John Holladay LatanE

The Pan American movement, which has for its object the promotion of closer social, economic, financial, and political relations between the independent republics of the Western Hemisphere, has attracted much attention in recent years. The Pan American ideal is an old one, dating back, in fact, to the Panama Congress of 1826. The object of this congress was not very definitely stated in the call which was issued by Simon Bolivar, but his purpose was to secure the independence and peace of the new Spanish-American republics either through a permanent confederation or through a series of diplomatic congresses. Henry Clay, who was secretary of state at the time, was enthusiastically in favor of accepting the invitation extended to the United States to participate in the congress. President Adams agreed, therefore, to the acceptance of the invitation, but the matter was debated at great length in both House and Senate. In the Senate the debate was particularly acrimonious. The policy of the administration was denounced as dangerous, and it was asserted that a participation in the congress at Panama could be of no benefit to the United States and might be the means of involving us in international complications. One of the topics proposed for discussion was "the manner in which all colonization of European powers on the American continent shall be restricted." The Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs objected strenuously to the United States in any way committing itself to guaranteeing the territory of any other American state. The slavery question also projected itself into the debate, mainly because the negro Republic of Haiti was to be represented and because most of the other states had proclaimed the emancipation of slaves. The Senate finally agreed to the nomination of Richard C. Anderson, of Kentucky, and John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, as envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the assembly of American nations at Panama, and Congress made the necessary appropriation. The delay proved fatal to the plan, however, for the American delegates did not reach Panama until after the congress had adjourned.

In view of the opposition which the plan encountered in Congress, the instructions to the American delegates were very carefully drawn by Secretary Clay and their powers were strictly limited. They were cautioned against committing their government in any way to the establishment of "an amphictyonic council, invested with power finally to decide controversies between the American states or to regulate in any respect their conduct. Such a council might have been well enough adapted to a number of small contracted states, whose united territory would fall short of the extent of that of the smallest of the American powers. The complicated and various interests which appertain to the nations of this vast continent cannot be safely confided to the superintendence of one legislative authority. We should almost as soon expect to see an amphictyonic council to regulate the affairs of the whole globe. But even if it were desirable to establish such a tribunal, it is beyond the competency of the government of the United States voluntarily to assent to it, without a previous change of their actual constitution."

The delegates were also instructed to oppose the formation of an offensive and defensive alliance between the American powers, for, as Mr. Clay pointed out, the Holy Alliance had abandoned all idea of assisting Spain in the conquest of her late colonies. Continuing, he said:

Other reasons concur to dissuade the United States from entering into such an alliance. From the first establishment of their present constitution, their illustrious statesmen have inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances as a leading maxim of their foreign policy. It is true, that in its adoption, their attention was directed to Europe, which having a system of connections and of interests remote and different from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not mix ourselves up with them. And it is also true, that long since the origin of the maxim, the new American powers have arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable. Without, therefore, asserting that an exigency may not occur in which an alliance of the most intimate kind between the United States and the other American republics would be highly proper and expedient, it may be safely said that the occasion which would warrant a departure from that established maxim ought to be one of great urgency, and that none such is believed now to exist. Among the objections to such alliances, those which at all times have great weight are, first, the difficulty of a just and equal arrangement of the contributions of force and of other means between the respective parties to the attainment of the common object; and secondly, that of providing beforehand, and determining with perfect precision, when the casus foederis arises, and thereby guarding against all controversies about it. There is less necessity for any such alliance at this juncture on the part of the United States, because no compact, by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or whatever name or character it might assume, could be more obligatory upon them than the irresistible motive of self-preservation, which would be instantly called into operation, and stimulate them to the utmost exertion in the supposed contingency of an European attack upon the liberties of America.[273]

The British government sent a special envoy to reside near the congress and to place himself in frank and friendly communication with the delegates. Canning's private instructions to this envoy declared that,

The Panama Congress was without practical results, and it possesses merely an historical interest. As a matter of fact, only four republics, Colombia, Central America, Peru, and Mexico, were represented. Several treaties and conventions were drafted with the view mainly of combined defense against Spain, but ratification was withheld by all of the states except Colombia, which gave only a partial approval to what had been done. Before adjourning, the Congress of Panama decided to meet again at the town of Tacubaya, near the city of Mexico, and to continue its sessions at stated intervals. But as the result of the failure of the states represented at the congress to ratify the agreements arrived at, and as the result of internal disorders, the plan was not carried out, although Mexico issued invitations for another congress in 1831, 1838, 1839, and 1840.

