  THE TREVILIAN RAID The contents of this chapter constitute the latest contribution of the author to the literature of the events recorded in this book. Much of that which has gone before and all of what follows was written many years ago. But in this final draft, every line has been revised. Time and the ripeness of years have tempered and mellowed prejudice; the hasty and sometimes intemperate generalizations of comparative youth have been corrected by maturer judgment; something of ill-advised comment and crudity has been eliminated. Many of his conclusions and even the accuracy of some of his statements of fact, he realizes fully, may not remain unchallenged; yet it has been his honest endeavor and purpose to give, so far as in him lies, a truthful and impartial recital of those salient memories that remain to him of the stirring experiences of the youthful days when, as a boy he "followed the fortunes of the boy general" in the campaigns of 1863-64, in the great civil war. The outlines of the sketches herein made have been drawn from the official "records of the rebellion" which have been carefully consulted; the details for the most part have been taken from the storehouse of a somewhat retentive memory; something of color and atmosphere necessarily has been left to the imagination. It is a picture that he would present, rather than a dry recital of dates and places, or a mere table of statistics. The importance of these things need not be lessened by seeking to give them an attractive form. The writer must confess, also to an ambition to contribute something, albeit but a little, toward giving to the Michigan cavalry brigade the place in history which it richly earned; so that it may receive in its due proportions the credit which it deserves for the patriotic and valiant services rendered on so many battle fields. And especially does it seem to be to him a duty to do this for the regiment in which it was his privilege and good luck to serve. This ambition, however, was nearly stifled, soon after its birth, by an experience very galling to the pride of a well meaning, if sensitive and fallible historian. It was something like twenty years ago that a paper on the battle of Cedar Creek, prepared with conscientious care and scrupulous fidelity to the facts as the writer understood them, was mailed to General Wesley Merritt, with the request, couched in modest and courteous phrase, that he point out after having read it any inaccuracies of statement that he might make a note of, as the article was intended for publication. The distinguished cavalry officer replied, in a style that was bland, that he had "long since ceased to read fiction;" that he no longer read "even the Century war articles;" that an officer one month would give his version of things which another officer in a subsequent number of the same magazine would stoutly contradict; and that he was heartily tired of the whole business. General Merritt was, however, good enough to give in detail his reasons for dissenting from the writer's account of a certain episode of the battle, and his letter lent emphasis to the discussion in one of the early chapters of this volume concerning men occupying different points of view in a battle. This particular matter will be more fully treated in its proper place. One must not be too sure of what he sees with his own eyes and hears with his own ears, unless he is backed by a cloud of witnesses. Moreover this was notice plain as holy writ, that no mere amateur in the art of war may presume, without the fear of being discredited, to have known and observed that which did not at the time come within the scope of those who had a recognized status as professional soldiers and find its way into their official reports. Indeed, a very high authority as good as told the writer in the war records office in Washington that no man's memory is as good as the published record, or entitled to any weight at all when not in entire harmony therewith. It is evident that this rule, though perhaps a proper and necessary one, to protect the literature of the war against imposition and fraud, may very easily bar out much that is valuable and well worth writing, if not indispensable to a fair and complete record, provided it can in some way be accredited and invested with the stamp of truth. It was quite possible for brigade and even regimental commanders, not to draw the line finer still, to have experiences on the battle field of which their immediate superiors were not cognizant; nor is it necessary to beg the question by arguing that all commanding officers were allowed to exercise a discretion of their own within certain limits. Official reports were oftentimes but hastily and imperfectly sketched amidst the hurry and bustle of breaking camp; or on the eve of battle, when the mind might be occupied with other things of immediate and pressing importance. Sometimes they were prepared long afterwards, when it was as difficult to recall the exact sequence and order of events as it would be after the lapse of years. Some of the "youngsters" of those days failed to realize the value their reports would have in after years as the basis for making history. Others were so unfortunate as to have them "lost in transit" so that, although they were duly and truly prepared and forwarded through the official channels, they never found their way into the printed record. Attention already has been called to the absence of reports of the commanders of the Michigan cavalry brigade regiments for the Gettysburg campaign. General George B. Davis, U.S. army, when in charge of the war records office in Washington, told the writer that he had noticed this want and wondered at it. He could not account for it. A like misfortune befell the same regiments when they