It requires the erudition and investigations of experts to write with any adequacy about the earlier relations between China and Tibet. I must therefore confine myself here only to the existing state of those relations.

Tibet is nominally a protectorate of China, and as such she is bound to pay a tribute to the Suzerain State. In days gone by, Tibet used to forward this tribute to China, but subsequently the payment was commuted against expenses which China had to allow Tibet, on account of the Grand Prayer which is performed every year at Lhasa for the prosperity of the Chinese Emperor. As a result of this arrangement, Tibet ceased to send the tribute and China to send the prayer fund.

The loss of Chinese prestige in Tibet has been truly extraordinary since the Japano-Chinese War. Previous to that disastrous event, China used to treat Tibet in a high-handed way, while the latter, overawed by the display of force of the Suzerain, tamely submitted. All is now changed, and instead of that subservient attitude Tibet regards China with scorn. The Tibetans have come to the conclusion that their masters are no longer able to protect and help them, and therefore do not deserve to be feared and respected any more. It can easily be understood how the Chinese are mortified at this sudden downfall of their prestige in Tibet. They have tried to recover their old position, but all their endeavors have as yet been of no avail. The Tibetans listen to Chinese advice when it is acceptable, but any order that is distasteful to them is utterly disregarded.

While I was staying in Lhasa a yellow paper, containing the Chinese Emperor’s decree issued at the termination of the Boxer trouble, was hung up in the square of that city. The decree was addressed to all the eighteen provinces of China and all her protectorates. It warned the people under pain of severe penalty against molesting and persecuting foreigners, as they, the people, were too frequently liable to do from their ignorance of the state of affairs abroad and their misunderstanding of the motives of the foreigners who came to their respective districts. These foreigners, the decree continued, have really come to engage in industrial pursuits or in diffusing religion, and for other purposes beneficial alike to the people and themselves. In order to promote these aims of mutual benefit, the middle kingdom has been opened so as to allow foreigners freedom of travelling to any place they wish, and so, concluded the decree, this policy of welcome and hospitality should be adopted in all the provinces and protectorates.

Two other decrees of like import arrived afterwards and were similarly posted up, and I thought at that time that the allies must have entered Peking, and that this decree must have been issued as a result of the conclusion of peace between the Powers and China.

The decree, however, failed to produce any particular impression on the Tibetans. I asked a high Government official what Tibet was going to do with the order set forth in the decree, and whether the Tibetan Government, in the face of that injunction, could refuse, for instance, to allow Englishmen to enter the country. The official scornfully replied that his Government was not obliged to obey an order which the Chinese Emperor issued at his own pleasure. And besides it was highly doubtful whether the Emperor, who was an incarnation of a high saint, could have issued a decree of that nature, which he must have known to be utterly opposed to the interests and traditional policy of Tibet. It was more probably clandestinely issued by some wicked men near the Emperor’s person, as a result of bribes received from foreigners. It did not deserve to be trusted, much less to be obeyed, declared my Tibetan friend.

Whatever be the motive, therefore, the Tibetans are utterly indifferent to most of the decrees coming from China, and treat them like so many gamblers’ oaths, neither more nor less.

Whether it be from polygamous customs or from other causes, the fact remains, though it is not possible to prove it by accurate statistical returns, that the population of Nepal is rapidly increasing. It must be remembered that the Government takes great pains to increase its population, in order to expand its interests both at home and abroad, and, probably under the impression that polygamy is conducive to that end, it is encouraging this questionable practice. In Nepal therefore even a man who can hardly support his family has two or three wives, and one who is better off has many more. Apparently this policy is attended with success, so far as the main object aimed at is concerned, for I have never seen so many children anywhere as I saw in Nepal, where every family consisted of a large number of boys and girls.

Be the cause what it may, the beneficial effect of this steady advance of population is plainly visible in that country, where almost every nook and corner of available land is brought under tillage, where woods are tended with extreme care, and even the remote forests inhabited by wild beasts are made to contribute their share to the stock of lumber, of which a large portion is annually exported to lower India. Already the population of Nepal appears to be too large for the limited area of the country, and so a considerable emigration is taking place. Thus we find the Nepalese serving in the army of the Indian Government, or pursuing trade or opening up wild lands in Sikkim or at Darjeeling. Above all the Nepalese seem to cast their longing glances towards Tibet as the best field for their superfluous population; for Tibet, while possessing an area about twelve-fold that of Nepal, is far more thinly populated. They even seem to be prepared to go through the ordeal of war, if necessary, to secure that best outlet for their needy population, which cannot find sufficient elbowroom at home. Perhaps the Nepal Government has that contingency in view in maintaining, as it does, a standing army which is evidently far above its home requirements in numerical strength.

