APPENDIX. No. VII. OPINION OF MR. ANDERSON.

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OPINION OF MR ANDERSON.[5]

The interest which has recently been manifested in the improvement of our means of communication with India, China, &c. vi Egypt and the Red Sea, seems to have revived the speculations, first broached during the occupation of Egypt by the French forces under Napoleon, as to the feasibility of opening a communication between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean by a Canal through the Isthmus of Suez.

Various statements upon this subject have lately appeared in the newspapers and periodicals, both of this country and the Continent, and a kind of prospectus proposing the formation of a Company to execute the undertaking, has just been put in circulation in London.

These statements and speculations, in so far as they have come under the cognizance of the writer of the following pages, are, in a great measure, superficial, crude, or erroneous,[6] and, therefore, calculated to mislead rather than inform the public in regard to the practicability and utility of an enterprise, whose importance it is scarcely possible to overrate, considering the nature and magnitude of the interests which would be involved in its successful accomplishment.

The writer has had the means of obtaining information relative to this matter, which he considers may be relied on, and having devoted much of his attention to this Canal question, he deems the present time opportune for submitting to the public some facts and observations tending, he ventures to believe, to lead to more correct conclusions on this very interesting subject than any which have as yet been published.

These facts and observations will be found arranged under the following heads:—

1.—The physical practicability of the enterprise.

2.—The political arrangements requisite for effecting it.

3.—The advantages or disadvantages of navigating by the proposed Canal route, as compared with the route by the Cape of Good Hope.

4.—Financial considerations.

5.—General observations as to the political, commercial, and moral benefits which would be derived from the accomplishment of the undertaking.

That facility of intercourse creates commerce, and commerce carries with it civilization, is an axiom founded on universal experience.

Where seeming exceptions to it are found, they may be traced to the blind selfishness of human legislation, counteracting the natural laws established by the all-wise and beneficent Governor of the universe.

A project, therefore, which, by severing two continents, proposes to change the whole course of commerce and communication between the eastern and western worlds, and approximate by many thousand miles the knowledge and industry of the west to the ignorance and barbarism of the east, presents considerations of a nature to excite the imagination, and to awaken some of our best feelings in its favour.

In dealing with it, the writer, however, purposes to limit himself to a strictly practical view of the subject. He will state his facts with accuracy,—place every circumstance, whether for or against the undertaking, as far as his information enables him to judge, impartially before the reader,—and thus leave him to form his own opinion as to the practicability of accomplishing the contemplated enterprise, and of its utility should it be accomplished.

The writer deems it proper to add, that the matter was some time since submitted by him to the consideration of Her Majesty’s Government, and that the extract from M. Linant’s Survey of the Isthmus, herein given, appears in the “Commercial Tariffs, Regulations, &c., of Foreign Countries, part 10, presented to both Houses of Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, 14th July, 1843,” being part of those valuable compilations, for which it is well known the country is indebted to the talents and industry of Mr. Macgregor, of the Board of Trade.

Physical practicability of the Enterprise.

The improvement of our communication with the East has been, for some time past, an object of much public solicitude, and in proportion to the progress made in its developement, its importance becomes more and more manifest. The establishment of a steam communication with India, &c., vi the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, although as yet only in its infancy, has already been productive of considerable benefit, both to Great Britain and her Oriental dependencies.

But, although the steam communication presents a greatly improved means of transit by this route for passengers and letters, it cannot, except in a comparatively very limited degree, be made available for the general purposes of commerce. The transport of all articles of merchandize of moderate value, compared to their bulk or weight, must, from the small stowage-room afforded by steam vessels, and the expense of the transit across Egypt, continue to be effected by means of sailing vessels navigating by the long and circuitous route round the Cape of Good Hope.

The principal object, therefore, of the contemplated Canal, would be to open a shorter route between Europe and the East, which could be availed of by sailing as well as by steam vessels, and thus serve the general purposes of commercial intercourse.

Previously to proceeding to treat of the practicability of opening such a canal, it may be proper to explain how it has fallen to my lot to deal with this subject:—

In the year 1841, I visited Egypt. While there, my attention was, among other matters, directed to the question which has so frequently been mooted, although never hitherto, I think, satisfactorily treated, viz. the practicability of re-opening the ancient Canal through the Isthmus of Suez, said to have once joined the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.

