We have now covered the work of the Salvation Army social movement in its different branches. We have described the work, the extent and the management of each department. We have also considered the criticisms and objections to which each department is open, and we have attempted to estimate the value of each department to society. We have arrived at the conclusion that the work of the Industrial Department, leaving out the Industrial Colony, is a practical, deserving and successful effort to put unfortunate men once more on their feet, at no expense to the public, saving a slight embarrassment to those already engaged in the salvage and second hand business; that the Army lodging house is the best so far offered for the housing of the lower homeless class, although not entirely satisfactory; that the Slum Work is good, but limited in its scope, owing to the religious sentiment attached, and the mental inferiority of its workers; that the Rescue Work is about the best of its kind; and that good work is being done in other directions, such as the prison work, the employment bureaux and the children's work. On the other hand, we have found that the two Industrial Colonies and three Farm Colonies are not successful enough to warrant any additional expenditure on them or on any new colonies. This is due to the fact that the class most needing help in the cities is not the class to succeed on the land, and to the fact that men are more successful as pioneers on the land, when they are scattered and left to rely on themselves, having experienced farmers as neighbors, than when they are grouped closely together in one colony. Also there is nothing in favor of heavy expenditure for Christmas dinners, since the same amount of money can be put to better advantage in other ways. But, having reached these conclusions regarding the separate departments of the Army social work, what about the movement as a whole? The critics have advanced a good many objections against the Army. Some of these objections relating to special departments and not to the Army as a whole, we have already 1. That the organization is narrow and not willing to cooperate with other organizations. 2. That the highly centralized military form of government is likely to lead to disastrous consequences. 3. That the Army, in its financial dealings, does not take the public sufficiently into its confidence. 4. That the Army collects funds, on the strength of its social work, and applies these funds to religious propaganda. 5. That there is a lack of accuracy in its reports of work accomplished. 6. That the Army, as an organization, has become more of an end in itself, than a means to an end. Regarding the first objection, the narrowness and lack of cooperation, we think there is a good deal of truth in it. The Army has made a great success as an organization, and the work of its founder and his assistants is one of the most remarkable achievements of the age. Things apparently impossible have been accomplished, and obstacles apparently unsurmountable have been overcome. The result is a self-confidence and assurance, amounting in many cases to bigotry. The members of the organization look upon it as especially favored by God, and as above any other organization. Hence, we find many of the leaders far from humble in their bearings, whatever their profession may be, and entirely uninclined to cooperate with other organizations. This fact has been brought to the foreground of late years in England and America by a certain amount of antagonism between the Army and the Charity Organization Society, the Army claiming that it can do its work along its own lines and get along without any alliance with the Society, and the latter claiming that much economy would result if the Army would unite its efforts along social lines with the Charity Organization Society. The controversy cannot be discussed here, Coming to the second objection, that the highly centralized military form of government of the Army is likely to lead to disastrous consequences, we think that, if continued, this form of government must indeed lead to disaster. It is evident that this might happen in different ways. In an organization held together by one man or by one idea, disintegration would tend to take place in the one case by the failure or death of the leader, and in the other case by the expansion of the idea. The Army is held together by both the man and the idea, and we need not turn away from its own history to get examples of this disintegration in both ways. Take the first bond of union, the man of striking, hypnotic personality. Since the very inception of the movement, time after time, men who have gained influence in the Army, have separated from its ranks and started a movement of their own of more or less formidable dimensions. The instance most applicable here is that of the division which took place a few years ago in the United States. At that time the Army in this country had been very successful under the leadership of one of General Booth's sons, Ballington Booth and his wife, Maud, the latter especially being a most attractive and talented personality and gifted, persuasive speaker. Mr. and Mrs. Ballington Booth were flattered by attention from all sides, and by the worship of the soldiers and officers under them. Orders came from General William Booth, commanding them to give up their leadership in the United States and take control of some other country. But It is possible, however, that there will gradually be effected a change in the form of government of the army which will allow for enlargement and differentiation within the movement itself. General Booth, the sole head of the movement, cannot live much longer, and at his death, changes already threatening will demand attention. He has maintained a remarkable control over his world-wide following, in spite of numerous outbreaks and dangerous splits, and has legally arranged with great care, we are told, the succession to follow him. But that there will ever be a second General Booth, or that there could be a series of General Booths, able to hold the organization as he has, is incredible. We have talked with leading officers of his Army on this subject and find that they too, are looking for changes. The fact that the social work is having such a remarkable growth, while the spiritual work is apparently unable to hold its own, is in itself a feature demanding a change. The Army of industrial and social officers and employees will not be bound by the same ties to the General as his former Army of spiritual officers and soldiers. The latter were possessed with an emotional, fanatical enthusiasm which blinded them to everything save the service of their much adored General. The former have a different outlook on life. By the third objection, that the Army in its financial dealings does not take the public sufficiently into its confidence, is meant that complete records of detailed expenditure are not issued. The public provides for a large part of the income of the Army, and it has a right to know just how and where that income is spent. The man and woman who is being continually confronted by a lassie on the street with a little box for the receipt of contributions, after contributing again and again, is likely to ask the question, just where is this money going; and it would be of advantage to the Army itself, if it would issue a more definite statement of the use to which it puts public money. Some people are satisfied with the general report that "the Army is doing good," but there are many who would contribute more largely, if they knew directly for what they were contributing. In reply to this criticism, the Army states that it deposits regularly with the state authorities a statement showing the disposition and state of the finances of its corporations, such as "The Reliance Trading Company" and "The Salvation Army Industrial Homes Company." The Army also issues every year a balance sheet which shows its assets and liabilities on a large scale. But this is not sufficient. The ordinary person can receive no light from either the statement deposited with the state authorities or the yearly balance sheet published by the Army. In fact, although the Army uses the services of an expert accountant in getting out this balance sheet, for all that the public knows, it may be using the funds entrusted to it in any way it wishes. This should be remedied by a regular statement, clearly revealing the disposition of every cent donated. A discussion of the preceding objection leads us to the fourth objection, that the Army collects funds on the strength of its social work, and applies these funds to the carrying on of its religious propaganda. A fifth objection is the lack of accuracy shown by the Army in its reports of work accomplished. The sixth and last objection is a very important one and one which has been seen in the history of organizations without number, viz: that the organization tends to become an end in itself, instead of a means to an end. This objection is also allied to a former one regarding a lack of cooperation on the part of the Army with other organizations. More and more an organization, formed as is the Army, feels complete in itself, and works continually for its own interests and its own glory. In a large number of instances the objective point that was once humanity and the glory of God tends to become the advancement of the Army. While feeling that this objection is a serious one, it still cannot be considered as anything but unavoidable, considering the government and general character of the movement. If it were possible for the Army to be governed locally, and to some extent, nationally by boards, a part of whose membership represented the public, we believe that the tendency to advance its own interest would be diminished. Study out the workings and control of this organization, and it is found a machine, ever seeking to increase its power and field of work. If this machine could be controlled to some extent by the public which feeds it, it might be kept as a useful servant, but otherwise, in spite of the great service which it does society to-day, the tendency to get away from its object and to become an object itself, will be more and more dangerous. In conclusion, then, we find that these objections advanced by the critics are not without foundation, and while some may be more tendencies than actualities, it lies with the organization to guard itself from them. We have found the Army an efficient worker along several lines, and society owes it a considerable debt for past service and lessons learned from it. Hence it would be a great pity for its efficiency as a great public servant to be lessened by a lack of publicity regarding its finance, or by a narrow, self-centered policy, or by a too centralized form of government. Some of the Army leaders are men of great hearts and strong |