A few years ago George L. Beer, one of our leading students of British colonial policy, said "It is easily conceivable, and not at all improbable, that the political evolution of the next centuries may take such a course that the American Revolution will lose the great significance that is now attached to it, and will appear merely as the temporary separation of two kindred peoples whose inherent similarity was obscured by superficial differences resulting from dissimilar economic and social conditions." This statement does not appear as extravagant to-day as it did ten years ago. As early as 1894, Captain Mahan, the great authority on naval history, published an essay entitled "Possibilities of an Anglo-American Reunion," in which he pointed out that these two countries were the only great powers which were by geographical position exempt from the burden of large armies and dependent upon the sea for intercourse with the other great nations.

In a volume dealing with questions of American foreign policy, published in 1907, the present writer concluded the last paragraph with this statement: "By no means the least significant of recent changes is the development of cordial relations with England; and it seems now that the course of world politics is destined to lead to the further reknitting together of the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race in bonds of peace and international sympathy, in a union not cemented by any formal alliance, but based on community of interests and of aims, a union that will constitute the highest guarantee of the political stability and moral progress of the world."

The United States has very naturally had closer contact with England than with any other European power. This has been due to the fact that England was the mother country, that after independence was established a large part of our trade continued to be with the British Isles, that our northern boundary touches British territory for nearly four thousand miles, and that the British navy and mercantile marine have dominated the Atlantic Ocean which has been our chief highway of intercourse with other nations. Having had more points of contact we have had more disputes with England than with any other nation. Some writers have half jocularly attributed this latter fact to our common language. The Englishman reads our books, papers, and magazines, and knows what we think of him, while we read what he writes about us, and in neither case is the resulting impression flattering to the national pride.

Any one who takes the trouble to read what was written in England about America and the Americans between 1820 and 1850 will wonder how war was avoided. A large number of English travellers came to the United States during this period and published books about us when they got home. The books were bad enough in themselves, but the great English periodicals, the Edinburgh Review, Blackwood's, the British Review, and the Quarterly, quoted at length the most objectionable passages from these writers and made malicious attacks on Americans and American institutions. American men were described as "turbulent citizens, abandoned Christians, inconstant husbands, unnatural fathers, and treacherous friends." Our soldiers and sailors were charged with cowardice in the War of 1812. It was stated that "in the southern parts of the Union the rites of our holy faith are almost never practised. . . . Three and a half millions enjoy no means of religious instruction. The religious principle is gaining ground in the northern parts of the Union; it is becoming fashionable among the better orders of society to go to church . . . The greater number of states declare it to be unconstitutional to refer to the providence of God in any of their public acts." The Quarterly Review informed its readers that "the supreme felicity of a true-born American is inaction of body and inanity of mind." Dickens's American Notes was an ungrateful return for the kindness and enthusiasm with which he had been received in this country. De Tocqueville's Democracy in America was widely read in England and doubtless had its influence in revising opinion concerning America. Richard Cobden was, however, the first Englishman to interpret correctly the significance of America as an economic force. His essay on America, published in 1835, pointed out that British policy should be more concerned with economic relations with America than with European politics. As Professor Dunning says, "Cobden made the United States the text of his earliest sermon against militarism and protectionism."

Notwithstanding innumerable disputes over boundaries, fisheries, and fur seals, trade with the British West Indies and Canada, and questions of neutral rights and obligations, we have had unbroken peace for more than a hundred years. Upon several occasions, notably during the Canadian insurrection of 1837 and during our own Civil War, disturbances along the Canadian border created strained relations, but absence of frontier guards and forts has prevented hasty action on the part of either government. The agreement of 1817, effecting disarmament on the Great Lakes, has not only saved both countries the enormous cost of maintaining navies on these inland waters, but it has prevented hostile demonstrations in times of crisis.

During the Canadian rebellion of 1837 Americans along the border expressed openly their sympathy for the insurgents who secured arms and munitions from the American side. In December a British force crossed the Niagara River, boarded and took possession of the Caroline, a vessel which had been hired by the insurgents to convey their cannon and other supplies. The ship was fired and sent over the Falls. When the Caroline was boarded one American, Amos Durfee, was killed and several others wounded. The United States at once demanded redress, but the British Government took the position that the seizure of the Caroline was a justifiable act of self-defense against people whom their own government either could not or would not control.