In 1847 the republics of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada, and Peru held a so-called "American Congress" at Lima, which drafted a treaty of confederation, one of commerce and navigation, a consular convention, and a postal convention. These treaties were not ratified and, therefore, the congress was without practical results. The preamble of the proposed treaty of confederation referred to the nations assembled as being "bound to each other by the ties of a common origin, a common language, a common religion, common customs, and the common cause for which they have struggled, as well as by their geographical position, the similarity of their institutions, and their analogous ancestors and reciprocal interests." It is evident, therefore, that this particular congress was Spanish-American rather than Pan American.[274]

In 1856 the republics of Peru, Chile, and Ecuador signed at Santiago a treaty of confederation, known as "the Continental Treaty," for the purpose of "cementing upon substantial foundations the union which exists between them, as members of the great American family, which are bound together by the ties of a common origin, similar institutions, and many other signs of fraternity." This treaty was not ratified. It seems to have been dictated by a spirit of hostility to the United States as the result of the filibustering enterprise of William Walker in Central America.

The question of a "continental" league was discussed between Costa Rica and Colombia in 1862. After stating that, "There are not always at the head of the Great Republic moderate, just, and upright men as those who form the administration of President Lincoln," Costa Rica continued:

In January, 1864, the government of Peru issued invitations to all the governments of the Spanish nations of America to join in a congress to be held at Lima. The objects of the meeting as stated in the invitation were "to declare that the American nations represented in this congress form one single family," to improve postal facilities, to exchange statistical data, to provide for the settlement of all boundary disputes, and "to irrevocably abolish war, superseding it by arbitration, as the only means of compromising all misunderstandings and causes for disagreements between any of the South American republics." In accepting the invitation to the congress Colombia expressed the opinion that "the United States ought not to be invited, because their policy is adverse to all kind of alliances, and because the natural preponderance which a first-class power, as they are, has to exercise in the deliberations, might embarrass the action of the congress." So far as definite results were concerned, this congress at Lima was of no greater importance than its predecessors.

The French invasion of Mexico and the war between Spain and the republics on the west coast of South America in 1865-66 brought about a realization of their danger on the part of the Spanish-American republics and a fuller appreciation of the friendship of the United States. In the war between Spain on the one hand and the allied republics of Peru, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador on the other, the United States declared its neutrality as usual, but at an early period of the struggle Secretary Seward offered to mediate between the warring nations. Spain refused to accept this offer, and the war dragged on in a state of "technical continuance" merely. The offer of mediation was again renewed by Secretary Fish, with the result that a conference was held at the State Department in 1870 attended by the representatives of Spain, Peru, Chile, and Ecuador. While it was found impossible to conclude a formal peace, the delegates signed an armistice April 11, 1871, by which the de facto suspension of hostilities was converted into an armistice which was to continue indefinitely and could not be broken by any of the belligerents without three years' notice, given through the government of the United States, of intention to renew hostilities.[276]

Within ten years of the signature of this perpetual armistice, war broke out between Chile, on the one hand, and Peru and Bolivia, on the other (1879-83). The subject of dispute was the nitrate deposits of northern Chile. In 1880 Chile signed with Colombia an arbitration treaty which provided that in case the two parties should be unable in any given case to agree upon an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to the President of the United States. Article III of this treaty was as follows:

A few weeks later, without waiting for the ratification of this treaty, Colombia issued invitations to the other Spanish-American republics to attend a conference at Panama for the purpose of securing their adherence to the treaty. The failure to include the United States in the invitation to the conference was explained by our minister to Colombia as being due "to the reason that the position assigned to the government of the United States by the proposed treaty is to maintain and exercise a friendly and judicial impartiality in the differences which may arise between the powers of Spanish America."[277] The continuance of the war between Chile and Peru led to the indefinite postponement of the conference.