In Nepal the military department receives appropriations which are quite out of proportion to those set apart for peaceful matters, as education, justice and philanthropy. Indeed the Nepal troops, the famous Gurkhas, may even rival regular British troops in discipline and effectiveness; they may perhaps even surpass the others in mountain warfare, such as would take place in their own country. Certainly in their capacity of enduring hardships and in running up and down hills, bearing heavy knapsacks, they are superior to the British soldiers. They very much resemble the Japanese soldiers in stature and general appearance, and also in temperament. The one might easily be mistaken for the other, so close is the resemblance between the two. In short, as fighters in mountainous places the Gurkhas form ideal soldiers; and it seems as though circumstances will sooner or later compel Nepal to employ for her self-defence this highly effective force. Russia is at the bottom of the impending trouble, while Tibet supplies the immediate cause.

The Russianising tendency of Tibet has recently put Nepal on her guard, and when intelligence reached Nepal that Tibet had concluded a secret treaty with Russia, that the Dalai Lama had received a bishop’s robe from the Tsar, and that a large quantity of arms and ammunition had reached Lhasa from S. Petersburg, Nepal became considerably alarmed, and with good reason. For with Russia established in Tibet, Nepal must necessarily feel uneasy, as it would be exposed to the danger of absorption. The very presence of a powerful neighbor must subject Nepal to a great strain which can hardly be borne for long.

It is not surprising to hear that Nepal is said to have communicated in an informal manner with Tibet and to have demanded an explanation of the rumors concerning the conclusion of a secret treaty between her and Russia, adding that if that were really the case then Nepal, from considerations of self-defence, must oppose that arrangement even if the opposition entailed an appeal to arms. What reply Tibet has made to this communication is not accurately known, but that Nepal sent an informal message to this effect admits of no doubt.

Nepal may be driven to declare war on Tibet should the latter persist in pursuing her pro-Russian policy, and allow Russia to establish herself in that country; and it is quite likely that England may be pleased to see Nepal adopt that resolute attitude. She may even extend a helping hand, for instance by supplying part of the war expense, and thus enabling Nepal to prosecute that movement. The reason is obvious, for England has nothing to lose but everything to gain from trouble between Nepal and Tibet, in which the former may certainly be expected to win. But even if Nepal is victorious her victory will bring her only a small benefit, and the lion’s share will go to England; Nepal therefore would be placed in the rather foolish position of having taken the chestnuts from the fire for the British lion to eat. The present Ruler of Nepal is too intelligent a statesman not to perceive that—judging at least from my personal observations, when I was allowed to see the Ruler, the Cabinet Minister. He knows that it would be far better for his countrymen to content himself with the reality of benefit rather than with the glory of a successful but necessarily costly war. He should confine himself to making some arrangements with Tibet by which the Nepalese may be enabled to enter, or settle in Tibet, and to carry on profitable undertakings there. If once his countrymen establish their influence in Tibet by virtue of economic undertakings, then they may regard with comparative complacency any advance of Russian influence in Tibet, for Nepal would be in a position to counteract that influence by peaceful means or even by war if necessary.

Thus, it is hardly likely that Nepal will go to extreme measures towards Tibet, even if England should cleverly encourage her.

It must be remembered that the relations between the two countries are not yet strained. The Tibetans do not seem to harbor any ill-feeling towards their neighbors beyond the mountains, nor do they regard them as a whole with fear, though they do fear the Gurkhas on account of their valor and discipline. The Tibetan Government also seems to be desirous of maintaining a friendly relation with Nepal. For instance, when on one occasion the Ruler of Nepal sent his messenger to Tibet to procure a set of Tibetan su?ras, the Dalai Lama, who heard of that errand, caused a set to be sent to Nepal as a present from himself, which is now kept in the Royal Library of Nepal.

The Nepal Government, on its part, appears to be doing its best to create a favorable impression on the Tibetans. The Ruler, it must be remembered, is not a Bu??hist but a Brahma?a; still, he pursues the policy of toleration towards all faiths, and is especially kindly to Bu??hists. The Bu??hists from Tibet who are staying in Nepal enjoy protection from the Government, and the Ruler not unfrequently makes grants of money or timber when Bu??hist temples are to be built in his dominion. The care bestowed by the Ruler on the Bu??hists is highly appreciated by their friends at home, and Nepal is therefore favorably situated for winning the hearts of the Tibetan people. It is easily conceivable that with a judicious use of secret service funds Nepal might easily establish her influence in Tibet. This, however, cannot be readily expected from that country, as internal conditions now are, for order is far from being firmly established in that little kingdom, and domestic troubles and administrative changes occur too frequently. Even the Prime Minister, who wields the real power, has been assassinated more than once, while changes have very frequently taken place in the incumbency of that post. Nepal is at present too deeply absorbed in her internal affairs, and cannot spare either energy or money for pursuing any consistent policy towards Tibet. Thus, though the military service of Nepal is sufficiently creditable, her diplomacy leaves much to be desired.