The demands of the United States were still unredressed when in 1840 a Canadian named Alexander McLeod made the boast in a tavern on the American side that he had slain Durfee. He was taken at his word, examined before a magistrate, and committed to jail in Lockport. McLeod's arrest created great excitement on both sides of the border. The British minister at Washington called upon the Government of the United States "to take prompt and effectual steps for the liberation of Mr. McLeod." Secretary of State Forsyth replied that the offense with which McLeod was charged had been committed within the State of New York; that the jurisdiction of each State of the United States was, within its proper sphere, perfectly independent of the Federal Government; that the latter could not interfere. The date set for the trial of McLeod was the fourth Monday in March, 1841. Van Buren's term ended and Harrison's began on the 4th of March, and Webster became Secretary of State. The British minister was given instructions by his government to demand the immediate release of McLeod. This demand was made, he said, because the attack on the Caroline was an act of a public character; because it was a justifiable use of force for the defense of British territory against unprovoked attack by "British rebels and American pirates"; because it was contrary to the principles of civilized nations to hold individuals responsible for acts done by order of the constituted authorities of the State; and because Her Majesty's government could not admit the doctrine that the Federal Government had no power to interfere and that the decision must rest with the State of New York. The relations of foreign powers were with the Federal Government. To admit that the Federal Government had no control over a State would lead to the dissolution of the Union so far as foreign powers were concerned, and to the accrediting of foreign diplomatic agents, not to the Federal Government, but to each separate State. Webster received the note quietly and sent the attorney-general to Lockport to see that McLeod had competent counsel. After considerable delay, during which Webster replied to the main arguments of the British note, McLeod was acquitted and released.

In the midst of the dispute over the case of the Caroline serious trouble arose between the authorities of Maine and New Brunswick over the undetermined boundary between the St. Croix River and the Highlands, and there ensued the so-called "Aroostook War." During the summer of 1838 British and American lumbermen began operating along the Aroostook River in large numbers. The governor of Maine sent a body of militia to enforce the authority of that State, and the New Brunswick authorities procured a detachment of British regulars to back up their position. Bloodshed was averted by the arrival of General Winfield Scott, who managed to restrain the Maine authorities. The administration found it necessary to take up seriously the settlement of the boundary question, and for the next three years the matter was under consideration, while each side had surveyors employed in a vain attempt to locate a line which would correspond to the line of the treaty. As soon as the McLeod affair was settled, Webster devoted himself earnestly to the boundary question. He decided to drop the mass of data accumulated by the surveyors and historians, and to reach an agreement by direct negotiation.

In April, 1842, Alexander Baring, Lord Ashburton, arrived in Washington and the following August the Webster-Ashburton treaty was signed. The boundary fixed by the treaty gave Maine a little more than half the area which she claimed and the United States appropriated $150,000 to compensate Maine for the territory which she had lost.

The settlement of these matters did not, however, insure peace with England. Settlers were crowding into Oregon and it was evident that the joint occupation, established by the convention of 1818, would soon have to be terminated and a divisional line agreed upon. Great Britain insisted that her southern boundary should extend at least as far as the Columbia River, while Americans finally claimed the whole of the disputed area, and one of the slogans of the presidential campaign of 1844 was "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight." At the same time Great Britain actively opposed the annexation of Texas by the United States. Her main reason for this course was that she wished to encourage the development of Texas as a cotton-growing country from which she could draw a large enough supply to make her independent of the United States. If Texas should thus devote herself to the production of cotton as her chief export crop, she would, of course, adopt a free-trade policy and thus create a considerable market for British goods.

As soon as it became evident that Tyler contemplated taking definite steps toward annexation, Lord Aberdeen secured the coÖperation of the government of Louis Philippe in opposing the absorption of Texas by the American republic. While the treaty for the annexation of Texas was before the Senate, Lord Aberdeen came forward with a proposition that England and France should unite with Texas and Mexico in a diplomatic act or perpetual treaty, securing to Texas recognition as an independent republic, but preventing her from ever acquiring territory beyond the Rio Grande or joining the American union. While the United States would be invited to join in this act, it was not expected that the government of that country would agree to it. Mexico obstinately refused to recognize the independence of Texas. Lord Aberdeen was so anxious to prevent the annexation of Texas that he was ready, if supported by France, to coerce Mexico and fight the United States, but the French Government was not willing to go this far, so the scheme was abandoned.