In following up this object, I became acquainted with M. Adolphe Linant, of Cairo, a French Civil Engineer, of considerable reputation, and who has been in the employ of the Pacha of Egypt, for, I believe, upwards of twenty years.

I found that M. Linant had devoted a great deal of time and labour to the practical investigation of this subject, had recently completed an elaborate survey of the Isthmus, and was in possession of much detailed information derived from a personal examination of the localities through which the proposed Canal would have to be cut. Under certain conditions I induced him to furnish me with a memoir on the subject, accompanied by a manuscript map of his Survey of the Isthmus of Suez, and of Lower Egypt, in which the site of the ancient and track of the proposed Canal are laid down with great minuteness. In short, the map, now in my possession, which is on a large scale, contains a far more complete view of Lower Egypt than any hitherto executed.

Political Arrangements.

The co-operation, or, at least, the concurrence of the Pacha of Egypt would be indispensable.

Having suggested the expediency of the interposition of one or more of the European powers to remove any political impediments which might stand in the way of this enterprise, it appears necessary to take a brief view of the interest which they would each have in promoting it.

Great Britain, from the vast extent of her commerce and political connections with the East, would, undoubtedly, derive the greatest advantage from it; but most of the other nations of Europe would derive benefit in proportion to the extent of their commerce; and those, having ports in the Mediterranean and Levant, or indeed anywhere nearer to the proposed communication than the ports of Great Britain, would gain more in proportion.

Holland, next to Great Britain, would, from the extent of her trade with the East, have a direct interest in the accomplishment of the proposed enterprise. Her commerce would be improved, and her political connection with her extensive colonies of Java, &c., would be much strengthened by it.

France would derive most important benefits. It would create almost a new commerce for her, in which, through her ports in the Mediterranean, she would have the advantage over us in importing direct the indigo, &c., of India, of which she requires such large quantities for the use of her manufactories, while the shorter route which would be opened to India, &c., would give a stimulus to her exports.

Austria, there is every reason to believe, would give a cordial support to the undertaking. She is making active and judicious efforts to extend and improve her commerce; and there is little doubt of her co-operation in promoting an undertaking so well calculated to further her views in that respect. The merchants of Trieste have been the first to avail themselves of an arrangement which the writer of this succeeded about two years since in effecting with the Pacha of Egypt, by which he agreed to relinquish the high rate of transit duties in Egypt, imposed by the treaties with the Porte, and to substitute as low a rate of duty as would admit of the transit through Egypt of goods to and from India, &c. Under this arrangement, two cargoes of India produce have been already brought from Bengal to Suez in sailing vessels, thence transported across Egypt to Alexandria, whence they were brought to Trieste.

The Chamber of Commerce of that port are, it is well known, anxious to extend their trade with the East in this direction; and it is stated, that a proposal was, a short time since, made by some Austrian capitalists to the Pacha, for opening a Canal through the Isthmus.

Greece would obtain a decided benefit by it. Her numerous small vessels would be well adapted for trading with the ports of Africa and Arabia in the Red Sea, and they would soon be seen covering these coasts.

Italy, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the minor northern states, and even America, would all participate more or less in the improved route for eastern commerce, and, taking a just view of their own interests, would hail it as a benefit.

Even Russia, although possessed of an over-land communication with Central Asia, India, and China, would gain an advantage by the Canal, as she could open a maritime intercourse with the east through her ports in the Black Sea, which would be less costly, and susceptible of greater extension than a land transit.

It hence appears, that all the European powers would have an interest, more or less, in promoting this enterprise; and there appears to be reasonable grounds for concluding, that if requested by one or more of the first-rate powers, either to undertake the work himself, or permit it to be undertaken by private capitalists, under such an arrangement as would connect his name with it, and secure to himself and his descendants a pecuniary benefit from it, as already suggested, Mehemet Ali would be induced to co-operate in it.

The guardianship of such a passage between Europe and the East, would serve to enhance the importance of his political position, and to strengthen those relations of mutual interest between the ruler of Egypt, and the communities of Europe, which would form the most efficacious guarantee for the continuance of the Government of Egypt in the family of Mehemet Ali.

The association of his name with so magnificent an enterprise, would, I consider, be another powerful motive to a man so ardently imbued with the love of fame.

