It was agreed that the Peace Conference should meet at Paris, and President Wilson considered the issues involved of such magnitude that he decided to head the American delegation himself. Great Britain, France, and Italy were to be represented by their premiers, and it was fitting that the United States should be represented by its most responsible leader, who, furthermore, had been the chief spokesman of the Allies and had formulated the principles upon which the peace was to be made. But the decision of the President to go to Paris was without precedent in our history and, therefore, it met with criticism and opposition. When he announced the names of the other members of the delegation, the criticism became even more outspoken and severe. They were Secretary of State Lansing, Henry White, former ambassador to France, Colonel Edward M. House, and General Tasker H. Bliss. There had been a widespread demand for a non-partisan peace commission, and many people thought that the President should have taken Root, or Roosevelt, or Taft. Mr. White was a Republican but he had never been active in party affairs or in any sense a leader. In the Senate there was deep resentment that the President had not selected any members of that body to accompany him. President McKinley had appointed three senators as members of the commission of five that negotiated the treaty of peace at the close of the Spanish War. With that exception, senators had never taken part directly in the negotiation of a treaty. The delegation was attended by a large group of experts on military, economic, geographical, ethnological, and legal matters, some of whom were men of great ability, and in their selection no party lines were drawn.

But just before the signing of the Armistice, the President had suffered a serious political defeat at home. There had been severe criticism of Democratic leadership in Congress and growing dissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet. In response to the appeals of Democratic Congressmen, the President issued a statement from the White House on October 25, asking the people, if they approved of his leadership and wished him to continue to be their "unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad," to vote for the Democratic candidates for Congress. He acknowledged that the Republicans in Congress had loyally supported his war measures, but he declared that they were hostile to the administration and that the time was too critical for divided leadership. This statement created a storm of criticism, and did more than any other act in his administration to turn the tide of public opinion against the President. The elections resulted in a Republican majority of thirty-nine in the House and two in the Senate. The President had followed the practice of European premiers in appealing to the people, but under our constitutional system he could not very well resign. Had he not issued his appeal, the election would have been regarded as a repudiation of the Democratic Congress, but not necessarily as a repudiation of the President. The situation was most unfortunate, but the President made no comments and soon after announced his intention of going to Paris. In December Lloyd George went to the country, and on pledging himself to make Germany pay for the war and to hang the Kaiser, he was returned by a substantial majority. These pledges were unnecessary and had a most unfortunate influence on the subsequent negotiations at Paris.

The President sailed for France December 4, leaving a divided country behind him. His enemies promptly seized the opportunity to assail him. Senator Sherman introduced a resolution declaring the presidency vacant because the President had left the territory of the United States, and Senator Knox offered another resolution declaring that the Conference should confine itself solely to the restoration of peace, and that the proposed league of nations should be reserved for consideration at some future time.

While his enemies in the Senate were busily organizing all the forces of opposition against him, the President was welcomed by the war-weary peoples of Europe with demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm such as had been the lot of few men in history to receive. Sovereigns and heads of States bestowed the highest honors upon him, while great crowds of working men gathered at the railroad stations in order to get a glimpse of the man who had led the crusade for a peace that would end war and establish justice as the rule of conduct between the nations of the world, great and small nations alike.

No mortal man could have fulfilled the hopes and expectations that centered in Wilson when he landed on the shores of France in December, 1918. The Armistice had been signed on the basis of his ideals, and the peoples of Europe confidently expected to see those ideals embodied in the treaty of peace. He still held the moral leadership of the world, but the war was over, the German menace ended, and national rivalries and jealousies were beginning to reappear, even among those nations who had so recently fought and bled side by side. This change was to be revealed when the Conference met. There was no sign of it in the plaudits of the multitudes who welcomed the President in France, in England, and in Italy. He returned on January 7, 1919, from Italy to Paris, where delegates to the Conference from all the countries which had been at war with Germany were gathering.

The first session of the Peace Conference was held January 18. The main work of the Conference was carried on by the Supreme Council, constituted at this meeting and composed of the two ranking delegates of each of the five great powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, the United States, and Japan. The decisions which this Council arrived at, with the aid of the large groups of technical advisers which accompanied the delegations of the great powers, were reported to the Conference in plenary session from time to time and ratified. The Supreme Council was, however, gradually superseded by the "Big Four," Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, while the "Five," composed of ministers of foreign affairs, handled much of the routine business, and made some important decisions, subject to the approval of the "Four." According to statistics compiled by Tardieu, the Council of Ten held seventy-two sessions, the "Five" held thirty-nine, and the "Four" held one hundred and forty-five. As one of the American experts puts it: "The 'Ten' fell into the background, the 'Five' never emerged from obscurity, the 'Four' ruled the Conference in the culminating period when its decisions took shape."

