Grouchy first heard the news of Napoleon’s defeat at half-past ten on the morning of the 19th, just as he was preparing to pursue Thielemann and push his infantry towards Brussels. The news was brought by a staff officer, riding up with the most dejected appearance. He could scarcely get his words out, and Grouchy seemed at first to believe that the fellow was mad. But at last there was no doubt about it: the French had been severely beaten. What was Grouchy to do? Should he continue his own operations, as if nothing had happened, and keep his men in ignorance, whereby he might yet cover Napoleon’s retreat? Or should he retreat himself before he was hemmed in?

At first he thought of marching against Blucher’s rear, but very little reflection showed him that Thielemann would in the meantime attack his rear, and his 30,000 men would be caught between two forces. Then Vandamme, always impetuous and for action, proposed that they should march straight on Brussels, set free the French prisoners there, and retire by Enghien and Ath to Lille. This was a daring but futile plan.

Of what use would such a movement have been, even had it been successfully carried out? To march boldly completely round the rear of the allied armies, liberate a few prisoners, and then march off in the opposite direction, would have been to waste the only formed body left of all Napoleon’s army. And what would Thielemann do in the meantime? There was now no hope of winning over Brussels or the Dutch-Belgians, otherwise there would have been some weight in Vandamme’s extraordinary proposal. But Grouchy counselled otherwise. He knew that he already ran the risk of being attacked in flank, most probably in rear, by a portion of Blucher’s army, while Thielemann would certainly advance again as soon as the retreat began. He therefore decided to retreat on Namur, where he would act further according to circumstances. It was useless as well as dangerous to direct his retreat towards the line taken by the remnants of Napoleon’s host, where all would be confusion; it was better by far to retreat on his own line and endeavour to preserve his troops intact as long as possible. At Namur, he might do great things yet; for Namur had not, like Charleroi, witnessed first the triumph and then the downfall of Napoleon’s last plans.

Even at this moment, Grouchy was already in danger of being attacked in rear. For Pirch I. had received orders on the night of the 18th to march towards Namur with his Corps (the Second) and cut off Grouchy from the Sambre; and by the time that Grouchy heard of the rout, he had reached Mellery, on the Tilly-Mont St Guibert road, and 8 miles in Grouchy’s rear. But his troops were exhausted, and his Divisions scattered—the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth Divisions, twenty-four squadrons of his reserve cavalry, and the reserve artillery, were with him; but the Fifth Division and the rest of his cavalry were pursuing the French on the Charleroi road. So Pirch ordered a halt at Mellery.

Blucher’s main body was pursuing the French by Charleroi in the direction of Avesnes and Laon. The cavalry of the First and Fourth Corps, also twelve squadrons belonging to the Second Corps, were at this time following up the fugitives between Frasnes and Gosselies, while the Prussian infantry followed as rapidly as their exhaustion would allow. Bulow’s Corps had pursued over-night as far as Genappe, where it bivouacked, and then resumed its march at daybreak, sending out cavalry—the 8th Prussian Hussars, followed by two other regiments—to watch Grouchy’s movements on the left. The Fourth Corps was leading the Prussian main body in the pursuit. The First Corps followed, and likewise sent out cavalry to watch the left flank for signs of Grouchy.

Meanwhile, Grouchy began his retreat. His troops had reached the line La Bavette-Rosieren, in their pursuit of Thielemann, and now Excelmans’ Cavalry was sent off with orders to make all speed to Namur and secure the bridges over the Sambre at that place. Excelmans reached Namur at 4.30 P.M., a little more than five hours to cover 30 miles by devious lanes and byways in a terrible condition after the rains.

GÉrard’s Corps, preceded by the Seventh Cavalry Division (six squadrons under Vallin, who had taken Maurin’s place), re-crossed the Dyle by the bridge at Limale, and moved by a narrow lane to the main Namur-Brussels road. Vandamme’s Corps withdrew from La Bavette, and marched through Wavre, Dion-le-Mont, Chaumont, Tourinnes, Sart À Walhain, Grand Leez, St Denis to Temploux on the Namur-Nivelles road, where it arrived at 11 P.M. and there bivouacked. GÉrard’s Corps had reached Temploux an hour earlier.

