That the editor transacts his business of editor not merely in his own name, but in the name of another*** (namely the author), and without whose consent cannot transact this business at all, is confirmed from certain obligations which fix themselves according to universal acknowledgement.

Were the author to die after he had delivered his manuscript to the editor to be printed, and the editor had previously bound himself as the authorized publisher: then the editor would not have the liberty to suppress the manuscript's publication on the grounds that it is his property; but the public has a right, if the author left no heirs, either to force the editor to publish the book or to give up the manuscript to another who offers to publish it. For the publishing of his manuscript is a business which the author, prior to dying, had the intention to transact with the public through the editor, and for which the editor succeeds the author by becoming the agent. The public does not even need to know whether or not the author had this intention, or to agree with the author's intention; the public acquires this right against the editor (to perform something) by the law only. For he possesses the manuscript only on the condition to use it for the purpose of a business of the author's with the public; but this obligation towards the public remains, though that towards the author has ceased by his death. Here the argument is not built upon a right of the public to the manuscript, but upon a business with the author. Should the editor give out the author's work, after his death, mutilated or falsified, or let the necessary number of copies for the demand be wanting; the public would thus be entitled to force him to more justness or to augment the publication, but otherwise to provide for this elsewhere. All of which would not be legally justifiable, were the editor's right not deduced from the legal concept that the editor is transacting a business between the author and the public in the name of the author.

However, to this obligation of the editor's, which will probably be granted, a corresponding right exists, namely, the right to all that, without which the editor's obligation could not be fulfilled. This is: that he exercises the right of publication exclusively, because the rivalry of others in his business would render the transaction of it practically impossible for him.

Works of art, as things, may, on the other hand, be imitated or otherwise modeled, at will, from a copy of them which was rightfully acquired, and those imitations may be publicly sold, without requiring the consent of the author of the original or of the master who supervised the artist in developing the artist's ideas. A drawing, which anyone has drawn, or had engraved by another, or executed in stone, metal, or stucco, may be copied, and the copies publicly sold; as everything, that one can perform with his thing in his own name, does not require the consent of another. Lippert's "Dactyliotec" may be imitated by every possessor of it who understands it, and exposed to sale, and the inventor of it has no right to complain of encroachment on his business. For it is a work (an opus, not an opera; these terms are mutually exclusive) which everybody who possesses it may, without even mentioning the name of the inventor, assume title over it, and also imitate it and use it in public trade, in his own name, as his own.

But the writing of another is the speech of a person (opera); and whoever publishes it can speak to the public only in the name of this other, and say nothing more of himself than that the author makes the following speech to the public through him (Impensis Bibliopola). For it is a contradiction, to make in his own name a speech which he knows, and conformably to the demand of the public, must be the speech of another.

The reason why all works of art of others may be imitated for public sale, but books, to which an editor is designated, dare not be counterfeited, lies in this: that artworks are works (opera), but books are acts (operae); artworks may be as things existing for themselves, but books can have their existence only in a person. Consequently, books belong to the person of the author exclusively;**** and the author has an inalienable right (jus personalissimum) always to speak himself through every other, that is, nobody dares make the same speech to the public except in the author's name.

But while altering (abridging, augmenting or retouching) the book of another, such as to re-work the book into what is substantially a new book, such that it would be wrong to publish the new book in the name of the author of the original book, the retouching of a book, in the proper name of the publisher, is no counterfeit, and therefore is not prohibited. For here, another author transacts, via his editor, another business transaction that is different from the initial business transaction transacted by the initial author, and consequently does not intrude upon the initial author's initial business transaction with the public; he represents not that author, as speaking through him, but another. Similarly, [I believe that the unauthorized] translation of an author's work into another language cannot be considered to be a counterfeit; for the translated book is not the same speech of the author, though the thoughts may be exactly the same.

If the idea of a copyright, or of the publication of books in general, that were demonstrated in this essay, were well-understood, and precisely elaborated (which, flattering myself, I think is possible), with a formality that was at the level of Roman juridical learning, a complaint against a counterfeiter might be brought before a court, without first needing to ask for a new law to structure the due process proceedings that would govern such a lawsuit against a counterfeiter.