THE YELLOW TAVERN CAMPAIGN

The sequel to the false alarm about Hancock's left flank being turned was that all the cavalry was drawn in to guard the trains and protect the rear of the army. Custer's brigade moved back to the furnaces where it remained during the night. The morning of the seventh he was ordered to resume his position of the day before. Gregg's division was returned to Todd's Tavern. Before the arrival of Gregg's command the First Michigan cavalry had a spirited encounter with Fitzhugh Lee, in which Captain Brevoort, in command of the mounted men, particularly distinguished himself. There was pretty sharp fighting during the entire day, mostly on foot, the nature of the ground practically precluding movements on horseback.

The engagement of the cavalry on the seventh of May is known in history as the battle of Todd's Tavern. It was made necessary in order to retake the position surrendered by Meade's order of the sixth. Much blood was shed and many valuable lives were lost in retrieving the error. In the events of the two days may be found a good illustration of the rule that an officer (even a great soldier like Sheridan) must obey orders, right or wrong. Sheridan must have known that there was no need to withdraw his cavalry from the left of the army. On the contrary he knew that by all means it ought to remain where it was. Yet he obeyed and had to fight an offensive battle to regain what he was thus forced to give away. The conditions of the two days were reversed. On the morning of the sixth Sheridan was in possession and Stuart was trying to drive him out. On the morning of the seventh Stuart was in possession and Sheridan had to drive him out. The material difference was that Stuart failed, Sheridan succeeded. Sheridan outgeneraled Stuart in both offensive and defensive tactics. The names of the respective chiefs are given here but, on the sixth the actual fighting of the union forces was directed by Custer and Gregg, of the confederates by Rosser and Fitzhugh Lee; on the seventh, by Gregg, Merritt and Custer for the federal side, by Fitzhugh Lee on the part of the confederates. Gregg and Custer stood together in the Wilderness as they had done at Gettysburg. At Todd's Tavern Merritt, Davies and Devin were added to the combination. And it was one that neither Stuart, Fitzhugh Lee nor Hampton was ever able to match.

At night the First and Second divisions were encamped in the open fields east of Todd's Tavern, and in front of the positions held by them during the previous two days. Mounted pickets and patrols guarded the front and it soon became apparent that a movement of both armies was in progress. From front and rear came significant sounds which the practiced ear had no difficulty in interpreting. Grant, breaking off successively from his right, was passing by the rear to the left, concentrating around Todd's Tavern for a forward movement in the morning towards Spottsylvania Courthouse. The principle involved was to maneuver Lee out of the Wilderness into more open country by threatening his communications. Once again his strategic plans were thwarted by the faulty manner in which the tactics of the movement were executed. Sheridan had planned to seize Spottsylvania with his cavalry and his orders were for all three divisions to move at daylight with that end in view. Wilson was to lead and be followed up and supported by Merritt and Gregg with the First and Second divisions. We shall see how Wilson was successful in carrying out his part of the plan, but how the others were stopped by orders from Meade, thus preventing the accomplishment of a well conceived enterprise and neutralizing two-thirds of the cavalry corps just when it was about to open the way to victory.

By his peculiar tactical night movement Grant held his line of battle intact except as the various corps broke successively from right to rear to march to the left. Thus Hancock's corps, though on the extreme left, was the last corps to move.

Lee, quick to divine the purpose of his adversary, moved his army by the right flank on a parallel line. All night long the ears of the alert cavalrymen could catch the indistinct murmur of troops moving with their impediments which, coming from both front and rear, bespoke the grand tactics of both commanders and presaged a great battle on the morrow. The "pop," "pop," "pop," of the carbines along the line of videttes was well nigh continuous, showing the proximity of the enemy's prowling patrols and scouts, and the necessity of constant vigilance. So closely did the confederates approach the outposts that there was unceasing fear of an attack and neither officers nor men were able to obtain much rest. To sleep was out of the question. The First Michigan was held in readiness to make a mounted charge, while the other regiments were under orders to deploy dismounted, in case the attack which was looked for should be made. The officers of the First could be heard encouraging and instructing their men, keeping them alert and prepared for battle.

