John Holladay LatanE

The attempt of Louis Napoleon to establish a European monarchy in Mexico under the tutelage of France was the most serious menace that republican institutions in the new world have had to face since the schemes of the Holy Alliance were checked by Monroe and Canning. The thwarting of that attempt may be accounted one of the greatest triumphs of American diplomacy. The internal disorders common to South and Central American republics have always been a fruitful source of embarrassment to the United States, on account of the liability to European intervention to which these governments continually subject themselves in such periods by their open and flagrant disregard of international obligations. Of no country is this statement truer than of Mexico, where the well-nigh interminable strife of parties gave rise between the years 1821 and 1857 to thirty-six different governments. In 1857 a favorable change occurred in the affairs of the republic. A constituent congress, elected by the people of the different states, framed and adopted a republican constitution which promised better things for the future. Under the provisions of this constitution an election was held in July (1857) and General Comonfort chosen president almost without opposition. His term of office was to begin December 1, 1857, and to continue four years. Within one brief month, however, President Comonfort was driven from the capital, and ultimately from the country, by an uprising headed by General Zuloaga. As soon as Comonfort abandoned the presidency, General Benito Juarez, the president of the Supreme Court of Justice, became according to the constitution, the president de jure of the republic for the remainder of the unexpired term, that is, until December 1, 1861. General Zuloaga had, however, assumed the name of president, with indefinite powers, and the entire diplomatic corps, including the minister of the United States, had recognized his government. But Zuloaga was speedily expelled, and the supreme power seized by General Miramon, the head of the church party, whom the diplomatic corps likewise recognized. Meanwhile Juarez, the constitutional president, had proceeded to Vera Cruz, where he put his administration into successful operation.

For several months, Mr. John Forsyth, the American minister, continued at the city of Mexico in the discharge of his duties. In June, 1858, however, he suspended his diplomatic connection with the Miramon government. Our relations, which had been bad under former governments, were now rendered almost intolerable under that of Miramon by outrages towards American citizens and personal indignities to Mr. Forsyth himself. His action was approved by President Buchanan, and he was directed to return to the United States. All diplomatic intercourse was thus terminated with the government of Miramon, but as yet none was established with the Juarez government. The ultimate success of the latter became, however, so probable that the following year the President sent a confidential agent to Mexico to inquire into and report upon the actual condition of the belligerents, and in consequence of his report, Mr. Robert M. McLane was dispatched to Mexico, March 8, 1859, "with discretionary authority to recognize the government of President Juarez, if on his arrival in Mexico he should find it entitled to such recognition according to the established practice of the United States." On the 7th of April, Mr. McLane presented his credentials to President Juarez, having no hesitation, he said, "in pronouncing the government of Juarez to be the only existing government of the republic." He was cordially received by the authorities at Vera Cruz, and during all the vicissitudes of the next eight years the United States government continued to extend its sympathy and moral support to the government of Juarez as the only one entitled to the allegiance of the people of Mexico.

Juarez thus came forward, in the rÔle of reformer, as the champion of constitutionalism and the supremacy of the state against the overreaching power, influence, and wealth of the church party. He was a full-blooded Indian, without the slightest admixture of Spanish blood. In December, 1860, he finally succeeded in overthrowing the party of Miramon and driving the latter into exile. Immediately, on reoccupying the city of Mexico, the Constitutionalists proceeded to execute with severity the decree issued at Vera Cruz nationalizing or sequestrating the property of the church.

The most difficult question which the new government had to face was that of international obligations recklessly contracted by the various revolutionary leaders who had successively been recognized as constituting the government of Mexico. In consequence of debts contracted and outrages and enormities perpetrated, for the most part during the rÉgime of Miramon and the church party, the governments of England, France, and Spain determined to intervene in Mexico.

The grievances of the British government were based on the following facts: non-settlement of claims of British bondholders; the murder of the British vice-consul at Tasco; the breaking into the British legation and the carrying off £152,000 in bonds belonging to British subjects, besides numerous other outrages committed on the persons and property of individuals.[193]

The claims of the British bondholders referred to had been recognized by the Pakenham convention of October 15, 1842, and formed into a consolidated fund of $250,000, which was to be paid off, principal and interest, by a percentage on import duties at the custom-houses of Vera Cruz and Tampico. This convention was not carried out by the Mexican government, and on December 4, 1851, Mr. Doyle signed on behalf of Great Britain a new convention, in which not only the claims under the Pakenham convention, but others, recognized by both governments, were likewise formed into a consolidated fund, on which the Mexican government bound itself to pay five per cent. as a sinking fund and three per cent. as interest until the debt should be paid off. This five and three per cent. were to be met by a percentage of customs receipts. In 1857 the sinking fund was to be raised to six per cent. and the interest to four per cent.