At the plenary session of January 25, President Wilson made a notable speech in which he proposed the creation of a league of nations, and a resolution to organize such a league and make it an integral part of the general treaty was unanimously adopted. A commission to draft a constitution for the League was appointed with President Wilson as chairman. On February 14 the first draft of the Covenant of the League was presented by him to the Conference, and on the following day he sailed for the United States in order to consider the bills passed by Congress before the expiration of the session on March 4. The first draft of the Covenant was hastily prepared, and it went back to the commission for revision. As soon as the text was made known in the United States, opposition to the Covenant was expressed in the Senate. During the President's brief visit to Washington, he gave a dinner at the White House to members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs for the purpose of explaining to them the terms of the Covenant. There was no official report of what occurred at this dinner, but it was stated that some of the senators objected to the Covenant on the ground that it was contrary to our traditional policies and inconsistent with our Constitution and form of government. On March 4, the day before the President left New York to resume his duties at the Conference, Senators Lodge and Knox issued a round robin, signed by thirty-seven senators, declaring that they would not vote for the Covenant in the form proposed, and that consideration of the League of Nations should be postponed until peace had been concluded with Germany. That same night the President made a speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City in which, after explaining and defining the Covenant, he said: "When that treaty comes back gentlemen on this side will find the Covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the Covenant that you cannot dissect the Covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure." In this same address he also said: "The first thing I am going to tell the people on the other side of the water is that an overwhelming majority of the American people is in favour of the League of Nations. I know that this is true. I have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country, and the voice rings true in every case." The President was evidently quite confident that public sentiment would compel the Senate to ratify the peace treaty, including the Covenant of the League. A nation-wide propaganda was being carried on by the League to Enforce Peace and other organizations, and public sentiment for the League appeared to be overwhelming. The President took back to Paris with him various suggestions of changes in the Covenant, and later ex-President Taft, Elihu Root, and Charles E. Hughes proposed amendments which were forwarded to him and carefully considered by the commission. Some of these suggestions, such as the reservation of the Monroe Doctrine and the right of withdrawal from the League, were embodied in the final draft.

When the President returned to Paris he found that Secretary Lansing and Colonel House had consented to the separation of the League from the treaty of peace. He immediately reversed this decision, but the final adoption of the Covenant was delayed by the demand of Japan that a clause be inserted establishing "the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals," which would have brought within the jurisdiction of the League the status of Japan's subjects in California and in the British dominions. France urged the inclusion of a provision creating a permanent General Staff to direct the military operations of the League, and Belgium insisted that Brussels rather than Geneva should be the seat of the League. Meanwhile other national aspirations were also brought forward which delayed the general treaty of peace. France wanted the entire left bank of the Rhine; Italy put forth a claim to Fiume; and Japan, relying on secret agreements with England, France, and Italy, insisted on her claims to Shantung. No economic settlement had as yet been agreed upon, and the question of reparations was threatening the disruption of the Conference.

The most difficult problem that the Conference had to solve was the establishment of a new Franco-German frontier. There was no question about Alsace-Lorraine. That had been disposed of by the Fourteen Points, and Germany had acquiesced in its return to France in the pre-Armistice agreement. But no sooner was the Armistice signed than Foch addressed a note to Clemenceau, setting forth the necessity of making the Rhine the western frontier of Germany. The Left Bank, extending from Alsace-Lorraine to the Dutch frontier, embraced about 10,000 square miles and 5,500,000 people. The debate on this question continued at intervals for six months and at times became very acrimonious. The French representatives did not demand the direct annexation of the Left Bank, but they proposed an independent or autonomous Rhineland and French, or inter-Allied, occupation of the Rhine for an indefinite period, or at least until the full execution by Germany of the financial clauses of the treaty. Both the British and American delegates opposed the French proposals. Lloyd George repeatedly said: "We must not create another Alsace-Lorraine." He also remarked on one occasion: "The strongest impression made upon me by my first visit to Paris was the statue of Strasburg veiled in mourning. Do not let us make it possible for Germany to erect a similar statue."