participated in the Kilpatrick raid. Only a part of their reports covering the campaign of 1864, including the Trevilian raid, were published. In this respect the Sixth Michigan suffered more than either of the others. Not a single report of the operations of that regiment for that period, appears in the record, though they were certainly made as required. General Custer's reports cover that regiment, of course, as they do the others in the brigade, but it is unfortunate that these are not supplemented by those of the regimental commander. Until the volumes successively appeared, he was not aware of this defect; nor did he ever receive from any source an intimation of it, or have opportunity to supply the deficiency. Hence, it appeals to him as a duty to remedy, so far as it can be done at this late day, the omissions in the record as published of this gallant regiment. From the beginning to the end of the campaign of 1864, in Virginia—from the Wilderness, May 4, to Cedar Creek, October 19—except for a single month when he was in command of the brigade, the writer was present with and commanded the Sixth Michigan cavalry. Not a single day was he absent from duty, nor did he miss a battle or skirmish in which the regiment was engaged. Reports were made, but as we have shown they did not find their way into the war department. No copies were retained, so there is a hiatus in the record. There are numerous cases of a similar kind. Some officers, there is reason to believe, were smart enough to seek and were given the opportunity to restore the missing links. The Trevilian raid resulted from the seeming necessity of drawing the confederate cavalry away from the front of the army of the Potomac while the movement of the latter from the Chickahominy to the James was in progress. Sheridan was ordered to take two divisions and proceed to Charlottesville, on the Virginia Central railroad. Incidentally he was to unite there with the force operating under General Hunter in the direction of Lynchburg. He decided to take the First and Second divisions (Gregg and Torbert). Wilson with the Third division was to remain with the army, taking his orders directly from General Meade. As we have seen, the expeditionary force, before making the start, was at Newcastle Ferry, on the south bank of the Pamunkey river. Three days' rations to last five days were ordered to be taken in haversacks; also two days' forage strapped to the pommels of the saddles; one hundred rounds of ammunition—forty on the person, sixty in wagons; one medical wagon and eight ambulances; Heaton's and Pennington's batteries; and a pontoon train of eight boats. The brigade commanders were: Custer, Merritt, Devin, Davies and Irvin Gregg. In the Michigan brigade there had been some changes since Cold Harbor. Colonel Alger had returned and resumed command of his regiment. Major Melvin Brewer, of the First Michigan, had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to command of the Seventh Michigan, his appointment dating June 6. There is a certain something about the events of that war that makes them stand out in bold relief, like architectural images on the facade of an edifice. They throw all other recollections of a lifetime into the shade. As I sit at my desk writing, with memory at elbow as a prompter, it is difficult to believe that today (May 7, 1908) it lacks but one short month of being forty-four years since those preparations were making on the banks of the Pamunkey river for a cavalry expedition in some respects more strenuous, more difficult than any which had preceded it. Yet those incidents are burned into the memory, and it seems that, after all, it may have been but yesterday, so deep and lasting were the impressions then produced. As the well focused optical image is transferred to a sensitized surface, reproducing the picture, so were those scenes fixed in the mind with photographic certainty, to be retained as long as memory lasts, somewhat faded by time, it may be, but complete in outline if not in details. The campaign of the previous month had been a hard one for the cavalry. Aside from the fact that he was leaving one third of his force behind, Sheridan's corps had been decimated. A large number of his troopers had been killed and wounded, or rendered hors de combat in other ways. The horses had suffered terribly and many of them had been shot. So only about half the number of mounted men fit for duty that followed the colors of the cavalry corps out of the Wilderness, May 8, marched across the Pamunkey on the pontoon bridge, June 6. Readers who have followed this narrative through the preceding chapters will readily understand this. Sheridan's plan hampton WADE HAMPTON Sheridan's march began on the morning of June 7. Passing between the Pamunkey and the Mattapony rivers, he reached Polecat station on the Richmond and Potomac (Fredericksburg) railroad the evening of June 8, and encamped there for the night. The next day the march was resumed, passing through Chilesburg to the North Anna, and along the bank of that river to Young's Mills, where the entire command bivouacked. June 10, he journeyed to Twyman's store and crossed the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford, near Miner's bridge, between Brock's bridge and New bridge, encamping for the night on the road leading past Clayton's store to Trevilian Station. In the meantime, as soon as Sheridan's movement was discovered two divisions of confederate cavalry (Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's) under Hampton—the latter's division commanded by Butler—started by the direct road between the Annas for Gordonsville, for the purpose of intercepting Sheridan. Breckinridge timed his movements to make his line of march parallel with that of Sheridan. Hampton, having