Pajol, in command of the rear-guard, which was composed of the Fourth Cavalry Division—twelve squadrons, under Baron Soult—and Teste’s Infantry Division, demonstrated against Thielemann to keep him occupied until Wavre had been cleared, and then retreated by Corbaix, Walhain, SauveniÈre, to Gembloux, where he bivouacked for the night.

As has been seen, Pirch was at Mellery with the Second Corps during the 19th from 11 A.M.; but he did not wish to risk attacking Grouchy without news of Thielemann. Grouchy’s army was still in good order and capable of stout fighting, but Pirch might have assisted the general situation by at least threatening GÉrard’s right flank as he retreated. It is not likely that Grouchy would have checked his retreat on Namur, even if Pirch had shown himself, but GÉrard would have been obliged to face round, and might possibly have been cut off; or if Grouchy had halted to confront Pirch, Thielemann would have had a good opportunity to attack him in flank.

Thielemann only heard of the French retreat towards 6 P.M. on the 19th, and his intelligence came through General Borcke, who discovered Grouchy’s movement, from St Lambert. Pajol had a rear-guard still in front of Thielemann, and as the latter’s troops were tired with their recent exertions, the Prussians postponed their pursuit until the next day, the 20th, when Borcke was ordered to march at daybreak with the Ninth Division from St Lambert, across the Dyle, and towards Namur.

At daybreak on the 20th, Grouchy’s rear-guard left Gembloux and marched on Namur by St Denis and La Falize. His infantry left Temploux about 9 A.M. GÉrard’s Corps was intended to lead, Vandamme’s Corps covering the retreat of the Fourth, but Vandamme upset the arrangements by betaking himself over-night to Namur, leaving no instructions behind him for his Divisional generals. Consequently, the Divisions of the Third Corps moved off by themselves, early in the morning, and GÉrard’s Corps, which was carrying the wounded with it, was left uncovered. A short distance beyond Temploux, the column was attacked by Prussian cavalry which had been sent off in pursuit by Thielemann at daybreak that morning. And at the same time, more cavalry were seen coming against the rear, along the Nivelles-Namur road. This was the cavalry heading Pirch’s Corps, which had marched from Mellery to Sombreffe. GÉrard’s column had now stumbled on Vandamme’s rear-guard, posted 3 miles outside Namur; and Vandamme himself coming out from Namur, Grouchy ordered him to clear the road for the Fourth Corps, and cover its march with his rear-guard.

Thielemann’s Cavalry, accompanied by a battery of horse artillery, had come on at a great pace, and were almost too exhausted to attack the French with any vigour; but they managed to drive back the enemy’s cavalry and capture three guns. Further attack on the French rear-guard was left to Pirch’s Corps, which was now hurrying up.

The French retreated through Namur, after being well treated by the inhabitants (who supplied them with food, transport, and boats), and leaving Teste’s Division with eight guns in defence of the town against Pirch’s Corps. The remainder of Grouchy’s army crossed the Sambre by the Namur bridge and marched on Dinant by the valley of the Meuse.

In Namur, Teste made a brilliant defence. The town was fortified, but the works were out-of-date and dilapidated; and there was no time to improve the local resources. Teste’s men only numbered 2,000, with eight guns, and Pirch’s Corps was some 20,000 strong. All the wounded, the baggage, and the transport had been sent across the Sambre, and the bridge barricaded.

Pirch had suffered severely in his attack on Vandamme’s rear-guard outside Namur, losing over 1,200 men. The French had beaten back his three assaulting columns, and withdrawn into the town without letting the Prussian cavalry cut them off. Consequently Pirch was in no mind for a costly assault on Namur while Teste’s Division held the place; and he knew that Teste would not hold his position longer than was absolutely necessary for Grouchy with the main body to gain a safe distance. He contented himself with holding the enemy’s attention in front, while he despatched the main body of the Seventh Division to threaten the retreat over the Sambre. But as soon as the main portion of Grouchy’s army had cleared the river, Teste began to make his own preparations for retreat. He ordered a sortie to be made against the Prussians on the north, to gain time and to divert their attention from the bridge; and when all was ready, he withdrew his troops rapidly in single file across the parapets of the barricaded bridge, setting fire to a heap of faggots and lumber piled up against the enemy’s end. The guns had to be left behind.