Two days after the signing of this Doyle convention the Spanish minister in Mexico also signed a convention on behalf of some Philippine missionaries, known as the "Padre Moran" convention, on almost the same basis as the British. The consolidated fund in this case was $983,000, the sinking fund five per cent., and the interest three per cent.

The interest was paid on both funds in almost the whole amount, but the sinking fund was not kept up. Succeeding agreements were made in 1858, in 1859, and in 1860, by which the custom-house assignments to satisfy both conventions (British and Spanish) were raised from twelve per cent. in 1851, to twenty-nine per cent. in 1860.[194]

It will thus be seen that the British and Spanish claims were perfectly legitimate. The French claims, however, were of a somewhat different character. During Miramon's administration arrangements were made through the agency of Jecker, a Swiss banker, by which $750,000 were to be raised through an issue of $15,000,000 of bonds. These bonds fell into the hands of Jecker's French creditors and were pressed by the French government, which thus demanded the repayment of twenty times the original sum advanced. A claim was made also for $12,000,000 for torts on French subjects.[195]

When the Liberal party came into power again in 1860, they were unable to meet the situation and showed a disposition to question the obligatory force of engagements entered into by their various revolutionary predecessors. The British government had undertaken to provide against this contingency upon the occasion of extending recognition to the Juarez administration. Under date of March 30, 1861, Lord John Russell wrote to Sir Charles Wyke, recently appointed minister to Mexico, as follows:

The instructions addressed to Mr. Mathew, both before and since the final triumph of the Liberal party, made the recognition by Great Britain of the constitutional government contingent upon the acknowledgment by that government of the liability of Mexico for the claims of British subjects who, either in their persons or in their property, for a long series of years, can be proved to have suffered wrong at the hands of successive governments in Mexico.[196]

And further on in the same communication the attitude of the British government is expressed yet more strongly:

Her majesty's government will not admit as an excuse for hesitation in this respect the plea that the robbery was committed by the late government. For, as regards this, as indeed all other claims, her majesty's government cannot admit that the party who committed the wrong is alone responsible. Great Britain does not recognize any party as constituting the republic in its dealing with foreign nations, but holds the entire republic, by whatever party the government of it may from time to time be administered, to be responsible for wrongs done to British subjects by any party or persons at any time administering the powers of government.

Mexico, however, was slow to admit this principle of international law. In a letter to Lord John Russell, June 25, 1861, and in other communications, Sir Charles Wyke urged the necessity of a naval demonstration against Mexico. His plan was to take possession of the custom-houses of Vera Cruz, Tampico, and Matamoros on the Atlantic, and of one or two on the Pacific, lower the duties so as to attract the great bulk of trade from other ports, and pay themselves by the percentage to which they were entitled by treaty stipulation.

On the 17th of July, 1861, President Juarez brought matters to a crisis by the publication of a decree, the first article of which declared that "all payments are suspended for two years, including the assignments for the loan made in London and for the foreign conventions."[197]

On the 23rd, Sir Charles Wyke, the British minister, demanded the repeal of this law within forty-eight hours. On the 24th, the French minister demanded its repeal within twenty-four hours. These demands were not complied with and diplomatic relations were immediately broken off by the British and French representatives.

The Spanish government had acted somewhat in advance of the other governments and was already preparing to back its claims by an armed expedition against Mexico. The rupture with the British and French governments very naturally pointed to joint action with Spain as the best means of securing their interests. The United States government, which had just entered upon one of the greatest struggles of modern times and had its hands practically tied as far as Mexico was concerned, regarded the contemplated intervention of European powers in Mexico with grave apprehension, not to say suspicion. So great was the uneasiness occasioned in the United States by the measures in contemplation and so strong was the desire to ward off the threatened danger to republican institutions on this continent, that Mr. Seward authorized (September 2, 1861) the negotiation of a treaty with Mexico for the assumption by the United States of the payment of the interest, at three per cent., upon the funded debt of Mexico (the principal of which was about $62,000,000) for the term of five years from the date of the decree of the Mexican government suspending such payment, "provided that the government of Mexico will pledge to the United States its faith for the reimbursement of the money so to be paid, with six per cent. interest thereon, to be secured by a specific lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights in the several Mexican states of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa, the property so pledged to become absolute in the United States at the expiration of the term of six years from the time when the treaty shall go into effect, if such reimbursement shall not have been made before that time."[198] All this, of course, was subject to the confirmation of the Senate.