the shorter distance to cover, although he started two days later than his adversary, was able to anticipate the latter in arriving, and was between Gordonsville and Trevilian Station the night that Sheridan crossed the North Anna. Fitzhugh Lee at the same time was near Louisa Courthouse, the two confederate commanders thus being separated by a distance of some six or seven miles on the evening of June 10. The federal cavalry was all together and in position favorable for preventing a union of the confederate forces by a sudden movement in the morning. Both commanders were looking for a battle on the following day and had made their plans accordingly. Hampton had with him the three brigades of Rosser, Butler and Young; while the other division consisted of the brigades of Lomax and Wickham. It will thus be seen that, while the federal commander had a much smaller force than that which followed him on the raid of the previous month, his opponent was able to meet him with nearly twice the relative strength with which Stuart confronted him at Yellow Tavern. In other words, while Stuart fought him with the three brigades of Lomax, Wickham and Gordon (Hampton not being present) the latter at Trevilian Station had five brigades, including the big South Carolina brigade which fought so gallantly at Haw's Shop. More than that, Breckinridge's infantry was behind the cavalry, ready to reinforce it, if needed. Sheridan's camp was in the woods north of Clayton's store, and extending eastward as far as Buck Chiles's farm, Gregg on his left, Torbert on the right. His plan was to advance on Trevilian Station, at an early hour on the morning of June 11, by the direct road from Clayton's store. It was given to Gregg to look out for Fitzhugh Lee, who was expected to come into the action from the direction of Louisa Courthouse. Hampton planned to advance from Trevilian Station with his own division and attack Sheridan at Clayton's store. Lee was to take the road from Louisa Courthouse to the same point and form on Hampton's right. A glance at the map will show that the two roads intersect. Still another country road runs from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station. Sheridan formed his line of battle with Merritt on the right, Devin to Merritt's left, Custer and Gregg, en echelon, still farther to the left. Custer covered the road toward Louisa Courthouse. The Seventh Michigan picketed that road during the night. At a very early hour the pickets of that regiment were attacked by Lee's advance. The First Michigan was sent to reinforce the Seventh. One brigade of Gregg's division was also sent out to meet Lee. The other one was formed on Devin's left. Sheridan then advanced and attacked Hampton instead of awaiting his attack. Hampton moved from Trevilian Station with the two brigades of Butler and Young, Butler on the left. Rosser was sent to guard a road farther to the left, protecting that flank. Thus Rosser was isolated when the battle began and Hampton came into action with but two brigades on the line. Fitzhugh Lee was headed off by the First and Seventh Michigan and Gregg's brigade, so that, instead of coming to Hampton's assistance as intended, he was finally compelled to take the road leading directly to Trevilian Station instead of the one to Clayton's store. It will be seen later that he arrived there at an opportune moment to prevent the complete destruction of Hampton's division. The entire country between the North Anna river and the railroad was covered with timber and a dense undergrowth, except where there were occasional patches of cleared farm lands. When Torbert with his two brigades came into contact with Hampton, his line was found strongly posted in woods so dense that it was difficult to make headway against the defense. From the start, however, Sheridan was the aggressor and Hampton was forced to fight a defensive battle. In view of the rule laid down by General Sheridan himself (quoted in a footnote on page 241) a criticism might be made on the tactics of the battle. But whether the error, if it was an error, should be laid at the door of the chief of cavalry or of General Torbert there is no way of finding out, though there is reason to believe that the former left the tactics on the field to be worked out by the division commanders. Custer was ordered to take a country road and pass around the flank to the rear of the enemy confronting Torbert. The exact location of this road was unknown and Torbert states in his report that he was under a misapprehension about it; that it did not come out where he supposed it did; and that Custer by taking it lost touch with the other brigades which he was not able to regain until it was too late to accomplish the best results. Such "combinations rarely work out as expected" and Custer should have been put into action on the left of the line of battle; should have advanced with the division, keeping touch to the right, all the brigades in position to support each other. Then, by directing the entire movement in person, it is probable that Sheridan might have thrown his left forward, completely enveloping Hampton's right and crushing it before there was any possibility of receiving reinforcements. In that event, this turning movement would have been Custer's part of the battle, his regiments would have been kept together, under his eye, and well in hand for a combined movement at the right moment. Complete success must have followed. The road which Custer took leaves the North Anna river at New bridge, and runs to Trevilian Station. It crosses the Louisa Courthouse and Clayton store road east of Buck Chiles's farm. It intersects the direct road from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station at a place designated on the map as "Netherland." When Custer started out in the morning the chances were that he would have a hard fight with Fitzhugh Lee at the outset. But it has been shown how, by the interposition of the First and Seventh Michigan and one of Gregg's brigades, that officer was obliged to abandon the plan of reaching Clayton's store and take the other road. So Custer, being relieved from pressure in that direction, started with the Fifth Michigan in advance, followed by Pennington's battery, to carry out his orders to get in Hampton's rear, at or near Trevilian Station. The advance guard was led by Major S.H. Hastings, one of the most daring officers in the brigade. At some point beyond the crossroads, east of Buck Chiles's farm, the exact location being a matter of great uncertainty, upon which the official reports shed no light whatever, Hastings discovered a train of wagons, caissons, led horses and other impedimenta, which he reported to the brigade commander and received orders to charge upon it, the charge to be supported by the entire regiment under Colonel Alger. This charge resulted in the capture of the outfit, but was continued for a long distance beyond the station, this being necessary in order to head off the train, which made a desperate effort to escape in the direction of Gordonsville. Custer's order to the Fifth did not contemplate continuing the pursuit beyond the station, since he was supposed to make a junction there with the other brigades of the First division. But those two brigades were still fighting with Hampton, and the Fifth Michigan was directly in the latter's rear. When this tumult arose in his rear, Hampton immediately recalled Rosser's brigade posted to protect his left flank, thereby leaving the way open for this foray around his right. Rosser, coming quickly upon the scene, not only intercepted Alger's retreat, but proceeded to contest with the Fifth Michigan the possession of the captures which that regiment had made. But, I am outrunning my story: The charge of the Fifth Michigan left Custer's front uncovered, and a force of confederates which belonged to Young's brigade and had probably been looking out for Hampton's right flank and rear, threw itself across his path and boldly challenged his right to advance. This was not a large body of troops, probably the Seventh Georgia cavalry, but it made up in audacity what it lacked in numbers. At that time—immediately after the charge of the Fifth Michigan—and before Rosser had begun his interference, Custer had with him only his staff and escort, and behind them was Pennington's battery which had no opportunity to come into action. The situation was apparently critical in the extreme. The only available regiment at the time to throw into the breach was the Sixth Michigan and that was just starting to move out of the woods where it had been encamped during the night. It was not supposed then that the battle was joined and, indeed, the expectation was that the march was to be a continuation of that of the previous day, although the picket firing in the early morning indicated the close proximity of the enemy. But that had been the case for a morning or two before. Before mounting, the officer in command had thoughtlessly acceded to the request of a brother officer to ride a spirited and nervous black horse belonging to the latter, as he expressed it, "To take the ginger out of him." In place of the regulation McClellan saddle the horse was equipped with one of those small affairs used by jockeys in riding race horses. This had been picked up en route. Horse and saddle certainly made an attractive looking mount, but not such an one as a cavalry officer with a sound mind would select for close work on the battle line. The narration of these circumstances will enable the reader to judge of how little the subordinate officers knew of the real impending situation. It can be stated with absolute certainty that the officers of the Sixth were innocent of any knowledge of the fact that Custer had started out for a fight, up to the moment when they were ordered to mount and move out of the woods into a road running along the east side. The commander of the regiment, mounted as described, and leading the column of files, not having yet formed fours, on account of the woods and brush, had barely reached the edge of the woods by the road, when a member of the brigade staff brought the order to, "Take the gallop and pass the battery." It is probable that this order was sent at the same time that the Fifth was sent forward to capture the train. Custer of course supposed that the Sixth was in column of fours in the road behind the battery. The commanding officer of the Sixth had moved out in compliance with orders and knew nothing about the conditions in front. The command, "Form fours, gallop, march" was given and a touch of the spur sent the black steed flying toward the front, followed as quickly as possible by the leading squadron of the regiment. A regimental staff officer remained to repeat the order to the other squadrons as they came into the road, successively. Approaching the crossroads, the conditions were revealed as described in a previous paragraph. Custer and his escort were exchanging shots with their revolvers, at short range, with the confederates in their front. The most remarkable coolness and courage were being displayed on both sides. The enemy certainly was commanded by an officer of resources who realized to the fullest extent the responsibility resting upon him to delay our further advance as long as possible. Custer never lost his nerve under any circumstances. He was, however, unmistakably excited. "Charge them" was his laconic command; and it was repeated with emphasis. Looking back to see that the leading squadron was pretty well closed up I gave