Should a firman or other formal act from the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, in his character of sovereign of the soil, be deemed requisite for securing a permanent and indisputable right to make and keep open the Canal, I should suggest that point being left to the management of the Pacha, who, I have some reason to think, would obtain it much more easily and promptly than if it were attempted through the medium of European diplomacy.

Advantages of navigating by the canal route, as compared with the route by the Cape of Good Hope.

Before entering on a comparison of these two routes with regard to their navigation by sailing vessels, it may be well to consider what advantages the contemplated Canal would afford in facilitating the steam communication with the East vi Egypt and the Red Sea, commonly, though very erroneously, denominated “the Overland Route.”

In order to make this properly understood, it will be necessary to give a brief account of the present arrangements for the transit through Egypt of the mails, passengers, and packages, to and from India, China, &c.

It is, no doubt, generally known, that this communication is carried on by the steamers of a private Company, which ply monthly between Southampton and Alexandria, touching at Gibraltar and Malta, and by smaller steamers belonging to the East India Company, which ply monthly between Bombay and Suez, chiefly for the purpose of conveying the mails. The private Company have now also placed two steam ships, the “Hindostan,” and the “Bentinck,” of 1800 tons, and 520 horse power each, to ply between Suez and Calcutta, touching at Aden, Ceylon, and Madras. The vessels of that Company, both on this side of Egypt, as well as on the other side, convey goods as well as passengers, and the mails; but the East India Company’s vessels plying between Suez and Bombay, do not receive goods, and have but limited, and comparatively inferior accommodations for passengers.

The mails, passengers, and packages, are, of course, disembarked from the steamers coming from England at Alexandria, and are re-embarked at Suez in the steamers proceeding to India on the outward route, and vice vers on the homeward route.

It now remains to show how their transit across Egypt, between Alexandria on the Mediterranean, and Suez on the Red Sea, is effected, with the present cost of it, in order to estimate how far it would be improved by the contemplated Canal communication.

I shall now proceed to consider what advantages the Canal would present to sailing vessels navigating between Europe and the East.

The distance from the English Channel to Calcutta, vi the Cape of Good Hope, by the route taken by the best sailing vessels, may be put down at miles13,000
Vi the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and Indian Ocean, it is about 8,000
Gain in distance by the latter route, to or from Calcutta 5,000
By the Cape route to Bombay it is about 11,500
By the Red Sea route 6,200
Gain in distance to or from Bombay 5,300

This is, of course, assuming the navigation by the Mediterranean and Red Sea route to be of equal facility with the Cape route. And I shall now endeavour to examine this part of the question with the accuracy which its importance demands.

The first point which presents itself in this consideration, is the influence of the monsoons, or periodical winds, which prevail throughout the Indian Seas, and in the southern part of the Red Sea.

The south-west monsoon, which blows much stronger than the north-east monsoon, prevails in the Indian Ocean, between the east coast of Africa and the coasts of India, &c., from May until October, blowing with the greatest force during the months of June, July, and August.

The north-east monsoon prevails from October to May, but is of much less force than the south-west monsoon.

In order to estimate the difficulties or advantages of these periodical winds, to a sailing vessel navigating by the Red Sea, as compared with the route by the Cape of Good Hope, we must, for vessels bound to or from the most important commercial ports in India—the Presidencies of Madras and Bengal, as also Ceylon, Singapore, Java, China, &c., suppose her placed at a point a few degrees to the southward of Ceylon from or to which she would have to proceed, whether navigating by the Cape of Good Hope, or by the Red Sea route.

Now, it is well known, that from this position a vessel steering for the coast of Africa towards Cape Guardafui (the southern extremity of the Gulf of Aden), and thence to the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb (the entrance of the Red Sea), would carry the wind a-beam, and could therefore make her passage to or from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, and the given point to the southward of Ceylon, during the whole of the south-west monsoon.

As the north-east monsoon blows in an exactly opposite direction to the south-west monsoon, and is much more moderate, a sailing vessel could make good her course between the Red Sea and the same point south of Ceylon, equally well as in the south-west monsoon, and therefore during the whole year could effect this part of the passage with tolerable certainty.

Vessels proceeding to or from Bombay would have to arrange their passages to suit the monsoons. Sailing from England, or other places in Europe, so as to have the south-west monsoon in their favour; and sailing from Bombay for Europe so as to have the north-east monsoon in their favour.