On November 29, 1881, Secretary Elaine extended "to all the independent countries of North and South America an earnest invitation to participate in a general congress, to be held in the city of Washington on the 24th day of November, 1882, for the purpose of considering and discussing the methods of preventing war between the nations of America." He expressed the desire that the attention of the congress should be strictly confined to this one great object, and he expressed the hope that in setting a day for the assembling of the congress so far ahead, the war that was then in progress on the South Pacific coast would be ended, and the nations engaged would be able to take part in the proceedings.[278] In this expectation Mr. Blaine was disappointed. The war between Chile and Peru continued, and the invitations to the conference were withdrawn.

Toward the close of President Cleveland's first administration, the Congress of the United States passed an act authorizing the President to invite the republics of Mexico, Central and South America, Haiti, Santo Domingo, and the Empire of Brazil, to join the United States in a conference at Washington on October 2, 1889. Among the subjects proposed for discussion were the adoption of a customs union, the improvement of the means of communication between the various countries, uniform customs regulations, a uniform system of weights and measures, laws for the protection of patents and copyrights, extradition, the adoption of a common silver coin, and the formulation of a definite plan for the arbitration of international disputes of every character. When the conference assembled, Mr. Blaine was again secretary of state, and presided over its opening sessions. The conference formulated a plan for international arbitration and declared that this means of settling disputes was "a principle of American international law." Unfortunately this treaty was not ratified by the governments whose representatives adopted it. The most lasting achievement of the conference was the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics in Washington. While the conference was in session Brazil went through a bloodless revolution, which converted the empire into a republic. Thus disappeared the only independent monarchy of European origin which ever existed on American soil.

Scarcely had the Washington conference adjourned, when the United States and Chile got into an ugly wrangle and were brought to the verge of war over an attack on American sailors on shore leave at Valparaiso. During the civil war between President Balmaceda and the Congressional party, the American minister, Mr. Egan, admitted to the American legation certain adherents of the President. The people of Chile resented the action of the American minister, and were further aroused against the United States by the detention of the Itata, a vessel which left San Diego, California, with a cargo of arms for the Congressional party and was overhauled by an American warship. The United States cruiser Baltimore was lying in the harbor of Valparaiso when news of this incident was received. Members of her crew who happened to be on shore leave were attacked by the populace and several of them killed. As this attack upon American sailors appeared to be due to resentment against the official acts of their government, an apology was immediately demanded, but refused. After considerable delay, President Harrison had just laid the matter before Congress when a belated apology from Chile arrived, and war was fortunately averted. The charge that the United States had interfered in behalf of one of the parties in a civil strife created an unfavorable impression throughout Latin America and counteracted, to a considerable extent, the good effects of the Washington conference.

The Second International American Conference was held in the city of Mexico 1901-02. This conference arranged for all Latin-American States to become parties to the Hague Convention of 1899 for the pacific settlement of international disputes, and drafted a treaty for the compulsory arbitration of pecuniary claims, the first article of which was as follows:

This treaty was signed by the delegates of seventeen states, including the United States of America.[279]

The Third International American Conference was held at Rio de Janeiro in 1906. Among other things it extended the pecuniary claims convention drafted by the previous conference for another period of five years, and recommended to the governments represented that they invite the Second Hague Conference, which had been called for 1907, "to examine the question of the compulsory collection of public debts, and, in general, means tending to diminish between nations conflicts having an exclusively pecuniary origin."[280] Added significance was given to the Rio conference by the presence of Secretary Root who, although not a delegate, made it the occasion of a special mission to South America. The series of notable addresses which he delivered on this mission gave a new impetus to the Pan American movement.

The Fourth International American Conference was held at Buenos Aires in 1910. It drafted treaties relating to patents, trade-marks, and copyrights. It extended the pecuniary claims convention for an indefinite period. And finally, it enlarged the scope of the Bureau of American Republics and changed its name to the Pan American Union.[281] A fifth conference was called to meet at Santiago, Chile, in 1914, but was postponed on account of the European war.