From the time of the organization of the Michigan brigade, the First regiment had been designated as distinctively a saber regiment, the Fifth and Sixth for fighting on foot, as they were armed with Spencer rifles, and the result was that with them, dismounting to fight when in contact with the enemy in the early part of their terms of service became a sort of second nature. The First had a year's experience with the cavalry before the others went out, and it was in a saber charge at the Second Bull Run battle that Brodhead its first colonel was killed. The First Vermont, like the First Michigan, was a saber regiment and went out in 1861. When this regiment was attached to the brigade, Custer had three saber regiments, and it fell to the lot of the Fifth and Sixth Michigan to be selected more often than the others, perhaps, for dismounted duty. It often happened, however, that the entire brigade fought dismounted at the same time; and sometimes, though not often, all would charge together mounted. Owing to the nature of the country, most of the fighting in Grant's campaign from the Wilderness to the James was done on foot. In the Shenandoah valley campaign in the latter part of the year 1864, the reverse was the case and at the battles of Tom's Brook, Winchester and Cedar Creek the troopers in the command for the most part kept to the saddle throughout the engagements.

When Custer wanted to put a single regiment into a mounted charge he generally selected the First Michigan, because it was not only older and more experienced but had many officers who possessed both great personal daring and the rare ability to handle men in action, keeping them well together so as to support each other and accomplish results. This regiment was not excelled by any other in the army for that purpose. The Seventh was an under study for the First. The Fifth and Sixth worked well together on the skirmish line or dismounted line of battle and had no superiors in this kind of work. That they were pretty reliable when called upon mounted also, is shown by the conduct of the Sixth in the Wilderness and of the Fifth at Trevillian Station. It is only necessary to mention the gallantry of the Seventh at Hanovertown and at Yellow Tavern to demonstrate that it was an apt pupil of the First. All the officers and all the men of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh took off their hats and gracefully yielded the palm to the First. It is doubtful if there was another regiment in the federal cavalry service which contained so many officers highly marked for their fearless intrepidity in action. The circumstance of their talking to their men before an expected engagement was characteristic. They were always ready to face the peril and lead their men.

Later in the evening, away to the left where the infantry was going into bivouac a union band began to play a patriotic air. This was the signal for loud and prolonged cheering. Then a confederate band opposite responded with one of their southern tunes and the soldiers on that side cheered. Successively, from left to right and from right to left this was taken up, music and cheering alternating between federals and confederates, the sounds receding and growing fainter and fainter as the distance increased until they died away entirely. It was a most remarkable and impressive demonstration under the circumstances and lingered long in the memory of those who heard it.

Though the fighting on the 5th, 6th and 7th had been for the most part favorable to the union troopers, it was disjointed and, therefore, neither decisive nor as effective as it might have been. Sheridan believed that the cavalry corps should operate as a compact organization, a distinct entity, an integral constituent of the army, the same as the other corps. He looked upon his relation to the general in command as being precisely the same as that of Hancock, Sedgwick or Warren, and insisted that orders to the cavalry should be given through the cavalry corps commander just as orders to the Second corps were given through General Hancock. He could not bring himself to consent to be a mere staff officer dangling at the heels of General Meade, but conceived himself to be an actual commander, not in name only but in fact.

Proceeding on this theory he issued orders to the various division commanders to move at daylight on the morning of May 8, and cooperate with each other under his personal direction in a plan which he had devised to seize Spottsylvania Courthouse in advance of Lee's infantry. They were to advance on converging roads in such a manner as to arrive successively but to support each other and open a way for the infantry columns. Wilson crossed Corbin's bridge, charged through the town driving out some of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalrymen and pursuing them several miles beyond. Merritt and Gregg made a good start and if they had been allowed to proceed would have had no difficulty in accomplishing what Sheridan desired to have them do. But without notice to Sheridan, Meade countermanded the orders to those two officers directing them to halt at the bridges and not cross. The result was that Wilson was isolated, Merritt's cavalry became inextricably entangled with Warren's infantry, so that neither one of them reached Spottsylvania, as they were both expected to do, Gregg was neutralized, Wilson's safety jeoparded, Sheridan's combinations broken up without his knowledge, and the way was left open for Lee's infantry, so that Anderson with Longstreet's corps took advantage of the situation and drove Wilson out and took possession—thus paving the way for Lee to form a defensive line there instead of farther south, probably inside the defenses of Richmond. Then it befell that a series of bloody battles had to be fought to regain what was thus foolishly surrendered; to regain what indeed might have been held with slight loss, if Sheridan had been let alone, and permitted to have his way. If he had been given a free hand, and assuming that Warren, Burnside, Sedgwick and Hancock would have carried out their part of the program with the same zeal and skill displayed by Sheridan, it is certain that the battle of Spottsylvania with its "bloody angle" would never have taken place.

