In order more fully and clearly to form a Judgment of the foregoing Expedition, it may not be improper to subjoin this Narrative of the Enemy's Situation, Strength, and Disposition at Carthagena, as the Fleet and Forces found them on their Arrival there: And in order to carry it on agreeable to the Advances that were made, begin with a Disposition of Punta Canoa Bay, where the Fleet first anchored. This Bay is about five Miles to the North West of the City of Carthagena, but not an extraordinary good anchoring Place, as the Water is shoal a great Way off the Shore, and the Coast pretty strait, that Ships are not much sheltered with the Point of Land, from the Violence of the Breezes that generally blow. In the Bottom of this Bay is an Entrance into the great Lake of Jesea, (called the Boquilla) where the Enemy had a small Fascine Battery of four Pieces of Cannon, and kept a Guard; but upon the Fleet's Arrival, (and during the Time they continued to lie there) a considerable Number of the Enemy's Forces, both Horse and Foot, kept constantly there, expecting a Descent. The next Place of Note was the Cruizes, where the Enemy kept a Guard ordinarily of a hundred Men: This Place is about half Way from the Boquilla to the Town, and guards a narrow Creek or Pass from the Town to the Lake, called Passa de Juan D'Ingola, through which Supplies come in Canoes from the other Side of the Lake to the Town: As for the City itself, Nature has fortified that against any Attempt by Sea, the Water shoaling near a League off, and the Shore being plentifully bounded with Rocks; besides, the Sea is very seldom smooth, so that it is difficult at all Times landing. However, as the Enemy knew the Bravery of those they had to deal with, they began to wall this Side of the Town, and make a Ravelin in the Middle, there being already a strong Bastion at each End. Bocca Grande being the next Place the Enemy suspected an Attempt might be designed, had posted two of their Men of War, the Conquestodore of sixty six Guns, and the Dragon of sixty to guard it, and began two Fascine Batteries, one on each Point of the Entrance. This Passage, called Bocca Grande, was formerly the principal Entrance into the Harbour, but by Storms, and the Force of the Sea, a Bank was thrown up, which quite closed the Entrance, and then it was called Bocca Serrada; but as strange Revolutions are frequent in these Countries, within these few Years this Passage has broke out again, and there is now nine or ten Foot Water in it. About three Miles below this, on the Island of Terra Bomba, was a small Fort of four Guns, called Battery de Chamba; and half a Mile further, a Fascine Battery of twelve Guns, (both of these the Enemy had abandoned.) The next Places of Defence were the Forts of St. Philip and St. Jago, one of seven Guns, the other of fifteen, which served as Redoubts to the Castle of Boccachica. One of these Forts was built on the Rock Ponti landed on, and probably to prevent any one's landing there again, (especially so easily as he did.) The Castle of Boccachica was the Enemy's chief Dependance, as it guarded the Entrance into the Harbour. It is a regular Square, with four Bastions well built, and was capable of making a stout Defence if well garisoned, and would have been much stronger had the Glacis and Counterscarp been finished. There was mounted in it eighty two Guns, and three Mortars, and the Enemy had cleared three or four hundred Yards of the Woods round it, to prevent Approaches being made undiscovered, (as Ponti did in 1697.) On the other Side the Harbour's Mouth was a Fascine Battery of fifteen Guns, called the Barradera; and in a small Bay a back of that, another Battery of four Guns; and facing the Entrance of the Harbour, on a small flat Island, stood St. Joseph's Fort of twenty one Guns: From this Fort to Boccachica Castle a Boom and Cables were fixed across, fastened with three large Anchors at each End; and just within the Boom was moored in a Line four Men of War, the Galicia of sixty six Guns, (aboard which was the Admiral Don Blass D'Leso,) the Africa and St. Carlos, each of sixty six Guns, and the St. Philip of seventy Guns, which spread the Width of the Harbour's Mouth, that there was not room for a Ship either to pass a head or a stern of them, so that it was impossible for shipping to force an Entrance into the Harbour; and had the Enemy here made a Defence equal to the admirable Disposition they had formed, it must have been a difficult Task for the Fleet to have got in, even after Boccachica Castle was taken. About four or five Miles from hence is a Creek, or Passage, that parts the Grand Baru from the Main called Passa Cavallos, through which there is Water enough for small Vessels: This Pass the Enemy had defended with two Fascine Batteries, one of eight Guns, the other of four, as well to protect their own Imbarkations that come this Way with Provisions from Tolu, and the River Sina, as to prevent any Attempts being made this Way. The next place of Defence was Castillo Grande, which is about eight Miles up the Harbour. This Castle is a regular Square with four Bastions, strong and well built, and defended to the Land by a wet Ditch and Glacis proper, and one Face towards the Sea has a Raveline, and a double Line of Guns. This Castle can mount sixty one Guns, though there was but fifty seven in it. Opposite to this was a Horse-shoe Battery of twelve Guns, called Mancinilla; and in the Middle between these two Forts is a large Shoal with not above two or three Foot Water on it, which divides the Channel into two: In each of these Passages were Ships sunk across, to prevent, if possible, the Fleet's getting by; for that Part of the Harbour above these Castles is a perfect Bason, and seems rather like one Harbour within another, so that if some of the Ships could not have got past to have covered the Troops landing (where they did) they must have marched several Miles, and been greatly exposed; besides, it would have been excessively difficult transporting the Cannon, neither could the Bomb-Ketches have got near enough this Way to have diverted the Town; so that the Intent of this Disposition was exceeding good, had it been effectually executed, (but Fear made the Enemy work in too much Hurry.) Near three Miles further up the Harbour, on two flat sandy Islands, or Keys, stands the famous City of Carthagena, and Himani, called its Suburbs, which are both irregular Figures, but well fortified to the Land with strong Bastions at proper Distances, and Lakes and Morasses running round them; and the Water at the Head of the Harbour shoal so far off, that Ships cannot come near enough to do any material Execution with their Guns, which adds much to its Strength.