It was nightfall now—that is to say, towards 9 P.M.—when Teste’s Division filed across the bridge. The Prussians entered on the north, but their way was barred by obstacles, and they were too late to prevent the last men from escaping over the river. Their pursuit was checked by the burning barricades, which had to be put out before the bridge could be used; and the troops were halted in the town for the night, only a few cavalry being pushed across the river on the road to Dinant, ready for pursuit next day.

Teste continued his retreat unharmed, and reached Dinant at daybreak next day, the 21st. Grouchy’s main body had arrived there over-night, and the whole force proceeded to Phillippeville on the 21st. Pirch spent the night at Namur with his Corps; Thielemann’s cavalry at Temploux, his infantry at Gembloux.

Between Namur and Dinant, Grouchy had barricaded every narrow passage, and placed obstacles at intervals on the roads; and in this way hindered the chances of Prussian pursuit, and gaining time for himself.

The scattered remnants of Napoleon’s army were fleeing along the roads from Charleroi towards Avesnes, Laon, and Phillippeville. Grouchy therefore designed his retreat so as to bring his army clear of pursuit as quickly as possible, and to work his way towards the fragments which were with difficulty being collected round Laon by Soult, Reille, and others. He hoped to reach Paris before the allied armies, in time to organise a defence, or perhaps to effect a junction with the army of the Alps under Suchet and with Lecourbe. Napoleon himself had given up the plan of rallying his routed army under Grouchy’s still formidable force, and had ridden in haste to Paris, where his position was already precarious.

On the 21st, Grouchy marched from Dinant to Phillippeville, but Pirch I. did not pursue. His Corps was required elsewhere, to blockade some of the fortresses which barred the line of advance of Blucher’s army. Grouchy might have retired through Givet and down the valley of the Meuse, instead of risking the more dangerous road to Phillippeville. But his aim was to draw near to any body of troops which were left from Napoleon’s army, and to avoid marching down the narrow defile of the Meuse valley where he would be liable to an attack in flank or in rear, under great disadvantages. Zieten was at Beaumont on 20th June, 12 miles from Phillippeville, but he had marched at daybreak on the 21st. Pirch, marching to Thuin on the 21st, was moving parallel to Grouchy, but the latter’s march was not hindered.

Four French fortresses barred Blucher’s advance—LandrÉcies, Maubeuge, Avesnes and Rocroi. It was necessary to reduce these before any further advance on Paris was made; hence Grouchy was able to retreat unmolested for the greater part of his movement. On the 22nd he reached Rocroi; and MeziÈres on the 23rd. His force constituted an important menace to the left flank of the Prussian army; and Blucher was thus obliged to detach several parties of cavalry to watch the French movements.

Zieten took Avesnes on the 21st, and Grouchy’s march from Phillippeville to Rocroi was in danger; but his strength was not accurately known at the Prussian headquarters, and Blucher was anxious to push on to Paris. The fall of Paris was expected to put an end to the French resistance. The capture of Avesnes relieved Blucher of the danger which threatened his army if he advanced, and it also gave him an advanced depÔt for his supplies.

On the 22nd, Soult was at Laon endeavouring to collect the remnants of Napoleon’s army. He succeeded in gathering some 3,000 fugitives, mostly of Reille’s Corps and d’Erlon’s, and with these he hoped to join Grouchy. Urgent messages from Paris implored Grouchy to unite all the forces he could find and oppose the advance of the allies. This was easier said than done, for it was now a race between Blucher and Grouchy. Grouchy had to take a long detour to avoid being cut off; while the Prussians could advance direct on Paris, leaving detachments to watch the fortresses which might prove dangerous in the rear, and keeping close observation on the left flank on Grouchy’s operations. Those fortresses which had not been taken by Zieten and Bulow were blockaded by Pirch, and nearly all of them—at least all those which menaced the advance—being garrisoned by ill-spirited and disheartened troops, and capable of little resistance, were compelled to surrender. But Blucher was careful to take no risks, and systematically he cleared the way for his advance. The shorter line by which he marched ensured his reaching Paris before Grouchy, if only with one Corps. Retreating troops move quickly, but the Prussians proved themselves capable of some wonderful forced marches.

