CHAPTER XII. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: FIRST PERIOD, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE. B.C. 218-216.

The Second Punic War was not so much a contest between the powers of two great nations—between Carthage and Rome—as between the individual genius of Hannibal on one hand, and the combined energies of the Roman people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar. His command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the government at Carthage, and the latter seemed disposed to devolve all responsibility upon him. Even now they did little themselves to prepare for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who, after the conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting the scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the same time he did not neglect to provide for the defense of Spain and Africa during his absence. In the former country he placed his brother Hasdrubal, with a considerable army, great part of which was composed of Africans, while he sent over a large body of Spanish troops to contribute to the defense of Africa, and even of Carthage itself.

All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter quarters at New Carthage in the spring of B.C. 218, and crossed the Iberus with an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. The tribes between that river and the Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance, and, though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of 11,000 men under Hanno to maintain this newly-acquired province. His forces were farther thinned by desertion during the passage of the Pyrenees, which obliged him to send home a large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, but one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition; for the Gaulish tribes through which he passed were favorably disposed to him, or had been previously gained over by his enemies.

The Consul P. Cornelius Scipio had been ordered to proceed to Spain, but various causes had detained him in Italy, and upon landing at Massilia (Marseilles) he found that Hannibal was already advancing toward the Rhone. Meantime the Carthaginian general effected his passage across the river, notwithstanding the opposition of the Gauls; and when Scipio marched up the left bank of the river he found that Hannibal had advanced into the interior of Gaul, and was already three days in advance of him. Despairing, therefore, of overtaking Hannibal, he determined to sail back to Italy and await him in Cisalpine Gaul; but as the Republic had already an army in that province, he sent the greater part of his own forces into Spain under the command of his brother Cn. Scipio. This prudent step probably saved Rome; for if the Carthaginians had maintained the undisputed mastery of Spain, they might have concentrated all their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy, and have sent him such strong re-enforcements after the battle of CannÆ as would have compelled Rome to submit.

Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, continued his march up the left bank of the river as far as its confluence with the IsÈre. Here he interposed in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and, by lending his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-operation of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther progress. But in his passage across the Alps he was attacked by the barbarians, and as he struggled through the narrow and dangerous defiles the enemy destroyed numbers of his men. It was some days before he reached the summit of the pass. Thenceforth he suffered but little from hostile attacks, but the descent was difficult and dangerous. The natural difficulties of the road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the beginning of October, at which time the snows had already commenced in the high Alps), caused him almost as much loss as the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of the mountains. So heavy were his losses from these combined causes, that, when he at length emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po and encamped in the friendly country of the Insubres, he had with him no more than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse.[31] Such were the forces with which he descended into Italy to attempt the overthrow of a power that a few years before was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.

Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which the actual passage of the Alps had occupied fifteen days. Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone. After a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly reduced, and took their principal city (Turin). The news of the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn his attention toward a more formidable enemy. In the first action, which took place in the plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favor. The Romans were completely routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence of which he hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed the Po higher up, and, advancing to Placentia, offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by the other Consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had hastened from Ariminum to his support. Their combined armies were greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager to bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force. The result was decisive; the Romans were completely defeated, with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with the two Consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. The battles of the Ticinus and Trebia had been fought in December, and the winter had already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered severely from cold, and all his elephants perished except one. But his victory had caused all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his favor, and he was now able to take up his winter quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among the Gauls while he awaited the approach of spring.

As soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B.C. 217), Hannibal entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately declared in his favor, and descended by the valley of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this route in order to avoid the Roman armies, which guarded the more obvious passes of the Apennines; but the hardships and difficulties which he encountered in struggling through the marshes were immense; great numbers of his horses and beasts of burden perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length, however, he reached FÆsulÆ in safety, and was able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.

The Consuls for this year were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. The latter was the author of the celebrated Agrarian Law which occasioned the Gallic War, and in his first consulship he had gained a great victory over the Insubrian Gauls (see p. 79). He had been raised to his second consulship by popular favor, in spite of the opposition of the Senate; and he hurried from Rome before the Ides of March,[32] lest the Senate might throw any obstacle in the way of his entering upon his consulship. He was a man of great energy, but headstrong and reckless. When Hannibal arrived at FÆsulÆ, Flaminius was with his army at Arretium. It was always the object of Hannibal to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, and therefore, in moving from FÆsulÆ, he passed by the Roman general, and advanced toward Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of march. Flaminius immediately broke up his camp, and, following the traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared for him. His army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circumstances, where it was hemmed in between rocky heights, previously occupied by the enemy, and the Lake of Trasimenus. Its destruction was almost complete. Thousands fell by the sword, among whom was the Consul himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost only 1500 men. Hannibal's treatment of the captives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which he afterward uniformly acted; the Roman citizens alone were retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the nations of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in the position of the leader of a national movement rather than that of a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give time for this feeling to display itself that he did not, after so decisive a victory, push on toward Rome itself; but, after an unsuccessful attempt upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great part of the summer, and was able effectually to refresh his troops, who had suffered much from the hardships of their previous marches; but no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he had looked for among the Italians.

Meantime the Romans had collected a fresh army, which they placed under the command of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been elected Dictator by the Comitia of the Centuries. Fabius formed a different plan for the campaign. He determined to keep the heights, and not to risk a battle, but at the same time to watch the Carthaginian army, cut off its supplies, and harass and annoy it in every possible way. From pursuing this policy he received the surname of Cunctator, or the Lingerer.