This step was communicated informally to the British and French governments, and the validity of the convention was to be conditioned upon those governments engaging not to take any measures against Mexico to enforce the payment of the interest of the loan until time should have been given to submit the convention to the ratification of the United States Senate at its approaching session. It was also to be a condition that, if the convention should be ratified, Great Britain and France should engage, on their part, not to make any demand upon Mexico for the interest, except upon its failing to be punctually paid by the United States.[199]

Grave objections to Mr. Seward's plan of paying the interest on the Mexican debt were entertained both in Paris and in London. The French minister of state, M. Thouvenel, said to the British minister at Paris:

Lord Lyons declared to Mr. Seward:

The British government avoided beforehand the necessity of a point-blank refusal of the plan of Mr. Seward, in case the treaty should go through, by declaring that the interest on the funded debt was not the only cause of complaint, but that there remained over and above that the outrages perpetrated upon British subjects still unredressed.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, the United States minister to England, did not approve the plan of guaranteeing the Mexican interest, and in his dispatch to Mr. Seward of November 1, 1861, he expressed his opinion rather more frankly than is usual for a minister to do in discussing an instruction from the state department.

While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government in reference to some method of releasing Mexico from her complications with the allied governments of Europe, the United States Senate, in reply to two successive messages of the President, passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, declaring the opinion "that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers." This effectually put an end to Mr. Seward's plan.

Meanwhile Sir Charles Wyke had reopened negotiations with the Mexican government and negotiated a treaty which might have satisfied British claims, but the treaty was thrown out by the Mexican congress by a large majority, and also disapproved by the British government in view of an agreement entered into with France and Spain unknown to Sir Charles Wyke.[203]

The agreement referred to was the convention signed at London, October 31, 1861, between Spain, France, and Great Britain, in reference to the situation of affairs in Mexico and looking to armed intervention for the purpose of securing their rights. The preamble of the convention recites that the three contracting parties "being placed by the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the authorities of the republic of Mexico under the necessity of exacting from those authorities a more efficient protection for the persons and property of their subjects, as well as the performance of the obligations contracted toward them by the republic of Mexico, have arranged to conclude a convention between each other for the purpose of combining their common action." The most important article of the convention in view of its subsequent violation by the Emperor Napoleon, was the second, which declared that:

The fourth article, recognizing that the United States also had claims against Mexico, provided:

The advisability of inviting the coÖperation of the United States had been the subject of considerable discussion and difference of opinion among the three European governments. England and France had urged the coÖperation of the United States, while Spain had opposed it.In compliance with the fourth article the convention was submitted to the government of the United States by a note dated November 30, 1861, signed jointly by the representatives of Spain, France, and Great Britain at Washington.

Mr. Seward's reply conveying the declination of the United States to the invitation to coÖperate with the three allied European powers in the demonstration against Mexico was dated December 4, 1861. After reviewing the substance of the convention, he said:

In the second place, Mr. Seward expressed the satisfaction of his government that the allied powers had clearly repudiated in the convention all idea of carrying on the war for their own ambitious ends and all intention of exercising in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to constitute the form of their own government.

In conclusion, Mr. Seward referred to the fact that the United States government had authorized their representative in Mexico to enter into a treaty conceding to the Mexican government material aid, which might, he hoped, enable that government to satisfy the just claims and demands of the allied sovereigns and so to avert the war which they have agreed among each other to levy against Mexico.[205]

As already related, the efforts of the executive in this direction were not approved by the Senate and the negotiations in regard to guaranteeing the interest on the Mexican loan were broken off. The treaty negotiated by Mr. Corwin was in fact never submitted to the Senate, for by the time it was ready the French forces occupied a part of Mexican territory, and it was feared that a loan to Mexico under such conditions would be considered a breach of neutrality.

In pursuance of the London convention, Vera Cruz was occupied in the early part of 1862 by a Spanish force of 6,000 men under command of Marshal Prim; a French force of 2,500, which was largely reinforced soon afterward; and a force of 700 British marines.