This discussion was being carried on with great earnestness and intensity of feeling when Wilson returned to Paris March 14. That very afternoon he met Lloyd George and Clemenceau. The French argument was set forth again at length and with great skill. The fact was again pointed out that the destruction of the German fleet had relieved England from all fear of German invasion, and that the Atlantic Ocean lay between Germany and the United States, while France, which had suffered two German invasions in half a century, had no safeguard but the League of Nations, which she did not deem as good a guarantee as the Rhine bridges. Finally Wilson and Lloyd George offered the guarantee treaties, and Clemenceau agreed to take the proposal under consideration. Three days later he came back with a counter proposition and a compromise was reached. France gave up her demand for a separate Rhineland, but secured occupation of the Left Bank, including the bridge-heads, for a period of fifteen years as a guarantee of the execution of the treaty. In return the United States and Great Britain pledged themselves to come to the immediate aid of France, in case of an unprovoked attack, by an agreement which was to be binding only if ratified by both countries. This treaty the United States Senate refused to ratify. Foch was opposed to this compromise, and adopted a course of action which was very embarrassing to Clemenceau. Fierce attacks on the French Government and on the representatives of Great Britain and the United States, inspired by him, appeared in the papers. When the treaty was finally completed, he even went so far as to refuse to transmit the note summoning the German delegates to Versailles to receive it. Wilson and Lloyd George finally protested so vigorously to Clemenceau that Foch had to give way.

In view of the promises of Clemenceau and Lloyd George that Germany should pay the cost of the war, the question of reparations was an exceedingly difficult one to adjust. President Wilson stoutly opposed the inclusion of war costs as contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau finally had to give in. The entire American delegation and their corps of experts endeavored to limit the charges imposed on Germany rigidly to reparation for damage done to civilians in the occupied areas and on land and sea. Lloyd George, remembering the promises which he had made prior to the December elections, insisted that pensions paid by the Allied governments should be included as damage done to the civilian population. This claim was utterly illogical, for pensions fall properly into the category of military expenses, but it was pressed with such skill and determination by Lloyd George and General Smuts that President Wilson finally gave his assent.

From the first the American delegates and experts were in favor of fixing definitely the amount that Germany was to pay in the way of reparations and settling this question once for all. They hoped to agree upon a sum which it was within Germany's power to pay. But Clemenceau and Lloyd George had made such extravagant promises to their people that they were afraid to announce at this time a sum which would necessarily be much less than the people expected. They, therefore, insisted that the question should be left open to be determined later by a Reparations Commission. They declared that any other course would mean the immediate overthrow of their governments and the reorganization of the British and French delegations. President Wilson did not care to put himself in the position of appearing to precipitate a political crisis in either country, so he finally gave way on this point also. These concessions proved to be the most serious mistakes that he made at Paris, for they did more than anything else to undermine the faith of liberals everywhere in him.

The Italian delegation advanced a claim to Fiume which was inconsistent both with the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points. When disagreement over this question had been delaying for weeks the settlement of other matters, President Wilson finally made a public statement of his position which was virtually an appeal to the Italian people over the heads of their delegation. The entire delegation withdrew from the Conference and went home, but Premier Orlando received an almost unanimous vote of confidence from his parliament, and he was supported by an overwhelming tide of public sentiment throughout Italy. This was the first indication of Wilson's loss of prestige with the peoples of Europe.

As already stated, the Japanese had insisted on the insertion in the Covenant of the League of the principle of racial equality. It is very doubtful whether they ever expected to succeed in this. The probability is that they advanced this principle in order to compel concessions on other points. Japan's main demand was that the German leases and concessions in the Chinese province of Shantung should be definitely confirmed to her by the treaty. Two weeks after the outbreak of the World War, Japan had addressed an ultimatum to Germany to the effect that she immediately withdraw all German vessels from Chinese and Japanese waters and deliver not later than September 15 "to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiao-chau with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China." In a statement issued to the press Count Okuma said:

"As Premier of Japan, I have stated and I now again state to the people of America and all the world that Japan has no ulterior motive or desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or any other peoples of anything which they now possess."