The conferences above described were political or diplomatic in character. Besides these there have been held two Pan American scientific congresses in which the United States participated, one at Santiago, Chile, in 1908, and one at Washington, December, 1915, to January, 1916. There have also been held two Pan American financial conferences in the city of Washington, the first in May, 1915, and the second in January, 1920. These conferences have accomplished a great deal in the way of promoting friendly feeling and the advancement of science and commerce among the republics of the Western Hemisphere. The First Financial Conference recommended the establishment of an International High Commission, to be composed of not more than nine members resident in each country appointed by the Minister of Finance of such country for the purpose of carrying on the work of the conference. This recommendation was adopted by the various countries, and the Congress of the United States, by act of February 7, 1916, authorized the establishment of a section in this country. The International High Commission carries on its labors largely through the various national sections. Its first general meeting was held at Buenos Aires in April, 1916.

The American Institute of International Law, organized at Washington in October, 1912, is a body which is likely to have great influence in promoting the peace and welfare of this hemisphere. The Institute is composed of five representatives from the national society of international law in each of the twenty-one American republics. At the suggestion of Secretary Lansing the Institute at a session held in the city of Washington, January 6, 1916, adopted a Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations, which was as follows:

This Declaration has been criticized as being too altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims.

On the same day that the above Declaration was made public, President Wilson delivered a notable address before the Second Pan American Scientific Conference then in session at Washington. In the course of this address he said:

President Wilson's Pan Americanism went further than some of the Latin-American states were willing to go. A treaty embodying the above proposals was actually drafted, but some of the states held back through the fear that, though equal in terms, it would in fact give the United States a plausible pretext for supervising the affairs of weaker states.[283]

President Wilson has not hesitated to depart from many of the fundamental ideas which have hitherto guided so-called practical statesmen. His handling of the Mexican situation, although denounced as weak and vacillating, has been in full accord with his new Latin-American policy. On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized and imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator. Four days later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wilson, the American ambassador, promptly urged his government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he assumed control of affairs at Washington. He refused to recognize Huerta whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in various parts of the country. It was claimed by the critics of the administration that the refusal to recognize Huerta was a direct violation of the well known American policy of recognizing de facto governments without undertaking to pass upon the rights involved. It is perfectly true that the United States has consistently followed the policy of recognizing de facto governments as soon as it is evident in each case that the new government rests on popular approval and is likely to be permanent. This doctrine of recognition is distinctively an American doctrine. It was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary of state as an offset to the European doctrine of divine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Huerta could lay no claim to authority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of the Mexican people. He was a self-constituted dictator, whose authority rested solely on military force. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would never recognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidential contest. This announcement made him deaf to advice from Washington and utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life and property.

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico was the occupation of Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight with Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventy wounded. The American chargÉ d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once handed his passports, and all diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called A B C powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptly accepted their mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, assumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to respect the lives and property of American citizens the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson the six ranking representatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice, however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize the government of Carranza, who now controlled three-fourths of the territory of Mexico. As a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks on American citizens and raids across the border, which in March, 1916, compelled the President to send a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies of militia to the border.[284]

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not only made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along the border, and even assumed a threatening attitude. There was a loud and persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico. American investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises were very large, and these financial interests were particularly outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting." The President remained deaf to this clamor. No country had been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore it was suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutions had been financed by American capital. President Wilson was determined to give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their national life on a better basis and to lend them every assistance in the task. War with Mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even a successful war would have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an indefinite period. President Wilson's refusal to become involved in war with Mexico convinced the world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during the Great War such as no political leader of any nation ever before commanded.

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the President's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy. The difference between the two cases, however, was that the Haitian situation, if taken in time, could be handled without bloodshed, while the same method applied to Mexico would have led to a long and bloody conflict. It would be easy enough to go into Mexico, but exceedingly difficult to get out. The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the A B C powers and his subsequent consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America. This action has brought the Pan American ideal to the point of realization. It has been received with enthusiasm and it has placed our relations with Latin America on a better footing than they have been for years.