About a Quarter of a Mile from the Gate of Himani, on a pretty high Eminence, stands the Castle (or Redoubt) of St. Lazare, which in itself is but trifling, but its Situation very advantageous, and by some new Works lately thrown up much strengthened. This Redoubt overlooks all the Town, but has a Brow of a Hill (about four hundred Yards from it) that overlooks it as much, and entirely commands it, where would have been a proper Place to have raised a Battery, which the Enemy full well knew, for they constantly kept a Guard there, to observe the Army's Motions. As it was this famous Castle put an End to the Siege of Carthagena, a particular Description of it may not be unwelcome.
The Hill it stands on is about fifty or sixty Foot high, naturally steep, but made more so by the Earth out of the Trenches and Lines being thrown over the Brow. The Castle is a Square of about fifty Foot, with three Demi-Bastions, two Guns in each Face, one in each Flank, and three in each Curtain. When the Army first landed, there was no material Works about the Castle, but a Fascine Battery, of five Guns at the North End of the Hill, facing the Brow of the commanding Hill abovementioned; but whilst they were encamping, &c. the Enemy cut Lines round the Foot of the Castle, and erected another Fascine-Battery on the South Brow of the Hill, and brought four Guns out of the North Battery, and mounted in this, as it commanded the Ascent of the Hill best; these Lines ran in Traverses, and communicated from Battery to Battery, and were a better Defence, and much stronger, than all the other Works together. After the Attack, the Enemy being able to judge where their Foible lay, mounted two Guns in the Lines, against the angular Point of one of the Bastions (which was not defended) where the Troops ascended the Hill, and to the South Part of the Hill lengthened their Lines, and made a Stair-case up the Hill, to the Fascine-Battery, and a Breast-work cross the Road, from the Foot of the Hill down to the Water-side, which effectually blocked themselves up, and was a Security against the Army's making a second Attack, and coming at them the right Way, as they might have done at first, had they taken the Guide's Advice. The Side next the Town is quite defenceless, and the Way into the Castle up a Ladder, on that Side, which draws up, like a Bridge.
From the several Examinations of Deserters it appeared, the Number of the Enemy did not exceed four thousand, (regular Forces, Seamen, Militia, Blacks, and Indians included) and daily Experience convinced us of the Goodness of their Engineers, Bombardiers, and Gunners, as Desertion and Cowardice convinced us of the Badness of others.
Having given an Account of the Enemy's Situation and Strength, it may likewise be necessary to relate some Account of the State of the Army, and what pretty Instruments and Materials they were furnished withal. That the whole Body of the Troops, that came from England (unless two Regiments) were raw, new raised, undisciplined Men, is a Fact known to every one; and the greatest Part of the Officers commanding them, either young Gentlemen whose Quality or Interest entitled them to Preferment, or abandoned Wretches of the Town, whose Prostitution had made them useful on some dirty Occasion, and by Way of Reward were provided for in the Army; but both these Sorts of Gentlemen had never seen any Services, consequently, knew not properly how to act, or command; so that the worthy old experienced Officers, who had served long and well, underwent a continual Hardship, in teaching and disciplining a young raw Army, at a Time when they were on Service, and every one ought to have been Masters of their Trade, instead of having it to learn; and thus, by more frequently exposing themselves, most of them were knocked on the Head. As for the American Troops, they were in general many Degrees worse, but the Officers in particular, who were composed of Blacksmiths, Taylors, Shoemakers, and all the Banditti that Country affords, insomuch, that the other Parts of the Army held them in scorn. And for Engineers, Bombardiers, and Gunners, worse never bore the Name, or could be picked out of all Europe.
Amongst the ten Engineers, there was but one who ever saw a Siege (and that was the simple Siege of Gibraltar) and he was killed at Boccachica, in the midst of his own defenceless Works; so that the rest may justly have been said to be left without a Head. As for the Bombardiers and Gunners, the Colonel commanding the Train was in his grand Climacterick, and consequently very unfit to be sent upon this Expedition; but he, poor Gentleman, was soon dispatched (thanks to the Ignorance of the Engineers) and his Successor took care to render himself as unfit for Duty, by Excess of Drinking, as Old Age rendered the other; and as to Inferiors of both Sorts, Bombardiers and Cannoneers, many of them were Country Fellows, who told the General they were provided for in the Train for voting for Mr. —— and Mr. such a one, &c. Out of these few that were good, by constant Attendance and Duty's falling hard few were left, and indeed they had not many Opportunities of shewing their Abilities, the Materials they were provided withal being mostly bad; for two thirds of the Bomb-Shells either broke short in the Air, or their Fusees went out, and they never broke at all; nor were there one in three of the Grenadoes would burst; the Shells were so thick, and the Cavity so small, they would not hold Powder sufficient to crack them; nay, so little Care was taken in providing and packing up proper Materials for a Train of Artillery, that out of eight Pieces of Battering-Cannon-Principals, one was found defective and unserviceable, and the Expedition had like to have set forward, without a Plank or Joist for Platforms for the Guns, or any Bill-Hooks to cut Fascines and clear the Ground, had not Lord Cathcart been informed these Things were wanting, and wrote timely to have them supplied before the Fleet sailed, which lay then at St. Hellens.
Upon the whole, the Service that has been performed best demonstrates the Goodness of this Army: How much it has suffered, as well as the Reputation of the Nation, by the Death of Lord Cathcart, the End of the Expedition must resolve.
Thus much may be said in Behalf of the common Soldiers, though they were raw and undisciplined, they wanted not for Courage and Resolution becoming Englishmen.