the command, "Draw sabers" and, without waiting to form front into line, or for the remainder of the regiment, the column of fours charged straight at the line of confederates, the black horse leading. In a moment we were through the line. Just how it was done is to this day more or less of a mystery. The enemy gave way—scattered to the right and left—and did not await the contact. On down the road, one hundred, two hundred—it may have been five hundred—yards, but not more than that, at breakneck speed, the charge continued. Then it was seen that there was no enemy in front of us. Where was the enemy? Custer says in his report that Alger's orders were to stop at the station. The single word "charge" comprehended his order to me. Nothing was said about stopping. No warning was given that the Fifth had already charged and was ahead of us. Nor did I know it. The order had been obeyed to the letter. The enemy had apparently been dispersed. At all events he had disappeared from our front. At such times the mind acts quickly. The obvious course was to halt, rally, reform, see what was going on in rear, rejoin the brigade commander, get the regiment all together, for work where we were most needed. Finding that both hands were required to curb the excited steed which, up to that moment had not allowed another horse to come up with him, I returned my revolver to the holster and, when his speed began to slacken, and Captain Vinton, commander of the charging squadron, came alongside, gave the command, "Halt" which was twice repeated. My horse swerved to the right and, when brought to a standstill, was a little way in the woods. The clatter of hoofs behind had told me that I was followed, and I supposed it was by my own troopers. Not so, however. Vinton either did not hear, or was too much "under the influence of a pardonable excitement and zeal" to heed the order to halt, and continued on down the road to and beyond the station, where he overtook the rear of the Fifth and proceeded to assist in the endeavor to bring away the captured property. He was attacked by Rosser who made a lot of his men prisoners. The detachment that went with him did not rejoin the regiment until late in the afternoon and then less the men who had been captured. The word, "Surrender" uttered in imperious tones saluted my ear and, glancing over my left shoulder to find whence it came, I found that a well mounted and sturdy confederate officer had come up from my left rear and, addressing me in language both profane and apparently designed to cast reflections on my ancestry, declared that if I did not comply instantly with his polite request he would complete the front cut on my head. His men circling around in front with their carbines in the position of "ready" seemed to hint that they considered his demand a reasonable one and expressed a purpose to assist in enforcing it. Now, it is a maxim that no cavalry officer may surrender so long as he is not unhorsed. But in the situation in which I found myself there did not seem to be an available alternative. I surrendered, gave up the black horse and the jockey saddle, and never saw either of them afterwards. After the experience described I was glad to be rid of them on most any terms. Several others were captured at the same time and in the same way. One of them after being dismounted tried to run away but was quickly brought to a halt by a shot from a confederate's gun which wounded him. It appears that when we went through their line the rascally confederates rallied and, leaving Custer's front charged our rear. Custer says in his report that after "the Sixth Michigan charged the rebels charged that regiment in rear." When he wrote that report he had forgotten that it was only a portion—less than a third of the Sixth which charged. Two-thirds of the regiment was still back where he was and not yet in the action. There were two squadrons, one commanded by Captain Manning D. Birge, the other by Captain Don G. Lovell in reserve. In using the term squadron here I mean what in the civil war was known as a battalion (four troops). Vinton's squadron did not all take part in the charge. Four confederate cavalrymen undertook the duty of escorting myself and a young Sixth cavalryman who had been trapped in the same way to the rear through the woods. Anticipating that our attack would be followed up, we managed to delay our guards as much as possible, and had gone not more than a hundred yards when a yelling in the road proclaimed that the curtain had risen on the second scene of our little drama. Custer had ordered Birge to charge. Birge's advance put the confederates to flight, what there were left of them. The noise of the pursuit disconcerted our captors so that we took the chances and made our escape under cover of the thick undergrowth. They fired at us as we ran but did not succeed in making a hit. Fortunately Birge directed his course through the woods out of which the enemy had come and into which they had gone in their flight. In a minute we met him coming with a squad of men. He was greatly rejoiced to find that he had rescued me from my disagreeable predicament and, looking back across the years, I can see and freely acknowledge that to no man on this earth am I under greater obligations than to Manning D. Birge. But for his approach it might not have been possible for us to successfully make our break for freedom. That was the only time I ever was a prisoner of war and then only for about ten minutes. Custer, referring to my capture, says that I was rescued by a charge of my own regiment led by Captain Birge. birge MANNING D. BIRGE Bidding Birge to follow my late captors I hurried out to the road and thence to the crossroads from which we had started so short a time before. Custer was still there. His