The first intimation of the real purposes of the Emperor Louis Napoleon was given in the letter of instructions of M. Thouvenel to the admiral commanding the French expedition to Mexico, dated November 11, 1861. He said that in case of the withdrawal of the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior of the country, an advance upon the capital might become necessary. He reminded the admiral of the self-abnegatory character of the second article of the convention, but continued:

To such efforts the admiral was expressly told that he was not to refuse his encouragement.[206]

In view of this order, the British government at once instructed its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that, while there was nothing to be said against the reasoning of the French government in reference to the probable necessity of marching against the city of Mexico, he was to decline to take part in the advance into the interior, and that the fact, that the whole available British force was only 700 marines, would be sufficient reason for declining.[207]

The seriousness of the situation was fully appreciated by the United States government. Shortly after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the Spanish forces and the announcement of the outfit of a French force to follow up the advantage, Mr. Charles Francis Adams wrote to his government from London:

About this time reports began to be circulated that the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would be invited by a large body of Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico, and that the Mexican people would gladly hail such a change. To whatever extent such reports might be credited, the United States could not call into question the good faith of the parties to the London convention. The British government, as the issue showed, acted with perfect sincerity in the matter; and the Spanish government, whatever may have been its original intentions, followed the lead of Great Britain. When the reports in regard to Maximilian were first circulated, the British government declared to its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, that:

At the time, however, the attitude of the British government was not at all understood. Mr. Adams wrote:

In the face of armed invasion, the Mexican government assumed a more reasonable attitude, and on the 19th day of February, 1862, the plenipotentiaries of Spain, Great Britain, and France signed, at Soledad, with the secretary of state of the Mexican government a preliminary agreement or convention, in which they recognized the constitutional government as then organized. Declaring that they had "no designs against the independence, sovereignty and integrity of the Mexican republic," they agreed to open negotiations for the settlement of all the demands which they had to make at Orizaba. During the negotiations the forces of the allies were to be allowed to leave the unhealthy locality of Vera Cruz and occupy the three towns of Cordova, Orizaba, and Tehuacan, with their natural approaches. In the event of negotiations being broken off, the allies agreed to abandon the towns above named before reopening hostilities.[211]

The convention of Soledad proved, however, of short duration. On the 9th of April, 1862, the representatives of the allies announced in a formal note to the Mexican government, "that not having been able to agree about the interpretation which ought to be given in the present circumstances to the convention of the 31st of October, 1861 (the convention of London), they have resolved to adopt for the future an entirely separate and independent line of action. In consequence, the commander of the Spanish forces will immediately take the necessary measures to reimbark his troops. The French army will concentrate in Paso Aucho as soon as the Spanish troops have passed from this position, that is to say, probably about the 20th of April, thereupon beginning their operations."[212] According to instructions already alluded to, the British force, which was limited to 700 marines, had declined to advance into the interior, and hence was not present when the breach occurred.In spite of all appearances to the contrary, the French government still persisted in disavowing to the United States government, in the most emphatic terms, all designs upon the independence of the Mexican republic. Even after the rupture at Orizaba, M. Thouvenel assured Mr. Dayton, the United States minister at Paris, that all that France wanted was that there should be a stable government in Mexico, not an anarchy with which other nations could have no relations.

M. Thouvenel's disclaimer to the British government was equally emphatic.[214]

To return to the situation of affairs at Orizaba, the disagreement between the allies requires some explanation. The immediate cause of the rupture and of the withdrawal from the convention of London was the protection extended by the French agents to General Almonte, Padre Miranda, and other leading men of the reactionary or church party who had been banished from the country and who now from the French camp maintained an active correspondence with Marquez, Cobos, and other notorious chiefs of the armed bands then in open rebellion against the constituted government of the country. Almonte and his associates openly favored the scheme of placing Maximilian on the throne.

The Mexican government demanded the removal of General Almonte and his associates from the camp of the allies, and in this demand the British and Spanish representatives concurred. A somewhat stormy conference was held between the commissioners of the allied powers at Orizaba, April 2, 1862, at which the French agents virtually said that they did not regard the convention of London or the preliminaries of Soledad as binding upon them. Specifically then the two causes of the rupture were (1) the persistency of the French commissioners in opposing the removal of the Mexican exiles, and (2) their refusal to take part in the conferences which had been arranged by the convention of Soledad to be held with the Juarez government at Orizaba, April 15, 1862. The British government heartily approved of the action of its agent, Sir Charles Wyke, in breaking up the conference and putting an end to the joint action of the three powers.[215] The policy of Spain was completely in accord with that of England.