It hence appears that the monsoons present no particular difficulties in the voyage between India, &c. and the entrance of the Red Sea, more than in the ordinary route by the Cape of Good Hope; but that, on the contrary, for ships trading with the eastern and most important parts of Hindostan, and to Ceylon, Malacca, Singapore, Java, China, &c. this part of the voyage would be made with more certainty than an equal distance in the Indian Ocean, of a voyage by the Cape of Good Hope route.

The Red Sea Passage.

The length of the Red Sea from the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb to Suez is 1200 miles, its medium breadth about 150 miles, and its direction nearly N. N. W. and S. S. E.

Its coasts on either side are fringed with coral rocks, which render it dangerous in navigating it to approach near its shores.

In the southern part of it, say from the latitude of Jidda to Bab-el-Mandeb, being about one-half of its whole length, the southerly monsoon predominates nearly two-thirds of the year, commencing in October and ending in May or June. The northerly winds then set in, and continue about four months, say June, July, August, and September.

Outside the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden, the wind generally prevails from the eastward for six months, say, from October to May, and from the westward during the other part of the year.

In the northern part of the sea, from Jidda to Suez, but more particularly near to Suez, the prevailing winds for nine months of the year are northerly, and in the months of June, July, and August, it is very difficult for sailing vessels to beat up to Suez. In this part of the Red Sea southerly breezes are at all times but of short duration.

The best time for vessels to sail from Suez for India, &c. is therefore about the end of August, which will enable them to clear the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb in September, before the easterly winds commence in the Gulf outside.

From all these facts it will appear,

1st. That the passage between India, &c., and the Gulf of Aden, may be made with ordinary facility by sailing vessels.

2nd. That some delay would be experienced by sailing vessels in the Gulf of Aden during certain portions of the year, whether bound to or from India; and also by vessels coming from India, in the northern part of the Red Sea, during the greater part of the year.

Against these difficulties in the Red Sea route must, however, be set off the delays by calms and contrary winds, between the trades experienced by vessels navigating by the Cape route. In order to ascertain how nearly they may balance each other, and consequently whether a saving of time in navigating by the Mediterranean and Red Sea, proportionate to the shorter distance, as compared with the voyage round the Cape of Good Hope, might be effected, I would beg leave to submit the following questions to the consideration of experienced nautical men.

1st. Is the navigation by a sailing vessel, between England and Pelusium, say 3000 miles, of equal facility as a similar distance from England on the Cape route?

2nd. Is the navigation to or from the given point, to the southward of Ceylon and Cape Guardafui, more certain than that of an equal distance between the same point and the Cape of Good Hope?

3rd. Would the impediments in the navigation of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, already pointed out, be greater or less than those experienced from calms and contrary winds between the trades in navigating by the Cape of Good Hope route? And, assuming that the answer to the second query should be in favour of the Red Sea route, would that gain set off against the difficulties of navigating the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and reduce the latter to a par with the impediments between the trades just alluded to?

4th. Would not the nature of the coast of Egypt, at the embouchure of the Canal in the Mediterranean, present considerable difficulty and danger to sailing vessels approaching it for the purpose of seeking the Canal entrance? The coast, it is well known, for a distance of upwards of 150 miles to the eastward, as well as to the westward of the Canal entrance, is destitute of any sheltered anchorage, is exceedingly low, and not easily discoverable until within a short distance of it, and very shallow at a distance of two leagues from the shore. A good light on the pier or breakwater might obviate some of the danger, but still it is to be apprehended, that sailing vessels approaching this part of the coast, with the wind strong from the north and north-west, and which is very prevalent, would incur considerable risk of getting embayed and being driven ashore.

If the result of this investigation should be such as to place the difficulties and facilities of each route on a par, it will then follow that a gain in time of from four to six weeks would be effected in navigating to or from India, &c. by the proposed Canal, as compared with the Cape of Good Hope route.

Before concluding this part of the subject, I think it well to advert to another objection which may possibly be raised against the Canal passage, namely, the difficulty of tracking a vessel of heavy burthen through the Canal, from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, against a current of three to four miles an hour, which would be the velocity of the stream constantly flowing from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean.

To this may be answered, that the same northerly winds which prevail as already stated, for the greater part of the year, in the upper or northern part of the Red Sea, also blow across the Isthmus, and consequently the vessel would be for the most part able to stem the current by using her sails. In default of this, a sufficient number of dromedaries would track a vessel of almost any size, or posts placed along the banks of the Canal for warping would effect the object on occasions, which would be of but rare occurrence, of a failure of wind.