For the French it was a time when the Napoleon of former days would have revived the broken fortunes of his country, and rallied every soldier for the protection of Paris. He would have brought up all the troops in the West, from the Pyrenees, and from the Alps; and he would have led a new army of 100,000 or 150,000 men against Blucher. The old strategy of 1814 would have been repeated, and many a loss suffered by the allies before they could bring all their six armies to converge on Paris. But now there was no Napoleon to fill the vacancy. The Emperor was defeated in Paris as well as at Mont St Jean. He had no party, no power; Frenchmen were wearied and sickened by the disasters he had brought on their country through his insatiable ambition. Grouchy alone showed power and resolution; yet he only led his forces in retreat. Could he still save the country?

The 23rd was a day of comparative rest for the Prussian army. Blucher was anxious to draw in his Corps for his advance on Paris. Thielemann moved from Beaumont to Avesnes. On the 24th the advance was resumed. The Prussian army was to march in two columns. On the left, nearer Grouchy, Zieten’s and Thielemann’s Corps were to march by the valley of the Oise on CompiÈgne, keeping a sharp watch for Grouchy. On the right, Bulow’s Corps, the Fourth, was to march by St Quentin, Ham, Roye, to Pont St Maxence.

On the 24th Zieten took Guise without firing a shot, and thus secured another important point, to serve as a depÔt, and as a refuge for wounded. The First Corps halted for the night in the town, sending out its cavalry as far as La FÈre and Marle. Thielemann marched from Avesnes to Nouvion, and threw out scouts to Hirson and Vervins. Bulow reached the neighbourhood of St Quentin.

Grouchy, on the 24th, marched from MeziÈres to RÉthel; Soult, from Laon to Soissons. The Prussians were observed to be gaining.

On the 25th Zieten moved from Guise to CÉrisy, with cavalry towards La FÈre. Thielemann marched from Nouvion to Origny; Bulow, from St Quentin to Chauny.

Grouchy, finding Soult had retreated from Laon, changed his direction, and hastened with part of his forces along the valley of the Aisne to Soissons, while Vandamme, with the remains of the Third and Fourth Corps, marched to Reims, where he arrived on the 25th.

Blucher, learning from the reports of the advanced cavalry of Soult’s retreat from Laon, now directed his troops to seize the passages of the Oise, cross the river, and cut off both Grouchy and Soult between Soissons and the capital. It was a race for the bridges of the Oise, and for Crepy and Senlis.

So anxious was the Prussian Commander-in-Chief, that at midnight on the 25th-26th, he ordered Zieten to make a forced march with his advanced guard on CompiÈgne. A squadron of Hussars managed to reach that place at midnight on the 26th-27th, and found that a large body of French were expected there at any moment from Soissons. The remainder of Zieten’s advanced guard could get no further than Noyon that night, while the main body of his Corps bivouacked at Chauny. They were too exhausted to go further that day. Thielemann, however, marched from Origny to Guiscard, 20 miles as the crow flies; and Bulow from Ham to Ressons, 25 miles.

The French, in the meantime, were also hurrying to the Oise. Grouchy had taken over the command of Soult’s motley force, and d’Erlon was sent forward with about 4,000 men to reach CompiÈgne before the Prussians if possible, and secure the bridge there. Vandamme was hurrying from Reims towards Soissons with the Third and Fourth Corps.

At 4.30 A.M. on the 27th, Zieten’s advanced guard, consisting of a Division, marching during the night, reached CompiÈgne, and Jagow, in command, immediately took steps for its defence. Half an hour later the head of d’Erlon’s troops appeared on the Soissons road! This was indeed a narrow margin for success.

D’Erlon at once attacked, but a battery of Prussian horse artillery, posted on the road, opened such a heavy fire on his columns that the men gave way, and took refuge in a wood. From thence a sharp fire was kept up by the French skirmishers, and four guns were brought up to cope with the Prussian artillery; but these were soon silenced, and d’Erlon ordered the retreat, finding that he could no longer gain the bridge over the Oise, or delay the Prussian advance. As soon as he retreated, a regiment of Hussars was sent in pursuit, but Jagow’s men were too tired by their long forced march to follow up, and d’Erlon’s Corps was allowed to gain much time. Zieten with his main body reached CompiÈgne at mid-day; and found Blucher already there. Zieten was then ordered to send the Second Division (this division had relieved the Third, under Jagow, as advanced guard) towards Villets Coterets to cut off any force which might be retreating from Soissons on Paris; also to send his reserve cavalry and artillery to Gillicourt.