The French government was not satisfied with the convention of Soledad, but did not dispute its validity, and declared that if the negotiations should be broken off, its provisions in regard to the withdrawal of the troops from their vantage ground must be observed. The French government further assumed that, when negotiations with the Mexican government should be broken off, the allied forces would proceed to act jointly under the convention of London.[216] The British and Spanish governments, however, having become convinced of the duplicity of the French government in the matter, terminated the London convention without further discussion and ordered the immediate withdrawal of their forces and agents from Mexican territory.

The government of Louis Napoleon, thus left to its own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and Spain, and by the helpless condition, for the time being, to which the war of secession had reduced the government of the United States, greatly reinforced its Mexican expedition and placed General Forey in command. Soon after the withdrawal of the British and Spanish contingents, General Almonte instituted a government in the territory occupied by the French and assumed the title of "Supreme Chief of the Nation," but it soon became evident, as Mr. Dayton expressed it, that instead of the emperor having availed himself of the services of General Almonte, Almonte had availed himself of the services of the emperor. Accordingly, shortly after General Forey assumed command, he issued an order dissolving the ministry of Almonte, depriving him of his title and limiting him thereafter "in the most exact manner to the instructions of the emperor, which are to proceed as far as possible, with other Mexican generals placed under the protection of our flag, to the organization of the Mexican army."

The misfortunes which had overtaken Mexico and the dangers that threatened the permanence of her republican institutions, had now thoroughly alarmed her sister republics of Central and South America, and a correspondence began between them relative to organizing an international American conference to oppose European aggression.

During the remarkable series of events that took place in Mexico in the spring of 1862, Mr. Seward consistently held to the opinion well expressed in a dispatch to Mr. Dayton, June 21, 1862:

For some months the French troops gradually extended their military operations and occupied a greater extent of territory without, however, any material change in the situation. The Juarez government still held the capital. In the spring of 1863, however, military operations were pushed forward with greater activity, and in June, General Forey organized a junta of government composed of thirty-five Mexican citizens designated by decree of the French emperor's minister. The members of this supreme junta were to associate with them two hundred and fifteen citizens of Mexico to form an assembly of two hundred and fifty notables. This assembly was to occupy itself with the form of the permanent government of Mexico. The junta appointed an executive body of three, of whom General Almonte was the head.

On the 10th of July, 1863, the capital of Mexico was occupied by the French army, and on the following day the Assembly of Notables declared:

The crown of Mexico was formally offered to Maximilian by a deputation of Mexicans headed by SeÑor Estrada, October 3, 1863; but Maximilian replied that he could not accept the proffered throne until the whole nation should "confirm by a free manifestation of its will the wishes of the capital." This was a wise decision, had it been given in good faith and had it been wisely adhered to, but the sequel shows that the archduke was either not sincere in his protestations or else was woefully deceived by representations subsequently made to him. Six months later he accepted the crown without the question having been submitted to the wishes of any but a very small portion of the Mexican people.

In spite of the declaration of the Mexican Assembly, which showed so unmistakably the hand of Napoleon, the French government continued to repudiate the designs imputed to it against the independence of Mexico, and Mr. Seward continued to express, officially at least, the satisfaction of the American government at the explanations vouchsafed by France. September 11, 1863, he stated the case as follows:

The probable acceptance of the crown by Maximilian was, however, the subject of frequent communications between the governments of France and the United States. In the course of a somewhat familiar conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French minister of state, in August, 1863, Mr. Dayton expressed the fear that in quitting Mexico France might leave a puppet behind her. De Lhuys replied: "No; the strings would be too long to work."

The chances of Maximilian's success in Mexico had been from the first deliberately calculated on the basis of the probable success of the Southern Confederacy; and, therefore, the cause of the Juarez government and the cause of the Union were considered the same. The active sympathy of the Unionists with the Mexican republic made it difficult for the administration to maintain neutrality. This difficulty was further enhanced by the doubt entertained in the United States as to the intentions of France. In this connection Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Dayton, September 21, 1863, as follows:

