been quartered there for some time and had developed into an important hospital. All the people who were brought here found good food and accommodation in the spacious buildings of the mission with its extensive gardens.