It is to be considered also, that as the beds of the Bitter Lakes and of the Lake Timsah, would form two very extensive basins in the course of the Canal, nearly half-way between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, these would become halting places or inland ports, and here steam tugs would no doubt, among other accessories, be found, should the Canal ever become a general channel of intercourse.

From the Red Sea to the Mediterranean the vessel would, of course, be carried along by the stream.

General Observations as to the Political, Commercial, and Moral Benefits which would be derived from the Accomplishment of the Undertaking.

In a political point of view, the facilities which the Canal passage, combined with steam navigation, would afford to Great Britain, as regards the government of her Indian empire and dependencies, are almost incalculable.

From Malta troops could be placed in Bombay in three weeks; in Ceylon and Madras in four weeks; and in Calcutta in five weeks. And by means of the frequent intermediate coast communication in India, which the extended and comprehensive plan of steam navigation anticipated to result from the opening of the Canal passage would afford, troops and stores could be rapidly moved from one station to another.

Let any military man compare this with the present mode of effecting similar operations. The long sea voyage by the Cape of Good Hope, of four or five months, in a sailing vessel;—the men worn out, and requiring almost as many months more after debarkation, to recruit their health and strength, so as to be fit for active duty;—the length of time, and great fatigue, in moving between distant military stations;—and I think he will admit, that India might, with the facility alluded to, be efficiently governed with one-half the number of European troop which is now required. The facility for despatching ships of war, and stores of all kinds, to or from India, &c., need only be glanced at to be at once appreciated. The stability of British power in India would be thus increased, while the cost of maintaining it would be considerably diminished.

To estimate the importance of the proposed communication in a commercial point of view, it is necessary to take into consideration the extent of the field of operations for commerce, which the vast and populous regions of the East present. India contains 100,000,000 of subjects of the British Crown, and there are 50,000,000 of adjacent tributaries and allies; in all, 150,000,000 in the Peninsula of Hindostan, exclusive of the island of Ceylon. Little has as yet been done to stimulate the people to improve their resources and ameliorate their condition and habits; but of late years more attention has been directed to these objects, and the trade with British India has been rapidly on the increase.

China contains, it is estimated, not less than 350,000,000 of inhabitants, said to be inclined to industry, and to be peculiarly addicted to traffic. A timid and jealous system of government has for ages hermetically sealed, as it were, this vast country and population from intercourse with the rest of the world. British valour has now removed the barrier, and opened this almost new world to European commerce.

Let us suppose that the people of India and China should, from improved intercourse, require to the extent of one shilling per annum, for each individual, in value of British manufacture or produce. Even this seemingly insignificant amount would produce an annual increase of 25,000,000 in our exports. The opening of the Canal route would tend greatly to facilitate our intercourse with the 500,000,000 of people who inhabit India and China, and hence its commercial importance must be sufficiently obvious.

The application of steam power to the purposes of navigation, is doubtless one of those mechanical discoveries destined to effect a great moral revolution in the human mind throughout the world. The printing press has contributed, in an immense degree, to the progress of civilization, by furnishing a means for the spread of thought. But it seems scarcely to admit of a question, that the power of steam, applied to navigation, will exercise a more extensive, a more rapid, and a more efficacious influence in accelerating the civilization of the world than even the printing press.

Five hundred millions of human beings inhabiting Hindostan and China remain to this day enslaved by debasing superstitions, and sunk in mental darkness and delusion. What a field is here opening to the Christian philanthropist! To aid in the removal of ignorance and superstition by the diffusion of useful knowledge, and an enlightened religion; to plant industry and the arts where indolence and barbarism have hitherto prevailed, are noble efforts, tending no less to elevate those who engage in them, than the object of their exertions. The opening of the proposed communication would obviously subserve the promotion of such objects, and therefore can scarcely fail to excite an interest in the mind of every sincere well-wisher to his fellow creatures.

The preceding statement and observations will, I trust, be sufficient to show that the object of which they treat is, at least, of sufficient importance to warrant an effort being made to ascertain, in the manner suggested, whether it be practicable or not, and if found practicable, whether, and in what manner, the Pacha of Egypt would be disposed to concur or co-operate in it. If the information and suggestions therein given should lead to such a result, the chief object of their publication will be attained.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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