It has been suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policy that if we are to undertake to set the world right, we must come before the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we denounce the imperialistic policies of Europe, we must abandon imperialistic policies at home. The main features of President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if we may draw a general conclusion, have been to pledge the weaker American republics not to do anything which would invite European intervention, and to secure by treaty the right of the United States to intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for the establishment of self-government. The test of such a policy is the degree of unselfishness with which it is carried out.

The loyalty of the Latin-American states to the principles of Pan Americanism was put to a severe test when the United States entered the Great War. When President Wilson announced to Congress the severance of relations with Germany and declared his intention of protecting our commerce on the high seas, he expressed the confident hope that all neutral governments would pursue the same course. He probably had especially in mind our Latin-American neighbors, but if so, his expectation was not fully realized. Only eight of the twenty Latin-American republics eventually entered the war: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Five others broke off relations with Germany: Bolivia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay.[285]

Only two Latin-American states, Brazil and Cuba, took an active part in the war. At the request of the British government in December, 1917, Brazil sent two cruisers and four destroyers to European waters to coÖperate with the British navy, and a few months later a group of Brazilian aviators took their place on the Western front. A number of physicians and several Red Cross units from Brazil also coÖperated with the Allies. Cuba turned over to the United States several German steamships interned in her waters. A compulsory military service law was passed and a number of training camps established. In October, 1918, the Cuban government announced that it had 25,000 troops ready to send to France, but the armistice was signed before arrangements could be made for their transportation. The only active service rendered by Cubans was in the field of aviation, where several individuals won high distinction.

Of the A B C powers Argentina and Chile remained neutral. So also did Mexico. Brazil was thus the only one of the larger states that actually entered the war. The relations between Brazil and the United States have almost always been peculiarly close and friendly. From the outbreak of the European war strong sympathy for the allied cause was manifested in Brazil, and a league for aiding the Allies through the agency of the Red Cross was organized under the presidency of Ruy Barbosa, the most distinguished statesman of Brazil and one of the most brilliant orators of Latin America. Brazil's experience during the period of neutrality was very similar to that of the United States. Her commerce was interfered with and her ships were sunk by German submarines. A few weeks after the United States entered the war, Brazil severed relations with Germany and seized the forty-six German ships interned in Brazilian harbors. In a circular note of June 2 the Brazilian government declared to the world that it had taken this step because the Republic of Brazil was bound to the United States "by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law," and because it wished to give to its foreign policy, in this critical moment of the world's history, "a practical form of continental solidarity—a policy indeed which was that of the old rÉgime on every occasion on which any of the other friendly sister nations of the American continent were in jeopardy." President Wilson's reply to this note expressed the deep appreciation of the United States and the hope that the act of the Brazilian Congress was "the forerunner of the attitude to be assumed by the rest of the American states." On October 26, 1917, on the receipt of the news of the torpedoing of another Brazilian ship by a German submarine, a resolution recognizing "the state of war initiated by the German Empire against Brazil" was adopted by the unanimous vote of the Brazilian Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 in the Chamber of Deputies.[286] Brazil's enthusiastic support of the United States and of the allied cause has been recognized by those powers in giving her representation on the Council of the League of Nations. In fact at the first meeting of the Council in London in February, 1920, Brazil was the sole American power represented.

Argentina, the largest and most important of the states of Spanish origin, remained neutral throughout the war, notwithstanding the fact that a large part of the population and some of the leading newspapers were strongly pro-Ally. When the United States declared war, SeÑor Drago, the former minister of foreign affairs and author of the doctrine that bears his name, issued a statement in which he said:

About the same time a note was sent through Ambassador NaÓn stating that "in view of the causes which have prompted the United States to declare war against the government of the German Empire," the Argentine government recognizes "the justice of that decision." But German propaganda, which had its headquarters in Buenos Aires, and the attitude of President Irrigoyen kept the country out of the war. Popular indignation was aroused by the Luxburg disclosures, which revealed the fact that the German representative, after coming to an understanding with the President, had advised his government that two Argentine ships then approaching the French coast "be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left" (spurlos versenkt). The Senate and Chamber of Deputies passed by large majorities a resolution severing relations with Germany, but to the surprise of everybody President Irrigoyen expressed himself as satisfied with Germany's disavowal of Luxburg's conduct and continued his policy of neutrality.