In reply, the French minister declared that the question of the establishment of Maximilian on the Mexican throne was to be decided by a majority vote of the entire nation; that the dangers of the government of the archduke would come principally from the United States, and the sooner the United States showed itself satisfied, and manifested a willingness to enter into peaceful relations with that government, the sooner would France be ready to leave Mexico and the new government to take care of itself, which France would, in any event, do as soon as she with propriety could; but that she would not lead or tempt the archduke into difficulty, and then desert him before his government was settled. He said that the early acknowledgment of that government by the United States would tend to shorten, or perhaps to end, all the troublesome complications of France in that country; that they would thereupon quit Mexico.[221]

To this communication, Mr. Seward replied that the French government had not been left uninformed of the opinion of the United States that the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico would be found neither easy nor desirable; that the United States could not anticipate the action of the Mexican people; and that the United States still regarded Mexico as the scene of a war which had not yet ended in the subversion of the government long existing there, with which the United States remained in the relation of peace and friendship.[222]Before formally accepting the crown, the archduke visited England with a view to securing a promise of recognition for his new position. He was, of course, to pass through Paris, and in view of his approaching visit, Mr. Dayton asked for instructions as to his conduct on the occasion. Mr. Seward replied, February 27, 1864:

The archduke visited London in company with his father-in-law, Leopold of Belgium. The British government declined to act on the subject at that juncture, "but gave them reason to hope that, so soon as the action in Mexico would appear to justify it, they would acknowledge him."[224] Spain and Belgium were ready to follow in the wake of France.

About the time of this visit of Maximilian to England, Mr. McDougall, of California, introduced in the Senate a resolution declaring "that the movements of the government of France, and the threatened movement of an emperor, improvised by the Emperor of France, demand by this republic, if insisted upon, war." This resolution was not carried, but some days later, on the 4th of April, 1864, the House of Representatives passed by a unanimous vote a resolution declaring its opposition to the recognition of a monarchy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, fearing a rupture with France on this account, took pains to inform the government of that country, through Mr. Dayton, that this action of the House was in no way binding on the executive, even if concurred in by the Senate.

The formal acceptance of the crown of Mexico by Maximilian took place April 10, 1864, at Miramar, the palace he had built near Trieste, in the presence of the Mexican deputation. The next day the Emperor and Empress of Mexico, as they styled themselves, set out for their new dominions by way of Rome, where they received the blessing of the Pope. Before leaving Europe Maximilian signed with the Emperor of the French a convention in the following terms:

The French troops in Mexico were to be reduced as soon as possible to 25,000 men.

The French troops were to evacuate Mexico in proportion as the Emperor of Mexico could organize troops to replace them.

The "foreign legion," composed of 8,000 men, was to remain in Mexico six years after all the other French troops should have been recalled.

The expenses of the French expedition to Mexico, to be paid by the Mexican government, were fixed at the sum of two hundred and seventy million francs for the whole duration of the expedition down to July 1, 1864. From July 1st all expenses of the Mexican army were to be met by Mexico.[225]

The resolution of the House referred to above came very near producing the rupture that Mr. Seward was striving to avert, or at least to postpone, during the continuance of the war of secession. When Mr. Dayton visited M. Drouyn de Lhuys just after the resolution reached Europe, the remark which greeted Mr. Dayton when he entered the room was: "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton replied that he did not think France had a right to think that the United States was about to make war against her on account of anything contained in that resolution; that it embodied nothing more than the principles which the United States had constantly held out to France from the beginning.

The Confederate agents were taking advantage of the resolution to stir up trouble between the United States and France. In fact they had long caused reports to be spread in Europe, and had succeeded in gaining credence for them, to the effect that the United States government was only awaiting the termination of domestic troubles to drive the French from Mexico. The French naturally concluded that if they were to have trouble with the United States, it was safest for them to choose their own time.[226] Napoleon was all the while coquetting with the Confederate government, and holding above Mr. Seward's head a veiled threat of recognition of Confederate independence. The Confederate government quickly caught at the suggestion of an alliance between Maximilian and the South with the power of France to back them. A Confederate agent was actually accredited to the government of Maximilian, but did not reach his destination. Although Napoleon's calculations were based on the overthrow of the Union, and although he had assumed at the outset, with England and Spain, an attitude decidedly unfriendly to the Federal government, nevertheless he was not willing to go the full length of recognizing the Confederacy as an independent power while the issue of the conflict was still in doubt.