The Germans had spent about $100,000,000 in improving Tsing-tau, the principal city of Kiao-chau, and they had no intention of surrendering. After a siege of two months the city was captured by the Japanese army and navy, assisted by a small force of British troops. This was the first act in the drama. On January 8, 1915, Japan suddenly presented to the Chinese government the now famous Twenty-one Demands, deliberately misrepresenting to the United States and other powers the nature of these demands. Among other things, Japan demanded not only that China should assent to any agreement in regard to Shantung that Japan and Germany might reach at the conclusion of the war, but that she should also grant to her greater rights and concessions in Shantung than Germany had enjoyed. China was finally forced to agree to these demands.

Japan's next step was to acquire from the Allies the assurance that they would support her claims to Shantung and to the islands in the Pacific north of the equator on the conclusion of the war. This she did in secret agreements signed in February and March, 1917, with England, France, Italy, and Russia. England agreed to support Japan's claim on condition that Japan would support her claims to the Pacific islands south of the equator. France signed on condition that Japan would use her influence on China to break relations with Germany and place at the disposal of the Allies the German ships interned in Chinese ports. The Allies were evidently uneasy about Japan, and were willing to do anything that was necessary to satisfy her. This uncertainty about Japan may also be the explanation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement signed November 2, 1917, in which the United States recognized the "special interests" of Japan in China.

The secret treaties of the Allies relating to the Japanese claims were not revealed until the disposition of the German islands in the Pacific was under discussion at the Peace Conference. When informed by Baron Makino that the islands north of the equator had been pledged to Japan by agreements signed two years before, President Wilson inquired whether there were other secret agreements, and was informed that the German rights in Shantung had also been promised to Japan. As the other powers were pledged to support Japan's claims, President Wilson found himself in a very embarrassing situation, especially as he had also to oppose Japan's demand that a clause recognizing racial equality be inserted in the Covenant of the League. This was a moral claim that Japan urged with great strategic effect. In pushing her claims to Shantung she ignored all moral considerations and relied entirely upon her legal status, secured (1) by the secret treaties with the Allies, (2) by the treaty of 1915 with China, and (3) by right of conquest. When charged with having coerced China into signing the treaty of 1915, Japan replied with truth that most of the important treaties with China had been extorted by force. Japan declared, however, that she had no intention of holding Shantung permanently, but that she would restore the province in full sovereignty to China, retaining only the economic privileges transferred from Germany. In view of this oral promise, President Wilson finally acquiesced in the recognition of Japan's legal status in Shantung.

On May 7 the completed treaty was presented to the German delegates who had been summoned to Versailles to receive it. When the text was made public in Berlin there was an indignant outcry against the alleged injustice of certain provisions which were held to be inconsistent with the pledges given by President Wilson in the pre-Armistice negotiations, and the Germans made repeated efforts to draw the Allies into a general discussion of principles. They were, however, finally given to understand that they must accept or reject the treaty as it stood, and on June 28 it was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles—the same hall in which William I had been crowned Emperor of Germany forty-eight years before.

The next day President Wilson sailed for the United States, and on July 10 personally presented the treaty to the Senate with an earnest appeal for prompt ratification. The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which the treaty was referred, proceeded with great deliberation, and on July 31 began a series of public hearings which lasted until September 12. The Committee called before it Secretary Lansing and several of the technical advisors to the American delegation, including B. M. Baruch, economic adviser, Norman H. Davis, financial adviser, and David Hunter Miller, legal adviser. The Committee also called before it a number of American citizens who had had no official connection with the negotiations but who wished to speak in behalf of foreign groups, including Thomas F. Millard for China, Joseph W. Folk for Egypt, Dudley Field Malone for India, and a large delegation of Americans of Irish descent, who opposed the League of Nations on the ground that it would stand in the way of Ireland's aspiration for independence. The rival claims of Jugo-Slavs and Italians to Fiume, the demand of Albania for self-determination, the claims of Greece to Thrace, and arguments for and against the separation of Austria and Hungary were all presented at great length to the Committee. On August 19 the President received the Committee at the White House, and after submitting a written statement on certain features of the Covenant, he was questioned by members of the Committee and a general discussion followed.