The affair was a fiasco, but for that no blame can be attached to either Sheridan or Grant, unless the latter be considered blameworthy for not directing the movements in person instead of leaving the tactics of the battle to be worked out by Meade.

Once more, as in the Wilderness, the cavalry was drawn in. The entire corps was massed in rear of the infantry and rendered inert. Sheridan with his ten thousand troopers was held idle and inactive while Warren, Sedgwick and Burnside were given the task of defeating Lee's veteran army without Sheridan's help. All his plans were rendered nugatory. He became satisfied that his efforts were useless. About noon he went to Meade's headquarters and they had an interview which is one of the famous historical episodes of the civil war. He told Meade that, inasmuch as his plans were to be interfered with, his orders countermanded, thus destroying the efficiency and usefulness of the cavalry corps, he must decline to give it further orders and General Meade could take it and run it himself, as he evidently desired to do. He kept his poise, however, sufficiently to intimate that he would like an opportunity to take his corps and go out after Stuart, since he believed he could whip Stuart in a fair fight if he could have a chance. Meade reported this conversation to Grant who told Meade to let him go and try. Grant had confidence enough in Sheridan to believe that he would make his word good.

The outcome of this was that the entire corps was ordered that very afternoon to concentrate at Alrich's, on the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, and be prepared to start at daylight on an expedition around Lee's right flank, into the enemy's country. It was to be a second edition, only on a much larger scale, and under a very different commander, of the Kilpatrick raid, an account of which was given in a previous chapter. The route selected was very much the same. But, unlike Kilpatrick and others who had led cavalry expeditions up to that time, and whose idea was to ride rapidly through the country and avoid the enemy as much as possible, never fighting unless forced into it unwillingly, Sheridan went out with the utmost deliberation, looking for trouble—seeking it—and desiring before every other thing to find Stuart and fight him on his native heath. The confidence which he manifested in himself and in the prowess of his command was of its own kind, and a distinct revelation to the army of the Potomac, in which it had long been a settled article of belief that Stuart was invincible and, indeed, up to that time he had been well nigh so, as Sheridan points out in his memoirs.

In the meantime, the battle was raging around Spottsylvania. Lee's army was getting into position, his various corps concentrating and intrenching, and making every preparation for a new base and a stout resistance. Grant's plans had all miscarried, thus far. Still, he had taken up his bridges and resolved to fight it out on that line. It was already evident that there was to be no more retreating. The officers and men of the army of the Potomac made up their minds that they had crossed the Rapidan and the Rappahannock for the last time and that Lee would never be permitted to make a permanent halt outside the intrenchments of Richmond.

When the long column was marching along the rear of the army, the sounds of the battle going on could be distinctly heard. Hundreds of wounded men were coming from the front, mostly so slightly injured that they were helping themselves off the field to a place of safety where they could receive needed treatment. It filled us with astonishment to see the number of them. The official records show that Grant lost more than ten thousand men in the series of battles around Spottsylvania. It seemed wicked to take ten thousand men well mounted and equipped away from the army at such a time as that. Queer ideas Meade had. And queerer still that Grant should have yielded to him in a matter of such vital importance. And the men that Sheridan was taking away, were the very same troops with whom he broke Early's flank at Winchester; and who stood like a stone wall in the way of Early's advance at Cedar Creek after two corps of infantry had been routed, only a few months later. Just imagine for a moment what might have been the result if Sheridan had been permitted to make the same use of his cavalry in the Wilderness or at Spottsylvania which he made of it at Winchester and Cedar Creek.