Chile was so far removed from the scene of the war in Europe and had so few ships engaged in European trade that her government did not have the same provocation that others had. Furthermore, German propaganda had made great headway in Chile and the Chilean army, trained by German officers, was strongly pro-German. In the navy, on the other hand, sentiment was strongly in favor of the Allies. This was a matter of tradition, for since the days of Lord Cochrane, whose exploits have been described in an earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has followed English ideals. Under these circumstances Chile remained neutral, though before the end of the war public sentiment had shifted to the side of the Allies.[287]

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing relations with Germany proclaimed their adherence to the principle of American solidarity. Paraguay's neutrality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smarting under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to take sides with the United States. In Venezuela most of the government officials were under German influence. Panama and four of the five Central American republics declared war on Germany, Salvador alone remaining neutral. Cuba and Haiti also declared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic severed consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its neutrality, but permitted its soil to become a hot-bed of German intrigue and President Carranza exhibited at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which tended to increase the tension that already existed between the two countries.

In an article on "The European War and Pan Americanism"[288] Ambassador NaÓn of the Argentine Republic draws the following interesting conclusions, conclusions that are all the more interesting because his country was not one of those that took the course to which he gives his approval. He says: "The political action developed by the different governments of the continent in the presence of the European conflict, especially since the breaking out of hostilities between the United States and Germany, has not been either the best advised or the most propitious for achieving the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The situation created by the European war, he continues, "affected the entire continent in the same manner and with the same political and economic intensity as the United States, and both self-interest and moral obligations ought to have counseled the consummating of solidarity, here and now, by making common cause and endorsing the attitude of the United States to the extreme limit, until the disturbing force should be overcome. The political action of America did not take this direction, however. Some of the most important governments of the continent, going counter to the political aspirations and doubtless to the political interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy of neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a policy of isolation, and thus the solidarity of the continent was broken, with consequent prejudice to Pan Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the action of the governments could not be counted upon, nevertheless, the sentiment, expressed in eloquent manifestations of public opinion and in complete disagreement with that attitude of the governments, persisted throughout the crisis. Thus the spirit of Pan Americanism was saved, and we are justified in believing that there will come a reaction which will restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty interests involved."

Ambassador NaÓn believes, however, that Pan Americanism has many obstacles in the way of its complete realization. Among them he mentions "the recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities" by the peace conference at Paris in the classification of nations as great powers and small powers. The fundamental principle of Pan Americanism he believes to be the doctrine of equality. He further points out that as long as American states remain, whether as the result of their own shortcomings or not, in these conditions of inferiority in world politics, "there will continue to exist for the United States the causes that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all its objections will continue to exist." Finally he says that "the idea of solidarity is being weakened or thwarted by another idea, the unwholesome one of Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing itself upon supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals between the other countries of America and the United States. This purpose, which is anarchical, might cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neglecting to foster this tendency, it should succeed, by pandering to paltry prejudices and flattering national vanities, in gaining a footing in the thought of the other governments of the continent to the extent of constituting itself a political force, capable of replacing the system of solidarity which Pan Americanism seeks, by a system of a continental equilibrium: a system which has just failed in the European conflict."

This summary of the views of the distinguished Argentine statesman is sufficient to show that his analysis of the situation is correct. The weakness and backwardness of certain states, specifically those in the zone of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As long as they remain in their present condition the United States must continue to protect them against European intervention and, when occasion arises, supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from provoking such intervention. As long as it is necessary to pursue this course the United States will have to rest under the suspicion of having imperialistic designs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism which in turn must be overcome before we can fully realize the ideal of Pan Americanism.

FOOTNOTES:

[280] Third International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Documents (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional. 1907), P. 605.