The two foremost issues in the campaign of 1844 were the annexation of Texas and the occupation of Oregon. Texas was annexed by joint resolution a few days before the inauguration of Polk. This act, it was foreseen, would probably provoke a war with Mexico, so Polk's first task was to adjust the Oregon dispute in order to avoid complications with England. The fate of California was also involved. That province was not likely to remain long in the hands of a weak power like Mexico. In fact, British consular agents and naval officers had for several years been urging upon their government the great value of Upper California. Aberdeen refused to countenance any insurrectionary movement in California, but he directed his agents to keep vigilant watch on the proceedings of citizens of the United States in that province. Had England and Mexico arrived at an understanding and joined in a war against the United States, the probabilities are that England would have acquired not only the whole of Oregon, but California besides. In fact, in May, 1846, just as we were on the point of going to war with Mexico, the president of Mexico officially proposed to transfer California to England as security for a loan. Fortunately, the Oregon question had been adjusted and England had no reason for wishing to go to war with the United States. Mexico's offer was therefore rejected. Polk managed the diplomatic situation with admirable promptness and firmness. Notwithstanding the fact that the democratic platform had demanded "Fifty-Four-Forty or Fight," as soon as Polk became President he offered to compromise with England on the 49th parallel. When this offer was declined he asked permission of Congress to give England the necessary notice for the termination of the joint occupation agreement, to provide for the military defense of the territory in dispute, and to extend over it the laws of the United States. A few months later notice was given to England, but at the same time the hope was expressed that the matter might be adjusted diplomatically. As soon as it was evident that the United States was in earnest, England gracefully yielded and accepted the terms which had been first proposed.

As war with Mexico was imminent the public generally approved of the Oregon compromise, though the criticism was made by some in the North that the South, having secured in Texas a large addition to slave territory, was indifferent about the expansion of free territory. In fact, Henry Cabot Lodge, in his recent little book, "One Hundred Years of Peace," says: "The loss of the region between the forty-ninth parallel and the line of 54-40 was one of the most severe which ever befell the United States. Whether it could have been obtained without a war is probably doubtful, but it never ought to have been said, officially or otherwise, that we would fight for 54-40 unless we were fully prepared to do so. If we had stood firm for the line of 54-40 without threats, it is quite possible that we might have succeeded in the end; but the hypotheses of history are of little practical value, and the fact remains that by the treaty of 1846 we lost a complete control of the Pacific coast."

That the United States lived through what Professor Dunning calls "the roaring forties" without a war with England seems now little less than a miracle. During the next fifteen years relations were much more amicable, though by no means free from disputes. The most important diplomatic act was the signature in 1850 of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which conceded to England a joint interest in any canal that might be built through the isthmus connecting North and South America. One of the interesting episodes of this period was the dismissal of Crampton, the British minister, who insisted on enlisting men in the United States for service in the Crimean War, an act which pales into insignificance in comparison with some of the things which Bernstorff did during the early stages of the Great War.

Relations between the United States and England during the American Civil War involved so many highly technical questions that it is impossible to do more than touch upon them in the present connection. Diplomatic discussions centred about such questions as the validity of the blockade established by President Lincoln, the recognition by England of Confederate belligerency, the Trent affair, and the responsibility of England for the depredations committed by the Alabama and other Confederate cruisers. When the United States first demanded reparation for the damage inflicted on American commerce by the Confederate cruisers, the British Government disclaimed all liability on the ground that the fitting out of the cruisers had not been completed within British jurisdiction. Even after the close of the war the British Government continued to reject all proposals for a settlement. The American nation, flushed with victory, was bent on redress, and so deep-seated was the resentment against England, that the Fenian movement, which had for its object the establishment of an independent republic in Ireland, met with open encouragement in this country. The House of Representatives went so far as to repeal the law forbidding Americans to fit out ships for belligerents, but the Senate failed to concur. The successful war waged by Prussia against Austria in 1866 disturbed the European balance, and rumblings of the approaching Franco-Prussian war caused uneasiness in British cabinet circles. Fearing that if Great Britain were drawn into the conflict the American people might take a sweet revenge by fitting out "Alabamas" for her enemies, the British Government assumed a more conciliatory attitude, and in January, 1869, Lord Clarendon signed with Reverdy Johnson a convention providing for the submission to a mixed commission of all claims which had arisen since 1853. Though the convention included, it did not specifically mention, the Alabama Claims, and it failed to contain any expression of regret for the course pursued by the British Government during the war. The Senate, therefore, refused by an almost unanimous vote to ratify the arrangement.