Meanwhile, the treaty was being openly debated in the Senate. The President had been an advocate of publicity in diplomacy as well as in other things, and the Senate now undertook to use his own weapon against him by a public attack on the treaty. Although the opposition to the treaty was started in the Senate by Lodge, Borah, Johnson, Sherman, Reed, and Poindexter, it was not confined to that body. Throughout the country there were persons of liberal views who favored the League of Nations but objected to the severe terms imposed on Germany, and charged the President with having proved false to the principles of the Fourteen Points. There were others who did not object to a severe peace, but who were bound fast by the tradition of isolation and thought membership in the League of Nations would involve the sacrifice of national sovereignty. The main object of attack was Article X, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of all the members of the League. President Wilson stated to the Senate Committee that he regarded Article X as "the very backbone of the whole Covenant," and that "without it the League would be hardly more than an influential debating society." The opponents of the League declared that this article would embroil the United States in the internal affairs of Europe, and that it deprived Congress of its constitutional right to declare war.

In the Senate there were three groups: the small number of "irreconcilables" who opposed the ratification of the treaty in any form; a larger group who favored ratification without amendments, but who finally expressed their willingness to accept "interpretative reservations"; and a large group composed mainly of Republicans who favored the ratification of the treaty only on condition that there should be attached to it reservations safeguarding what they declared to be the fundamental rights and interests of the United States. This group differed among themselves as to the character of the reservations that were necessary, and some of them became known as "mild reservationists."

It is probable that at the outset only the small group of "irreconcilables" hoped or intended to bring about the defeat of the treaty, but as the debate proceeded and the opposition to the treaty received more and more popular support, the reservationists determined to defeat the treaty altogether rather than to accept any compromise. The Republican leaders were quick to realize that the tide of public opinion had turned and was now running strongly against the President. They determined, therefore, to ruin him at all hazards, and thus to bring about the election of a Republican president.

When President Wilson realized that the treaty was really in danger of defeat, he determined to go on an extended tour of the country for the purpose of explaining the treaty to the people and bringing pressure to bear on the Senate. Beginning at Columbus, Ohio, on September 4, he proceeded through the northern tier of states to the Pacific coast, then visited California and returned through Colorado. He addressed large audiences who received him with great enthusiasm. He was "trailed" by Senator Hiram Johnson, who was sent out by the opposition in the Senate to present the other side. Johnson also attracted large crowds. On the return trip, while delivering an address at Wichita, Kansas, September 26, the President showed signs of a nervous breakdown and returned immediately to Washington. He was able to walk from the train to his automobile, but a few days later he was partially paralyzed. The full extent and seriousness of his illness was carefully concealed from the public. He was confined to the White House for five months, and had to abandon all efforts in behalf of the treaty.

On September 10 the Committee on Foreign Relations reported the treaty to the Senate with a number of amendments and reservations. The Committee declared that the League was an alliance, and that it would "breed wars instead of securing peace." They also declared that the Covenant demanded "sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty which would in no way promote the world's peace," and that the amendments and reservations which they proposed were intended "to guard American rights and American sovereignty." The following day the minority members of the Committee submitted a report opposing both amendments and reservations. A few days later Senator McCumber presented a third report representing the views of the "mild reservationists." It objected to the phraseology of the Committee's reservations as unnecessarily severe and recommended substitute reservations. The treaty then became the regular order in the Senate and was read section by section and debated each day for over two months. The amendments of the text of the treaty were all rejected by substantial majorities for the reason that their adoption would have made it necessary to resubmit the treaty not only to the Allies but also to Germany. The majority of the senators were opposed to such a course. The Committee, therefore, decided to substitute reservations for amendments, and Senator Lodge finally submitted, on behalf of the Committee, fourteen reservations preceded by a preamble, which declared that the ratification of the treaty was not to take effect or bind the United States until these reservations had been accepted as a condition of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and associated powers, namely, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.

The first reservation provided that in case of withdrawal from the League the United States should be the sole judge as to whether its international obligations under the Covenant had been fulfilled. This reservation was adopted by a vote of 50 to 35.

The second reservation declared that the United States assumed no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations under the provisions of Article X "or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide." This reservation was adopted by a vote of 46 to 33.

Reservation Number 3, providing that no mandate under the treaty should be accepted by the United States except by action of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 52 to 31.

Number 4, excluding domestic questions from consideration by the Council or the Assembly of the League, was adopted by a vote of 59 to 26.

Number 5, declaring the Monroe Doctrine "to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in said treaty of peace with Germany," and reserving to the United States the sole right to interpret the Monroe Doctrine, was adopted by a vote of 55 to 34.