We camped at Alrich's for the night. And it was Sunday night. It will be remembered that the Kilpatrick expedition left Stevensburg on Sunday night. Three days' rations were drawn and issued to the men. There was but one-half of one day's ration of grain for the horses. So it was settled that our animals would have to depend on the country for their forage. The force thus assembled consisted of three divisions—about ten thousand troopers—under Merritt, Gregg and Wilson—seven brigades commanded by Custer, Devin, Gibbs, Davies, Irvin Gregg, McIntosh and Chapman. These were all veteran officers, often tried and never found wanting. Of these brigade commanders, two, Custer and Davies, held the rank of brigadier general; Devin was colonel of the Sixth New York; Gibbs of the First New York dragoons; Gregg of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania; McIntosh of the Third Pennsylvania; Chapman of the Third Indiana.

There were six batteries of artillery, all regulars but one—the Sixth New York independent—Captain J.W. Martin. Pennington was still with the Third division, as was the First Vermont cavalry also. The four Michigan regiments were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Peter Stagg, Colonel Russell A. Alger, Major James H. Kidd and Major Henry W. Granger, respectively.

The movement began at an early hour. The start was made long before daylight. General Custer, who was to lead, ordered that the Sixth Michigan move out first and thus it fell to my lot to be in the van at the outset of that historic expedition. A guide was furnished, with directions that the route taken be by the plank road to Tabernacle church, thence to the Telegraph road running from Fredericksburg to Richmond, then due south toward Thornburg. The long column wound its way slowly out of the wilderness on a single road, marching by fours, Merritt in front, Gregg in rear, Wilson in the centre—seven brigades and six batteries—beyond doubt the most superb force of mounted men that ever had been assembled under one leader on this continent, and a more formidable body of horse than had been seen in that war on either side, up to that time, or was ever seen afterwards. The column when stretched out like a huge snake was thirteen miles in length, so that when the last of Gregg's regiments turned south on the Telegraph road, the head of Custer's brigade must have been nearing Chilesburg.

The night was clear and quiet; the air was soft and refreshing. To the right the two great armies were sleeping. There was no note of bugle, no boom of cannon, no crack of rifle to disturb the tranquility of the night. As the dawn approached the baying of dogs in the distance gave notice that the echoes of the march would soon reach the ears of the enemy's outposts.

But the morning was far advanced, the head of column well on its way past the right flank of Lee's army, when the first hostile patrols were encountered. At a crossroad leading to the right a small force of cavalry made its appearance. It was put to flight by Captain Birge with troop A. At this point troop E, Captain A.E. Tower, was sent to the front as advance guard, Sergeant M.E. Avery with eight men going ahead with orders to charge any enemy that appeared on the road, the troop to follow him closely and the regiment to support the troop. General Custer with his staff and escort rode close up to the rear of the regiment. Behind him came the other Michigan regiments, Devin's and Gibbs's brigades, then Chapman, McIntosh, Irvin Gregg, and Davies in succession. Davies was to look out for the rear. Thus the latter, who led the Kilpatrick expedition, found his position reversed on this. The responsibility was great and he met it with his accustomed courage and ability. Davies was one of the few men who early in the war found his niche and stuck to it. He was an ideal general of brigade; and he kept his place as such without a check until the war closed.

tower

ANGELO E. TOWER

To those of us who had been with Kilpatrick but a short two months before the contrast presented by a mental comparison of Sheridan's manner of conducting a march with that of his predecessor was most marked and suggestive. This movement was at a slow walk, deliberate and by easy stages. So leisurely was it that it did not tax the endurance of men or horses. There was a steadiness about it that calmed the nerves, strengthened self-reliance, and inspired confidence. It was a bold challenge for the confederates to come out and fight a duel to the finish. That they would be compelled to take up the gage thus thrown down there was no shadow of doubt.

The advance guard was kept active in the pursuit of confederate scouts and pickets, small bodies of whom were constantly appearing in front or hovering on the flanks. Before reaching the point where the road leading to Beaver Dam was to be taken, the guide, either by ignorance or design, misled Avery and his men and took them to the eastward. Avery suspecting something wrong put a halter around the guide's neck and started to swing him up to the limb of a tree. He immediately discovered his mistake and a trooper was sent with word to take the other road, who reached the intersection just as the head of column did, so there was not a moment's delay. Avery soon came in with a squad of prisoners who with the guide were turned over to the provost guard. After reaching Chilesburg we were on the same road over which we marched with Kilpatrick and needed no guide. The confederate prisoners looked with astonishment upon this big body of cavalry which had stolen into their territory like a thief in the night, unexpected and unannounced.