When Grant became President, Hamilton Fish renewed the negotiations through Motley, the American minister at London, but the latter was unduly influenced by the extreme views of Sumner, chairman of the Senate committee on foreign relations, to whose influence he owed his appointment, and got things in a bad tangle. Fish then transferred the negotiations to Washington, where a joint high commission, appointed to settle the various disputes with Canada, convened in 1871. A few months later the treaty of Washington was signed. Among other things it provided for submitting the Alabama Claims to an arbitration tribunal composed of five members, one appointed by England, one by the United States, and the other three by the rulers of Italy, Switzerland, and Brazil. When this tribunal met at Geneva, the following year, the United States, greatly to the surprise of everybody, presented not only the direct claims for the damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers, but also indirect claims for the loss sustained through the transfer of American shipping to foreign flags, for the prolongation of the war, and for increased rates of insurance. Great Britain threatened to withdraw from the arbitration, but Charles Francis Adams, the American member of the tribunal, rose nobly to the occasion and decided against the contention of his own government. The indirect claims were rejected by a unanimous vote and on the direct claims the United States was awarded the sum of $15,500,000. Although the British member of the tribunal dissented from the decision his government promptly paid the award. This was the most important case that had ever been submitted to arbitration and its successful adjustment encouraged the hope that the two great branches of the English-speaking peoples would never again have to resort to war.

Between the settlement of the Alabama Claims and the controversy over the Venezuelan boundary, diplomatic intercourse between the two countries was enlivened by the efforts of Blaine and Frelinghuysen to convince the British Government that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was out of date and therefore no longer binding, by the assertion of American ownership in the seal herds of Bering Sea and the attempt to prevent Canadians from taking these animals in the open sea, and by the summary dismissal of Lord Sackville-West, the third British minister to receive his passports from the United States without request.

President Cleveland's bold assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, while the subject of much criticism at the time both at home and abroad, turned out to be a most opportune assertion of the intention of the United States to protect the American continents from the sort of exploitation to which Africa and Asia have fallen a prey, and, strange to say, it had a clarifying effect on our relations with England, whose attitude has since been uniformly friendly.

The Venezuelan affair was followed by the proposal of Lord Salisbury to renew the negotiations for a permanent treaty of arbitration which had been first entered into by Secretary Gresham and Sir Julian Pauncefote. In the spring of 1890 the Congress of the United States had adopted a resolution in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties with friendly nations, and the British House of Commons had in July, 1893, expressed its hearty approval of a general arbitration treaty between the United States and England. The matter was then taken up diplomatically, as stated above, but was dropped when the Venezuelan boundary dispute became acute. Lord Salisbury's proposal was favorably received by President Cleveland, and after mature deliberation the draft of a treaty was finally drawn up and signed by Secretary Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote. This treaty provided for the submission of pecuniary claims to the familiar mixed commission with an umpire or referee to decide disputed points. Controversies involving the determination of territorial claims were to be submitted to a tribunal composed of six members, three justices of the Supreme Court of the United States or judges of the Circuit Court to be nominated by the president of the United States, and three judges of the British Supreme Court of Judicature or members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to be nominated by the British sovereign, and an award made by a majority of not less than five to one was to be final. In case of an award made by less than the prescribed majority, the award was also to be final unless either power should within three months protest against it, in which case the award was to be of no validity. This treaty was concluded in January, 1897, and promptly submitted to the Senate. When President Cleveland's term expired in March no action had been taken. President McKinley endorsed the treaty in his inaugural address and urged the Senate to take prompt action, but when the vote was taken, May 5th, it stood forty-three for, and twenty-six against, the treaty. It thus lacked three votes of the two thirds required for ratification. The failure of this treaty was a great disappointment to the friends of international arbitration. The opposition within his own party to President Cleveland, under whose direction the treaty had been negotiated, and the change of administration, probably had a good deal to do with its defeat. Public opinion, especially in the Northern States of the Union, was still hostile to England. Irish agitators could always get a sympathetic hearing in America, and politicians could not resist the temptation to play on anti-British prejudices in order to bring out the Irish vote.