battery was there. Most of the Sixth was halted there. My recollection is that the First and Seventh about that time joined Custer, after finding that Fitzhugh Lee had withdrawn from their front looking toward Louisa Courthouse. Birge's charge had cleared the road of the enemy, for the time being. Custer ordered that a rail barricade be thrown up across the road leading to the right, from which direction the attacks had been made on him. Putting the men of Vinton's and Birge's squadrons who were available at work, Lovell's squadron of four troops which was intact and well in hand under as good an officer as there was in the brigade, was posted in line mounted, parallel with the road, and behind a screen of timber, in readiness to repel any further attack. In a few minutes Sergeant Avery, one of the men who had gone with Birge in pursuit of the enemy from whom I had escaped, came in with a confederate prisoner splendidly mounted. Avery with cocked revolver was making his prisoner ride ahead of him and thus brought him in. Receiving orders to dismount, the man gave the horse a caress and with something very like a tear in his eye said: "That is the best horse in the Seventh Georgia cavalry." The horse, with Avery's consent was turned over to me to take the place of the captured black. He proved to be a prize. Handsome as a picture, kind and well broken, sound, spirited but tractable, with a glossy coat of silky luster, he was a mount that a real cavalryman would become attached to and be proud of. I rode him and he had the best of care until he succumbed to the cold weather and exposure near Winchester in the winter following. He was a finely bred southern horse and could not endure the climate. Birge was not so fortunate. When he went after his prisoners he caught a Tartar, or came very near it. The barricade was only partially completed, when yelling in front,—that is in the road leading to the right,—caused every one to look in that direction. Birge and a few of his men were seen coming at full speed with what looked like a good big squadron of the enemy at their heels. Mounting the Seventh Georgia horse, I rode around the barricade and into the field where Lovell was with his battalion. He had been placed there for just such an emergency. Birge did not stop until he had leaped his mare over the barricade. When the confederate column came up, Lovell surprised them with a volley right in their teeth, which sent them "whirling" back into the woods out of which they had come. This was the end of the fighting at that point. Taking with him the Seventh, under Lieutenant Colonel Brewer, and the battery Custer then moved on toward Trevilian Station, leaving the First under Lieutenant Colonel Stagg and the Sixth to bring up and look out for the rear. The affray at the crossroads had occupied less time than it takes to tell it. In giving the story it has been difficult to steer into the middle course between a seeming desire to give undue prominence to one's own part in the action, on one hand, and affectation of undue modesty, on the other. The only course appeared to be to narrate the incidents as they befell and leave it to the kind reader to judge the matter on its apparent merits. When Custer approached the station he found Rosser in his way on his front and right flank. Fitzhugh Lee, coming from Louisa Courthouse, also attacked his left flank. For a time there was a melee which had no parallel in the annals of cavalry fighting in the civil war, unless it may have been at Brandy Station or Buckland Mills. Custer's line was in the form of a circle and he was fighting an enterprising foe on either flank and both front and rear. Fitzhugh Lee charged and captured a section of Pennington's battery. The Seventh Michigan led by Brewer recaptured it. Fragments of all the regiments in the brigade rallied around Custer for the mounted fighting, of which there was plenty, while the First and Sixth dismounted took care of the rear. Custer was everywhere present giving directions to his subordinate commanders, and more than one mounted charge was participated in by him in person. Torbert's attack with Merritt's and Devin's brigades was at length successful in routing Hampton, whose men were driven into and through Custer's lines. Many of them were made prisoners. An officer and twelve men belonging to the Seventh Georgia cavalry, making for the rear as they supposed, came into the arms of the Sixth Michigan skirmishers at one time. The officer gave up his revolver to me and it proved to be a very fine five shooting arm of English make. In the final stages of the battle, Gregg concentrated against Fitzhugh Lee, Torbert effected his junction with Custer, and the latter was extricated from his difficult and dangerous predicament, after performing prodigies of valor. The lines changed front and the confederates were driven across the railroad, Hampton towards Gordonsville, Lee to the eastward. The two did not succeed in coming together that night, and Lee was obliged to make a wide detour in order to reunite with his chief on the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, June 12. The entire command encamped on the battle field in the neighborhood of Trevilian Station for the night. The next morning Gregg was set at work tearing up the railroad toward Louisa Courthouse. The First division was given a rest until the afternoon when, at about three o'clock, although it was Sunday, the order came for the First division to proceed in the direction of Gordonsville. In the meantime, the forces of Hampton and Lee had united and, as will be seen, had planned to stop Sheridan's further progress at all hazards. There is some reason to believe that a part of Breckinridge's infantry had come out from Gordonsville to reinforce Hampton. Such