During the day, as long as I had the advance, Captain Craig Wadsworth of Sheridan's staff rode by my side to represent and report to his chief. No very important incident happened, but the weather was pleasant, the air was exhilarating, the companionship was congenial, and there was sufficient of excitement to make it interesting. Things were kept moving, and it was very enjoyable, as service with the advance of a marching column always is.

Late in the afternoon we passed Chilesburg and the country began to have a familiar look. It was not yet dark when we crossed the North Anna river at Anderson's bridge and the First division prepared to bivouac on the south side. Gregg and Wilson went into camp for the night north of the river.

After crossing the river, Custer was ordered to proceed with his brigade to Beaver Dam station. Here the First Michigan was given the advance, Major Melvin Brewer with one battalion as advance guard. The Sixth followed the First. Otherwise the order of march was the same as during the day. A mile or so before reaching Beaver Dam, Brewer came upon several hundred union prisoners who were being hurried under the escort of confederate infantry to the station, where trains were waiting to convey them to Richmond. His appearance, of course, resulted in the release of the prisoners, those of their guards who did not succeed in escaping by running away in the woods being captured. The engineers began to sound their locomotive whistles, as a signal for the confederate escort to hurry up with their prisoners, and Brewer followed by the First and Sixth dashed into the station before the presence of the Michiganders was suspected, taking them by surprise and capturing the two locomotives with their trains. In a few minutes Custer with the entire brigade was on the ground and it was found that, besides the trains, he had captured an immense quantity of commissary, medical, and other stores belonging to Lee's supply departments and which included nearly all his medical supplies. Everything that could not be carried away was destroyed. While this destruction was going on some confederates made their appearance in the adjacent woods and opened fire but they were driven away without much trouble. This must have been a very severe loss to the confederates.

The brigade then marched away and rejoined the division, every trooper having his horse loaded to the limit with such supplies as he thought he could use. General Merritt in his official report refers to this destruction of property as a mistake and characterizes the action as "gaucherie." It is, however, quite certain that the only way to have saved the supplies for issue to the corps would have been to move the division to Beaver Dam that night, for Stuart was concentrating his force at that point and might have been able to reclaim a portion of them if they had not been destroyed. At all events, Custer was on the ground and Merritt was not. Custer's action must have been approved by his judgment.

Early on the morning of May 10 the march was resumed by the Negrofoot road toward Groundsquirrel bridge across the South Anna river. It was even more leisurely than on the day before. Flankers were thrown out in both directions. The long column of fours thus proceeded slowly by the road while to the right and to the left, about 500 yards out, were parallel columns of flankers, marching by file, thus assuring that should the enemy attack either flank, it was only necessary to wheel by fours in that direction to be in line of battle with a very strong line of skirmishers well out in front.

But Stuart did not attack. He seems on that morning to have begun to comprehend Sheridan's plan which was no doubt then sufficiently puzzling but, as we can see now, very simple. In a word, a slow and steady march, straight toward the confederate capital, all the time in position to accept battle should Stuart offer it. If he should not, to hold to the unyielding tenor of his purpose, and with exasperating persistence continue to invite it. Stuart had turned off toward the east and was making a forced march with Fitzhugh Lee's division, consisting of the brigades of Lomax and Wickham, Gordan's brigade still hanging on to the rear of Sheridan's column. Our column made the march of eighteen miles to Groundsquirrel bridge without molestation and camped there that night on the south side of the river. Stuart after a much longer march went into camp at Hanover Junction. At one o'clock in the morning May 11 he moved out toward Yellow Tavern, arriving there at about ten o'clock in the forenoon, before Sheridan's advance, which was headed in the same direction, made its appearance. Stuart had thus by a long and hard march brought his command where it could interpose between the Union cavalry and Richmond. He seems, however, to have been halting between two opinions—whether to form squarely across Sheridan's front or to hold his position on the flank until near enough to Richmond to be within reach of reinforcements from the troops that were being hurried into the city from the south to aid in the defense. He appears to have chosen the latter alternative, for he formed his command in a line running north and south, facing west, Wickham on the right, Lomax on the left with batteries near both his right and left flanks. The left of his line crossed the Telegraph road in front of Yellow Tavern where was quite an elevated piece of ground on which across the road was a battery well stationed and well manned. His men, however, must have been pretty well exhausted by the long march.