Just as Zieten’s troops reached Gillicourt, d’Erlon’s rear-guard left that place, and followed d’Erlon to Crepy. From Crepy, however, the French were again driven out by the Prussian cavalry, and d’Erlon retreated westwards towards Senlis, hoping to gain the bridge at Creil. Zieten’s Fourth Division with his cavalry and artillery bivouacked at Gillicourt; his Second Division near Villets Coterets.

Bulow, in the meantime, was hastening down from Ressons to seize the bridges at Pont St Maxence and Creil; and his advanced guard was ordered to detach a “flying column” to secure the passages. Accordingly, Sydow took a squadron of Hussars and a company of infantry, and marched with all speed to Creil, the infantry being carried in carts. Just as the Prussians reached the bridge, part of d’Erlon’s advanced cavalry was observed making for the same place from the opposite side. Sydow attacked with his squadron and drove back the French; and on the arrival of the rest of Bulow’s advanced guard, a regiment of infantry was left to hold Creil, while a regiment of cavalry pushed on to Senlis, where it was expected to find d’Erlon. But on reaching that village, it was found to be unoccupied, and the Prussians halted there. At nightfall, however, Kellermann, leading d’Erlon’s column, came up from Crepy with a brigade of heavy cavalry, and immediately charged down on the Prussians. The latter were unprepared, and were speedily routed. They fled back to Pont St Maxence, and Kellermann fell back on d’Erlon’s infantry. Sydow now came up with the rest of Bulow’s advanced guard, expecting to find Senlis already occupied by Prussians, but he was astonished by their absence. However, he occupied Senlis at 10 P.M. When d’Erlon approached, he was met with a heavy fire from the Prussian sharpshooters, who had loop-holed the nearest houses and taken shelter behind walls. Finding Senlis too strongly held, d’Erlon withdrew, and made his way towards Gonesse, while Reille took part of his force to Nanteuil. Night put an end to pursuit.

Thus at the close of the 27th, all the bridges over the Oise were in Blucher’s hands, and there seemed every prospect of Grouchy’s forces being cut off from Paris. The French had now three separate columns in retreat, and there was a great danger of two of these being cut off.

On the 28th, long before dawn, the Second Division of Zieten’s Corps approached Villets Coterets, where Grouchy had his headquarters. The Prussians, hearing that the place was not strongly held, resolved to carry it by surprise; but Grouchy had 9,000 men posted on the road to Nanteuil, and these attacked and drove back the Prussians. Suddenly, however, a panic seized the greater part of the French troops, who, seeing a movement of Prussian troops towards Crepy, thought that their retreat was being cut off, and they fled in a body down the road towards Meaux. Thus Villets Coterets fell into the hands of the Prussians.

Vandamme, after restoring some order among the fugitives, led them, the remains of the Third and Fourth Corps, scarcely 8,000 men, by Meaux, La FertÉ, and Lagny to Paris.

Zieten pushed on to Nanteuil on the 28th, where Reille’s rear-guard was found and driven out. Reille was retreating on Gonesse, to effect a junction with d’Erlon, who was falling back from Senlis. Bulow was marching rapidly on St Denis, and had reached Marly la Ville by the evening of the 28th, threatening to cut off Reille and d’Erlon. Thielemann hastened from CompiÈgne and reached Crepy that night.

On the 29th Blucher’s Corps closed in, and by nightfall they occupied the following positions:—Bulow’s Corps at Le Bourget and St Denis; Thielemann’s Corps at Dammartin; Zieten’s at Blanc Mesnil and Aulnay. Grouchy’s forces had entered Paris, having lost 4,000 men and 16 guns in the numerous skirmishes along the Oise. But they had won the race, and their retreat must be considered as a skilful operation. It had little actual effect on the advance of the allies, but Grouchy, who had so slurred his reputation in the great operations entrusted to him by Napoleon, in his retreat somewhat retrieved his character as a general.