was the impression at the time, and one at least, of Sheridan's commanders, states in his report that he was confronted by infantry. The writer is of the opinion that the "infantry" was Butler's dismounted cavalry which, when in a good position as they were that day, could do as good fighting as any infantry in the confederate service. The Michigan brigade moved out first and the Sixth had the advance. The order was to proceed to a certain point named and then halt until the division closed up. Memory does not recall what the place was, but is quite clear as to that being the specific direction given by General Custer to the officer in command of the advance regiment. We had gone but a short distance, not more than a mile or two at most, when the advance guard reported the enemy entrenched across the way. Skirmishing began at once between our mounted men in front and dismounted confederates behind breastworks of considerable strength. A squadron was deployed and Sergeant Avery was directed to make his way far enough into the woods to find, if possible, what we had in our front. He came back in about ten minutes and reported that the breastworks in our immediate front were thoroughly manned, and that he had seen a column of at least a thousand men moving into the entrenchments on the enemy's right, in front of our left flank. He was sent back to give Custer this information, and the general came up and ordered the entire regiment to be dismounted to fight on foot. The Sixth was put in on the right of the road and directly thereafter the Seventh was sent in on the left. It did not take long to demonstrate that two regiments were not enough and the First and Fifth went into the action on the right of the Sixth. Then Torbert reinforced the line with the Reserve brigade and a portion of the Second, all under Merritt. The entire division became engaged. Several assaults were made upon the confederate line but without success. They were in each instance repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee got in on the right flank of the division and inflicted severe damage upon the Reserve brigade. We have never been able to understand why, if it was intended to break the enemy's line, Gregg's division was not brought into the engagement to protect that flank. General Merritt in his report intimates that he had to do more than his share of fighting; that when the Reserve brigade advanced to the assault on the right it was supposed that the attack would be pressed on the left; that it was not so pressed and that his brigade suffered unduly on that account. This is another case of a man being unable to see all that is going on in a battle. The Michigan brigade was on the left of the line. It was the first brigade engaged. It began the fight and stayed in it till the end. Harder fighting has rarely been done than that which fell to the Michigan men in that battle. Several attempts were made to drive the enemy from their front. The First Michigan especially made a charge across an open field in the face of a terrible fire from behind breastworks, going half way across before they were repulsed. When the First Michigan could not stand before a storm of bullets, no other regiment in the cavalry corps need try. That is a certainty. The losses in killed and wounded were very severe, as will be shown in a table printed at the end of this chapter. avery SERGEANT AVERY The fighting continued till ten o'clock that night, when Sheridan decided to withdraw and abandon the expedition. It is worthy of remark that the entire division was unable to advance one inch beyond the place where the advance guard first encountered the enemy and where Sergeant Avery made the reconnoissance which revealed to General Custer the true situation. Poor Avery was killed while doing his duty as he always did in the very front of the battle in the place of greatest danger. Captain Lovell and Lieutenant Luther Canouse of the Sixth were wounded; Captain Carr, and Lieutenants Pulver and Warren of the First Michigan were killed, and Captain Duggan and Lieutenant Bullock of the same regiment wounded. Captains Hastings and Dodge of the Fifth were wounded; also Lieutenant Colonel Brewer of the Seventh was wounded on the eleventh. The casualties in the two days' fighting at Trevilian Station were very severe. The losses in killed and died from wounds received in the action aggregated in the brigade forty one, as follows:
Of prisoners lost there were in all two hundred and forty-two, distributed as follows:
Of those who were captured and held as prisoners of war, eighty-eight died in southern prisons—most of them in Andersonville—as follows:
The battle of Trevilian Station practically ended the fighting which was done by the Michigan brigade in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. Sheridan's retreat was skilfully conducted but was not especially eventful. A tabulated statement of the losses in the command, beginning in the Wilderness, May 6, and ending at Trevilian Station June 12, is appended hereto. By losses I mean killed in action or died of wounds received in action. It is not possible to give a reliable statement of the wounded, reports of regimental commanders being very deficient in that particular. The table is compiled from the official records in the office of the adjutant general of Michigan and is believed to be approximately correct:
Recapitulation—Killed and died of wounds, the Rapidan to the James:
In General Merritt's official report "The losses in killed and wounded, (in the Reserve brigade,) are annexed in tabular statement. As they number more than the loss of the entire rest of the command they sufficiently attest the severe services of the brigade." When General Merritt says "the entire rest of the command" we shall assume that he means "the entire rest" of the First division. We have no desire to make invidious comparisons, and have avoided doing so throughout these recollections. The Reserve brigade was a fine brigade and always fought well, and never better than at Trevilian Station and in the battles immediately preceding that engagement. To prove that his comparison was not warranted it is necessary only to refer to the official records. On page 810 of the same volume,
The Reserve brigade comprised five regiments, two of volunteers and three of regulars. The Michigan brigade consisted of four regiments, of course, all volunteers. One third of the losses in killed and wounded at Trevilian Station in the Reserve brigade were in the single regiment, the First New York dragoons. My authority for this is still the official records. See page 186 of the volume already quoted and referred to in the footnote. Close analysis, therefore, shows that there are inconsistencies in the official records, and unguarded statements in the official reports. The rest of the month of June was consumed in the return march to the army. Owing to the necessity of caring for a large number of wounded and of guarding several hundred prisoners, to say nothing of an army of colored people of all ages and of both sexes who joined the procession, it was necessary to take a tortuous course which traversed the Spottsylvania battle ground, touched at Bowling Green, followed the north bank of the Mattapony river, reaching King and Queen Courthouse June 18. From this place the sick, wounded and prisoners were sent to West Point. On the 19th we marched to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river, which was crossed on a pontoon bridge and thence to the Pamunkey, opposite White House. June 21, the entire command crossed the Pamunkey at White House and marched the next day (June 22) to Jones's bridge on the Chickahoming. June 25 reached the James river and on the 28th crossed that river to Windmill Point. From here the First and Second divisions were sent to Reams's Station to the relief of the Third division under Wilson which had run into a situation similar to, if not more serious than that which Custer faced on the 11th at Trevilian. Finding that officer safe, we returned to Lighthouse Point and settled down—after having fought and marched for fifty-six consecutive days—for a period of rest and recuperation. During the entire march from Trevilian to the James, Hampton hovered on the flank of Sheridan's column, watching for a favorable opportunity to inflict a blow, but avoiding a general engagement. In crossing from the Pamunkey to the James, Sheridan was charged with the duty of escorting a train of 900 wagons from the White House to Douthat's Landing on the James. General Gregg was entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the right flank, which placed him in the post of danger, and the brunt of the fighting as well as the greater part of the honors of the movement fell to his share. Indeed, General Sheridan in his official report, written in New Orleans a year after the war closed, gave Gregg credit for saving the train. The time from July 2, when we returned to Lighthouse Point on the James river, to July 26 was quiet and uneventful. Many hundred convalescent wounded and sick men returned from hospital to duty; many also who had been dismounted by the exigencies of the campaign returned from dismounted camps. A fine lot of new horses were received. During the month the condition of the animals was very much improved, good care and a plentiful supply of forage contributing to the result. The duty performed was to picket the left flank of the army, the Michigan regiments connecting with Crawford's division of the Fifth corps. The story of the participation of the cavalry with the Second corps in the movement to the north side of the James, which began on the forenoon of July 26, has been so fully and so well told by General Sheridan in his reports and in his memoirs that nothing is left to be added. In fact there is little, if anything, in the part taken by any portion of the force taken across by Sheridan and Hancock to differentiate it from that played by the whole. The object of the movement was to draw the enemy's attention away from the lines around Petersburg preparatory for the explosion of the mine which was to take place on the 30th. In this it was successful. General Lee mistook the attack on his left for real instead of a feint, and detached enough troops to meet it to not only assure the success of the attack on Petersburg, if it had been made with determination, but to seriously menace the safety of the two corps engaged in the movement. General Sheridan truthfully says that, "The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion, was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command." This was the last incident of importance connected with the services of the First cavalry division with the army of the Potomac in the year 1864. August 1, Sheridan was ordered to the Shenandoah Valley and selected the First and Third cavalry divisions to go with him. Since this is in some sort a personal narrative it may be of interest to mention that while at Lighthouse Point I received my commission as colonel and, July 9, was mustered out of the United States service as major—with which rank I had been commanding the regiment—and was mustered in in the new grade. The promotion, which was unsought, was due to a request made to the governor, signed by all the officers of the regiment serving in the field, and recommended by General Custer. On the original petition, on file in the adjutant general's office in Lansing, is an endorsement in the general's own handwriting. |
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