Yellow Tavern, which gave its name to the battle that ensued, is a hamlet at the junction of the Telegraph and Old Mountain roads, about six miles north of Richmond, where the first named road coalesces and becomes the Brook Turnpike, as I understand it. The Old Mountain road comes down from the northwest, the Telegraph road from the east of north. Sheridan struck the former at Allen's Station on the Fredericksburg railroad and followed it to Yellow Tavern. The Reserve brigade reached that place a little before noon and finding Stuart in possession immediately began skirmishing. Devin came up next and was put on the line to reinforce Gibbs. When Custer's brigade came up pretty sharp skirmish firing could be heard in front. Merritt was in charge and the battle was on. Stuart had dismounted his entire force and formed them in a very strong defensive position on a commanding ridge beyond the tavern. Merritt had dismounted a portion of Gibbs's and Devin's commands and was feeling of Stuart's position. Custer's regiments as they successively arrived were massed mounted in column of battalions on the right of the road, in a field, thus clearing the road. The march that day had been an easy one, the rest the night before had been complete, and never were men and horses in better condition or spirits for battle than were Sheridan's troopers.

sheridan

PHILIP H. SHERIDAN

Then there was an anxious pause. Glancing back I saw that we were at the rear of the division. Down the road about 100 yards a column of cavalry was approaching very slowly. Something at the head of the column attracted my particular attention and in a moment I made out that it was a general's battle flag. But I did not recognize it as one that I had seen before. There were a good many staff officers and a pretty large escort. As they came opposite the regiment, the officer at the head looked back and saw that the flag was hanging limp around the staff, there not being air enough stirring to make it float out. He noted this and said to the color bearer, "Shake out those colors so they can be seen." The voice was mild and agreeable. The color-bearer did as directed and the general looked our way with a keen glance that was characteristic and took in every detail. Then instantly I knew who he was. I saluted and said, "Men, General Sheridan," and they gave him a cheer.

That was the first time I had seen Sheridan except as I "looked toward" him when passing in review. One may do a good deal of service, even be in many skirmishes and battles without getting a good look at the corps commander, much less the commander of the army. There was nothing about Sheridan's appearance at first glance to mark him as the principal figure in the scene. Except for the fact that he rode in front one might have mistaken one of the other officers for chief. But close inspection easily singled him out. He was well mounted and sat his horse like a real cavalryman. Though short in stature he did not appear so on horseback. His stirrups were high up, the shortness being of leg and not of trunk. He wore a peculiar style of hat not like that of any other officer. He was square of shoulder and there was plenty of room for the display of a major general's buttons on his broad chest. His face was strong, with a firm jaw, a keen eye, and extraordinary firmness in every lineament. In his manner there was an alertness, evinced rather in look than in movement. Nothing escaped his eye, which was brilliant and searching and at the same time emitted flashes of kindly good nature. When riding among or past his troopers, he had a way of casting quick, comprehensive glances to the right and left and in all directions. He overlooked nothing. One had a feeling that he was under close and critical observation, that Sheridan had his eye on him, was mentally taking his measure and would remember and recognize him the next time. No introduction was needed.

It would be as difficult to describe the exact physical traits that marked Sheridan's personality as to make a list of the characteristic mental attributes that distinguished him from others. There were perhaps no special, single, salient points. At least none were abnormally developed. In making an estimate of the man it was the ensemble of his qualities that had to be considered. He had to be taken "all in all." So taken, he was Sheridan. He was not another, or like another. There was no soldier of the civil war with whom he fairly can be compared with justice to either. As a tactician on the field of battle he had no equal, with the possible exception of "Stonewall" Jackson. In this respect he to my mind more nearly resembled John Churchill, the great duke of Marlborough, than any other historical character of modern times of whom I have any knowledge. If he had not the spark of genius, he came very near to having it. This is a personal judgment put down here, the writer trusts, with becoming modesty and with no desire to put himself forward as a military critic.

