[1] [To economize ammunition at manoeuvres, batteries sometimes signal that they are firing instead of actually doing so.—Ed.]

[2] [What in the British Army are colloquially known as “Pow-wows.”—Ed.]

[3] [1903.—Ed.]

[4] Independent fire is difficult to control, and almost impossible to stop in action.

[5] [The Cross of St.George corresponds to our Victoria Cross, but is more easily won.—Ed.]

[6] [Russian regiments in Europe, as a rule, consist of four battalions. East Siberian Rifle regiments in the late war had three.—Ed.]

[7] [Liao-yang.—Ed.]

[8] [The Sha Ho.—Ed.]

[9] [Hsi-ping-kai, Kung-chu-ling, and Kuang-cheng-tzu.—Ed.]

[10] [1903.—Ed.]

[11] [See next page.—Ed.]

[12] It was followed by the 2ndInfantry Division; 10th and 17thArmy Corps; 5th Siberian Corps; 1stArmy Corps, and 6thSiberian Corps.

[13] The leading units of the 10thArmy Corps arrived on June30.

[14] Sixty miles by a road which the rains had made very difficult.

[15] [A European Russian regiment contains four battalions.—Ed.]

[16] My report of June20.

[17] The officer commanding the 2ndManchurian Army stated that the whole war strength of his force (total of rifles, sabres, guns, with twenty-five men to a gun, and ten to a machine-gun) constituted, on an average, only half the actual numbers.

[18] This amounted in some units to as much as 20 per cent. in men, and 30 per cent. in officers.

[19] [Behind and between armies.—Ed.]

[20] [One man on one full day’s work.—Ed.]

[21] [General Kuropatkin’s views on this point appear to have changed, see p. 270.—Ed.]

[22] [Who had succeeded Grippenberg in the command of the 2ndArmy.—Ed.]

[23] Or sergeant-majors.

[24] [On account of student disorders that had led to the closing of the Universities.—Ed.]

[25] Medical students.

[26] [General Kuropatkin himself.—Ed.]

[27] Our communications were threatened, and the Yen-tai Mines on the flank were in the enemy’s hands.

[28] The retirement from Liao-yang was orderly, while that from Mukden more nearly approached a rout; but it is not certain that the Russians were really beaten at the former place when the decision to retire was made.—Ed.

[29] [Sic. This seems almost incredible.—Ed.]

[30] [The portion of this chapter which immediately follows deals in great detail with the breakdown of the unit organization. It has been separated from the text, and is given in Appendix II.—Ed.]

[31] When the appointments of Inspector-Generals were created, some confusion resulted between the powers of these and that of the district commanders.

[32] Two in the two brigades, and two on the divisional staff.

[33] [Service with the colours in Russia has been reduced generally from five to three years.—Ed.]

[34] The transport was not fully horsed.

[35] [By this expression is meant a land not belonging to Russia.—Ed.]

[36] [The term used by common folk in Russia when addressing men of higher birth.—Ed.]

[37] Owing to famine in the Kholm district in the years just before the war, the reservists in it were called up later than those in the neighbouring districts, and the majority of them were consequently stationed on the line of communications.

[38] [Summary courts-martial under martial law.—Ed.]

[39] With two-wheeled baggage-carts, the number has to be increased by an additional fifty-four men.

[40] Cooks and mess caterers, eighteen of each—i.e., sixteen per company, and two with scout sections, one mounted, one dismounted.

[41] Three per company.

[42] [This is taking a regiment at 4,000—i.e., the men actually in the firing-line and not employed specially—for scout sections, etc.—Ed.]

[43] I several times reported to the War Minister that the despatch of drafts to fill up wastage in the units already at the front was much more necessary than the despatch to us of fresh units.

[44] [Battle of Hei-kou-tai.—Ed.]

[45] Colonel Ujin’s pack-telephone system, which I tried in Manchuria, is a very good one.

[46] [Presumably squares on a map.—Ed.]

[47] Artillery regiments to be subordinate in all respects as regards command to the divisional commander. The commander of an artillery brigade must technically superintend and inspect all batteries with an army corps.

[48] One cavalry regiment per division.

[49] One sapper battalion and one company of sappers per division; one mining and two telegraph companies as corps troops.

[50] [Sic. This word is rather misleading. Some formation less than a regiment is meant.—Ed.]

[51]

[52] In the wars with Turkey and Persia, in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

[53] [The first portion of this chapter, which is a recapitulation of what has already been written in Chapters I. to VII., has been omitted from this translation. What is now given touches more upon the war itself.—Ed.]

[54] [About 1–1/3 miles to the inch.—Ed.]

[55] [Sic. Killed and wounded (see p. 207, Vol I.).—Ed.]

[56] [At the Sha Ho.—Ed.]

[57] [At Mukden.—Ed.]

[58] [Possibly the author refers to China, Japan, and India being young in a national sense.—Ed.]

[59] [? Telegram.—Ed.]

[60] [General Linievitch.—Ed.]

[61] [? 1904 and 1905 also.—Ed.]

