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[1] I think it to the purpose to insert here a letter, which I addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, on my leaving Constantinople:—

Pera, 28th February, 1855.

“There are questions which require to be boldly met in order to be well resolved, as there are wounds which must be opened in order to be healed. The frankness with which you received my first remarks upon a subject, the gravity of which I do not affect to disguise, encourages me to submit to your consideration a point of view from which it appears to me advisable to contemplate the question of the Isthmus of Suez. The great influence which your character and your long experience naturally give you the right to exercise in the decisions of your Government on all Eastern questions, makes me especially anxious to neglect no opportunity of enabling Your Excellency to form an opinion from a perfect acquaintance with the case.

The results already obtained from the intimate alliance of France and England, testify sufficiently to the advantages that the European balance and civilization in general derive from that union of the two peoples. The future and the welfare of all the nations of the universe are therefore concerned in maintaining intact, in preserving from any attack, a state of things, which, to the everlasting honour of the Governments that have brought it about, can alone, with time, ensure the blessings of progress and of peace to the human race. Thence the necessity of getting rid, beforehand, of all causes of rupture, or even of coolness, between the two peoples; thence, consequently, the paramount duty of anticipating amongst future contingencies, those circumstances calculated to awake ancient feelings of antagonism, and to raise, in the bosom of either nation, those emotions against the violence of which, the wisdom of Governments is powerless to struggle. The motives for hostile rivalry are tending successively to give place to that generous emulation which gives birth to great things.

Looking at the situation of affairs in a general way, it is scarcely to be perceived upon what ground and upon what occasion, those struggles, which so long desolated the world, could be renewed. Is it financial and commercial interests that could cause division between the two peoples? Why, British capital thrown into all the undertakings of France, and the immense developement of international commerce, have established ties between them which become closer every day. Is it political interests and questions of principle? Why, the two nations have but one common aim, one same ambition: the triumph of right over might, of civilization over barbarism. Is it, finally, a sordid jealousy of territorial extension? Why, they acknowledge, at the present time, that the globe is vast enough to offer to the spirit of adventure that animates their respective populations, countries to make available, human beings to withdraw from the state of barbarism; and, moreover, from the moment that their flags wave together, the conquests of the one profit by the activity of the other.

At the first glance, then, nothing is perceived in the general state of affairs that could impair our cordial relations with England.

If, however, we look closer, an eventuality presents itself which, causing the most enlightened and most moderate cabinets to partake in popular prejudices and passions, is capable of reviving old antipathies, and of compromising, with the alliance, the benefits to be derived from it.

There is, in fact, a point of the globe with the free passage of which the political and commercial power of Great Britain is bound up, a point, the possession of which France had, on her part, aspired to in former times. This point is Egypt, the direct route from Europe to India, Egypt bathed once and again with French blood.

It is superfluous to define the motives which would not allow England to see Egypt in the possession of a rival nation without opposing it by the most energetic resistance; but what should also be taken into serious consideration, is, that with less positive interests, France under the dominion of her glorious traditions, under the impression of other feelings more instinctive than rational, and therefore more powerful over the impressionable spirit of her inhabitants, would not, in her turn, leave to England the peaceable sovereignty of Egypt. It is clear that, so long as the route to India is open and certain, that the state of the country ensures the facility and promptitude of the communications, England will not set about creating the most grave difficulties by appropriating a territory which, in her eyes, has no other value than as a means of transit. It is likewise evident that France—whose policy, for the last fifty years, has been to contribute to the prosperity of Egypt, both by her counsels and by the concourse of a great number of Frenchmen distinguished in the sciences, in administrative capacity, in all the arts of peace or war—will not seek to realize, in this direction, the projects of another epoch, so long as England does not interfere.

But let one of those crises occur which have so often shaken the East, let a circumstance arise wherein England should find herself under the rigorous necessity of taking a position in Egypt to prevent another power from forestalling her, and tell us then if it is possible that the alliance could survive the complications which such an event would occasion. And why should England consider herself obliged to become mistress of Egypt, even at the risk of breaking her alliance with France? For this single reason, that Egypt is the shortest and most direct route from England to her Eastern possessions; that this route must be constantly open to her; and that, in whatever concerns this mighty interest, she could never temporise. Thus, from the position given to her by nature, Egypt might still become the subject of a conflict between France and Great Britain; so that this chance of rupture would disappear if, by a providential event, the geographical conditions of the ancient world were changed, and, that the commercial route to India, instead of passing through the heart of Egypt, were removed to its confines, and, being opened to all the world, could never be exposed to the chance of its becoming the exclusive privilege of any one.

Well! this event, which must have been the design of Providence, is now within the reach of man. It may be brought about by human skill. It is to be realized by the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, an undertaking to which nature opposes no obstacle, and wherein English capital, as well as that of other countries, will certainly take part.

Let the Isthmus be cut through, let the waves of the Mediterranean mingle with those of the Indian Ocean, let the Railroad be continued and completed, and Egypt, in acquiring an increased importance as a productive country, as a country of internal commerce, as a general storehouse and common transit, loses its dangerous pre-eminence as an uncertain and contested passage of communication.

The possession of its territory being no longer an object of interest to England, ceases to be a possible bone of contention between that power and France, the union of the two peoples is for the future unalterable, and the world is preserved from the calamities which a rupture between them would produce. This result affords such securities for the future, that it is sufficient to point them out, to attract to the undertaking destined to produce it, the sympathy and the encouragement of the Statesmen whose efforts are directed to the settlement of the Anglo-French alliance upon an immoveable basis. You, my Lord, are one of those Statesmen, and you have too large a share in questions of high policy, to which I am a stranger, for me not to entertain the wish to communicate to you my aspirations.

Ferd. de Lesseps.”

[2] These very sensible observations are taken from a correspondence which appeared in the “Times” of the 13th June last.

[3] The other two were Mr. Stephenson for England, and M. NÉgrelli for Austria.

[4] As the work of the Viceroy’s Engineers will be published, an extract only is here given, which will suffice to make known the importance of their labours, and show the practical results of their investigations.

[5] Extracts from Communications with India, China, &c. Observations on the Practicability and Utility of opening a Communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, by a Ship Canal, through the Isthmus of Suez. By Arthur Anderson. London, Smith, Elder & Co. Cornhill, 1843.

[6] Since writing this, an article on the “Suez Canal” has appeared in the Foreign and Colonial Quarterly Review, which, although containing some inaccuracies of minor importance, and professing only to take a general view of the subject, the writer would exempt from the above description.

[7] Extracts from Inquiry into the Means of establishing a Ship Navigation between the Mediterranean and Red Seas. By James Vetch, Capt. R.E., F.R.S. London, Pelham Richardson, 23, Cornhill, 1843.

THE END.

CHISWICK PRESS: PRINTED BY C. WHITTINGHAM, TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE.


Transcriber’s Note: The images are clickable for a larger version, if the device you’re reading this on supports that.

Panorama

PANORAMIC VIEW OF THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ AND THE MARITIME CANAL.

ACCORDING TO THE SCHEME OF LINANT BEY & MOUGEL BEY. ENGINEERS TO THE VICEROY OF EGYPT.

Sketch map

Sketch shewing the MAHMOUDIEH CANAL, THE RIVER AND RAILWAY CONVEYANCE THROUGH EGYPT BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA AND SUEZ, AND THE DIRECT TRACK OF THE PROPOSED SHIP CANAL, THROUGH THE ISTHMUS OF SUEZ.

Map

ROUTE OF STEAM SHIPS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EAST.





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