Hannibal now recrossed the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, without opposition, that fertile territory. But he was unable either to make himself master of any of the towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general contented himself with occupying the mountain passes leading from Samnium into Campania, by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had caught him, as it were, in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by an ingenious stratagem, passed the defiles of the Apennines without loss, and established himself in the plains of Apulia, where he collected supplies from all sides, in order to prepare for the winter. Meantime the Romans, having become impatient at the inactivity of Fabius, raised Minucius, the Master of the Horse, to an equality in command with Fabius. His rashness very nearly gave Hannibal the opportunity, for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army by a decisive blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from destruction; and Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage, took up his winter quarters at the small town of Geronium. Minucius acknowledged his error, and resumed his post of Master of the Horse.

During the winter the Romans made preparations for bringing an unusually large force into the field. The people thought that it needed only a man of energy and decision at the head of an overwhelming force to bring the war to a close. They therefore raised to the consulship C. Terentius Varro, said to have been the son of a butcher, who had been for some time regarded as the champion of the popular party. The Senate regarded this election with dismay, as Varro possessed no military experience; and they therefore persuaded the people to appoint as his colleague L. Æmilius Paullus, who had distinguished himself by the way in which he had conducted the Illyrian war during his consulship.

Hannibal remained at Geronium until late in the spring (B.C. 216), when, compelled to move by the want of provisions, he surprised the Roman magazines at CannÆ, a small town of Apulia, and established his head-quarters there until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile the two Roman Consuls arrived at the head of an army of little less than 90,000 men. To this mighty host Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of CannÆ. We have no statement of the numbers of his army, but it is certain that it must have been greatly inferior to that of the enemy; notwithstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry, and the disciplined valor of his African and Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive victory. The immense army of the Romans was not only defeated, but annihilated, and between forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, among whom was the Consul Æmilius Paullus, both the Consuls of the preceding year, the late Master of the Horse, Minucius, above eighty senators, and a multitude of the wealthy knights who composed the Roman cavalry. The other Consul, Varro, escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia, and a small band of resolute men forced their way from the Roman camp to Canusium; all the rest were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. Hannibal has been generally blamed for not following up his advantage at once, after so decisive a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome itself—a measure which was strongly urged upon him by Maharbal. "Only send me on with the cavalry," said this officer, "and within five days thou shalt sup in the Capitol." Whatever may be the motives that deterred Hannibal from marching upon Rome, we can not but be surprised at his apparent inactivity after the battle. He probably expected that so brilliant a success would immediately produce a general rising among the nations of Italy, and remained for a time quietly in Apulia, until they should have had time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes disappointed; the Hirpinians, all the Samnites (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, declared in favor of Carthage. But, though the whole of the south of Italy was thus apparently lost to the Romans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so decisive as it would at first appear; for the Latin colonies, which still, without exception, remained faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the revolted provinces; and the Greek cities on the coast, though mostly disposed to join the Carthaginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with a Carthaginian force. Hannibal marched first into Samnium, and from thence into Campania, where he obtained possession of the important city of Capua, the gates of which were opened to him by the popular party. Here he established his army in winter quarters. Thus ends the first period of the war, in which Hannibal had met with uninterrupted success. Three great victories in three years, followed by the revolt of a city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance, seemed to promise a speedy termination of the war.

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NOTE ON HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE ACROSS THE ALPS.

(See p. 84.)

The narrative in the text is taken from that of the Greek historian Polybius, which is certainly by far the most trustworthy that has descended to us; but that author has nowhere clearly stated by which of the passes across the Alps Hannibal effected his march; and this question has given rise to much controversy both in ancient and modern times. Into this discussion our limits will not allow us to enter, but the following may be briefly stated as the general results: 1. That after a careful examination of the text of Polybius, and comparison of the different localities, his narrative will be found, on the whole, to agree best with the supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps, or Little St. Bernard; though it can not be denied that there are some difficulties attending this line, especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2. That CÆlius Antipater certainly represented him as taking this route (Liv., xxi., 38); and as he is known to have followed the Greek history of Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the greatest weight. 3. That Livy and Strabo, on the contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the Cottian Alps, or Mont GenÈvre. But the main argument that appears to have weighed with Livy, as it has done with several modern writers on the subject, is the assumption that Hannibal descended in the first instance into the country of the Taurinians, which is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, who says expressly that he descended among the Insubrians, and subsequently mentions his attack on the Taurinians. 4. That, as according to Livy himself (xxi., 29), the Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's guides were Boians, it was natural that these should conduct him by the passage that led directly into the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the Insubrians, rather than into that of the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. And this remark will serve to explain why Hannibal chose apparently a longer route, instead of the more direct one of Mont GenÈvre. Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he censures the exaggerations and absurdities with which earlier writers had encumbered their narrative, does not intimate that any doubt was entertained as to the line of march; and Pompey, in a letter to the Senate, written in 73 B.C., alludes to the route of Hannibal across the Alps as something well known. Hence it appears clear that the passage by which he crossed them must have been one of those frequented in subsequent times by the Romans. This argument seems decisive against the claims of Mont Cenis, which have been advocated by some modern writers, that pass having apparently never been used till the Middle Ages—See Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, vol. ii., p. 334, 335.

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