Sheridan was modest as he was brave, reticent of his plans, not inclined to exploit his own merits, and he did not wear his heart or his mind upon his sleeve. His inmost thoughts were his own. What impressed us at this first sight of him was his calm, unruffled demeanor, his freedom from excitement, his poise, his apparently absolute confidence in himself and his troops, his masterful command of the situation. He rode away toward the front as quietly as he had come from the rear, with no blare of bugles, no brandishing of swords, no shouting of orders, no galloping of horses. In his bearing was the assurance that he was going to accomplish what he had pledged himself to do. He had found Stuart and was leisurely going forward to see for himself, to make an analysis of his adversary's position, and, so far as necessary, to give personal direction to the coming conflict. But he was in no hurry about it and there was in his face and manner no hint of doubt or inquietude. The outcome was to him a foregone conclusion.

Such was our chief and such was the beginning of the battle from which dates his fame as a cavalry leader and independent commander of the first rank.

Merritt and Custer were already at the front. Experience taught us that sharp work was at hand. It was not long delayed. The order came from General Custer for the Fifth and Sixth to dismount to fight on foot. The First and Seventh were held in reserve mounted. Not having visited this battle field since that day I am unable to give a very accurate description of its topographical features and shall not attempt to do so. The published maps do not throw a very clear light upon the matter, neither do the official reports. I am in doubt as to whether the Telegraph road and Brook turnpike are synonymous terms after passing Yellow Tavern or whether the former lies east of the latter. As I have shown, Stuart's line ran along the Telegraph road, the right north of Half Sink, the left on a hill near Yellow Tavern. My authority for this is McClellan. Lomax held the left and had two pieces of artillery posted "immediately in the road;" one piece behind them "on a hill on the left." This would make his line extend due north and south and our approach to attack it must have been from the west. Devin in his report says Stuart was driven off the Brook pike to a position 500 yards east of it. Whether that was at the beginning or near the close of the engagement is not quite clear. If the former, then the line referred to by Major McClellan could not have been on the Brook turnpike. I shall have to deal in general terms, therefore, and not be as specific and lucid as I would like to be in describing Custer's part in the battle.

Just where the Michigan regiments were posted at the time they were ordered into the fight I cannot say. They came down toward Yellow Tavern on the Old Mountain road and I have no recollection of crossing the pike. It seems to me that they must have been west of it. We were moved across the road, from where stationed when Sheridan came up, and deployed in the woods, the Sixth on the right of the Fifth. The line advanced and presently reached a fence in front of which was a field. Beyond the field, and to the left of it were woods. In the woods beyond the field were the dismounted confederate cavalry. Skirmishing began immediately across the field, each line behind a fence. After a little, Captain Bayles of Custer's staff came from the right with an order to move the Sixth by the left flank and take position on the left of the Fifth. Just as he was giving this order a great shout arose to the left and, looking in that direction, we saw that the entire of the Fifth cavalry was climbing the fence and starting for a charge across the field. The Sixth instantly caught the infection and, before I could say "aye, yes or no," both regiments were yelling and firing and advancing on the enemy in the opposite woods. "You can't stop them," said Bayles. I agreed and in a moment had joined my brave men who were leading me instead of my leading them.

The wisdom and necessity of Custer's order was, however, immediately apparent. Some confederates lurking in the woods to the left, opened fire into the flank of the Fifth Michigan, which for the moment threatened serious consequences. The line halted and there was temporary confusion. Quicker than it takes to tell it, Custer had appeared in the field mounted. One of Alger's battalions changed front and charged into the woods on the left and the two regiments advanced and drove the enemy clear through and out of the woods in front. Barring the temporary check, it was a most gallant and successful affair, for which Custer gave the two regiments full credit in his official report.

The line was then reformed with the Sixth on the left of the Fifth. At that time this was the extreme left of the First division and of the line of battle as well, the Third division not yet having become engaged.

It was then found that the force with which we had been fighting had retreated to their main line of battle, along a high ridge or bluff. In front of this bluff was a thin skirt of timber and a fence. Here Fitzhugh Lee's sharpshooters were posted in a very strong position indeed. Between the ridge and the edge of the woods where our line was halted was a big field not less than four hundred yards across, sloping down from their position to ours. To attack the confederate line in front it would be necessary to advance across that field and up that slope. It looked difficult. The confederate artillery was stationed to the right front on the extreme left of their line. We were confronted by Lomax's brigade. Beyond the right of the Fifth Michigan, Custer had the First Michigan, Colonel Stagg; the Seventh, Major Granger; and First Vermont, Lieutenant Colonel Preston; all mounted. They were across a road which ran at right angles with the line of battle, and in the direction of Lomax's battery.