[62] [The name of General Kuropatkin’s country estate in the province of Pskoff.—Ed.]

[63] [This chapter is composed of the introduction and conclusion to Volume III. of the original, which have been translated, as they add some light on points not touched upon in Volume IV.—Ed.]

[64] Eighteen infantry battalions, 25 squadrons, 86 guns total, 19,000 rifles and sabres.

[65] Two of them sapper battalions. The third battalions formed in Russia for all the East Siberian Rifle Regiments were only then beginning to arrive.

[66] The Viceroy’s letter (No. 2,960) of June6 called attention to the necessity of “bearing in mind measures to guard against the event of an advance by Kuroki.”

[67] 1st and 9th East Siberian Rifle Divisions, and 2ndBrigade of the 35th Division.

[68] [There are several passes of this name.—Ed.]

[69] [This action is apparently what is elsewhere known as that of Chiao-tou.—Ed.]

[70] [The reasons for this are given in great detail in Volume IV.—i.e., Chapters I. to XII. of this book.—Ed.]

[71] This regiment did splendidly in later fights.

[72] The 122nd Tamboff Regiment was attacked when bivouacking.

[73] The positions held on August31 by the portion of Kuroki’s army that crossed the river were only eleven miles from the railway.

[74] [? Houton.—Ed.]

[75] The corps also arrived at the front with a shortage of about 400 men per regiment—i.e., 1,600 per division.

[76] Less one brigade garrisoning Tieh-ling.

[77] [Presumably because it was destined for the 2ndArmy.—Ed.]

[78] Including Rennenkampf’s column, Shtakelberg had under him 85 battalions, 43 sotnias, 174 guns, and 3 sapper battalions.

[79] A very large number of men, particularly of the 1stCorps, left the ranks without reason. At Mukden, however, this corps fought with great gallantry and steadiness.

[80] [Grippenberg had already been appointed to the command of the 2ndArmy.—Ed.]

[81] From Ssu-chia-tun station to Ta-wang-chiang-pu.

[82] From Fu-shun to Ma-chia-tun.

[83] Of 72 squadrons and sotnias, 4 mounted scout parties, and 22 guns.

[84] Including thirty siege-guns.

[85] Its garrison was not more than two battalions.

[86] Two regiments of the four in this division had been sent to reinforce the Composite Rifle Corps, and one regiment to reinforce the 1stSiberians.

[87] General Grippenberg could not use the telephone himself, as he was somewhat deaf.

[88] Out of the 80,000 men of the drafts which had arrived.

[89] According to the programme of the arrival of the troops, I calculated on increasing my reserve by three and four Rifle brigades, but they arrived more than ten days late.

[90] For operations against Oku.

[91] [? Houton.—Ed.]

[92] One was ordered to support General Launits.

[93] [The body of Vol III. in the original deals in great detail with the battle of Mukden, and is omitted in this translation.—Ed.]

[94] Except from February27 to March1.

[95] 12.20 p.m., February28.

[96] 3.25 p.m., March2.

[97] 6.45 a.m., March5.

[98] [Query north-west.—Ed.]

[99] In addition to five and a half battalions of the 41stDivision.

[100] Sixteen battalions of the 19thCorps, concentrated at Sha-ling-pu under my orders on March2; sixteen battalions of Golembatovski’s; and eight battalions of Churin’s division, detained by Kaulbars on the way to join the troops operating against Nogi.

[101] Major-General Krauze’s report.

[102] And fifty battalions collected towards Hsin-min-tun were thus left with two squadrons of the Niejinsk Dragoons.

[103] In the afternoon of the 11th this division began to move on Tieh-ling; it had only suffered small loss during the battle.

[104] [Only the concluding portion of what follows in the original is given here; the remainder is an exact repetition of what has been more than once recapitulated.—Ed.]

[105] [This extract is, by the kind permission of the editor, reprinted from McClure’s Magazine, where it appeared as an editorial note upon the article on these memoirs, published in September, 1908.—Ed.]

[106] Osvobojdenie, No. 75, Stuttgart, August10, 1905. No question has ever been raised, I think, with regard to the authenticity of these letters and telegrams; but if there were any doubt of it, such doubt would be removed by a comparison of them with General Kuropatkin’s memoirs.—G. K.

[107] Asakawa, who seems to have investigated this matter carefully, says that the original contract for this concession dated as far back as August26, 1896, when the Korean King was living in the Russian Legation at Seoul as a refugee.—“The Russo-Japanese Conflict,” by K. Asakawa, London, 1905, p. 289.

[108] The italics are mine.—G. K.

[109] [Extracted from Chapter X.—Ed.]

[110] At the junction of roads near Newchuang.

[111] The 21st and 23rdEast Siberian Rifle Regiments.

[112] Of these a brigade of the 6thEast Siberian Rifle Division and one regiment of the 1stArmy Corps were sent by my orders.

[113] The Omsk Regiment lost its way, and for a long time could not be found, and the Krasnoyarsk and Tsaritsin Regiments were kept with the 2ndSiberian Corps.