For constant interest and the stimulus of frequent discussions, for many helpful suggestions in regard to the preparation of this paper, and for valuable criticism of the manuscript, the writer is under the deepest obligation to Professor Albert Bushnell Hart of Harvard University; for helpful criticism of the manuscript he is indebted also to Professor Edward Channing and to Professor William Bennett Munro of Harvard University; for conscientious and efficient service in the preparation of the manuscript for the press he owes a peculiar debt of gratitude to Miss Addie F. Rowe of Cambridge; and for practical help at every step of the way he again offers his hearty thanks to the scores of persons who have given him valued and appreciated assistance, some of them at great expense of time and labor. The accompanying map, made on the ground, but afterwards drafted under the supervision of J. Sutton Wall, chief draughtsman, and William A. Moore, assistant-chief draughtsman of the Interior Department, Harrisburg, Pa., gives a pretty clear idea of the course of the road and the location of the encampments. Of Middleton’s map (originally published in Olden Time, II. op. 528) Lowdermilk says, “The map as now given may be confidently accepted as perfectly accurate in every respect” (Lowdermilk, History of Cumberland, 137). To one who has followed the course of the road for himself, however, the fallacy of such an assertion is apparent; for, though Middleton’s map may fairly be regarded as altogether the best yet published, it does not show the route through the Narrows of Wills Creek at all, nor does it indicate all the deviations from the Cumberland (National) Road. Not that any sweeping claim to absolute accuracy is made for the accompanying map. The writer may be permitted to say, however, that he has exercised great care in laying down the road on the topographic sheets, and that from many trustworthy sources he has gained information which has helped to fix definitely points long since obliterated. In their second report, under date of January 15, 1808, the commissioners show that the new road followed only a very small portion of the Braddock Road. “The law,” runs the document, “requiring the commissioners to report those parts of the route as are laid on the old road, as well as those on new grounds, and to state those parts which require the most immediate attention and amelioration, the probable expense of making the same passable in the most difficult parts, and through the whole distance, they have to state that, from the crooked and hilly course of the road now traveled, the new route could not be made to occupy any part of it (except an intersection on Wills Mountain [Sandy Gap], another at Jesse Tomlinson’s [Little Meadows], and a third near Big Youghioghana [Somerfield], embracing not a mile of distance in the whole) without unnecessary sacrifices of distance and expense” (Executive Document, 10 Cong., 1 sess., Feb. 19, 1808, 8 pp.). On November 11, 1834, the new road through the Narrows was opened for travel, the citizens of Cumberland, Frostburg, and the vicinity celebrating the occasion in an enthusiastic and elaborate manner (Lowdermilk, History of Cumberland, 336). What Washington says about the length of time spent in marching from Little Meadows helps to fix the location of the camp; for it agrees with Orme’s assertion that they left Little Meadows on June 19 and marched from the camp on June 23 (Orme Journal, 336-340). Even in the matter of distance there is a difference of only a mile between the two accounts, and this difference may be accounted for by the fact that Orme always uses the phrase “we marched about” so many miles. See also Pennsylvania Gazette, July 3, 1755. “On the first of July,” says Orme, “we marched about five miles, but could advance no further by reason of a great swamp which required much work to make it passable.” This bivouac, as has already been said, is undoubtedly on the farm of John Truxell. The army, which was close at the heels of the advance or working party, had to halt there till a corduroy road could be thrown across the swamp, a process that required time. “On the 2d July,” continues Orme, “we marched to Jacob’s Cabin, about 6 miles from the camp.” Notice the words “from the camp.” The preceding stop was then a bivouac, not a camp. The camp referred to was the encampment one mile on the east side of the Youghiogheny, at Stewart’s Crossing. This day’s march would be about one mile, and the place of encampment Jacob’s Cabin. The two halting places were evidently both on the east side of Jacob’s Creek. What is commonly known as the Great Swamp Camp was only the bivouac to which reference has been made. This view of the matter seems, however, not to have been taken by any of the cartographers: but in estimating the value of maps one must, of course, consider whether the author’s first-hand knowledge, as well as his borrowed data, be trustworthy or not, and must also take into account the purpose for which the map was made. Professor Channing has pointed out among other things that, while “a lie in print is a persistent thing,” one on a map is even less eradicable, and for three reasons: (1) because the historical evidence on maps is liable to error, and an error once made is copied by other cartographers, with the result that a false impression frequently continues through centuries; (2) because the topography is often wholly wrong, especially on the earlier maps, a fact that is too commonly overlooked by historians; (3) because, as our own national history has abundantly proved, boundaries are frequently delineated imperfectly, inaccurately, and without basis in fact. In a word, Professor Channing thinks that maps are often taken too seriously, that the historical information given by them is liable to error, and that they simply raise a presumption. It is certainly true that, judged by the exceedingly accurate and reliable journal of Orme, the map accompanying Sargent’s History of an Expedition against Fort Du Quesne (op. 282) is in almost every instance wholly inaccurate in regard to the location of Braddock’s camps, which it represents as scattered promiscuously along the route. In scarcely a single respect, indeed, whether as to route or as to location of camps, mountains, rivers, or anything else, can it be depended upon. To cite a single instance, it puts Camp 6 (Bear Camp) on the Youghiogheny, when this, as we have seen, is the location of Squaw’s Fort (see p. 23). No clue to the authorship of this map or to any authority for it can be discovered. Similar fallacies occur in the work of one of our latest historians, E. M. Avery, who in his History of the United States and its People (Cleveland, 1904, IV. 67) also prints a beautifully-colored but inaccurate map. Judge Veech, too (in his Monongahela of Old, 61), recognizes an apparent inconsistency in Orme’s journal at this point; but, like the others, he only adds more fuel to the flame of confusion. “The Commissioner of Westmoreland County, pursuant to the directions of an Act of Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, entitled ‘An Act for laying out competent Districts for the appointment of Justices of the Peace, passed April 4, 1803,’ laid out the said county into the following districts, to wit:....” “Huntingdon South:—Beginning at the mouth of Big Sewickley; thence up the river Youghiogheny to the mouth of Jacob’s Creek; thence up said creek to Braddock’s Fording; thence along Braddock’s Road to Mt. Pleasant District line to a corner of Hempfield District; thence along said line to Big Sewickley; thence down said creek to the place of beginning.” (Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, Pa., Continuance Docket No. 5, p. 443.) On February 11, 1909, Mr. Dillon communicated to me the results of his labors based on a study of the ground in connection with the two maps made by Patrick Mackellar, Braddock’s chief engineer (Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe, 1905, I. op. 214-215), supplemented by the plan in Winsor’s Narrative and Critical History of America, V. 449, and by the Carnegie McCandless Company’s property map of 1873. This is by far the most able and careful study of the battlefield that has been made in modern times. Mr. Dillon’s plans enable one to follow the course of the road through the battlefield, and to form an idea of the action with a distinctness that has not been possible heretofore. In order to comprehend the nature of the fight, however, and to understand the conditions that made Braddock’s defeat almost inevitable, one must see the field for himself.
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