Number 6, withholding the assent of the United States from the provisions of the treaty relating to Shantung and reserving full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which might arise under said articles between China and Japan, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 41.

Number 7, reserving to Congress the right to provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and Council of the League and members of commissions, committees or courts under the League, and requiring the confirmation of all by the Senate, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 40.

Number 8, declaring that the Reparations Commission should not be understood as having the right to regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany or from Germany to the United States without an act or joint resolution of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 54 to 40.

Number 9, declaring that the United States should not be under any obligation to contribute to any of the expenses of the League without an act of Congress, was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 10, providing that if the United States should at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armaments proposed by the Council of the League, it reserved "the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the Council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war," was adopted by a vote of 56 to 39.

Number 11, reserving the right of the United States to permit the nationals of a Covenant-breaking State residing within the United States to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States, was adopted by a vote of 53 to 41.

Number 12, relating to the very complicated question of private debts, property rights and interests of American citizens, was adopted by a vote of 52 to 41.

Number 13, withholding the assent of the United States from the entire section of the treaty relating to international labor organization until Congress should decide to participate, was adopted by a vote of 54 to 35.

Number 14 declared that the United States would not be bound by any action of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions or colonies should cast in the aggregate more than one vote. This reservation was adopted by a vote of 55 to 38.

A number of other reservations were offered and rejected. Under the rules of the Senate, amendments and reservations to a treaty may be adopted by a majority vote, while a treaty can be ratified only by a two-thirds vote. A number of senators who were opposed to the treaty voted for the Lodge reservations in order to insure its defeat. When the vote on the treaty with the reservations was taken November 19, it stood 39 for and 55 against. A motion to reconsider the vote was then adopted, and Senator Hitchcock, the Democratic leader, proposed five reservations covering the right of withdrawal, domestic questions, the Monroe Doctrine, the right of Congress to decide on the employment of the naval and military forces of the United States in any case arising under Article X, and restrictions on the voting powers of self-governing colonies or dominions. These reservations were rejected, the vote being 41 to 50. Another vote was then taken on the treaty with the Lodge reservations, the result being 41 for and 51 against. Senator Underwood then offered a resolution to ratify the treaty without reservations of any kind. The vote on this resolution was 38 for and 53 against.

It was now evident that there was little prospect of securing the ratification of the treaty without compromise. On January 8, 1920, a letter from the President was read at the Jackson Day dinner in Washington, in which he refused to accept the decision of the Senate as final and said: "There can be no reasonable objection to interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But when the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we have ratified or rejected it. We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take it without changes which alter its meaning, or leave it, and then, after the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable task of making another and separate kind of treaty with Germany." In conclusion he declared: "If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and single way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlements of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetrate."

During the last week of January a compromise was discussed by an informal by-partisan committee, and the President wrote a letter saying he would accept the Hitchcock reservations, but Lodge refused to accept any compromise. On February 9 the Senate again referred the treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it back immediately with the reservations previously adopted. After several weeks of fruitless debate a fifteenth reservation, expressing sympathy for Ireland, was added to the others, by a vote of 38 to 36. It was as follows: "In consenting to the ratification of the treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when such government is obtained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations."

With a few changes in the resolutions previously adopted and an important change in the preamble, the ratifying resolution was finally put to the vote March 19, 1920. The result was 49 votes for and 35 against. On the following day the secretary of the Senate was instructed by a formal resolution to return the treaty to the President and to inform him that the Senate had failed to ratify it.

The treaty thus became the leading issue in the presidential campaign, but unfortunately it was not the only issue. The election proved to be a referendum on the Wilson administration as a whole rather than on the treaty. The Republican candidate, Senator Harding, attacked the Wilson administration for its arbitrary and unconstitutional methods and advocated a return to "normalcy." He denounced the Wilson League as an attempt to set up a super-government, but said he favored an association of nations and an international court. Governor Cox, the Democratic candidate, came out strongly for the treaty, particularly during the latter part of his campaign. The result was an overwhelming victory for Harding. President Wilson had been too ill to take any part in the campaign. His administration had been the chief issue, and the people had, certainly for the time being, repudiated it. He accepted the result philosophically and refrained from comments, content, apparently, to leave the part he had played in world affairs to the verdict of history. In December, 1920, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to him as a foreign recognition of the services he had rendered to humanity.