The Spanish War was the turning point in our relations with England as in many other things. The question as to who were our friends in 1898 was much discussed at the time, and when revived by the press upon the occasion of the visit of Prince Henry of Prussia to the United States in February, 1902, even the cabinets of Europe could not refrain from taking part in the controversy. In order to diminish the enthusiasm over the Prince's visit the British press circulated the story that Lord Pauncefote had checked a movement of the European powers to prevent any intervention of the United States in Cuba; while the German papers asserted that Lord Pauncefote had taken the initiative in opposing American intervention. It is certain that the attitude of the British Government, as well as of the British people, from the outbreak of hostilities to the close of the war, was friendly. As for Germany, while the conduct of the government was officially correct, public sentiment expressed itself with great violence against the United States. The conduct of the German admiral, Diederichs, in Manila Bay has never been satisfactorily explained. Shortly after Dewey's victory a German squadron, superior to the American in strength, steamed into the Bay and displayed, according to Dewey, an "extraordinary disregard of the usual courtesies of naval intercourse." Dewey finally sent his flag-lieutenant, Brumby, to inform the German admiral that "if he wants a fight he can have it right now." The German admiral at once apologized. It is well known now that the commander of the British squadron, which was in a position to bring its guns to bear on the Germans, gave Dewey to understand that he could rely on more than moral support from him in case of trouble. In fact, John Hay wrote from London at the beginning of the war that the British navy was at our disposal for the asking.

Great Britain's change of attitude toward the United States was so marked that some writers have naÏvely concluded that a secret treaty of alliance between the two countries was made in 1897. The absurdity of such a statement was pointed out by Senator Lodge several years ago. England's change of attitude is not difficult to understand. For a hundred years after the battle of Trafalgar, England had pursued the policy of maintaining a navy large enough to meet all comers. With the rapid growth of other navies during the closing years of the nineteenth century, England realized that she could no longer pursue this policy. Russia, Japan, and Germany had all adopted extensive naval programs when we went to war with Spain. Our acquisition of the Philippines and Porto Rico and our determination to build an isthmian canal made a large American navy inevitable. Great Britain realized, therefore, that she would have to cast about for future allies. She therefore signed the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty with us in 1901, and a defensive alliance with Japan in 1902.

In view of the fact that the United States was bent on carrying out the long-deferred canal scheme, Great Britain realized that a further insistence on her rights under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would lead to friction and possible conflict. She wisely decided, therefore, to recede from the position which she had held for half a century and to give us a free hand in the construction and control of the canal at whatever point we might choose to build it. While the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was limited in terms to the canal question, it was in reality of much wider significance. It amounted, in fact, to the recognition of American naval supremacy in the West Indies, and since its signature Great Britain has withdrawn her squadron from this important strategic area. The supremacy of the United States in the Caribbean is now firmly established and in fact unquestioned. The American public did not appreciate at the time the true significance of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, and a few years later Congress inserted in the Panama Tolls Act a clause exempting American ships engaged in the coast-wise trade from the payment of tolls. Great Britain at once protested against the exemption clause as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and anti-British sentiment at once flared up in all parts of the United States. Most American authorities on international law and diplomacy believed that Great Britain's interpretation of the treaty was correct. Fortunately President Wilson took the same view, and in spite of strong opposition he persuaded Congress to repeal the exemption clause. This was an act of simple justice and it removed the only outstanding subject of dispute between the two countries.

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty was by no means the only evidence of a change of attitude on the part of Great Britain. As we have already seen, Great Britain and the United States were in close accord during the Boxer uprising in China and the subsequent negotiations. During the Russo-Japanese war public sentiment in both England and the United States was strongly in favor of Japan. At the Algeciras conference on Moroccan affairs in 1905 the United States, in its effort to preserve the European balance of power, threw the weight of its influence on the side of England and France.