As soon as our line appeared in the open—indeed, before it left the woods the confederate artillery opened with shell and shrapnel; the carbineers and sharpshooters joined with zest in the fray and the man who thinks they did not succeed in making that part of the neighborhood around Yellow Tavern an uncomfortably hot place, was not there at the time. It was necessary to take advantage of every chance for shelter. Every Wolverine who exposed himself was made a target of. Many men were hit by bullets. The artillerists did not time their fuses right and most of the damage was done to the trees behind us, or they were on too high ground to get the range. The line gradually advanced, creeping forward little by little until it reached a partial shelter afforded by the contour of the ground where it sloped sharply into a sort of ditch that was cut through the field parallel with the line of battle. Here it halted and the battle went on in this manner for a long time, possibly for hours. In the meantime, Chapman's brigade, of Wilson's division, had come into position on the left of the Sixth Michigan, thus prolonging the line and protecting our flank which till then had been in the air and much exposed. Off to the left, in front of Chapman, the lay of the land was more favorable. There were woods, the ground was more nearly level. The confederate position was not so difficult of approach and gradually his left began to swing forward and threaten the right flank of Lomax's position or, more accurately, the confederate center.

Thus for several hours the lines faced each other without decisive results. At length Sheridan determined upon an assault by mounted troops supported by those on foot. To Custer was assigned the important duty of leading this assault. It was toward four o'clock when Sergeant Avery who had as quick an intuitive perception in battle as any man I ever knew, and whose judgment was always excellent and his suggestions of great value, called my attention to what appeared to be preparations for a mounted charge over to the right where General Custer was with his colors. "They are going to charge, major," said Avery, "and the instant they start will be the time for us to advance." That is what was done. The regiment forming for the charge was the First Michigan. Two squadrons under Major Howrigan led the vanguard. The bugles sounded, "forward," "trot," "charge." Heaton's battery farther over was served with splendid effect. Custer's staff passed the word along for the entire line to advance. There was no hesitation. The Fifth and Sixth and Chapman's regiments sprang forward with a shout. There was a gallant advance up the slope. Fitzhugh Lee's men held on grimly as long as they could, but there was no check to the charge. Howrigan kept on till he was among the guns sabering the cannoneers, capturing the two pieces in the road with their limbers and ammunition. In a few minutes Custer and Chapman were in possession of the ridge and the entire line of the enemy was in full retreat. Back about 500 yards the enemy attempted to make a stand and the Seventh Michigan was ordered to charge. This charge led by Major Granger resulted in his death. He was killed just before he reached the enemy's position, causing a temporary repulse of the regiment, but the entire line came on and the enemy was put to flight in all directions.

Stuart was mortally wounded while trying in person with a few mounted men of the First Virginia cavalry to stem the tide of defeat which set in when the First Michigan captured the battery. There is a controversy as to how he met his death. Colonel Alger claimed that Stuart was killed by a shot from one of the men on his dismounted line. Captain Dorsey, of the First Virginia, who was riding with Stuart at the time, quoted by Major McClellan, says that he was killed by a pistol shot fired by one of the men who had been unhorsed in the charge on the battery and who was running out on foot. In that case it must have been a First Michigan[25] man who, very likely, paid the penalty of his life for his temerity. It does not matter. One thing is certain. Stuart's death befell in front of Custer's Michigan brigade and it was a Michigan man who fired the fatal shot.

Stuart was taken to Richmond, where he died, leaving behind him a record in which those who wore the blue and those who wore the gray take equal pride. He was a typical American cavalryman—one of the very foremost of American cavaliers and it is a privilege for one of those who stood in the line in front of which he fell in his last fight to pay a sincere tribute to his memory as a soldier and a man.

It fell to that other illustrious Virginian—Fitzhugh Lee—to gather up the fragments and make such resistance as he could to the further march of the union cavalry.