In speaking of Slidell's movements in Europe and the encouragement given him in France, Mr. Bigelow wrote to Mr. Seward, February 14, 1865:

As the war of secession seemed nearing its end, the French papers became uneasy in view of possible intervention in Mexico by the United States on the ground of the Monroe Doctrine. This principle of American diplomacy, which was likened to the sword of Damocles suspended over the head of Maximilian, was discussed in all its bearings on the present case by the journals of Europe.[227]

Throughout all this period of turmoil, the United States recognized no authority in Mexico but that of the Juarez government. In April, 1864, the French minister at Washington complained that serious complications with France were likely to arise out of grants of land made by "ex-President Juarez" in Sonora to emigrants from California. The French government regarded these grants as illegal and proposed to send forces there to prevent the parties from taking "illicit possession."

In May, 1864, the French government sought explanations in regard to a club formed in New Orleans, called the "D. M. D.," Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward replied that the object of the club, so far as the government had been able to ascertain, was to bring moral influences to bear upon the government of the United States in favor of a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, but not to act in violation of the law, or of the well-understood governmental policy of neutrality in the war which existed between France and Mexico. Members of the association did, however, actually start on an expedition to Brownsville, but the steamer was taken possession of by United States officials. During the year 1864 constant complaint was made by the French government of shipments of arms to the Juarez government from California and from various points along the Rio Grande, particularly Brownsville, in violation of American neutrality.

Shortly after the surrender of General Lee, several Confederate officers of high position and influence went to Mexico and identified themselves with the government of Maximilian. Dr. Wm. M. Gwin, a former United States Senator from California, organized a plan for colonizing the states of northern Mexico with ex-Confederates. This scheme was the subject of several representations to the French government on the part of Mr. Seward. He reminded them that the sympathies of the American people were already considerably excited in favor of the republic of Mexico; that they were disposed to regard with impatience the continued intervention of France in that country; and that any favor shown to the proceedings of Dr. Gwin by the titular Emperor of Mexico or by the imperial government of France would tend greatly to increase the popular impatience. He further requested an assurance that the pretenses of Dr. Gwin and his associates were destitute of any sanction from the Emperor of France.

Among the most prominent Confederates connected with this scheme were Matthew F. Maury, the distinguished geographer and naval officer, who became a naturalized Mexican citizen and was appointed Imperial Commissioner of Immigration and an honorary councillor of state; and General John B. Magruder, who was charged with the supervision of the survey of lands for colonization. It was hoped that the prominence of these men and the high rank they had held under the Confederate government would, in the general uncertainty that prevailed as to the treatment of the South by the victorious Union party, induce many persons to emigrate to Mexico. Maximilian issued a special decree, September 5, 1865, regarding colonization with a view to inducing Southern planters to emigrate to Mexico with their slaves—the latter to be reduced to a state of peonage, regular slavery being prohibited by the laws of the empire. This scheme was altogether impracticable.

In July, 1865, Maximilian finally made an effort to secure recognition of his government by the United States. On the 17th of July, the Marquis de Montholon, the French minister at Washington, called at the department of state and informed Mr. Seward that a special agent had arrived at Washington, bearing a letter signed by Maximilian and addressed to the President of the United States, a copy of which the marquis presented to the secretary of state. On the 18th, Mr. Seward delivered back the copy of the letter to the Marquis de Montholon, and said that, as the United States were on friendly relations with the republican government of Mexico, the President declined to receive the letter or to hold any intercourse with the agent who brought it. The French government expressed to its representative at Washington its annoyance and embarrassment at this step, and said that Maximilian should have taken measures to learn the disposition of the United States before sending the agent.[228]

Mr. Tucker, in his book on the Monroe Doctrine, makes the statement that Mr. Bigelow, who succeeded Mr. Dayton as minister to France, announced to the French government that the United States would recognize the empire of Maximilian upon the immediate withdrawal of the French troops from the territory of Mexico, but that this statement, made upon the envoy's own authority, was disavowed by the President. This is hardly a correct version of the case. It seems that Mr. Bigelow, in the course of a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, asked him, "in his own name, and without prejudicing the opinion of his government, if he did not think that the recognition of Maximilian by the United States would facilitate and hasten the recall of the French troops."[229]

On the 3rd of October, 1865, Maximilian issued a decree at the city of Mexico, the first article of which declared:

All persons belonging to armed bands or corps, not legally authorized, whether they proclaim or not any political principles, and whatever be the number of those who compose the said bands, their organization, character and denomination shall be tried militarily by the courts-martial; and if found guilty even of the only fact of belonging to the band, they shall be condemned to capital punishment, within the twenty-four hours following the sentence.[230]