The submission of the Alaskan boundary dispute to a form of arbitration in which Canada could not win and we could not lose was another evidence of the friendly attitude of Great Britain. The boundary between the southern strip of Alaska and British Columbia had never been marked or even accurately surveyed when gold was discovered in the Klondike. The shortest and quickest route to the gold-bearing region was by the trails leading up from Dyea and Skagway on the headwaters of Lynn Canal. The Canadian officials at once advanced claims to jurisdiction over these village ports. The question turned on the treaty made in 1825 between Great Britain and Russia. Whatever rights Russia had under that treaty we acquired by the purchase of Alaska in 1867. Not only did a long series of maps issued by the Canadian government in years past confirm the American claim to the region in dispute, but the correspondence of the British negotiator of the treaty of 1825 shows that he made every effort to secure for England an outlet to deep water through this strip of territory and failed. Under the circumstances President Roosevelt was not willing to submit the case to the arbitration of third parties. He agreed, however, to submit it to a mixed commission composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord Alverstone, chief justice of England. As there was little doubt as to the views that would be taken by the three Americans and the two Canadians it was evident from the first that the trial was really before Lord Alverstone. In case he sustained the American contention there would be an end of the controversy; in case he sustained the Canadian view, there would be an even division, and matters would stand where they stood when the trial began except that a great deal more feeling would have been engendered and the United States might have had to make good its claims by force. Fortunately Lord Alverstone agreed with the three Americans on the main points involved in the controversy. The decision was, of course, a disappointment to the Canadians and it was charged that Lord Alverstone had sacrificed their interest in order to further the British policy of friendly relations with the United States.

At the beginning of the Great War the interference of the British navy with cargoes consigned to Germany at once aroused the latent anti-British feeling in this country. Owing to the fact that cotton exports were so largely involved the feeling against Great Britain was even stronger in the Southern States than in the Northern. The State Department promptly protested against the naval policy adopted by Great Britain, and the dispute might have assumed very serious proportions had not Germany inaugurated her submarine campaign. The dispute with England involved merely property rights, while that with Germany involved the safety and lives of American citizens. The main feature of British policy, that is, her application of the doctrine of continuous voyage, was so thoroughly in line with the policy adopted by the United States during the Civil War that the protests of our State Department were of little avail. In fact Great Britain merely carried the American doctrine to its logical conclusions.

We have undertaken in this brief review of Anglo-American relations to outline the more important controversies that have arisen between the two countries. They have been sufficiently numerous and irritating to jeopardize seriously the peace which has so happily subsisted for one hundred years between the two great members of the English-speaking family. After all, they have not been based on any fundamental conflict of policy, but have been for the most part superficial and in many cases the result of bad manners. In this connection Lord Bryce makes the following interesting observations:

"There were moments when the stiff and frigid attitude of the British foreign secretary exasperated the American negotiators, or when a demagogic Secretary of State at Washington tried by a bullying tone to win credit as the patriotic champion of national claims. But whenever there were bad manners in London there was good temper at Washington, and when there was a storm on the Potomac there was calm on the Thames. It was the good fortune of the two countries that if at any moment rashness or vehemence was found on one side, it never happened to be met by the like quality on the other."

"The moral of the story of Anglo-American relations," Lord Bryce says, "is that peace can always be kept, whatever be the grounds of controversy, between peoples that wish to keep it." He adds that Great Britain and the United States "have given the finest example ever seen in history of an undefended frontier, along which each people has trusted to the good faith of the other that it would create no naval armaments; and this very absence of armaments has itself helped to prevent hostile demonstrations. Neither of them has ever questioned the sanctity of treaties, or denied that states are bound by the moral law."

It is not strange that so many controversies about more or less trivial matters should have obscured in the minds of both Englishmen and Americans the fundamental identity of aim and purpose in the larger things of life. For notwithstanding the German influence in America which has had an undue part in shaping our educational methods, our civilization is still English. Bismarck realized this when he said that one of the most significant facts in modern history was that all North America was English-speaking. Our fundamental ideals are the same. We have a passion for liberty; we uphold the rights of the individual as against the extreme claims of the state; we believe in government through public opinion; we believe in the rule of law; we believe in government limited by fundamental principles and constitutional restraints as against the exercise of arbitrary power; we have never been subjected to militarism or to the dominance of a military caste; we are both so situated geographically as to be dependent on sea power rather than on large armies, and not only do navies not endanger the liberty of peoples but they are negligible quantities politically. Great Britain had in 1914 only 137,500 officers and men in her navy and 26,200 reserves, a wholly insignificant number compared to the millions that formed the army of Germany and gave a military color to the whole life and thought of the nation.

Not only are our political ideals the same, but in general our attitude toward world politics is the same, and most people are surprised when they are told that our fundamental foreign policies are identical. The two most characteristic American foreign policies, the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door, were both, as we have seen, Anglo-American in origin.